Agrarian Justice, Practical Reason and Rationality:

A Study of the Conditions of Existence in the South Asia

A Thesis Submitted to Assam University
for the Award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE
(Philosophy)

Scholar
Md. Mahmood Alam Ansari

Advisor
Professor Adarasupalli Nataraju

Philosophy Department
S. R. School of Philosophy
Assam University
SILCHAR (ASSAM)

May 2017

Certificate

This is to certify that this thesis entitled "Agrarian Justice, Practical Reason and Rationality: A Study of the Conditions of Existence in the South Asia" has been submitted by Md. Mahmood Alam Ansari for the award of the degree of the Doctor of Literature (DLitt) of Assam University.

(Signature of the Advisor) (Dean of the School)

…….

(Name and Designation)

(Signature of the Head of the Department)

Declaration

I, Md. Mahmood Alam Ansari, declare that this thesis, entitled "Agrarian Justice, Practical Reason and Rationality: A Study of the Conditions of Existence in the South Asia", submitted for the award of the degree of the Doctor of Literature (DLitt) of this University, has not been submitted earlier for the award of any other degree or diploma by this or any other University.

(Signature of the Candidate)

Acknowledgment

Completing this research work, I am reminded of the fact that late Professor Gautam Biswas had throughout been a continuous inspiration. I am indebted to him for he kept on motivating me to begin and carryout the work, and helped me in organizing the chapter plan.

I would ever remain indebted to the Advisor of this thesis, Professor Adarasupally Nataraju, for he has been highly inspiring and motivated me to complete the work in time.

I am thankful to the Dean of the SR School of Philosophical Studies, Professor Subhra Nag, as she has been an encouraging force throughout.

While working on various chapters of this thesis, my attraction towards the discipline of Philosophy kept on increasing and reading Philosophy would remain a permanent passion for me in the rest of my life. Venturing into the discipline of moral philosophy has certainly not been an easy journey. I still feel that a lot of readings are as yet required.

I am thankful to library staffs at ASSAM University, Silchar, and library staffs at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, for the academic support they rendered.

I would ever remember the phase of patience and toleration though which my wife, Sakeena Ansari and daughter, Ammna Rakshanda, have gone while I have been devoting myself to the research work at hand.

Mahmood Ansari

Contents

	Page Number
Certificate	**1**
Declaration	***2***
Acknowledgement	***3***
Table of Contents	**4-6**
List of Tables, Map and Arrow Diagrams	**7-9**
Introduction	10-47
Chapter 1	
Conceptual and Theoretical Frame: **Categories, Equalisandum and Diagrams**	48-75
1.1. Core Concepts	
1.2. Axiotima and Equalisandum – the Menu	
1.3. Conceptual Relational Design and Diagram	
1.4. Remarks	
Part – I	
Chapter 2	
Hybrid Morality: **Plural Standards**	**76-112**
2.1. Morality	
2.2. Contrasting Moral Appraisal	
2.3. Egoism, Utilitarianism and Deontology	
2.4. A Consensus	

Chapter 3

Transitional Justice: **113-148**
Divergent Debates

3.1. Justice
3.2. Liberal Construct of Ideal Justice
3.3. Individual Virtue and Social Justice
3.4. Economic Justice and Ownership
3.5. A Compromise

Chapter 4

Action and Reason: **149-181**
Foundational Categories

4.1. Action: Public and Crossbreed
4.2. Reasons: Practical and Public
4.3. A Summary

Chapter 5

Rationality and Agency: **182-222**
Conceptual Fluidity

5.1. Rationality
5.2. Person, Agency and the Public
5.3. The Fluidity

Chapter 6

Axiotima and Menu of Distribution: **223-262**
Concrete Things

6.1. Axiotima and Equalisandum
6.2. Prevalent Axiotima: Resources, Commodity and Income
6.3. Egalitarianism: Prevalent Equalisandum
6.4. The Finality

Part – II

Chapter 7

Economic Existence in South Asia: **263-321**
Policy, Deprivation and Inequality

7.1. Analytical-Empirical Methodology
7.2. Economic Policy Framework
7.3. Shortages, Malnutrition and Poverty
7.4. South Asian Economy Today
7.5. Epilogue: Agrarian Economic Justice

Chapter 8

Social Existence in South Asia: **322-377**
Policy, Exclusion and Insecurity

8.1. Social Policy Framework
8.2. Multiple Vulnerabilities, Insecurities and Hazards
8.3. South Asian Society Today
8.4. Epilogue: Agrarian Social Justice

Part – III

Chapter 9

Prospect of Existence in South Asia: **378-402**
Alternative Agenda and Policy Design

9.1. Policy Prescription Methodology
9.2. Alternative Policy Model
9.3. Governance Model
9.4. Epilogue: What are the Prospects?

Conclusion **403-409**

Bibliography **410-435**

List of Tables, Map and Diagrams

Table Numbers	Title	Page Numbers
Table – 2.1	A System of Ethics	84
Table – 6.1	Commonness and Differences among Left Egalitarians to Right Libertarians	300
Table - 7.1	Rate of Growth in Gross Domestic Product in South Asia: 1991-2005 (in percentage)	322
Table - 7.2	Area, Output and Yield of Cereals in South Asia: 2005	326
Table - 7.3	Rice and Wheat Production in South Asia, 2004	327
Table – 7.4	Agriculture and Cereals in South Asia: 2005-2011	329
Table – 7.5	Per Capita Consumption of Food Items in South Asia, 1980-2000 (in Kilograms)	334
Table – 7.6	Underweight Children and Malnourishment in South Asia: 1960-2007	335
Table – 7.7	Malnutrition and Undernourishment in South Asia, 1975-1998	336
Table – 7.8	Poverty in South Asia: 2005-2009	342
Table – 7.9	Below-poverty-line (BPL) Population in Countries of South Asia: 1991-2005	344
Table – 7.10	South Asia: Human Development Indicator and Headcount Poverty, 2005-2010	346
Table –7.11	Indices of Human Development and Multidimensional Poverty in South Asia: 2013	347
Table – 7.12	Land in South Asia: 1999-2009	352
Table – 7.13	Distribution of Land Holdings in South Asia: 1995-2002	354
Table – 7.14	Cropping and Irrigation in South Asia: 1979-2008	356
Table – 7.15	Land and Population in India, 2003-04 (In Number, percentage and Hectares)	359
Table – 7.16	Production of Cereals, Vegetables and Fruits in India, 2005 (In Metric Tons)	360
Table – 7.17	Markets and Mills in India , 2006 (In Number)	362
Table – 7.18	Populations and Labour in South Asia: 2005-2011	363
Table – 7.19	Gross Domestic Product, Income Share and Gini Coefficient in South Asia: 1991-2007 (In Dollars and percentage)	368
Table – 8.1	Social Protection in South Asia: Some Commonalities, 2009	388

Table – 8.2	South Asia: Social Protection Panorama and Design	390
Table – 8.3	Social Policy Panorama South Asia – Selected Examples	393
Table –8.4	Social Protection Expenditures in South Asia, 2006-2009	397
Table – 8.5	Social Expenditures as a Share of GDP, 2010	398
Table – 8.6	Expenditure on Education in South Asia: 1970-2009	399
Table - 8.7	Life Expectancy, Mortality, Underweight Children, DTP Immunization Coverage and Prevalence of Anaemia in South Asia: 2000-2010	407
Table – 8.8	Social Sectors in South Asia: 2005-2009 - Perception of Individual Well Being and Perception of Society	408
Table – 8.9	Literacy, Schooling and Social Sector in South Asia: 1970-2009	416
Table – 8.10	Social Sectors in South Asia: 1984-2008 (Safe Water, Sanitation, Doctor and Expenditure on Health)	417
Table – 8.11	Nature of Governance as Practiced in South Asia	434
Table – 8.12	Nature of Governance as Practiced in South Asia	435
Table – 8.13	Magnitudes and Value of Governance Indicators in South Asia, 2006 (Percentile Ranks)	436
Table – 8.14	Failed State Scores and Rankings in South Asia: 2006	438
Table – 9.1	Particulars of Alternative Policy Framework	451
Table – 9.2	Further Particulars of Alternative Policy Framework	459
Table – 9.3	Policy Process and Governance	463
Table – 9.3	Policy Process and Governance	464
Table – 9.3	Policy Process and Governance	465
Table – 9.3	Policy Process and Governance	466
Map – 7.1	Map of South Asia: Location of Countries	317
Arrow Diagram – 1.1	Liberty, Identity and Action	60
Arrow Diagram – 1.2	Rationality and Akrasia	61
Arrow Diagram – 1.3	Human Agencies and Capacity	62
Arrow Diagram – 1.4	Justice and Injustice	63
Arrow Diagram – 1.5	Agrarianism, Redistribution and Social Protection	64
Arrow Diagram – 1.6	Morality, Justice and Good Governance	65
Arrow Diagram – 2.1	Paradigms of Assessment of Human Action	82
Arrow Diagram – 2.2	Correlatives and Contradictions of Rights	91

Arrow Diagram – 9.1	Public Agenda and Policy	446
Arrow Diagram – 9.2	Stages of Policy Framework	447
Diagram – 9.1	Indifference Curve: Labour and Leisure	457
Venn diagram – 9.1	Shared Concepts among Good Governance, Social Policy and Human Development	462

Introduction

Chapter – 1

Conceptual and Theoretical Frame

Concepts, Equalisandum and Diagram

Part - I

Chapter 2

Hybrid Morality

Plural Standards

Chapter 3

Transitional Justice

Divergent Debates

Chapter - 4

Action and Reason

Foundational Categories

Chapter – 5

Rationality and Agency

Conceptual Fluidity

Chapter 6

Axiotima and Menu of Distribution

Concrete Things

Part - II

Chapter 7

Economic Existence in South Asia

Policy, Deprivation and Inequality

Chapter 8

Social Existence in South Asia

Policy, Exclusion and Insecurity

Part - III

Chapter 9

Prospect of Existence in South Asia

Alternative Agenda and Policy Design

Conclusion

Bibliography

'Agrarian Justice' was first coined in the year of 1793 in a pamphlet under the same title[1]. It was the earliest proposal of redistribution of a created national fund among the agriculturists, and all these in the name of agrarian justice. The pamphlet put forth a critique of the so-called 'Agrarian Law' – a law that was supposedly protecting the concentration of land in a few hands. It attempted to advance a reasoned out expression to a chief demand - justice in the countryside – under the banner of the social movement of 'agrarianism' in America[2].

Thomas Paine (1793) proposed a plan to deal with the problem of poverty by providing for the taxation of accumulated property. It was opined that the tax revenue collected must permit the machineries of the state to give each man and woman, who was reaching the age of twenty-one, the sum of fifteen pounds, and every person of fifty years of age or over, ten pounds per year. In other words, the state was made responsible to bring the justice to the poor through fiscal measures. In the name of agrarian justice, the demand was to lay down a system of 'social insurance', and it called for the system of ground rents and graduated 'inheritance taxes'.

American agrarianism acknowledged and advocated the constitutional provisions to ensure a pension and insurance fund for the peasantry. Such advocacy was framed as a matter of rights of men. It was not a matter of concern as to how affluent some persons were, as long as none was miserable in consequence of affluence of some (Paine, 1797, pp. 9-15). Henry George (1885) took up the mantle, expressing similar views and ideas, again in America during nineteenth century. Retrospectively speaking, both Paineian and Georgian proposals[3] skirted away from the public

---

[1] Thomas Paine, an American activist and social reformer, was the author of the treatise, and this was printed in English in Paris. It was claimed that both the rights of the owner-possessor as well as of those who had been dispossessed and thrown out of their natural inheritance by the introduction of the system of landed property were to be defended. It was only in a system of justice that the possessor can contemplate security (Paine, 1797, pp. 9-19).

[2] Agrarianism began with a demand for rights of agriculturists to ownership and control over land and compensation in the form of money transfers to landless and land-poor peasantry as old-age pensions.

[3] Undoubtedly, Paine's proposal was too moderate for some contemporary 'Agrarians'. A pamphlet on "The Rights of Infants" by Thomas Spence (1797) as a critique dealt, therefore, with the strictures on Paine's Agrarian Justice. It is worth arguing that neither Thomas Paine nor Henry George could at all advocate the establishment of an agrarian society on the line of reasoning advanced by many erstwhile land reformers who preceded and followed them. In the radical circles of America and Europe, the agrarian question remained an unsettled issue, therefore.

galore the issues of changes in the inheritance rules and laws pertaining to the real estate and land and the redistribution of land holdings among the masses. There was in essence no advocacy for redistribution of land at all.

European agrarianism that flourished in Russia in the mid-nineteenth century was a harbinger of formal and substantive theoretical debates on the contemporaneous life and future of peasantries in the realm of political economy (Thorner, 1965). Similar debates were the concerns of the class perspective of German agrarianism. The political economy perspective rediscovered the peasantry, not only in Russia but also in Germany in the nineteenth century. In the domain of political economy, the significant problem has been the issue of breaking the landed monopoly (and not the issue of insurance and pension for the peasantry).

The Russian '*Narodnik'* was a remarkable generation of populist theoreticians and ideologues, who wanted to re-establish the so-called peasant commune based on communal landholding, and throw away the economic bondage and new slavery of peasantry brought about by the Reform of 1861 in Russia. While the populist tradition of Russian agrarianism was made to `*found upon the preservation, not the decomposition of the peasantry*' (Harrison, 1977, p.324), the Marxist political economy and Agrarian Marxist tradition however talked about the problematic of peasantry under budding agrarian capitalism, for example, in Russia and Germany (Lenin, 1899; Lenin, 1907; Kautsky, 1899).

German and Russian agrarianism in the political economy perspective of economic class within peasantry became well established in the twentieth century. The demand of 'land to the tillers' in favour of the petty, marginal and small peasantry, land reforms and agrarian changes have been the principal feature of modern agrarianism, and such popular demands subsequently blossomed as the principal agenda of agrarian justice in the third-world countries. The governments everywhere have been attempting to contain and continues to take account of it by orchestrating agrarian reforms in late twentieth century - agrarianism of welfare state.

India had been no exception[4]. It was in the backdrop of history of agrarian mass movements that the Indian Constitution Draft Committee in the early 1950s provided for a separate Schedule dealing

[4] In a newly independent, ex-colonial country of India in Asia, the political leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, remarked in the Policy Resolution of the Indian National Congress in 1931:

> '*The great poverty and misery of the Indian people are due, not only to foreign exploitation in India but also to the economic structure of society, which the alien rulers*

with the *Directive Principles of State Policy* which was tilted in favour of establishing some pattern of rights and claims of peasantry through land reforms and agrarian reforms under the aegis of a welfare state (all in the name of attempt towards establishing the socialistic pattern of society in India). Consequent upon the failures of the government agencies in ameliorating the conditions of the peasantry and subaltern groups of rural society, the new political movement of farmers sprouted to organise the rural producers of all classes and sections in the 1970s – agrarianism of the civil society[5]. The agrarianism of the civil society was pitched against the agrarianism of welfare state.

Agrarianism at the level of the civil society, which had been consolidated in reaction to the deficits in agrarianism of the welfare state, had unfolded in both peaceful and violent forms of expression over the years. With regard to the violent forms of agrarianism in India, there exists before the nation-state the challenges posed by the violent grabbing of land and territory of influence by the outfits of new left-wing extremist organisation. There are in total 5 known left-wing extremist groups in India, also described as '*Maoist*' and '*Naxalite*', having a base of some 10,000 ideologically committed cadres. Chattisgarh is now the principal centre of a coordinated Maoist movement though it is spread over a wide expanse of territory stretching across 14 states and covering almost 165 districts (Nayar, 2009. pp.202-5).

Two points are notable. While the social and political movements demanding agrarian justice have progressed in America, Russia, Germany across the centuries and are as yet proceeding across landscape of the south Asian countries including India, the most significant sense is not that of 'justice' as such as it is largely of the various facets of injustice[6] that are in turn associated with the iniquitous distribution of external material resources and human productive capacity.

> *support so that their exploitation may continue ……. In order therefore to remove this poverty and misery and to ameliorate the condition of the masses, it is essential to make revolutionary changes in the present economic and social structure of society and to remove the gross inequalities*` (Nehru, 1931).

[5] This movement was characteristic in striking a difference with the traditional past movements of peasant resistance in India. Anti-Brahmanism and anti-urban were the core plank of this new movement – new agrarianism in India. The mass peasant movements and politics of resistance throughout the 1980s were as well related with the phenomenon of new agrarianism.

[6] Conceptually, justice and injustice are not simple antonyms to each other. While prevalence of social institution of justice does not strictly mean absence of instances of injustices, the measurement of justice is also different from the various measures of injustice in the literature (to be discussed onward in subsequent chapters of this thesis).

On the other hand, it has often been claimed that the agrarian changes and land reforms has been geared towards bringing an equal distribution of assets to the members of rural society, and thereby, income distribution in rural society (Dore, 1959; Warriner, 1957; Ladejinsky, 1964). In the course of time, a powerful critique developed whereby all empirical claims regarding attainment of equality has been refuted.

All around the world those who have championed the cause of modern agricultural social and applied ethics have been hoisting the ethical issues regarding management of earth's resources for the production of food and prescribe ways of resolution of such issues that are prudent, fair and humane. Contemporaneously, agrarian justice agenda is therefore related with not only an entire set of problems of the distribution of land ownership and water uses but also the distribution of food security in the countryside – broadly speaking, livelihood. There is more over the need to find a resolution of the senses of pervasive injustices regarding distribution of individual human productive capacity in the third world countries in general and South Asia in particular. Such injustices warrant resolution.

There have been attempts to inform and impact upon the public policy-making by articulating the ethical dimensions related with the negative implications of intensive use of resources for production on sustainability of global environment, bearing of modern agricultural biotechnologies on the human and animal welfare, impact of multinational agribusiness on rural income and employment, and mismatch between global food supplies and human nutritional needs. All these have been instrumental in the resurgence of agrarianism in the deontological tradition of rights, duties and obligations.

Within the domain of agricultural and social applied ethics, the socio-economic strand of agricultural ethics has been attempting to deal rather directly with the issue of distributive justice - the problem of mismatch between food supplies and human nutritional needs.

South Asia

Our specific concern in this research work is with the populace and space of the sub-continental region of South Asia. It is considered a geographical region and a political regional entity within Asia. Bounded by the borders of the countries of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives, the region gives shelter to almost 22

percent of the aggregate human population of the globe. Being spread over 412.09 million hectares of the surface area (approximately 2. 4 percent of the land surface area of the world), it is today the home of almost 1.3 billion human populace. The man-land ratio is 3.16 persons per hectare in the region. It is certainly a highly populous region, characterised by the phenomenon of scarcity of land for majority of populace.

South Asia has been a countrified region for a long time. While there are wide discrepancies in the rate of urbanization across countries of the region, it is not yet heavily urbanized space of the world. In 2000, it was only just about 28.2 percent of total population of the region that resided in the urban space (it was not even one-third of the aggregate populace of the region).

While continuing to be a countrified space, South Asia is also a region that is home to the largest number of economically poor populace. Over the years, the persistence of poverty and the growth in inequality has derived from the inherited unjust attire of the social order, which has effectively excluded the resource poor populace from equitable opportunities for earning a decent livelihood and participating in the development process.

South Asia is a society where agrarianism has both a colonial history as well as a contemporaneous base. To quote the observations of the experts on the contemporary agrarianism in India:

> *Referring to India's middle peasantry as a class of 'bullock capitalists' – 'small to medium sized self-employed independent agricultural producers' operating between 2.5 and 14.99 acres of land – the Rudolphs (1987, 337) suggest that the share of India's agricultural land operated by bullock capitalists increased from 42 percent in 1954-5 to 51 percent in 1971-2 ……. The Rudolphs complete their analysis by suggesting that India's bullock capitalists are taking a lead in organizing a new agrarian politics ……. The Rudolphs (1987, 364) maintain that 'agrarianism [in general] introduces a new cleavage into Indian politics and policy, the countryside versus the city'……. These claims deserve close empirical scrutiny (Bentall and Corbridge, 1996, pp. 29-31).*

In a number of countries, agrarian distributive transitional justice has been quite an old demand that has been attempted to be addressed under the national goal of 'growth with justice'. It has been as such since the end of colonial era.

A sort of a piecemeal and partial welfare policy to the effect of meeting such a demand has already been there in vogue. In order to ameliorate the conditions of the helpless, distressed and disadvantaged, a policy regime of the welfare state, centred at 'growth with justice'

through various schemes of initial redistribution of resources, had been unleashed right from the early years of 1950s and 1960s in all countries of the region[7]. While institutionalised social policy has been a late starter here, there has recently been a surge[8] in introducing innovations in design and expanding coverage of schemes under the framework of the policies of social welfare and protection regime. In India, it began since 2004.

Conceptually as well as from the point of view of program implementation, there have however been a number of problems[9]**.** While the policies have been loaded in intent and objectives, laden with rhetoric of the language of the "rights", burdened with a plethora of "legislations", rich in responses to court-verdicts on social issues, these have been deprived in funding, meagre in the scope of benefits, pathetic in design of schemes and programs and pitiable in delivery of social assistance[10] and depressed in outcomes measured in terms of human development and social development indicators.

---

[7] The rationale of a concern for macro-justice on an instrumentalist basis in a constitutional democratic setup such as one found in south Asia had necessitated in the past a prescriptive public policy framework that required the national objectives of macroeconomic and regional planning to gravitate towards attainment of the 'growth with justice'. In addition, the public welfare policy was guided by the spirit of egalitarianism that aimed at guaranteeing and maintaining the threshold level of a minimum amount of stock of cash fund, subsidized high-yielding varieties of plant seeds, redistributed surplus land and subsidized irrigation water for the worst-off in general and marginalized caste and tribe in particular. Bringing about distributional equity in matter of such vital resources among peasantries has been standard public welfare practice – first in India seconded by Sri Lanka and the rest of the countries of the region.

[8] This new surge in social protection measures in south Asia has coincided with the announcement of the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations system in 2000 (but effectively implemented from 203-2004). India has been pioneer in making the innovations in objectives and designs, as exemplified in the public schemes of the "*Sarva-Siksha Abhiyaan*", national "*Rural Health Mission*", *Mahatma Gandhi –National Rural Employment Guarantee Act*, "*Mid-Day Meal" Scheme*, "*Right to Food"* act, "*Right To Information"* act, *New Pension Schemes* and the latest "*Prime Minister- Jan Dhan Yojana"*, Cash payment through the "*ADHHAAR cards"*.

[9] The social policy under new direction of surging welfare regimes in all countries of the region are as yet residual in nature, fragmentary in networking, and segmented in coverage of citizens, regions; mostly these are means-tested and targeted, under-funded and inequitably resourced; the delivery mechanisms suffer from various sorts of "leakages" of social provisioning benefits of food, employment, income, inputs, education, health-care, hygiene and safe drinking water.

[10] The social and economic policies have been all practiced almost simultaneously without any regard to the relation of precedence and succession in time and priority, and the sense of proportion among the plethora of schemes has been missing. This has been the tragic aspect of south Asian policy frameworks. Such an almost simultaneous, nearly overlapping and much-publicized though vacuous pursuit had led to the phenomena of duplication of programs initiatives, wastages of

It has long been believed in the parlance of policy making in all countries of the region that the fast rate of economic growth would be an instrument of justice as this growth reaching a mature stage would trickle-down and bring equality which in turn would perform the instrumental role in attaining justice[11]**.** The critical experiences however have shown that unless the '*structural injustices which underlie poverty*' can be corrected, '*poverty will persist across South Asia*' (Sobhan, 2010, pp. xxiii-iv). In other words, South Asia continues to be characterised by facets of structural injustices in the countryside.

South Asia continues to be a multi-ethnic society harbouring huge populace divided along lines of race, caste and religion. Social transformations have taken place but still social insecurities and lack of social protection and insurance looms large in all countries of south Asia. The phenomenon of social exclusion is still persistent. The discrimination along the caste and community lines has not been properly eliminated. The literacy is low and health-care facilities are as yet inadequate. Peace and social security for the masses is yet a far away dream. Under the stewardship of an old welfare state (established mostly in late 1940s and early 1950s), there has been only moderate effect in terms of levelling the social set-up.

---

monetary and non-monetary resources and mis-targeting of human beneficiaries accompanied by a noticeable lack of direction of change in the countryside. The structures of such welfare policies over the years have thus become nearly outmoded by the repeated implementation failures in the region.

[11] Framed as it was on the instrumentalist reasoning, the past concerns of economic and social policies for justice in the region was grounded in conceptually weak premises when compared with modern debates and controversies about justice, fairness and impartiality pioneered in the writings of John Rawls, Robert Nozick and John Roemer. There are today multiple formulations of the concepts of surplus, equity and justice in the empirical literature.

It is not merely a case of India but throughout south Asia that there have been conceptual contradictions and conflicts inherent in the practices of instituting justice in vogue in addition to the implementation failures under the aegis of developmentalist governments. The categories of rationality principle, rationale of practical reason and social norm of justice have moreover been dealt with rather separately, and only lately an attempt to integrate and synthesize these has come on the scene.

South Asian economies are characterized by heavy reliance on the tropical Monsoon rain-fed agricultural practices, pervasiveness of the monopoly of ownership of land in few hands, preponderance of the smallholding farmers, predominance of acreages operated under the cereal production, and apathetic status of the rural non-farm sector. The circumstances as these exist today are empirical reflections of inadequacies and insufficiencies of the past public endeavour in matter of redistribution of seeds, water, land, food and income. It is under such a situation that an intellectual reading warned:

> *We are today on the threshold of a major revival of peasant resistance to the iniquitous process of globalisation, which is nothing less than a new phase of imperialism characterised by primitive accumulation vis-a-vis the third world. This phase of imperialism involves the blatant corporate grabbing of peasant land and forest resources, the undermining and pauperization of the peasantry and the dominating of third world agriculture by the giant corporations under contract farming* (Utsa Patnaik, 2007, p.9)

In view of all these circumstances, there has been popular demand for and urgent requirement of the replacement of the current misdirected and inadequate public practices of the state regarding instituting so-called 'growth with justice'. Such assertions have got reinforced by the resurgence of renewed demands for further equity and fairness by individual actors and groups at the level of grass-root of the civil society.

Our central focus in the present thesis is on human agency, normative prescription of egalitarian distribution of the goods and the rights to the surplus producing human capacity and the policy consideration of universal inclusive system of social security and protection of children, elderly, otherwise-able men and women in the countryside. The concepts of morality, rationality, practical reason, action, action appraisal and egalitarianism that are operative in linking these to the idea and agenda of justice and fairness in this project are explicable in the empirical setting of south Asia.

Moral Philosophy

The moral and political philosophy have been far ahead in comparison to other established academic disciplines of knowledge in attempts to define, re-define, refine and reformulate the conceptual framework of normative categories of justice, equality and virtue. Philosophy has been at the forefront of such endeavour for the last two millennia[12].

[12] The Greek philosophers had been preoccupied with the conception and idea of commutative and distributive justice. Medieval Christian and Islamic scholars had also devoted sermons, texts and

In the historically long-stretched tradition of moral philosophy and ethics, there is now a genuine attempt to strive towards developing a theoretical framework of hybrid morality. Regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens among human beings in society, such hybrid principles and norms of action has always been of moral significance.

There are action-guiding principles[13] that help human persons to distinguish the right from the wrong and the good from the bad. A hybrid morality combines the thoughts of deontology (championing the cause of the morality of the rights and intrinsic worth of human values) and the ideology of consequentialism (extolling the morality of the goods and instrumental worth of objectives and actions) to put forward the action-guiding principles and norms justified by human practical reasons - reasons of action. It is the synthetic morality that distinguishes the commendable, praiseworthy and upright action from blameworthy, culpable and outrageous action on the basis of initial conditions as well as the advantageous, beneficial and worthy action from the disadvantageous, harmful and disgraceful action on the basis of outcome of human action rather simultaneously and assigning symmetrical moral significance.

In the corpus of moral philosophy and ethics, the notion of transitional justice is a new entry. Theorization on transitional justice (de Greiff, 2012) has focused on adjudicating between retributive or restorative justice through reconciliation between victims and perpetrators in favour of establishing peace in post-conflict societies. Of late, the literature on transitional justice has included the issue of fair distribution of goods (de Greiff, 2009; Fuller, 2012). The idea of transitional justice, which is inspired by the works of John Rawls (1999) on non-ideal theory of justice, is associated with attempts to remove material scarcity and human vulnerability.

---

writings to the theme of requirements of justice. In recent years, the Aristotelian virtue ethics, idea of equality and commutative justice have been attempted to be revived and reinstated by a number of moral philosophers and political thinkers.

[13] The framing of such principles have either been informed by the moral concerns of consequentialism of Utilitarian philosophers (valorising the morality of the goods) or the moral philosophy of deontology of Kant (championing the cause of the morality of the rights).

Lisa Fuller (2011) has propounded a model of a non-ideal theory of 'transitional justice'[14] in political philosophy that attempts at policies and courses of actions required for lifting-up the 'worst-off representative person' of a 'burdened society'. Such courses of lifting up the worst-off persons are required urgently in societies suffering from structural injustices (Young, 2011). In the concept of "transitional justice", there is no need to know what perfect, ideal, transcendental, absolute justice is all about in knowing what comparative injustices are. What is required is the bottom-up type of deliberation and thinking (Kamm, 2011). The appropriate goal may simply be to reduce injustices, in addition to the goals of maximizing the self-interested preferences, commitment, sympathy, charity and others. Such an idea of justice is befitting to the circumstances in which the background institutions of society are either unjust or do not exist at all[15].

Amartya Sen (2009) in the book entitled "The Idea of Justice" favours the urgency of private and public human actions centered at curing particular injustices[16] without the need to have a theory of perfect, ideal justice, and advocates piecemeal changes without a blueprint of perfection. More urgent than identification of the features of justice and a theory of ideal, perfect justice is the practical requirement to identify the instances of injustices and other moral wrongs, and the practices of minimizing such injustices through

[14] The non-ideal policies of transitional justice are contrasted with the ideal principles of perfect justice. In contrast to the dominant prevalent conception of absolute perfect ideal maximal justice, there is an alternative tradition of conceptualising an imperfect justice as well. It is variously argued that what seems to be plausible is the idea and instances of an imperfect theory of non-ideal justice in the case of underdeveloped society.

[15] The agent-relative, comprehensive-outcome-sensitive, fair opportunity for capability formation as a moral principle of action is one such paradigm of imperfect justice, according to Amartya Sen (1999). It is argued that the incommensurability of multiple factors that are considered and evaluated in ranking that in turn itself may be incomplete and partial ranking of outcomes and state of affairs due to lack of information in answering questions ought not to paralyze us in declaring that a state of affair is unjust in comparison to another state of affair and/or more or less unjust in comparison to all other states of affairs.

[16] While comparative injustice instances can be known by knowing the comprehensive outcomes, that is the process through which the end-state has come about as well as the end-state itself, and without knowing the ideal, perfect justice, the specific failures of justice may be different from other moral failures, according to Amartya Sen. Failures of justice are to be distinguished from failures in other moral duties. An open (or non-parochial) impartiality is required. What injustices are' are better known at the grass-root level of the society. What seems to be plausible is the idea and instances of an imperfect theory of non-ideal justice in the case of underdeveloped society.

dialogues among critically reasoning agents. While empirical study focuses on the details of what has happened (a number of injustices of the past to be rectified) or is happening in transitional societies, attempts at theorization on transitional justice have been investigating what ought to have happened or what ought to happen in the future – a normative concern about transitional policies, laws, and procedures (de Greiff, 2012, p. 33).

Agrarian distributive transitional justice[17] is a highly desirable good and a sacrosanct right of human agency that is achievable by hybrid form of human action and what motivates and justifies this supreme action is a conception of a broad and comprehensive human reason and rationality. The thesis that such a justice is a human action that is in turn essentially motivated and justified by mostly desire-independent reasons - reasons that are binding on a rational private and public agent regardless of first-order desires and beliefs, and carried through ought-abidance to hybrid morality of private-public combined action are required to be explored[18].

In the contemporary mainstream political and moral philosophy literature, the principle of rationalist morality and a monist conception of liberal justice have however been authoritative and dominant. John Rawls, Derek Parfit and John Searle subscribe to the principles of rationalist morality, and the works of these philosophers are often revisited while addressing the problem and agenda of agrarian transitional justice in south Asia.

One of the most popular conceptions and theories of justice is that of John Rawls (1971; 1972). It is an egalitarian theory of justice of institutions of the basic structure of society in general. Integrating concerns regarding individual liberty, conditions of opportunities

[17] Agrarian justice is postulated to be a subset of distributive justice, and distributive justice is a matter not only of presumption of a rational and normative human reasoning and deliberation about considerations of principle and the mode of division of something valuable but also a feature of private and public human action – doing - regarding matters of freedom, fairness, impartiality, equality and morality on the part of individual person, persons-in-interaction and public (bureaucratic) agency in a society. In other words, agrarian distributive justice as an event and process in the countryside is not merely a feature of theoretical and practical reasoning – deliberation and desideration but essentially a normative description of the features of human action and interaction.

[18] In its facet of equality and equity in distribution avatar, agrarian justice and fairness is a specific class of actions of distribution of something among human agents and actors in the society. It relates to actions that establish and fructify the realization of equal claims, entitlement and due shares of all individual persons in matter of redistribution of human capacity to be secured through not only food, land and water but also other materials and services in the countryside.

available to individual person and the status of benefits to the least-advantaged, two principles of justice (of institutions in a society) and distribution of basic social goods in an ideal, liberal and democratic society was propounded by John Rawls in early part of seventies of twentieth century.

Being characterized by the significant propositions regarding the moral worth of human liberty, fairness in procedures and equality in opportunities as integral and defining contents of the idea of justice, Rawlsian principles of justice (see Rawls, 1972, p. 302) are to the effect that:

> *One, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for others,*
>
> *Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:*
> *a) to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged, consistent with the just savings principles, and*
> *b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.*

What is distinctive is that the idea of institutional justice in Rawlsian framework of principles[19] presupposes the moral capacities of a person (endowed with the traits of personhood) in human agency[20].

Realization of justice is in the form of establishing a basic just social structure in the society, and it is conditional on features of human actions. One of the recent statements that formalize the attributes of an action-guiding (normative) principle is that of Derek Parfit (2011). Combining Kantian deontology, consequentialism and Scanlonian contractualism, a

---

[19] In the backdrop of pioneering theoretical work of Plato and Aristotle on the themes of commutative and distributive justice and insightful commentaries of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith on retributive and distributive justice, John Rawls was a modern pioneer theoretician on the theme of social (distributive) justice.

[20] In the tradition beginning from ancient Greeks, it has been postulated that a rational agency has an interest in either leading a satisfying life (a thick interest) or acting rationally (a thin interest) or both. While the richer and determinate 'thick interest' conception was developed in its earliest philosophical version by Aristotle, the abstract and minimal 'thin interest' conception of a rational agency has been associated with the name of Emmanuel Kant. Both interests – 'thin interest' and 'thick interest' - which are attributes of a rational human agency yield an argument in practical reason of a person in action.

statement of 'Triple Theory' as a guidance to moral reasoning and action of rational individuals in a society was put forth by Derek Parfit (2011, p. 25) recently. This 'Triple Theory' of Derek Parfit (2011 p. 25) states that:

> *Everyone ought to follow the principles whose being universal laws would make things go best, because these are the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will and which are not reasonably rejectable.*

In the rule-consequentialism-contractualism perspective of Derek Parfit, agrarian justice may therefore be considered as a set of actions of moral persons that produce the result of making things go best and it is also a set of right actions that are universally willable and not reasonably rejectable.

> *An act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by the principles that are optimific, uniquely universally willable, and not reasonably rejectable*.

In the moral contrast between right and wrong action, this Theory further states that a moral person who is also a rational person ought to follow the supreme principles of morality, that is, the *optimific* principles - principles whose universal acceptance would make '*things go best*'.

Derek Parfit (2011) devotes chapter after chapter to underline that it is the conception of an object-given, value-based practical reason and rationality postulate that informs the supreme principles of morality – the *optimific* principles. One of the profound and analytical statements about what human reasons and human rationality is all about is however that of John R Searle (2001). He defines rather quite broadly, and puts forward his profound remarks about reasons as follows:

> *All reasons are propositionally structured entities: they may be facts in the world such as the fact that it is raining, or they may be propositional intentional states such as my desire that I stay dry. They can also be propositionally structured entities that are neither facts nor intentional states, entities such as obligations, commitments, requirements, and needs.*

It is in this framework that John R Searle (2001) has further distinguished the complex nature of human rationality from animal rationality. The long commentaries and dispersed statements on human rationality across various pages of the work under consideration (2001, pp. 7, 32 & 218) may be pooled together as follows:

> *In human rationality, as opposed to ape rationality, there is a distinction between reasons for action which are entirely matters of satisfying some desire or other and reasons which are desire independent. The basic distinction between different sorts of reasons for action is between those reasons which are matters of what you want to do or what you have to do in order to get what you want, on the one hand, and those reasons which are matters of what you have to do regardless of what you want, on the other hand……On the Classical Model human rationality is an extension of chimpanzee rationality. We are extremely clever, talking chimps. But I think there are some fundamental differences between human rationality and the instrumental reasoning of the chimpanzees. The greatest single difference between humans and the animal kingdom ads far as rationality is concerned is our ability to create, recognize and act on desire independent reasons for action…….. It is part of the concept of rationality that there can be desire-independent reasons, reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set.*

An agency, whose actions are directed towards attainment of justice on the basis of abidance to optimific principles is desirably a person who is capable of responding to a reason and in whose action the reason and the value necessarily resonate.

In our thesis, it is argued that these standard and foundational conceptualisation of the categories and themes of justice, reason, action, morality and rationality as propounded by John Rawls, Derek Parfit and John Searle are required to be modified and further improved. In order to describe, analyse and prescribe the agenda of agrarian transitional distributive justice through practices of hybrid morality in the specific societies of south Asia, the concreteness of analysis is to be preferred over the exercise of abstract, universal and foundational conceptualisation of the categories of transcendental justice, perfect liberty and basic absolute right of individual human agency. So far as these foundational concepts and constructs, which are framed in abstract and universal framework, are to be applied to the case of a specific society characterised by a long history of structural injustices, appropriate modifications are required to suit the specificities of populace and space.

With regard to modification, the ‘damage’ principle is a significant point f departure. John Rawls (1971) (1992) has asserted it quite recently that ‘liberty’ is quite important constituent of justice. An influential founder of classical political economy and classical liberalism, J S Mill, pointed it out long time back that justice is almost inconceivable without a conception and reality of ‘individual’ ‘equal’ ‘liberty’. While individual liberty and distribution of similar liberty for all is significant, morality and justice as a field of study have to invoke the principles of damages and human responsibility and principle-

based human actions to contain the damages. The 'damage' principle puts a restriction on individual liberty. Whenever there is '*a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law'* (Mill, 1978, p. 80).

Second, there is a prior moral claim regarding the moral equivalence of persons, and it is prior to the pursuit of mutual advantage by individuals. The Kantian and Rawlsian framework of 'autonomy', and 'moral equivalence' of persons grounds justice claims as moral claims, which the Nozickian and Gautherian frameworks do not (Roth, 2002, pp. 20-1). Moreover, a demand for agrarian justice is an issue of justice at the level of an individual, the interpersonal level and the level of aggregate society. There ought to be both a micro-foundation as well as a macro-foundation of the multiplicity of principles and a concomitant theory of justice.

Third, the distributive justice in essence is after all identified with not only the outcomes but also the features of human actions and the principles guiding the procedures associated with actions and interactions in a society. The postulates of hybrid morality and its goal-right system of assessment of private and public human actions towards attaining the transitional justice are worth pursuing and its application in the case of south Asian countryside is worth investigating. What is needed is that the categories of the rationality of individual actor and allocation and exchange institutions of the market ought to remain the focus of analysis but the issues of other institutions, and specifically the institutions of provisioning and distribution, ought also be brought into the focus of analysis of agrarian society and economy.

Objectives of Study

Our study puts forth an exposition of the idea and agenda of agrarian (transitional) (distributive) justice and the description of an alternative governance framework of the policies of justice and social protection, security and insurance under the aegis of a welfare state regime in the context of South Asian countryside society and economy.

There are three principal purposes of the thesis. The major purpose is to explore the rationale of a concern for a floor level of surplus generating capacity and a concern for equity and fairness with regard to the distribution of such a capacity as opportunity freedom and benefit among producing households in the countryside. The classical political economy pioneered the 'surplus' paradigm of analysis. It is required that it is brought back, and synthesized with the analytical conception of surplus-productive capacity, individual human rationality and morality of practical reasons of human agency.

To provide a critique of the existing public concerns for equity, which are variously sought to be achieved in matter of distribution of seed, land and water (resources) and food (commodity) in south Asia is our concomitant concrete practical aspiration in this study. The critique is based on synthesizing the theoretical categories with applications to empirical data. It is warranted that the theoretical framework is applied and synthesized with the published empirical data pertaining to the malnutrition-afflicted and poverty-stricken Monsoon-rain-based, tropical-vegetation-oriented south Asian countryside so as to build up argument in favour of enhancing agrarian distributive transitional justice.

An additional aim in this research endeavour is to develop an alternative public agrarian policy framework which prioritize the public concern regarding pursuing of agrarian distributive transitional justice through egalitarians distribution of capacity to reproduce surplus among rural actors in south Asia. It is also required to propose and develop an alternative public policy framework that is informed by the idea of good governance.

Systematic and precisely formulated distinct objectives of the present research endeavour are as follows:

1. to resolve the conceptual strain in the theoretical relations among categories of human rationality, practical reason and egalitarian justice, and thereby, to explore the rationale of the values of, and rights to, the fairness, equity and justice in the distribution of surplus-producing capacity among human persons as an evaluative criteria of economic activity and process,

2. to account for the prevailing iniquitous distribution of resources, commodity and income in the backdrop of failure of trickle-down effect of growth and pervasive food insecurity, malnutrition and poverty in the south Asian countryside, and

3. to advance a critique of the prevailing public policy practices and develop a prescription of an alternative public policy framework of agrarian distributive transitional justice through proposal of egalitarian distribution of surplus producing capacity among rural actors, and thereby, to formulate the design of governance of agenda of distributive transitional justice in south Asia.

Hypotheses of Study

We frame following two compound propositions as specific hypotheses to test. While the first hypothesis relates with a combination of presupposition regarding the conceptual-theoretical categories and their relations, the second one pertains to presumptions regarding the empirical facts of south Asian countryside. The hypotheses are as follows:

1. the conception of agrarian justice and fairness ought to be based on the idea of a minimum benchmark of surplus-generating-capacity of rural actors and its egalitarian redistribution among production and labour units in the countryside, and it is as such the case in view of the weak foundation of welfare economics that is based on a narrow conception of theoretical reason and individual rationality and does not go beyond the concern for individual and social welfare measured in terms of utility, satisfaction and want-fulfilment, and

2. the prevailing pervasiveness of iniquitous, uneven and asymmetric distribution of resources, commodities and income among peasantries and producing households and the failure of the trickle-down effect of economic growth and development necessitates the framing of an alternative public policy framework of agrarian egalitarian social distributive justice in the south Asian countryside.

The first concept-related hypothesis of theoretical nature is tested in the five chapters of part one while the second hypothesis is examined in the next two chapters of part two and the single chapter of part three of the thesis.

Methods of Study

The methodology of our thesis is compound and hybrid in nature. The thesis is an exercise in neither an explanation of the prevalent phenomena of justice and injustice nor a prediction of the future state of justice and injustice. It is about description and prescription of a norm of ought-abidance of justice and ought-avoidance of injustice.

Our composite and hybrid methodology is one that describes the idea of justice and the attendant ideas related to justice on the one hand, and analyses the circumstances of agrarian justice and injustice in south Asia on the other. It is befitting to the normative study and prescriptive framework of justice in the agrarian setting. The mixed methods of description, analysis and prescription are therefore adopted, and the tools and techniques of analysis and description are used to facilitate the laying of three foundations: conceptual design, analytical-empirical framework and policy prescription structure.

Our method of study of agrarian justice is descriptive and analytical; it is not at all explanatory and predictive in any sense. The method is not at all oriented towards explaining any observed phenomenon and instance of justice and predicting anything about, and related with, the magnitude and trend or otherwise of injustices and justice. It is not our concern to make any positive scientific analysis of the object under study.

The first foundation of methodology, that is, the conceptual design and framework, is elaborated in chapter - 1. It helps in carrying out the theoretical discussion and debate on the categories of description and concepts of analysis of the succeeding three chapters – 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Part – I of the thesis. In resolving the research problems, testing hypotheses and addressing objectives of our ensuing thesis, we often visit agrarianism, classical political economy and utilitarianism in various chapters of part – 1 of the thesis. These

three eighteenth century European enlightenment ideology, idea and value are sources of our continuous intellectual inspiration as well as pints of departure.

The analytical-empirical framework is the second foundation and the pillar of the overall methodology of the thesis. It is in this framework that the empirical analysis of social and economic conditions of deprivation, exclusion and injustices in south Asia is advanced with a purpose of critiquing it - testing a significant part of second hypothesis of the thesis.

The analytical-empirical method comprise of a framework of the empirical critique of prevalent social and economic public policies and programmes of the governments with regard to the theme and subject of agrarian justice and equity in south Asia. The description of the analytical-empirical method and the details of quantitative and qualitative data sources that is applied in building the framework of empirical analysis in chapter – 7 as well as chapter – 8 (Part – II of the thesis) is dealt and elaborated in the beginning of chapter – 7.

The third foundation of the methodology of our study is the foundation of alternative policy prescription of justice. It deals with the method of the plan to develop a prescription of an alternative agrarian justice and social policy and format of governance design. It helps in realizing the third objective of the thesis and checking the validity of second hypothesis in chapter – 9 of Part - III of the thesis. A description of the background conditions and definitions of terms are used as parts of policy statement. The method of alternative policy prescription of agrarian justice is set at the beginning of chapter – 9.

Scope and Limitations

The present research work is multi-disciplinary in thematic coverage and theoretical approach. It borrows categories of analysis and prescription heavily from the literature in the disciplines of political philosophy, political science, ethics and economics. So far as agrarian distributive transitional justice as a core theme of agrarian ethics and moral theory is elaborated with estimation procedure so common in the discipline of economics, the work is inter-disciplinary as well. It is therefore not a single-minded venture in theory and

philosophy. Rather, it combines theory, praxis and prescription from divergent disciplines and practices. We devote chapters – 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 to review the treatment given to various relevant categories in the divergent disciplines and practices.

Our central focus is on human agency, normative prescription of goods in conjunction with the positive analysis of surplus producing capacity and the egalitarian distribution of rights of men and women. The concepts of practical reason and rationality that are operative in linking these to the idea of justice and fairness in this project are explicable in the empirical setting of south Asia.

It is within our scope of study to revisit agrarianism, classical political economy and utilitarianism. Agrarianism, surplus paradigm and ethics of welfare are to be accommodated but only with modifications and improvements in the scope of their application. These are integrated into the theme of agrarian social egalitarian surplus producing human capacity distributive justice in the countryside.

So far as our concern with justice in the project is confined to justice to rural citizens in the society, the present work is limited in scope, and therefore, it does not address the issue of universalization in conceptualizing justice for all. It is confined to agrarian distributive transitional justice for rural citizens of south Asia only. The scope of study is thus limited in terms of coverage of theme of justice and its application to population and geographical area.

Our work is again limited to exploration about merely distributive justice. In other words, our project does not address the restorative and retributive justice (though conceptually, a wider and comprehensive agrarian distributive transitional justice encompasses commutative, restorative and distributive justice). Our concern is moreover confined to addressing the issues of institutional and macro-justice. It does not much address the micro-justice and individualized and interpersonal justice.

Our project of agrarian distributive transitional justice harps on human agency directly and addresses the vital normative issue of whether their life goes well. It avoids resourcism and

commodity-fetishism. In the binary choice between human agency and resources and commodities in the external world, it chooses human beings as the focus of analysis and prescription. It has no preoccupation and it does not go much in the area of exploring either distribution of income and wealth or resources and commodities in south Asia.

Chapters Scheme

Beginning with Introduction that furnishes the outline of objectives of study, the hypotheses, the scope and limitations of study, and the scheme of organizing the nine chapters, the thesis is divided into three parts.

Part - I is on the theoretical study of the conception of agrarian distributive transitional justice, and it is divided into five chapters – 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. These chapters deal with the categories of morality, human reason, postulate of rationality, action and assessment of action. These chapters are multi-disciplinary in orientation and borrow from the conceptual and theoretical literatures of philosophy, political science, and economics. Part - 2 is on the methodology of empirical analysis, data sources, description of the social and economic conditions in south Asia, and it is divided into two chapters – 6 and 7. The chapters are devoted to description, illustration and analysis of social, economic and political dimensions of human lives in south Asia. Part - 3 has only one chapter – 8 which deals with the prescription of alternative framework of agrarian distributive transitional justice and social protection floor policy. It elaborates the proposed agrarian justice and policy design.

In the first chapter, a method of description and analysis regarding conceptual and applied categories to the theme of agrarian distributive transitional justice is set. The conceptual framework on agrarian justice in south Asia is dealt with details regarding the core concept of human productive ‘surplus’ capacity. The principal category and object of description, analysis and prescription regarding the agenda of agrarian justice in south Asia is the theoretical concept, empirical data and policy variable related with the human capacity to produce a surplus – the equalisandum. The descriptions regarding the equalisandum and the rule of allotment and distribution of the equalisandum are furnished. The arrow diagrams which are pictorial representations of the features of the conceptual framework of the thesis

show the relations of dependence/independence, conditioning relation and relation of causation among the categories and concepts related with agrarian justice based on the distribution of equalisandum of human productive capacity to produce a surplus in the countryside.

In Part - I, the second chapter brings the category of morality under discourse. The role of interpersonal morality in human action is addressed. Morality of the good is contrasted with the morality of the right. There are debates about morality. There is a conception of rationalist morality. There are moral reasons instances. Arguments are advanced in favour of a compromise with a hybrid concept of morality. Where unreason prevails and moral deficits abound, the practice of hybrid morality is the resolution of problems of conceptual tensions and contradictions. A search for an objective, meaningful and universally acceptable norm and principle on the basis of which an action ought to be assessed, evaluated and judged leads to acceptance of hybrid morality. It is useful in realistic appraisal, assessment and evaluation of human actions, specifically the performance of intentional purposive human actions of the autonomous, rational and reasonable human agency. It is argued that the rationale is grounded in arguments deriving from a combination of the deontological force of the 'rights' and the consequentialist imperatives of the 'goods'.

The third chapter is devoted to advocacy of the conception and agenda of transitional justice. It begins with an elaboration of the origin of the idea and features of the categories of justice as free, fair and impartial action and also the idea of good, the virtuous and the right human action. Conceptions of liberal perfect justice, non-ideal imperfect justice and transitional justice are addressed. A number of conceptions of justice relate it variously with liberty, impartiality, and equality. There are pluralities of conceptions of aggregative distributive social justice in the literature. A variety of conception of justice in the form of individual, social and economic justices and the essential distinguishing attributes – liberty, impartiality, equality and fairness – are addressed. There are conceptions of liberal perfect justice but the chapter argues in favour of non-ideal imperfect transitional justice.

The fourth chapter is on the meaning of human action and the role of human reasons in human action. Private individual human action is distinguished from the public action of the government. Redistributive action of the democratic welfare state is the institutional just public action. It is argued that whenever there is faltering of free will, weaknesses of will, auto-activation deficit, apathy, impulsivity, incontinence and viciousness, the individual human agency fails in the market and in the civil society, necessitating public action by a supra-agency of the government. The multiplicities of ideological stands on the categories of action in general, conundrum of public action, action deficits and governance failures are also dealt with. The meanings and definition of human reason, practical reasons and public reason are also elaborated. Distinctions are drawn among the notions and ideas of theoretical reason, practical reason and public reason in a multi-disciplinary framework. A critical analysis of deficits, failures and near absence of reasons and the phenomena of apathy and un-reasons, and irrationalities and passions of individuals are also explored. In this chapter also, the first objective of the thesis is continued to be addressed. Testing the validity of the first hypothesis also continues in this chapter.

In the fifth chapter**,** the notions and the postulates of human rationality and human agency (including the notion of person) are dealt with. The concept of means-rationality and ends-rationality is contrasted. The meanings of economic rationality are revisited. The concept of reason and the postulate of rationality in philosophy as well as economics acquire significance because of the notion of agency and rational agency. Literature is reviewed to cull out the features of the postulate of a rational private and public agency. It is attempted to resolve the conceptual tensions in understanding of the meanings of various categories dealt across various schools of thought in philosophy, ethics and economics. It is not only the theme of category of morality and justice, and therefore, human action and action appraisal but also the categories of reasons and human rationality on the one hand and person and agency on the other that are characterised by the phenomenon of fluidity. The abstraction and universalism are not always successful. A consensus is developed at the last of the chapter.

Sixth chapter is the last one of part – I. We deal with the thing which is valued – the ‘axiotima’ as well as the thing which is required to be equalized in the fair distribution

among human beings – the 'equalisandum'. There are resources, commodities and income which have traditionally been valued since the possession and control of these are considered to be valuable in human life and contribute to some sense of individual and aggregate welfare in the society. These have also been considered the things whose equal distribution has been treated morally valuable and politically desirable. In recent writings in political and moral philosophy, it is however the human capacity that is prioritized. It is prioritized over the material goods, services and resources. The debate on the fundamental needs and prescription of basic income is reviewed. In an egalitarian scheme of arrangement of human society, the thing to be equalized (i.e. equalisandum) ought to be postulated to be the surplus-producing capacity of individual worker-owner-operator-producer in the countryside. A hybrid criterion of evaluation of human actions that argues for preferring the need-based sharing, division and equalization of human capacity (capability in general) to produce a decent minimum of material surplus of goods and services is positioned, and the notion of equalization of 'capacity' (capability) is preferred over the equalization of ownership and control of 'resources' and 'commodity'. The chapter elaborates the arguments.

The Part – II of the thesis comprises of the seventh chapter and the eighth chapter. This part of the thesis deals with the empirical features of social and economic existence of populations and the attendant features of public policy initiatives and interventions in south Asia region. In the beginning, however, methodology of application of conceptual framework to the case study of prevalent empirical conditions of economic and social existence of population and policy implementation on agrarian justice in south Asia is set. The method of description and analysis in this and the next chapter is grounded in the analytical-empirical framework. The details of the data source and information regarding the quantitative and qualitative data pertaining to south Asia is presented.

The materials furnished in the seventh chapter are mostly empirical in nature, and the empirical information and data pertain to both economic conditions in the individual countries as well as aggregate conditions in south Asia. The economic deprivations, exclusions and inequalities in the region are detailed as these are the outcomes of the prevalent public policies in south Asia. Whatever has ever been claimed in the name of and

with regard to the so-called 'trickle-down' effect of growth and development has not at all been operative in the region. It is argued in this chapter that the material gains and benefits of affluence and prosperity reflected in fast increasing gross domestic product and heavy industrialization have not percolated down to the least-advantaged section of society. There are instances of deficits in individual rationality and practical reason, and violations of social norms which are also responsible for the maintenance and exacerbation of inequality and inequity. It is in this chapter that a part of the third objective of the thesis is addressed, and a part of the second hypothesis is tested.

In the eighth chapter, the materials presented are again empirical in nature. A summary on the social existence of population in south Asia, and the resultant failures to achieve the social agrarian justice in the countryside is outlined. The descriptive quantitative profile of the social sector of education, health, labour employment, insurance and pensions, and institutions of social cohesion and exclusion are compiled. The status of the social policy and working of the welfare state regime are elaborated, and their weaknesses are brought to light. The purpose is to underline the undesirable phenomena of leakages and weaknesses in the mechanism of delivery of social services in the region as well. This bespeaks of the ineffective structures of societal private-public governance in south Asia. It is argued in this chapter that there are instances of deficits in and failures of policy of delivery of societal justice in the countrified pockets of human settlements and terrains of south Asia. It is also in this chapter that the second objective of the thesis is further addressed. A part of the second hypothesis is further tested in this chapter as well.

In Part – III, the ninth chapter advances an alternative prescriptive framework of a social (public) policy agenda of agrarian (distributive transitional) justice and chalks out an operational schema of implementation of this alternative public policy format of the future. It is argued that an inclusive and universal social policy ought to be an integral part in an alternative scheme of a composite policy framework for the future generation of populace. The prescription is for a public agenda of instituting an inclusive structure of a universal social policy and an effective governance process in south Asia. What is needed is a benevolent bureaucracy in the region that advances the welfare and justice. The prescription is for an effective governance process of a public agrarian policy of

equalization of a threshold level of production capacity of rural citizens and universal social policy of provision of education, health, insurance, pension and social protection floor in south Asia. Alternative policy and governance model that is prescribed for south Asia of the future is outlined and minimal features of a redistributive justice policy and governance framework are made. The third objective is addressed, and the second hypothesis is further tested in this last chapter of the thesis.

A concluding write-up summarizes the principal theoretical framework and empirical facts and prescriptive arguments advanced in the preceding nine chapters in a precise and concise manner. In this write-up, it is argued that governments of the south Asian region ought to be at the driving seat of instituting and governing justice. It is the concern for the primacy of social policy of the governments in the region together with the track record of successful governances that is the concern in view of the historically inherited deficiencies observed in the demonstration of rationality and practical reasoning of individuals and groups in the south Asian countryside. An argument in favour of revamping and repositioning the welfare state, in its new role of ‘social justice state’, is the conclusion. A bibliography follows at the last.

The chapter is divided into three short sections.

The first section is devoted to outlining the catalogue of meanings of the core concepts and selected conceptual categories.

In the second section, we deal with the most valued thing in human life and the thing which is required to be equalised for the sake of agrarian justice.

The third section undertakes the task of presenting the arrow diagrams which are pictorial representations of the features of the conceptual framework of the thesis - the framework of conceptual design on the theme of justice in general and the practical agenda of agrarian justice in particular in the context of south Asia. It is to capture the nature of relations among the concepts and categories related with agrarian justice.

.

The manner and mode of conceptualization, empirical analysis and prescription regarding agrarian justice is based on the triangular foundation of the composite methodology adopted in the thesis. The triangular foundation of conceptual framework of description of the theoretical concepts and categories, analytical-empirical framework of scrutiny of the qualitative and quantitative information and data pertaining to social and economic conditions and policy prescriptive framework of elaboration of an alternative policy prescription for agrarian justice in south Asia is warranted for systematic attainment of three objectives and appraisal of two hypotheses, and laying down the structure of our progressing thesis.

A conceptual framework is a network, or 'a plane', of interlinked concepts. The concepts that constitute a conceptual framework support one another, articulate their respective phenomena, and establish a framework-specific philosophy. It is a way of organizing ideas, making conceptual distinctions, showing conceptual relations and synthesizing ideas from multi-disciplines into a synthesis. A conceptual framework is often useful as organizing devices in empirical research. In a sense, a conceptual framework is also an abstract representation, connected to the research project's goal that directs the collection and analysis of data. Such a conceptual framework as an analytical tool with several variations and contexts is however a tool of neither explanation nor prediction. It does not provide at all a causal/analytical setting (Levering, 2002, p. 38). It rather provides merely an interpretative approach to social reality.

The method of establishing theoretical relations among categories of human rationality, practical reason and egalitarian distributive justice is addressed here in this chapter. Principal component of our composite and hybrid methodology is the conceptual framework[21] of description and prescription which is used throughout part – I comprising chapter – 2 to chapter - 6. In this chapter, it is elaborated.

[21] In the course of developing the conceptual framework analysis, there are phases involved. Adopting the insights and techniques proposed by Jabareen (2009), at least following five phases is distinguished:

1. First, mapping the spectrum of multidisciplinary literature regarding the principal categories and concepts related with agrarian justice, that is, the surplus producing capacity in a "fishing trip" or "scoping" or mapping plan,

Guillermina Jasso (2001) opines that the studies of justice fall into three main categories: descriptive studies, explanatory studies, and normative studies. Our study is descriptive and normative one. The purpose of our conceptual perspective, framework and design is the description and analysis of the existing state of discourse and knowledge on the category of agrarian justice; it is neither explanation of nor prediction on the theme under consideration. The descriptive study aims to identify the perceptions of justice held or acted upon by social actors – a sort of common understanding about demand of justice. This is the empirical foundations.

The method of analytical-empirical framework that is oriented towards providing the scheme of developing a critique of prevalent policy in south Asia is presented in the first section of chapter - 7. The empirical analysis of the social and economic conditions of human existence on the basis of supportive data and information in south Asia is instrumental in developing an empirical critique of the prevalent social and economic policies in the region. The third foundation of the composite methodology is constituted by the framework of outlining an alternative policy prescription for agrarian justice in south Asia with emphasis on the requirement of good enough governance and its detail is furnished in the first section of chapter - 9.

1.1. Core Concepts

2. Second, reading the selected definition, meaning, and data on rationality, practical reason, action, evaluation of human action, agrarian justice phenomenon and categorizing these by a scale of importance so as to maximizes the effectiveness of our inquiry and ensuring effective representation of each themes,
3. Third, rereading the definition, meaning, and data on principal categories from the literature to "discover" concepts so as to generate a list of a number of competing, and sometimes contradictory, concepts, and identifying the ontological, epistemological, and methodological role it plays in conceptualization and agenda setting on agrarian justice,
4. Fourth, integrating and grouping together concepts that have similarities to one new concept so as reduce the number of concepts drastically to a reasonable number of concepts, and synthesizing categories, concepts and data into a model theoretical framework, and
5. Lastly, building a scope in the model theoretical framework to be dynamic enough to be suitable for revision according to new insights, comments, and literature in the future.

To begin with, a concept is always understood 'relative to its own components, to other concepts, to the plane on which it is defined, and to the problem it is supposed to resolve' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991, pp. 20-21 quoted in Yosef Jabareen, 2009). Since concepts give rise to definitions, two essential features of a concept is that it is always created by something (and cannot be created from nothing), and a concept always has histories. There are always a set of core concepts, around which other concepts do revolve and all such other concepts are mostly related with the core concept in relations of mutual support and feedback.

Our core concept in this project of advocacy of the agenda of promotion of agrarian transitional distributive justice and demotion of injustices through mediation of hybrid morality of human – private and public – agency is the "human capacity for surplus reproduction". Conceptualized as agential capacity to produce a surplus, it is a core concept of the idea and the core agenda of the policy of agrarian distributive transitional justice. It is the axiotima – a thing most valued by peasantries and labourers as well as the 'equalisandum' – a thing to be equalized among peasantries and labourers in the countryside. It is our principal concept and the object of description.

In agriculture, a peasant household is both a consumer household as well as a producer household – almost coterminous. Agriculture involves a long 'period of production' over which a consuming household has to survive by consuming principally the accumulated stock from the previous cycle of production. This initial stock is created out of the surplus of goods and services generated in the last cycle of production. Confining to a self-employed agricultural set up of a society, economic surplus is a residual after deducting the paid-out material cost (for manures, fertilizers, fuels, etc) (including amortization), wage payments of hired labour and imputed value of family labour from the gross value of product output of goods and services. It is a part of net output value of goods and services over and above the necessary labour cost of production. It is the difference of net value added and labour cost of production.

Certainly, the idea of economic surplus of goods and services in agriculture which more or less resembles with the idea of actual surplus of goods and services in the form of savings is highly essential part of both the survival of households of peasantry and the economic

viability of the agricultural farms. A capacity formation would lead to the possibility of the idea of potential surplus of goods and services. Whatever be the actual surplus of goods and services across the economic classes of peasantry, the matter of significance is the increase the potential surplus of goods and services producing capacity and capability of human beings in agriculture. In agrarian setting, the surplus productive capacity is a human agential capacity to reproduce a surplus of a stock of food to feed the family and the family-attached stock of cattle till the next harvest in addition to a little more to guarantee a decent social minimum subsistence livelihood for members of the household in a rural location.

In particular, a single feature of circumstances of justice that warrants the virtue of agrarian distributive transitional justice is the unequal and asymmetric distribution in the human capacity to produce and reproduce food and other means of livelihood in south Asia. It is the resolution of conflicting claims among rural actors that is the most pressing social priority in such circumstances. In the practical action field of orchestrating, instituting and delivering agrarian distributive transitional justice, both scrutinized reasoned basis of the private choice of individuals (that is, private rationality) as well as that of the public choice of the state (that is, public rationality) may be required to figure prominently in the decision to act so far as the just outcome of a decent life of equalized-individuals in the society is concerned.

Related to this core category of analysis and description are the normative concept of the nature of human action - private and public, characteristics of human action in general, and the appraisal criterion of action in particular. There are a number of criteria to judge, appraise, assess and evaluate the worth of a human action, and egalitarian criteria is one of them. Other related categories and concepts are those of human person, agency, government (public agency), actor, rationality, reasonability, practical reason, impartiality, entitlements, equalisandum, wellbeing, needs-fulfilment, rights, goods, efficiency, capability, equality, fairness, freedom, justice, moral judgment, virtue, morality, social welfare, social protection, redistribution, and governance.

While a quite truncated introduction to definitional bits and pieces of a few crucial categories and concepts related with the idea, agenda and policy of agrarian justice are collated here in order to furnish the conceptual design and framework of the methodological structure of the thesis, their histories are elaborated in the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the present work.

Moral-theoretic Framework

Agrarian justice as an idea and a category of theoretical conception as well as an agenda of practical political discourse and policy ought to be grounded in the moral-theoretic framework**.** It is neither political philosophy nor political economy (including the modern discipline of mainstream economics) but moral philosophy which is enriched enough to deal with this area of investigation.

Morality is a matter of what to do. A moral question is actually a 'planning question' involving practical decisions about when and to what extent to feel such characteristically moral sentiments as compassion, guilt or resentment. Morality involves a decision, and many facts may inform the decision; but, these facts are not moral facts. These facts are entities that just count as considerations in the decision about what one ought to do. There are no moral facts except perhaps in some deflated, quasi-realist sense. Morality is not an issue of factual enquiry about the social and natural world. It is not regarding addressing the empirical questions about the social and natural world.

Common-sense morality largely consists in such obligations as most of us believe that there are certain people to whom we have special obligations. We believe we ought to help these people in certain ways. We should try to protect them from certain kinds of harm, and should try to give them certain kinds of benefit. These are the people to whom we stand in certain relations; the examples are our children, parents, pupils, patients, members of our trade unions, or those whom we represent.

Goal-right System

The idea and agenda agrarian justice in moral-theoretic framework ought to be grounded in the hybrid goal-right system of moral philosophy and ethics. A crossbreed goal-right system of ethics is neither pure deontology nor perfect consequentialism but a merger of the two systems of moral theory. It is this idea of hybridization rather than perfection and monism in moral discourse and practice that ought to be the foundation of pursuit of justice in the countryside. It is then required to resolve the issues: which goods of instrumental worth and beneficial, and which rights of intrinsic worth and value?

Pursuing justice ought to be a project that involves hybrid morality of the goods with the goal of attaining efficiency and morality of the rights to fairness, equality and liberty. A perusal of the contemporary literature is but a pointer to the on-going project of a reunion of the disciplines of philosophy and economics (Hutchison, 1981; Sen, 1987; Caldwell, 1993; Kirkpatrick, 1995), and this is special as such on the theme of the value of fairness and justice. A union of the normative economic principles of rationality and optimality leading to attainment of welfare with the philosophic moral principles of practical reason conducive to the attainment of freedom and fairness may thus the future ahead for the agenda of agrarian distributive transitional justice.

Minimization of Moral Bads

Agrarian justice theory and practice in hybrid morality structure of goal-right system ought to focus on minimization of the moral bads (for example, affront, harm, injury, human incapacity) as well as minimization of violation of the rights to human capacity. The minimization of moral bads ought to be more urgent than the maximization of the goods (which is so emphasized in the monist moral discourse and practice of utilitarianism-consequentialism).

Agrarian justice agenda, political discourse and policy ought to involve three-part minimizations: minimization of individual un-freedom, coercion, duress, oppression, threat, vulnerability, harms, damages, outrages and injuries, minimization of social inequality, unevenness, disparity, asymmetry, imbalances, exclusion, deprivation, exploitation, misery and resource-less-ness, and minimization of public unfairness, partiality, nepotism, undue

favour, rent-seeking, irresponsibility, un-accountability, violation of rule of law and corruption.

The human productive capacity being the ore concept and category in our project, there ought to be minimization[22] in the range between capability and non-capability and functioning and non-functioning. Efforts and attempts are required to minimize three gaps between the producing capacity and incapacity, between the self-appropriating capacity and incapacity, and between the disposing capacity and incapacity. Attempts at the minimization of affronts, harms, injury and moral bad of 'absence of human capacity' ought to proceed through argumentations and discourse among the rational and reasonable human gents and actors, even if it involves partial ranking of alternatives available for choice to individuals. The practical reasoning about distributive justice does involve such type of partial ranking of alternatives in matter of choices of individual agency.

The case for promotion of agrarian distributive transitional justice and minimization of injustices is warranted to be placed directly in the field of morality. In a moral-theoretic framework of the goal-right system of action of minimization of moral bads as attempt towards agrarian justice, answers to following questions are important: what is human reason? What is a human action? What is a rational and moral action? Who are the actors? Who is a moral agent-actor? What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains, and often justifies and recommends the action by giving a human agent's reason for doing what he/she did? What is a human agency?

Reasons

[22] Conceptually speaking, what is the upper limit of the optimal and maximal capacity is not always precise. It is not that while distributing capacity rather equally amongst all, there is something called a maximum capacity towards which attempts are to be made to reach and then equalize. Even if at all, the notion of maximum and optimal human individual capacity to produce a surplus is measurable, it is not always so easily attainable. In contrast to the mainstream literature in economics and philosophy that prioritise the promotion, expansion and maximization, the minimization of injustice (that arises from the lack of human capacity) is our point. In contrast to maximization of justice (whatever way it is conceived), the concrete problem is one of minimization of harms, injuries and injustices.

Reasons are reasons for desiring and believing as well as reasons for acting. A reason for desiring is a theoretical reason and a reason for acting is a practical reason for a person. Theoretical reason, which is the reason for belief, is a special case of practical reason (reason for action). Theoretical reason deals only with universality. The universal norms of reason are insufficient to guide in practical circumstances. Universality of reason is not enough for practice. Reason in philosophy and rationality in economics is a category par excellence. Practical reasons are the reasons for action - the *reasons for performing action*. It is directed toward action. Reasons to perform an action are reasons to intend to perform that action. Practical reasoning gives rise not to bodily movements, but to intentions. A reason for intending to do something or trying to do something is, other things being equal, a reason for doing it. A reason for action is practical reason.

A practical reason is a normative reason for action, that is, it is some fact that counts in favour of the agent's performing that action. A practical reason is an adequately informed and reflectively endorsed practical consideration. Practical reason is the reason that allows for scope of cooperative actions in lieu of morass of acts of conflicts among the thinking individuals. If a person has a reason for acting then there must be something good or right about what s/he is doing. Practical reason has a heterogeneous structure, including both universality of reason and openness to context – to specific circumstances on each particular situation.

Practical reason ought also to deal with particulars – the contingent, because human action is embedded in the contingent, real world, and an optimal moral system requires some degree of publicity. A general account of the role of reason in practical rationality involves understanding of five features: *freedom*, *temporality*, the *self and with it the first-person point of view*, *language and other institutional structures,* and *rationality*. Practical reason is subject to rational constraints in the same way as theoretical reason.

Consideration for justice is also a reason – a factitive entity, that is, either a fact or an intentional state or a propositionally structures entity, and therefore, a reason for action. Justice as virtue, as fairness, as impartiality, as liberty, and as equality is a practical reason that weighs in favour of and counts in favour of human action – both private as well as

public action. Justice is a consideration that is relevant to beings who are actually seeking it and seeking it with a practical purpose to act upon. It is seeking of good and right actions by one and all in a norm-driven society of rational and autonomous individuals.

Action

A profound question raised by Donald Davidson (2001) in the discipline of moral philosophy was: "What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving a human agent's reason for doing what he/she did"? Action is the fundamental feature of human life. It is through the action and performance of action that a change in the state of affairs of the world is brought about. It is human action that brings a change in the state of affairs of the world in terms of attainment, preservation and promotion of the "goods", attainment, embracing and entertaining the "rights" and both simultaneously. Action is but what a human being performs not merely to do something in order to bring about a change in the state of affairs of the world but also to become something in order to bring about change in the capacity, functioning and capability of oneself.

Action is purposive; action is intentional by its very nature. A purposive, intentional action is always motivated by a consideration which figures as the "reason" – theoretical reason, practical reason and moral reason. Once a reason or reasons counts in favour of an action, a disposition and an intention always intervene prior to initiation of action, and an action is always evaluated subsequent to completion of action in terms of the consequences and outcome. The human agency and moral personae and functionary pursue the goals of either the promotion of the goods or the protection of the rights or both in the interactive setting of society and economy. These two methods of appraising the worth of an action has been the standard formulation in ethics, moral and political philosophy. It is also accepted in the discipline of economics.

Justice is a feature of a human action; it is a feature of the beginning of an action, the process of ongoing action, and also the outcome of an action. A demand for liberty, fairness, impartiality, equality and virtue in the initial situations at the beginning of an

action is the demand for justice. It is also a feature of the process characterized by liberty, fairness, impartiality, equality and virtue is a feature of justice. An aspiration for an outcome that is based on the considerations of liberty, fairness, impartiality, equality and virtue as the conclusion of an action is the aspiration for justice.

It is as such a research problem in the domain of morality and ethics of justice to determine: whether investigation into the nature and features of individual private human actions in civil society and public policy actions of the government that are conducive to, facilitators of and instrumental in minimization of injustices, inequalities and exclusion of a majority of people is more realistic and pragmatic pursuit than the promotion and maximization of ideal/ transcendental/perfect justice.

Rationality

Rationality means that human behaviour is goal-directed behaviour. Rationality is identified with the 'maximizing' disposition and behaviour of individual human agency, person and actor. According to the thesis of egoism, rationality concerning ends consists in adopting as one's ultimate end the promotion of one's own good, and correspondingly, that rationality concerning means involves the adoption of appropriate means to the attainment of this end.

Means-rationality' involves the formal properties of decision-making. 'Ends-rationality' relates exclusively to desires. 'Belief-rationality' relates to the informational status of individuals. It involves the scientific thought and rules of logic whereby the internal model of the world of an individual is posited to be accurate and well-informed.

All actions based on genuinely held beliefs – subjective and objective – are rational in economics. 'Substantive rationality' refers to 'attributes of the equilibrium configuration of the system'. It is to be contrasted with 'procedural rationality' which refers to 'attributes of the dynamic process seen in all its dimensions (including disequilibrium). Rationality is a part of the real world and thus it is a physical phenomenon.

It is a feature of human judgement, human decision making, and human action. Rationality is a feature of the discourse among human beings and a feature of decision, action and interaction among human beings and altogether a feature of the human beings in general. All thought and language, and hence all arguments by human, presuppose rationality. In neoclassical framework of economic analysis and utilitarian moral philosophy, it is mostly related with maximising the 'income' in a concrete setting of an economy.

Since our conceptual framework revolves around the principal category of the surplus-producing capacity of human being as equalisandum, the interlinked concepts are related with antecedents of action, action-in-progress and consequences of action and that together provide a comprehensive understanding of phenomenon of justice. The specific class of human action that is our focus is that related with orchestration of justice – fairness, impartiality, equality and liberty of individual human beings and demotion of injustices.

The concepts related with the prior antecedents of human action as well as the categories describing the consequent outcome of human action are also part of the framework. Reasons and rationality of human persons play a significant role in action towards agrarian justice based on consideration of equalization of human capacity to produce a surplus in agriculture. The categories of reason, rationality and practical rationality of human person are also our principal focus.

Person

In ordinary parlance, we use the word 'human being' and also the word 'person'. In a philosophical definition of person, personal identity is important. A person is an entity who maintains a definite identity though changes. A human being is a person – possessed of a personality with individuality, a human is also an agency – endowed with free will (autonomy), and therefore, a human is a personal agency. A person is one having continuous consciousness over time, have second-order volitions, and is a deliberate actor. In philosophy and ethics, the notion of a human being is not a synonym for notion of a 'person'. A person is here a bit more than simply a human being. A human being is a person with a moral personality – a maker of himself/herself and a maker of projects of life.

Persons considered individually are separate from one another. The idea which motivates the demand for impartial consideration is the moral equivalence of persons. In law, a person is a being with certain moral status, and therefore a person is a bearer of rights. A person is recognized by law because the rights and duties are ascribed to him/her. In respect of moral status, a person has certain capacities. We need to accept that person has affective capacity as well.

All persons ought to be entitled to equal capacities and abilities, for example, in not only eudemonistic capacity, capacity to be healthy and educated, capacity to be socially insured, secured and protected but also in productive capacity and ability to reproduce material surplus for sustenance and reproduction of human household and labouring family. Such capacities of individual beings go into making a full-fledged equal citizen with civil and political rights in democratic society.

It is required to prioritise and consider the surplus productive capacity of individual human actors as lexically prior to all other capacities of humans. What is required here is that the first priority is to institute a system of guarantee of a floor level (a threshold level) of the agential capability or ability for the worst-off rural actors (prioritarianism) to do something to produce a surplus or to be a surplus producer in the countryside; second, this level of the agential capability (capacity) to do or to be is guaranteed as a matter of basic and fundamental right and entitlement for all producing human actors rather equally.

Agency

Action is performed by a human being, and a human being is an agency. An agency can choose one's goals and values with input of one's own and without having those goals and values imposed by some other individuals or by any extraneous factor in their social environment. A human being who is a person is a deliberator and an actor. While being a deliberator and an actor, a human person is first and foremost essentially an agency. An agency can choose his/her goals and values with input of his/her own and without having those goals and values imposed by some other individuals or by any extraneous factor in

their social environment. A human agency is one who is capable of acting in accordance with his/her deliberative understanding and take responsibility for it. A human being is a 'doing' species as well as an 'achieving' one. The achieving model of human agency needs to be complemented with doing model of procedural rationality, therefore.

An agency is considered to be a finite, embodied, historical person who responds to reasons. An agency is considered to be a finite, embodied, historical person who responds to reasons. A human being is a deliberator and an actor. A human agency is guided by his/her conception of his/her reasons – both theoretical and practical reasons. While being a deliberator and an actor, a human person is first and foremost essentially an agency. What a person can do in line with his/her own conception of the good defines the agency. An agent is one who acts and brings about change and whose achievement can be evaluated in terms of his/her own values and objectives. Agents are agents of their own lives.

Conceptually, the agenda and demand for agrarian distributive transitional justice ought to be theoretically grounded in the postulate of rationalist morality. A human person is not merely rational being but also a moral personality by virtue of being rational. Such principles as Triple theory of Derek Parfit as guidance to human moral action, which in turn leading to Rawlsian principles of justice, liberty, fair opportunity and the benefit of the least-advantaged as a priority in the moral philosophy literature requires further exploration.

Public Policy of Government

Agrarian egalitarian capacity-distribution transitional justice as agential actions towards minimization of affront of human productive incapacity and equalization of human productive capacity in matter of generation of material surplus in the countryside ought to be a principal feature of obligatory actions of public organizations and policy of government. Two significant questions are: to what extent may a government succeed in instituting justice in a social setup pervaded by private individual irrationalities and practical unreason? What role has the government to play in instituting equity/equality-centred agrarian surplus-capacity-justice through social policies of a benign welfare state?

The notion of constitutional welfare states in south Asia that pursues 'growth with justice' is our crucial point of departure. A government in a democracy ought to reflect the ethical demands of the masses which in turn is conducive to the evolution of policies leading to a just and humane social union and order. The mediation of an inclusive developmental welfare state regime is of significance. In the cases of moral deficits and failures of otherwise rational and autonomous private persons in interaction framework and break-down of cooperative contractual ventures in civil society, the second-best option is attempt at attainment of agrarian distributive transitional justice under the aegis of proactive, inclusive and universal social policy of an altruistic public bureaucratic agency.

Throughout twentieth century, there had been a clamour for the establishment of proactive, inclusive and universal social public policy framework of welfare states. In the concrete setting of malnutrition-afflicted and poverty-stricken Monsoon-rain-based, tropical-vegetation-oriented south Asian countryside, agrarian bureaucracy ought to be at the driving seat of instituting agrarian distributive transitional justice in south Asia.

Good Governance

Agrarian egalitarian capacity-distribution transitional justice as political agenda, government policy and public action programme ought to be implemented in the spirit of good governance. Good governance is a new paradigm of private-public participation in monitoring and assessing the outcome of policy initiatives of the governments in south Asia. In matter of agrarian justice in south Asia, there are two important questions: how is to ensure the effectiveness of the governments in realising the goal-right system of distributive justice in the countryside? How is to execute, monitor and assess the consequences in terms of redistribution of human surplus productive capacity and delivery of the 'good' and the 'right' to such human capacity?

A structure and processes of good and effective governance is a necessary and sufficient condition for generation of fruitful outcomes of agrarian distributive transitional justice as rational, reasonable and moral public action. The welfare governments in south Asia which

pursue the public goal of making individual and collective human life go well ought to ensure two things: a minimum benchmark of a surplus-producing capacity for each person, and an equal distribution of such a capacity among all persons in a closed agrarian society, and this is possible only in the case of effective government with good governance. Since the human capacity is not a visible entity, the government has to choose an indirect index, set a benchmark and attempt to equalize this index. This index may be a composite one. While implementing agrarian distributive transitional justice as a public policy does require the institutional set up of operation of rule of law and effective government, it does also require transparency in the process of execution of policy and fixation of accountability of the bureaucracy and the organs of governments in south Asia.

1.2. Axiotima and Equalisandum: The Menu

It is in the backdrop of uses of these categories with their stated eanings that we argue in our thesis that agrarian egalitarian distributive justice ought to be the first virtue of societies in south Asia as it is occasioned by the prevailing agrarian circumstances of justice. The circumstances of agrarian justice, to borrow from John Rawls and David Hume, are the circumstances that give rise to the virtue of justice, and agrarian distributive transitional justice in such circumstances ought to be the virtue of institutions, or framework of interactions among rural human persons concerning the distribution of benefits and burdens in this region under consideration.

The conditions that occasion the virtue of agrarian justice are empirical conditions pertaining to human life and working of institutions in south Asia. Justice in the countryside as occasioned by the circumstances of justice - the features of empirical conditions of conflicts and cooperation regarding distribution of human capacities, resources and commodities - prevailing in the societies of south Asia is a matter of action on the part of free and autonomous individual person, who has capacity to enter into a contract with each other as moral persons.

Agrarian distributive transitional justice as distributive ethics ought to be concerned with egalitarian distribution of human capacity and capability of action and as distributive

economics with egalitarian distribution of human capacity to produce a surplus over and above the necessary consumption requirements for sustenance of a dignified life in the countryside. Distribution of surplus-producing capacity of human agency is much more significant than distribution of surplus of agricultural resources and commodities among human actors because the resource endowment and commodity command may fail to translate into a human capacity. Redistribution of human capacity involves not merely the redistribution of seed, water, and, materials and food but also redistribution of opportunity-freedoms so as to lead to the formation of human capability.

Such exploration requires, prima facie, a modification of the Rawlsian principles of procedural justice on the one hand and an incorporation of insights from other egalitarian theory of distributive social justice (and of course, retributive justice) on the other in order to meet the demand for agrarian justice as occasioned by the prevailing 'circumstances of justice' in south Asia. In it minimal specification, it requires: the priority of the worst-off among rural producing actors, agency-sensitive distribution of rights, claims and entitlements in the countryside, minimization of affronts, harms, injuries and injustices of incapacities and inabilities to produce and reproduce a material surplus, and all such measures under the aegis of public policy of the public bureaucratic actors under the governments in south Asia.

Agential (Surplus Productive) Capacity

A human capacity is a set of attributes, features and characteristics of an individual being that is conducive, instrumental and helpful in doing or becoming something. It is a set of faculty to do something (ability to act on something) and also a set of competence to be something (become something). A productive capacity of a human individual is in the nature of bare ownership, and bare ownership does not confer full usufruct (usufruct denotes the right to use, right to benefit or to receive the rent). In matter of human capacities to do or to become, the only remaining possible type of external rights is the "rent-rights".

Productive capacity of human actors is not just geared to production of consumables but essentially to reproduction of investable surplus. Paul Baran (1969) differentiates three variants of economic surplus from the production perspective in terms of comparative statics: actual surplus, potential surplus, and planned surplus.

The capacity of a human rational and reasonable agent to deliberate on considerations, to reflect on the dispositions and to act in accordance with dispositions on the deliberated considerations is a rational capacity that is required to agree at the consideration of capacity to produce a surplus being a vital capacity of an individual in matter of biological and social survival and living a good life.

There is a prescription of a threshold level of the capacity of an agrarian productive unit (peasantry) to produce/reproduce a surplus for a rural household and farm; it is to be guaranteed at least at its minimum across the landscape of south Asia. This threshold level of human capacity is the economic capacity of human agency that is in need to be guaranteed for all on an equal basis as a matter of the moral-need-right.

A goal-right system of principles and actions motivated by and culminating in capacity of basic-needs-meeting as part of the capability set that is conducive to capacity-creation may be justified on grounds of failures of principal institutions in the society. In the goal-right perspective, surplus producing capacity of basic-needs-meeting of a rational and reasonable peasant actor in the countryside is to be accorded the moral status of an overriding goal of human person and agency, a fundamental right of individual citizen in a constitutional democratic welfare society, and most importantly, a basic need of the vulnerable human beings in adversity.

Under the framework of classical liberalism that advocates and confers the process–freedom to be assigned to individuals, the notion of individual liberty implies the right to the allocation of use-rights and benefit-rights in human capacities. There is a third component of human capacity - the rent-rights of capacity, and this is not conferred under the process-freedom. The rent depends on the quality of the capacity (such as its productivity for a productive capacity) of an individual, and the quality of human capacity reflected in the labour productivity is a function of genetic luck, health-care, education and

training, and disposition to work. A fraction of the rent-right ought to be distributed on the principles of equality for justice in society.

Agential (Surplus Productive Capacity) Egalitarian Distribution

Egalitarianism is the ideology of valuing equality. Equality is fair and inequality is unfair. Equality is constitutive of fairness and justice, and therefore contrarily, inequality is constitutive of injustice and wrong-doing. Over the last three decades, the normative principles of distributive justice designed to allocate the 'goods' in limited supply relative to demand, for example, the income, wealth and opportunity, are a matter of intense debate in the Anglo-American world.

In matter of fairness motivation of people and choice of principles in preference ordering, Morton Deutsch (1985) lists three principles of equality, equity and need. David Miller (1976) also lists principles of desert, need and rights. John Scott, et al. (2001) have as well noted three principles of equality, equity/merit, efficiency and need, though Walzer (1983) lists the principles of need, desert and free exchange. John Elster (1992) lists efficiency, basic needs and desert in lexicographic order. In other words, there are at least three distribution principles that constitute justice in distribution in the literature: equity, equality, and needs-fulfilment.

One of the basic tenets of medieval Semitic religions of Christianity and Islam has been some form of equality among faith-abiding individuals. The Marxists have championed the cause of egalitarian concerns since nineteenth century. As late as in 1971, equality continued to play a central role in the theory and principles of justice, proposed by John Rawls (1971). Egalitarianism does play a central role in the ideas of justice of Amartya Sen (1999) and Ronald Dworkin (1978) as well. Whatever the 'rights' are and whatever way the 'rights' ought to get priority over or trump upon or include the 'goods', there must be equality/equity in the allocation, division and distribution of claims, rights and entitlements of individual persons.

In the modern formulations, justice as equality of original positions has implied equality of opportunities for individuals, and it has of late implied justice as equality of basic, fundamental and natural rights. Equality in access to opportunities is a chance to do or to obtain something with a course of action within one's power and control, and also be able to take that course of action and ensure the fructification of doing or obtaining that something – equality in human capability. Demand for equality of original positions, construed as equality of proportions, had been the most primitive and also the oldest notion, dating from the writings of Aristotle and Greek philosophy. Equality in original position through the provision of opportunities is contrasted with equality as end-state or outcomes. The notion of equality of outcomes got associated with the idea of justice much later.

Theoretical and empirical analysis of justice addresses the specific concern regarding determination of what is that something which people need or deserve. Agrarian egalitarian distribution justice requires resolution of the questions: equality of what or equality with regard to what thing? What ought to be the equalisandum, considered both as the good and the right in the goal-right system? Agrarian egalitarian transitional distributive justice ought to focus on and be concerned with the idea and conceptual discourse on the capacity of human agency - the egalitarian distribution of human productive and reproductive capacity.

Agrarian justice as hybrid moral action of minimization of affronts and harms ought to be characterised by a distinct and specific concern for instituting an egalitarian distributive system in rural society. Agrarian distributive justice in the goal-right system of hybrid morality framework requires an equitable distribution – equity or equality or needs-fulfilment. In contrast to commodity (including resources) and income (reflecting the level of welfare in terms of access to utility), it is the human capacity that ought to be equalized for the sake of egalitarian distribution.

The recognition of need for achieving equality in the distribution of material surplus producing capability and concomitant relative opportunity aspect of positive freedom to enjoy the fruits of it by all peasantries and rural labourers in an equal manner is what ought to be explored as the singular pedestal of a deliberated scheme of enhancing agrarian distributive transitional justice. It is only recently that Amartya Sen (1999), Martha

Nussbaum (1992;2006) and their followers have favoured a conception of justice that insists on equality in human capability.

The argument is worth defending that agrarian egalitarian distributive justice ought to be grounded in the contemporaneous empirical facts and historically-inherited conditions of cooperation and endemic conflicts in the allocation, exchange and distribution of not only material resources and commodities but also human capacities (substantive capacities to produce a reproductive surplus) among actors in the countryside. The classical political discourse on the restoration of the rights of citizens through the rule of law, subsequent to harm/damage/violation, is in need to be jointed with the modern socio-economic discourse on equality/equity through distribution and redistribution of rights to resources, commodity and income.

1.3. Conceptual Relational Design and Diagram

Our method of analysis of conceptual categories related with the notion and idea of agrarian justice in a theoretical perspective and description of empirical data pertaining to south Asian contexts of society and economy follows a conceptual design that arranges the categories, concepts and data in their relations with each other. Our conceptual framework is constituted by the words, jargons, terminologies and categories that are put inside the box in the arrow diagram. Non-boxed items are outside the scope of study and thus, their definitions are not attempted either here in this methodology chapter or elsewhere in the thesis.

The arrow diagrams are used to represent the designs on the relations among concepts, theoretical categories and empirical data-categories pertaining to south Asia. The arrow diagram and Venn diagrams are presented here to pictorially represent the conceptual design and theoretical perspective of the study that is pursued in the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters of the thesis.

An arrow symbol is a deictic reference frame, identifying three different areas that contain the components of the arrow diagram. These three areas are referred to as the "*tail slot*", the

"*head slot*", and the "*body slot*". Each component of an arrow diagram is uniquely assigned to one of these three slots, thereby making the distinction of tail components, body components, and head components. These slots are conceptual rather than physical areas, and to understand the semantics of each arrow in a diagram is often a fundamental first step for the correct understanding (Bertin, 1983).

Arrows are a major component of diagrams, and with their simple shape, "*arrows*" capture a large variety of semantics, such as directions, movements, changes, interactions, sequences, and relations among categories of description and analysis. The arrow symbols alone, however, do not determine any specific meanings. The meaning of an arrow is organized when the arrow symbol refers to other surrounding elements. The combination of an arrow symbol and the elements to which the arrow symbol refers is considered a unit of meaning, and called an arrow diagram. The structural properties of arrows contribute to the interpretation of arrows. The elements to which the arrow symbol refers are called the "*components*" of the arrow diagram.

Arrow Diagram – 1.1

Liberty, Identity and Action



Arrow Diagram – 1.2

Rationality and Akrasia



Arrow Diagram – 1.3

Human Agency and Capacity



Arrow Diagram – 1.4

Justice and Injustice


Justice and Injustice as Human Action
Government Institutional Ethos
Civil Society Ethos
Civil Society Ethos
Injustice as "patterns of structural social disadvantages" requiring redress by sustained actions of the collective entity of government through Policy
Injustice as "episodes of individual malevolent acts" that stand in need of individual redress through rational and reasonable security and contracting and bargaining
Injustice as "events of harms to body, mind and soul of oneself" due to sufferings from apatheia, akanisia, akrasia, athymormia requiring redress by improvement in mental health, education and training of oneself

Arrow Diagram – 1.5

Agrarianism, Redistribution and Social Protection



Arrow Diagram – 1.6

Morality, Justice and Good Governance


Plural Morality of the Goods and the Rights
Transitional Distributive Justice
Theoretical and Practical Object-given, Value-centered Reasons
Private-Public Partnership Hybrid Action
Axiotima
Comprehensive and Meaningful Rationality
Surplus Producing Capacity
Partly-Akratic and Partly-Rational Agency and Person
Distribuandum
Public Policy of Taxation and Expenditure and Social Policy
Good Governance of Agrarian Justice and Social Protection Policy

To elaborate the diagram, a human being is identified with three essential entities: physical body and its skill, being capable of forming desires and entertaining beliefs about oneself and the world surrounding, and the mental capacity to think and deliberate about facts and consideration in life. On the other hand, it is highly essential that a human being is being free, in a position of freely acting and being free to act. These three dimensions of liberty and freedom ought to be the identity and value of human life. It is with such arsenals that a human being's principal identity is established by virtue of the fact that being acts. Action is the principal feature but the orchestration of the action is always constrained by the

external situation and environment (refer to arrow diagram – 1.1). The human action is not possible unless the heuristic of rationality is assumed. There are but a number of conception of human rationality, ranging from individualist, maximising rationality to collective, altruistic rationality. There are possibilities of not only perfect but also imperfect rationality of human beings. The neoclassical economics has but extolled the virtues and functionalities of a very narrow conception of rationality, and classified it into means-, ends, and belief –rationality. One ought to acknowledge the fact of the akrasia as a situation of weakness of the will where there may be a gap between disposition and action. The rationality may be also bounded and constrained (refer to arrow diagram – 1.2).

In addition to rationality and the capacity of a human being to be rational, reasonable and informed agency in disposition and action, the significant human capacity is the capacity to consume and produce. The capacity to be able to produce what a human being essentially consumes to survive and lead a decent life in this world is a highly significant capability. In the classical political economy, the human capacity to produce a surplus over and above the essential consumption requirement has been extolled. There are three dimension of such a productive capacity of a human being in the household, on the farm and on the market: social, technical and economic (refer to arrow diagram – 1.3).

It is with regard to the human capacity to produce a surplus or surplus productive capacity that a demand for promoting justice and minimize injustice may be conceived as a demand for a specific human action in the civil societal ethos and a public institutional environment. Injustice may also be conceived as human actions or events of harms to body, mind and soul of oneself due to sufferings from apatheia, akanisia, akrasia, athymormia requiring redress by improvement in mental health, education and training of oneself. The theory ought not to ignore such facts of human life (refer to arrow diagram – 1.4).

Our work is a based on using the insights from at least two academic disciplines of economics and ethics to understand the meaning of the social movement of agrarianism. It has been the issue of distributive justice that joins the common concern of agricultural economics and agrarian ethics. In addition to distribution of resources, commodities and human capacities, the concern has been also for affirmative action and redistribution at both

interpersonal and societal level. Agrarian justice, complemented with a concern for universal social policy for protection and security, has been the arena of application of standards of human action as proposed in moral theory – the casuistry (refer to arrow diagram – 1.5).

The concern for justice as manifestation of the features of human action, morality and good governance are all related. Beginning from the morality of the goods and the morality of the rights, the transitional distributive justice e through attempts at equalization of human surplus productive capacity requires an affective governance format of the implementation of taxation and expenditure policy of the government. It is the interactive setting of private individuals and the public authority that is essential for achieving the agenda of agrarian justice in a society (refer to arrow diagram – 1.6).

While the elaboration of the one-way, two-way and multiple-way feeding, dependency, interdependency and conditioning and causal relations among conceptual categories are in terms of the language-description, the pictorial representations are also in terms of boxed Arrow diagrams, Venn diagrams and tabular format.

Remarks

The methodology of the overall thesis is a compound one, as it is grounded on a triangular foundation of three frameworks: theoretical account of the conception of agrarian justice, empirical analysis of social and economic conditions in south Asia, and prescription of an alternative agrarian social policy and design of governance. There are issues of hitherto prevailing public welfare and redistribution policy. The prevalent social policy has been ad-hoc in orientation and residual in nature. It is the deficits and failures of the existing public policy of welfare and redistribution and growth-with-justice in south Asia that is the issue. There has been a pervasive governance failure in a matter of execution and implementation. In the alternative framework that is developed towards the end chapter of the thesis on the basis of methodology followed, it is argued that the governance of agrarian justice and social policy is required to be improved.

The chapter is divided into three principal sections and a brief concluding section at the last.

In the first section, the concept of morality is visited. The role of interpersonal morality in human action is also dealt with. Moral and morality has been a debatable and a matter of conflict of opinions in moral philosophy.

In the second section, the morality of the good and the moral philosophy of utilitarianism are discussed. The evaluative criterion of allocative efficiency of neoclassical economic approach variant is described. It is the criterion of evaluation of human actions that has been focused at the maximization of the 'goods' in society under the influence of utilitarianism. Such a criterion is narrow, and therefore, discarded in our project.

Third section deals with the morality of the rights and deontology. The morality of the goods and the morality of the rights are contrasted in historical perspective. The perspective of human rights and human needs are positioned to highlight another popular criterion. The 'right to equity/equality in productive capacity' is argued to be superior, realistic and worthwhile, and arguments are borrowed from the literature on deontology and the classical political economy.

We conclude with the discussion on the concepts of hybrid morality. A discussion on the features and arguments of rationalist morality thesis is also put forward. While a part of the first hypothesis is tested, a part of the first objective of the thesis is also addressed here in this chapter.

In a doctrine of agrarianism, it is a matter of substantive meaning as well as of analytical significance to accommodate a conception of hybrid and mixed morality – a morality of the goal-right system. A conception of hybrid morality is one that simultaneously creates an ought-abidance imperative for pursuit of the goods of something as well as seeking of the rights to something. This is required by the circumstances of justice in concrete societies which are not fully democratic and liberal. What is happening in the world and how the human lives are going in the world requires consequence-sensitivity in preference, choice and actions of individuals. The centrality of human lives in reasons assessment of the world in which we live is to be appreciated.

One of the influential advocates of a similar position has been Amartya Sen (1995), who has rejected the notion of preference-independent, consequence-detached perspective of rights of men/women, and rather favored a system of consequentialist-procedural approach. While 'no direct and basic importance' is attached to 'rights and liberties' in the evaluation of states of affairs in the utilitarian framework of analysis, the consequential analysis can still be employed in inverse form to determine which rights to protect.

To go back to the history of literature on the moral discourse, the most prominent paradigm of a hybrid moral theory, that is, a goal-based ethical theory of rights, is the utilitarianism-consequentialism. The social welfare theory employs a hybrid moral theory – emphasizing the goodness of utility and the property and exchange rights. The 'neoclassical' social welfare theory under the framework of utilitarianism-consequentialism emphasizing the goods is a hybrid moral theory. It is a hybrid of utilitarianism, libertarianism and liberalism that emphasize, in addition to subjective aims and goals of individuals, the concerns for welfare rights, property rights and rights to liberty, and constitutional public choice (Roth, 2002, pp.14-7).

In ethics, there are two mainstream and dominant theories of the "good" and of the "right". The moral theories of consequentialism and deontology have framed and formulated the specific standards to appraise the action of a human agency. There is a tradition in philosophy in which the 'the goods' are specified independent of 'the rights' and also a tradition which asserts the priority of 'the rights' (an agent-relative entity) over 'the goods'

(an agent-neutral entity). There is however a possibility of synthesizing the two systems. Hybridization in conceptualization exercises to accommodate the plurality of views on morality and justice is further reinforced by the facts of fluidity characterising the categories of deliberation, intentionality, disposition and action in moral philosophy.

Utilitarianism has been a hybrid moral theory but it has principally been a goal-based theory in which there has been no duty to respect rights and no duty to promote just institutions. It is not a genuine goal-right system of evaluation of human behavior, conduct and action. Pareto-optimal or efficient outcomes cannot accommodate the lexical priority of rights. The fluid conception of public good and institutional fluidity, that is, instituionless and value-free normative enterprise of utilitarianism has been conducive to \suggesting no institutional imperative to promote justice as a procedural notion.

So far as utilitarianism has been a rights-based moral theory, it has been able to assign merely an instrumental role to unattenuated property and exchange rights of individuals. It is a theory grounded in consequentialist, procedurally-detached and intendedly value-free theorisation about welfare, accommodates the moral force of the goods (though the 'ends', 'final aims' or goods are subjective in nature) as well as the rights, and fails to accommodate any plausible understanding of justice as mutual advantage and justice as impartiality because it fails to reconcile with the moral force of rights and their correlative duties (Roth, 2002).

Amartya Sen has broadened the conception of consequentialism in his notion of "comprehensive outcome" (rather than merely "culmination outcome") to be considered as representing the process as well as the end-state together. In the alternative hybrid goal-right system of morality, respecting individual rights is now also constitutive of the moral theory of utilitarianism championed by the discipline of neoclassical economics[23]. In the

[23] A similar appreciation is but not possible for Vilfredo Pareto. It is true that 'a conception of individual rights is *'constitutive of the Pareto system'.* It is axiomatic in Pareto's scheme that each person is sovereign over her preferences. It was however Pareto's denial of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons that had the effect of importing *'a powerful doctrine of individual autonomy into the core logic of utilitarianism'.* The system established by him created, analytically speaking, *'moral space for the Enlightenment ideal of individual rights'.* A close inspection however reveals it to be a narrow, and it cannot find *'many adherents among the vulnerable or*

framework of consequentialist-procedural approach to demand for justice, it is the equality of capability of human agency that is significant.

Ronald Dworkin (1978) has recently championed a goal-based ethical theory of rights, at the centre of which is the element of 'responsibility'. What is meant by a "responsibility" for an action is the accountability and answerability for the action and its consequences. Moral responsibility for an action includes the accountability and answerability and in addition, the "liability for praise and blame" for the action and its praiseworthy and blameworthy consequences.

The principal criticism has however been one advanced by Bernard Williams (1981) and Peter Winch (1972). Both had in their own respective ways resented over the tendency that traditional moral theories had attempted to be complete and hierarchically ordered, attempted to provide picture of ethics as a 'decision procedure for moral reasoning' and acted as a 'calculus of action'. In the neo-Aristotelian ethical thought of Phillipa Foot (1978), and Martha Nussbaum (1990), the traditional focus is found to have been shifted from the conception of action to that of the conception of character, and likewise from the choice to the perception and judgment, and from the narrow conception of morality to a broad conception of good life. A brod reallife conception of accommodative morality has to address all such concerns of Ronald Dworkin, Bernard Williams, Peter Winch, Phillipa Foot and Martha Nussbaum.

2.1. Morality

Rationality and morality are two core heuristics that have so often been used in modelling the relation among postulate of human rationality, personal agency, practical

---

dispossessed'. It is a fact that affluent people possessing the commodities which the dispossessed and vulnerable populations need can *'induce them to agree "voluntarily" to become prostitutes, to work for starvation wages, to sell themselves into indentured servitude, or perhaps in some cases, even into slavery'*. There are genuine arguments that a Pareto-superior move from the status quo may not be a good reason to accord it legitimacy *'if it involves humiliation, exploitation, or something worse'* (Shapiro, 2004, pp. 43-55).

reasons and actions of human beings. Morality is a significant category because it is considered something 'practical' in the sense that it is something that is considered 'action-guidance' for agency. In common parlance, the terminologies of 'moral belief', 'moral consideration', 'moral duty' and 'moral reason' are frequently used as substitutable phraseology for 'action-guidance'. Moral reasons play a conduct-guiding role. Morality is action-guidance.

Joan Robinson (1962), a famous Cambridge economist, has gone to the extent of remarking that the moral categories of conscience, altruism and shame are nearly ingrained in and certainly part of the biology of human beings. Morality is an integral part of ideal human life of a person and a rational agency. In individual man and woman, there is always a sense of shame, conscience, and of course, egoism. The sense of shame is *'natural and universal',* but just what it is that causes shame depends upon convention. Morality has *'a physical basis and arises out of biological necessity'.* There is altruistic emotion also, which is *'strong enough to evoke self-sacrifice from a mother defending her young'.* The egoism in the species is but what is necessary for biological survival. It is the egoism in men that creates '*a strong urge to get food for himself and to defend his means of livelihood*', and also to '*fight for the interests of his mate and his young* (Robinson, 1962, pp. 4-9)'.

Philosophically speaking, morality is often used as a term of approval. It is a term of approval since it is a social concept that requires submission to a tradition. It is often the content of human conscience; it is the psychological concept. It is an integral part of ideal human life of a person and a rational agency. Moral and morality is also used as a classificatory term. In a classificatory scheme, it is used to distinguish good/bad, right/wrong, privilege/obligation. The standard theories of rightness and wrongness, and their applications to classes of human actions are dealt in the normative ethics. Morality may refer to a certain kind of 'conduct', belief about conduct or 'principle' of good conduct. Moral evils are the self-interestedness, favouritism and partiality.

In common, parlance, when we invoke morality we mean moral principles - principles which are characterised as rational, impersonal, objective, impartial, critical and universal.

Moral evils are the self-interestedness, favouritism and partiality. Those who invoke 'moral principle' insist that a moral person learns to resist and control one's always present self-regarding tendencies. Moral principles are regarded a statements picking out those factors of situations which can be appealed to as moral reasons. A moral principle indicates some factor which is generally relevant to what ought to be done. The morality of principles requires adherence to and compliance with a rigid code of conduct and behavior creation principles. Moral principles are not merely principles, on which a person must always act without making exceptions but they are principles meant for everybody.

Be that as it may, the academic terrain is however not so settled and unitary in agreement. In philosophical literature, there have been a number of phrases which have been in use; for example, 'moral point of view', 'moral law', 'moral principle', and also 'moral obligations'. In order to clarify 'morality', the notion of 'moral point of view' became a popular slogan in the 1960s and 1970s. The moral point of view is characterized by a formal and a material condition. The formal condition is that a man cannot be said to have adopted the moral point of view unless he is prepared to treat the moral rules as principles rather than mere rules of thumb. The material condition is this that the rules must be for the good of everyone alike.

In short, morality, moral point of view, moral rule, moral code and moral principle is socially-beneficial ought-abidance norm that guides the human conduct and action. The test of a definition and the understanding of the moral and morality is not its correctness or incorrectness but rather the purpose it serves in human life (Whiteley, 1959-60, pp. 21-2). It generally serves the purpose of distinguishing the valuable things and actions in terms of the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, and the expedient and the obligatory in human life. Morality is an act of 'socially-beneficial' 'ought-abidance' on the formal as well as material criteria of guidance to action.

Common-sense morality refers to a certain kind of 'conduct', a sort of belief about conduct, and quite often, a 'principle' of good conduct. There are certain things that each of us ought to try to achieve. Each one of us has a view about the nature of morality. The dictum is: '*each does what, of the acts available, best achieves one's moral aims*' (Parfit,

1986, p. 50-8). It is to such an understanding that a famous passage the English philosopher, David Locke, is often quoted: '*But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures and left it to Aristotle to make them rational ..... He has given them a mind that can reason without being instructed in methods of syllogising*'.

Morality refers to both 'individual' as well as 'societal' norms that may guide the conduct of an action. There is individual morality based on conscience and social morality based on collective convention. In the traditionalist account, the words 'right' and duties' refer to the positive social morality. In a rationalist account, the word 'ought' is independent of the positive morality and an adherence to "ought to" constitutes the individual autonomous morality. The individual morality based on conscience is a formal morality while social morality requires as its basis the collective convention. Mature morality is socially beneficial ought-abidance, prescribing material as well as a formal criterion for the use of 'moral'.

Fundamental Debate

In moral philosophy, the discourse of moral and morality is certainly not a neatly settled tract. Way back in the year of 1967 (nearly fifty years back in time), what problems a monist and puritan conception of morality may face in the real concrete world of human beings was highlighted by two renowned authoritative voices in moral philosophy – David Gauthier (1967) and William Frankena (1967). There are two characteristics commonly associated with morality – *'first, a willingness to make sacrifices, and second, a concern with fairness?'*(Gauthier, 1967). The 'moral' man, in being trustworthy, is thus required to make certain sacrifices. To characterize morality as a system of principles advantageous to all is however *'not to answer the question 'why should I be moral?' nor is it to provide for those considerations of fairness which are equally essential to our moral understanding'* (Gauthier, 1967, pp. 246-50).

The very notion of morality has been a question for William Frankena (1967) – the moral philosopher with encyclopedic orientation: What is that something about which one can say

that it is *'moral' or a 'morality'*? In other words, morality is sometimes used as equivalent to *'rightness' or 'moral goodness', or 'the moral quality of an act or person'*. In one formulation, '*morality' must consist of 'the rules or principles of duty and obligation'* and in another, it must consist wholly of *'the ideals of virtue or moral goodness'*. Moral' is also often used, not as the opposite of immoral, but as the opposite of non-moral. It is variously agreed that an individual or group may have *'a morality without being morally good, living rightly, or having a good life'*. It only underlines the imperative that defining the 'moral' and 'morality' is thus more urgent than defining the 'rights' or the 'goods'. What are the *'necessary and sufficient conditions'* of something's being called moral or morality? (Frankena, 1967, pp. 146-8). These are interesting questions

Moreover, morality, with its dual emphasis on rationality and sociality, *'represents a bet'* that these two requirements do coincide in the world of human beings. Though such a coincidence has not been disproved decisively as yet and such a coincidence cannot be proved full-proof *'in our present state of knowledge',* we ought *'to build this bet into our future concept of morality too'* (Frankena, 1967, pp. 170-1). It is for such problems that there has been an opposition to a rigid conception of morality in a manner that there is of late a similar opposition to a rigid notion of rationality (much on it in the fourth chapter of the present work).

Kurt Baier (1958) and William Frankena (1973) championed the notion of moral point of view. Phillipa Foot (1954), Elizabeth Winscombe (1958) and Bernard Williams (1974) criticized it. The anti-universalist and anti-abstraction theories have challenged this notion of a 'moral point of view'. The moral point of view theories have been accused of a lot of sins like indifference, abstraction, alienation, context-insensitivity, impersonality, objectification.

Phillipa Foot (1958) remarked that a man *'cannot make his own personal decision about the considerations'* which are to count *'as evidence in morals',* because there is some sort of relations between the *'concepts of harm, advantage, benefit'* and importance on the one hand and different *'moral concepts, such as rightness, obligation, goodness, duty and*

virtue' on the other. Though they are *'so related seems undeniable',* there is however a need of more patient investigation into such a relation (Foot, 1958, p. 184).

'*Moral arguments break down more often than philosophers tend to think'.* It is quite common for one man to *'be unable to see what the other is getting at'* and this sort of misunderstanding is not resolvable by '*argument in the ordinary sense'*. People argue about *'what is right, good, or obligatory'*. People also argue about a certain character trait or *'a virtue'*. They do not confine their remarks to *'the adducing of facts which can be established by simple observation or by some clear-cut technique'*. The fact is that such subtle or profound discussion of character can be settled more by appeal to *'experience and imagination'* (Foot, 1958, p. 187).

William Frankena (1967, p. 154) quotes Tillich (1957, p.148) to remark that the famous theologian, Richard Rothe, was of the opinion that the word 'morality' should be excluded from all scientific treatment of ethics. Given its manifold connotations and contradictory meanings, the term 'morality' cannot be saved for any useful definition. An attempt to define morality or moral is thus futile. Moreover, morality is not always successful in guiding action. It is not only with regard to the notions, ideas and concepts of rationality (reason) and morality (ought-abidance) that the abstract universal formulations are meeting the danger of fluidity but also with regard to the very concept of human agency and action.

To revisit the academic disciplines of moral philosophy, moral is not considered at all a subdivision of language or of logic. Morals have neither vocabulary nor idioms of its own. There are but moral discourses. Socrates and Aristotle have been pioneer of such discourse and its relation with the character and virtues of men. A majority of men do not attend to the sense of honor but rather follow their pleasures and passions (Kirchner, 1989, pp. 54-7). Moral discourse is but significant. Moral discourse is relevant to the formulation of public policy within the context of a social contract between private autonomous agency and government.

Long time back, Aristotle reasoned out that the child's actions turn out to be for the most part '*involuntary'*. It is during the adulthood that the agent is able to deliberate and organize

his life. An acquired status is developed through education and training. Once an acquired state have been voluntarily reached, it is not possible to get out of them by a mere intention to do so. It is not the moral discourses that are able to make '*virtuous men'*. Such discourses however do stimulate and also encourage young and noble men. These have but no effect on the majority of men who appear to act for fear of punishment.

Morality is to be conceived as an activity, enterprise, institution, or system whose aim is to guide and influence action, to regulate what people do or try to become or at least what oneself does or tries to be (Frankena, 1967, p.151). The aim of morality and normative[24] science is not merely to know, explain and understand an activity, enterprise, institution, or system.

2.2. Contrasting Moral Appraisal

In an appraisal, assessment and evaluation of human action, the matters of morality ('right and wrong') are distinguished from, and often contrasted with, the matters of taste or preference, and matters of convenience or expediency. Morality is not an exercise in positive analysis. Philosophically speaking, men have multiplicity of conflicting pictures of

---

[24] Stephen Ziliak in another entry in the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (2nd Edition) remarked about the 'normative':

> *The word normative descends from the Latin norma, meaning a carpenter's T-square, a rule, or a prescription. In ordinary English, a norm is what is expected, what is customary, what is habitual. In mathematics, the norm is a standard unit. In economic discourse, ever since John Neville Keynes (1852–1949) published his influential On the Scope and Method of Political Economy (1891), normative conflates the Latin norma and the ordinary English norm, yielding something like, as Keynes put it, a "regulative science ..... a body of systematized knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be" ..... So if an economist assumes in an economic model, following the positive approach of Milton Friedman (1912–2006) and Gary S. Becker, that people have, for instance, a "taste for discrimination" (Becker [1957] 1971) or excessive partying or nationalism, then at minimum economists are obliged to state that they are examining the wanton, and not the reflective, side of human life. But that move, Hirschman and Sen would probably agree, reveals a normative judgment in positive economics. It makes transparent the assertion of human wantonness. Normative and positive continue to figure prominently in social science discourse and education. But the distinction rests on the so-called fact/value dichotomy, long collapsed (p. 535).*

ideal images and forms of a human life. Such ideal images and forms of human life are not agenda of a positive analysis[25]. A human actor speaks the language of morality to appeal to considerations of interest, advantage and the good (beneficial). A human actor does also often speak the language of morality to impress upon his/her fellows their duties and obligations, and urge them with appeals to what are considerations of privilege, obligatory and right (correct).

There are contrasting morality of the good and morality of the right. Teleology considers actions in terms of contribution to the goodness as a consequence and outcome. The ethics of ends evaluated by consequences and the ethics of goods are examples of teleology. The school of ethical thought connected with utilitarianism-consequentialism often champion the cause of moralities of goodness, while school of ethical thought connected with deontology has advocated the moralities of rightness/wrongness. For a utility based theory of beneficial human action, principal categories are action, good, efficiency and growth and development while for a rights based theory rules and institutions, the categories are the rules, rights, justice and equality (refer to arrow diagram – 2.1). Deontology considers actions to be intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of the consequences of actions; there

---

[25] Stephen Ziliak in an entry in the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd Edition, remarked about the 'positive':

> *In the context of French social thought, the words positive science were first uttered, it seems, by Madame de Staël (1766–1817), the eccentric thinker, writer, socialite, and associate of Romantic and scientific utopians of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Gordon 1991, p. 271) ..... Historians of ideas typically end their trace of positive social science with the originators of modern sociology, that is, with Henri Saint Simon (1760–1825) and his disciple, Auguste Comte (1798–1857). Thus the linguistic turn from positive science to positive social science .....One way to define it is to name what its diverse advocates claim it is not: positive social science is not old school metaphysics, and it is not a normative branch of science, such as welfare economics or applied ethics. Against the speculative metaphysics of Plato (427–347 BCE) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), for example, and against the value judgments of moralists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Comte and the contemporary philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002), positive social scientists are united in their attempt to understand and explain the sensory world in objective, logical, factual, and value-neutral observational terms ..... Logical positivists took Hume's fork to be the whole scientific meal, a belief that rapidly entered the mainstream of social scientific thought. Only scientific statements were to be accepted as "cognitively meaningful." And only axiomatic and value-neutral statements about the facts of the world would count as science. Value judgments— especially judgments of an ethical kind—were said to be the province of preachers and poets, objectively speaking, "meaningless," no guide to social or economic policy.*

are no references to value or goodness in deontology. Both the ethics of duty and obligation and the ethics of rights are the examples of deontology.

Arrow Diagram – 2.1

Paradigms of Assessment of Human Action


Theories of Human Action
Utility Based Theory Of Good Action Of Individual Being
Rights Based Theory of Right Rules of Institutions and Systems
Capability Based Theory of Virtue of Human Existence And Flourishing
Principal Categories: Action, Good, Goods, Efficiency, Growth
Principal Categories: Rules, Right, Rights, Justice, Equality
Principal Categories: Beings, Excellence, Virtues, Character, Human Flourishing
Utilitarianism
Deontology
Virtue ethics
Efficient Allocation of Goods Based On Preferences, Choice, Goals of Individuals
Just Distribution of Rights
Virtuous Utilization of Resources

In standard formulations of political philosophy, moral philosophy and ethics[26], a human being is posited to be endowed with the traits of rationality. For a personal agency who

[26] Ethics is a normative science of human conduct, behaviour and voluntary actions. In ethics, the description, analysis and study of human conduct is undertaken by expressing an opinion about its value, and a judgement is made about its goodness, fairness and rightness. Moral philosophy examines the validity and truth status of these standards for personal conduct and personal responsibility of autonomous individuals in the society, while ethics sets the standards of judgement of human conduct, behaviour and voluntary actions.

takes a decision to act and performs an action, there are facts and factitive entities in the world that counts as 'considerations'. These are 'reasons for action' – practical reasons. Such an agency has a capacity for the conception of the good as well as the conception of the right. The human agency who is involved in deliberating about the ideas of and performing the acts of distributive justice are rational and moral persons.

In philosophical ethics[27], moral philosophy and ethics, human agencies and persons are posited either to follow their aims (goals) to achieve and maximize the goods in the conduct of life or/and to show a concern about protection of their claims and furtherance of their rights in society. The moral theories are therefore typically characterized as either theories of the right or theories of the good: deontology and teleology (Goodin, 1993, p. 241). For utilitarianism, the ultimate end is the utility or satisfaction or happiness, the operational value is the efficiency and optimality and the basic abstract value is the good (the beneficial). For deontology, these are rights, justice and the right (the claim ort the entitlement). It is only in the virtue ethics, that the human virtue is the abstract value championed and the operational value is attainment of excellence through the ultimate ends of capability (refer to table – 2.1)

Table – 2.1

A System of Ethics

Objects Of Moral Evaluation	Values			
	Basic Abstract Values	Measurable Proxy /Operational Values	Axiomatic/ Ultimate Ends	Approaches
Human Acts	Good	Efficiency	Utility	Utilitarianism
Rules Of Institutions	Right	Justice	Rights	Deontology

There are but certain sciences in which the description, analysis and study of human conduct is undertaken without expressing any opinion about its value and without making any judgement about its goodness, fairness and rightness. These are the descriptive sciences of the disciplines of psychology and anthropology which must be contrasted with the normative science of ethics.

[27] The academic discipline of philosophical ethics is both a descriptive as well as normative science. In addition to ethics, the disciplines of aesthetics and logic are also normative sciences but these are not concerned about human conduct and action. Ethics is contrasted with psychology as well. A philosophical psychology is a study of the psychological states of humans and mental life of others but a moral psychology is concerned with the psychological states of desires, wanting, choice, preferences, happiness that are constitutive of psychological wellbeing and welfare. Ethics as a normative science is in contrast to the science of positive analysis.

Human Beings	Virtue	Excellence	Capability	Virtue Ethics

Source: Adapted from Shionoya, 2005, p. 21

Bernard Williams (1980) contrasted between morality that is a peculiar institution and ethics that is concerned with the broad question of how to live. Rationalist accounts provide us with reasons, but leave us without an answer to the question why we should act in accordance with them. There are short-sighted egoist and enlightened egoist and there are short-range sacrifices contrasted with long-range benefits. There are morals which embody the '*wisdom of a given society'*. An enlightened long-range egoist may adopt the rules of thumb as prima-facie maxims, though moral talk is impossible for consistent egoists.

Morality of the Goods

In ancient Greek philosophy, goodness has been the property of the objects of the world. The "idea of the good" (i.e., the form of the good) is the ultimate object of knowledge, according to Plato. Goodness is the product of knowing truth. In a system introduced by Cicero, the Roman jurist, in western philosophy, it is an end in itself. "Summum Bonum" is a Latin expression meaning the "highest good". In hedonist philosophy, simple "pleasure" is the ultimate good. In utilitarianism, virtue ethics, deontology and rational Eudaemonism, the highest good is the "maximum happiness for maximum number of people", "flourishing", "duty", and a combination of "virtue and happiness" respectively. The concept of goods in philosophy is a broad concept dealing with happiness, charity, life and justice, and is contrasted with "evil" as well.

David Hume (1751; 1777) has asked rather rhetorically: '*what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, is also the true interest of each individual?*' Though David Hume put it forward in a rhetorical way, it is but not a rhetorical question in reality. In moral philosophy and ethics, there is a contest, and often contradiction, between the morality of the good and the morality of the right. Such contrasts raise a real-life question: Can we speak to the same effect in the language of prudence, appealing to considerations of interest, advantage and the good? Right from the writings of Plato to the writings of the

present time, the belief has withstood that '*duty cannot be reduced to interest*', and that morality may '*require the agent to subordinate all considerations of advantage*' (Gauthier, 1967, p. 235).

With goods come the choice and preference. The goods are things which have positive effects on human wellbeing, flourishing and lives. There has been a dominant tradition of valuing the 'goods', acting with 'efficiency' to promote the good and evaluating the 'consequence' of human actions in terms of the promotion of the outcome of the goods. In this tradition, it is considered that a good is what is required, what is genuine, and what is valid. In utilitarian framework, the 'goods' are pleasures, benefits, and happiness. To deliver the goods means to do, accomplish and produce the thing required so as to satisfy. A good therefore is to be promoted and not to be harmed, damaged and disfigured.

In the mainstream economics, the "private goods" are posited to have the property of being both rivalrous and excludable in nature (that is individually consumed and subject to low-cost exclusion from benefits for those who do not pay for the right to receive such benefits), for example, food and cloth. The "common goods" have the property of being both rivalrous and nonexcludable in nature, for example, timber and coal (Hyman, 2010).

The "club goods" which have the property of being both nonrivalrous and excludable in nature , for example, cinema and park, and the "public goods" have the property of being both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable in nature, for example, air and defence (price-excludable public goods are however those that can be individually consumed and are subject to exclusion but their production or consumption are likely to generate externalities, for example, schooling, mass transit facility, and private and public hospitals; congestible public goods are those that are non-rival in consumption only up to a certain point beyond which exclusion from benefits of these goods are possible through application of certain fees, for example, roads, golf course).

Public goods are characterized by non-exclusion implying that it is too costly to develop a means of excluding those who refuse to pay from enjoying the benefits of a given quantity of public good. It is non-rival in consumption implying that its benefits cannot be withheld

from those who do not pay and are shared by large groups of consumers. The marginal cost of allowing additional people to consume a given amount of a good with non-rival benefits is zero. It is collectively consumed by entire population. Some public goods, such as world peace, might conceivably provide collectively consumed benefits to every single individual, no matter where they are on the face of the earth.

In practice, it is often difficult to draw a neat line between pure public good and pure private good (Hyman, 2010). Recreational services and faculties such as park and golf courses are supplied by both the government and the private sector. The provision of public good can be financed by both the revenue from sales and the taxes used to finance the subsidy. Efficiency requires that all economic activities be undertaken up to the point that their marginal social benefit is equated with their marginal social cost. This principle holds for pure public goods as well.

The marginal social benefit of any given amount of a pure public good is the sum of the individual marginal benefits received by all consumers. The voluntary contribution per unit of the public god of each member of the community equals her marginal benefit of the public good at the efficient level of output – Lindhal Prices, named after the Swedish economist, Eric Lindhal.

Morality of the Rights

In the alternative tradition of morality of the rights, 'rights' are the claims, privileges, immunities and power of individual agency. In political theory, analytical jurisprudence theory and normative theory, rights are not only considered the immunity and power but also the liberty. It is often affirmed that the rights control our sense of freedom and autonomy. Whenever we talk of right, we need to talk about freedom and coercion as well. It is also affirmed that the rights protect our interests and desires.

In the history of rights as these have originated in Rome and European countries, most popular rights have been the property rights and welfare rights. Property right includes the

right to exclusive use of one's property and the right that others not trespass on it; it also includes the liberty to use the property as one chooses. Welfare rights might be described as rights which create an unconditional duty on part of others to contribute. Social contract and natural rights theories were propounded in eighteenth century. In 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens was declared in France. In 1791, Thomas Paine wrote the Rights of Man. Greater attention was drawn towards human rights after Second World War during Nuremberg trial in 1945.

The Greeks had the laws of custom and convention. The language of rights and the intuitions that provided the structure of such rights however developed in a demanding culture of ancient Rome. The right of lex talions, a term coined by Cicero in Rome, was the right of retaliation or revenge. It evolved into a series of laws, rules and codes covering punishment, exchange for damage to the injured party and property rights. The natural rights theories developed as early as the high Middle Ages in Europe. In the twelfth century, cannon lawgivers began to ask whether a pauper could licitly take something from the superfluities of a rich man, in case he/she would perish without it. The accepted dictum was: a pauper in case of extreme necessity could legitimately take whatever he/she needed to survive. Necessity has no law. It became a standard doctrine in theology as well as civil law. Such doctrine continued unchallenged till the second half of the seventeenth century.

There has also been a tradition of championing the cause of 'divine rights'. The divine rights are conferred upon individuals by God. They are self-evident. Nowadays, it is popular anymore. The natural right is a non-descriptive normative concept. It is constant and immutable right attached to the human nature, and therefore, the natural right is neither conventional nor divine in nature. A person possesses such rights in virtue of his nature or humanity. The natural right is the right to acquire or retain something rather than of the right to do or to refrain from doing something. Some natural rights are universal and some are non-universal in nature. The natural rights theory slowly lapsed and lost the authority later.

Foundational rights are basic and primary rights. These rights are normally called human, moral or natural rights. They are inalienable. They are essential part of who we are as

human beings and require no proof since there are known by intuition. All human beings have certain natural rights and certain moral rights. Such rights are not created by the legal and social systems. The idea of the 'rights' is an agent-relative concept. There are civil, legal and political rights; there are social rights; there are contractual and promissory rights; and all these are conventional rights. These are implied rights which are of course derivative and secondary rights (Hoekema, 1986). Legal, constitutional and contractual rights are secondary and implied rights.

The conventional rights are created, conferred, granted and conceded to individuals by governments, states, legal systems and societies. The "rights" are resources deriving from norms, at the disposal of persons to deploy at their discretion in the pursuit of their own projects, subject to overriding reasons which may arise in particular cases. A right is used in dual senses of being correct and being the claim, privilege, immunity and power. A "right" is a thing that is antonym and contradiction of "wrong". It is anything that is opposite to the harm, mistake, and incorrect. Such rights are considered correct.

A right is always held by a person with respect to other person. All persons have certain rights simply as persons. A "right" is a claim of one on another, and therefore, it is the correlative of obligation, responsibility and duty. With rights come responsibilities and liabilities. The rights of someone entail a duty of non-interference with the rights of others and also a duty of contributing to the securing of rights of someone. Wherever there are rights, there are both positive and negative duties, responsibilities and obligations (Hohfeld, 1917; 1974).

There are correlative duties. 'To do good' is a positive duty. Not to do harm is a negative duty. Charity of someone makes one just a beneficiary of the goods. Kindness and charity is however different sort of duty; it is not moral duty. Benevolence and charity are "non-directed" duty. Right-holding is more than being merely a beneficiary of a directed duty. Not all duties are directed. A talk of duties owed to the "public" is merely shorthand of talking about duties owed to each and every citizen.

There are 'rights in something' and there are 'rights to something'. Rights in something are mostly the possession and acquisition, that is, entitlement to use and enjoy fruits. The 1974 Robert

Nozick's holdings entitlement theory of justice and rights is an example. Rights to something are promises and contracts, that is, due shares and obligations in leisure income as compensation that gives rise to the notions of compensatory justice and distributive justice. Nonetheless, the stipulative meaning of the rights is different from the descriptive usage meanings of the rights. The ways we use this word called "right" is ambiguous, incoherent, and loose and carry vague meanings. There is in actuality no common identical core of meaning attached to the terminology of "right", and it is difficult to define the term in its most generic sense. A conceptual hygiene exercise is often needed. The stipulative definition of rights should be derived from the linguistic intuitions about rights.

There are classic works on "rights" by Wesley Hohfeld, Stanley Benn, HLA Hart, Hillel Steiner and Feinberg. In contemporaneous political philosophy, Robert Nozick and Ronald Dworkin have prioritized the issues of rights in the literature. In the classic work, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1917) (1974) has talked in terms of "correlatives" and "contradictories" (opposites) to clarify the meaning of rights. Rights arise from claim, consent, recognition and what supervenes upon human nature.

The claim-right is correlative to duty, and a liberty is the contradictory of a duty. The right as power is correlative to liability, and the right as immunity is the contradictory of liability. A right is but primarily a moral concept. The character of moral rights differs in several respects from that of legal rights. Moral rights in the proper sense create corresponding duties, which may be either duties of noninterference or duties of contribution. Rights are directed and it entails a duty owing to someone and duty regarding someone. Someone having a duty means that some action or omission of a person is normatively required. This is the idea that whenever one is under a duty, other things being equal, one is required to do or omit some action.

Arrow Diagram – 2.2

Correlatives and Contradictions of Rights



Source: Hohfeld, 1974

There are three types of rights: legal, natural and moral. Wesley Hohfeld (1923) discovered four senses of the conception of legal rights: claim, privilege, power and immunity. The legal right is a right to claim something; it comes as correlative with duty. The legal right confers privilege to get something done; it is right without duty. The privilege is often the liberty. The legal right can also be in the form of power to effect changes in the legal relations. The legal right of immunity is a negation of liability.

The natural right is a right of an individual that supervene upon his nature, and thus, are inseparable from his nature. It is an inalienable right. An individual in state of nature does have natural right. It is a right of humanity. The natural right neither is nor created by claims, consent and recognition. It is independent of legal system and social environment. There is one central natural right: right to freedom and equality. This is a right belonging to all human beings by virtue of being simply a person. This is extra-legal and extra-societal right. In Rawl's theory of justice, such a right to freedom for all persons equally exists under the veil of ignorance.

Teleologists tend to maintain that an obligation to bring about some good consisting of the possession by someone of something to which he has a natural right can be overridden by an obligation to contribute to the attainment of some good other than the possession by someone of something to which he has such a right, whereas deontologists tend to maintain that it cannot be overridden (Lemos, 1986, pp. 54-5).

An important class of rights is comprised by rights not to have certain things done to one – the right not to be assaulted and the right not to be arrested without legal warrant. It is here that rights include second-order rights to protect the exercise of rights with force, if necessary. Second-order rights are the rights to "protect the exercise of rights" of the first-order. The state may be viewed as a system of social institutions to which individuals transfer their second-order rights to protect their rights. A second-order right provides a basis on which the use of coercion by governmental institutions can be morally defended. A distinctive feature of rights among moral concepts is the appropriateness of force or coercion to ensure their recognition. Rights are frequently asserted as a justification for the use of force.

2.3. Egoism, Utilitarianism and Deontology

In addition to the two broad classifications of schools of thought on morality, political and philosophical ideologies have developed variously over the last few centuries. In a survey of literature, it is evident that egoism is a doctrine of means that says that people ought to promote one's own good. There is a sense in which egoism is also universalistic, impersonal, and egalitarian. An egoist is claiming that the only unconditional obligation anyone has, regardless of who he may happen to be, is '*to act compatibly with the promotion of his own good*' (Ramon Lemos, 1986, pp. 15-28). Egoism is the theory that all human behaviour is (psychological egoism) or ought to be (ethical egoism) motivated entirely by self-interest. Interest "in" us are interests that one's own self have certain things, held to be good by the agent, which can be identified and possessed independently of the goods of others.

The desire to feel pleasure is the most widely held candidate for the status of fundamental motivator of all action, and pleasure is subjective, in the 'soul' or psyche of the agent. Interests "of" ourselves simply refer to whose interests they are, but not at all to what the interests are taken in- what they are aimed at affecting , either in or outside of ourselves. The so-called theory that we always act on motives of ours may therefore be called 'tautological psychological egoism". It is surely obvious that we are very interested in at

least some others, both positively (as with love) and negatively (as with hatred) (Narveson, 1998, pp. 15-6).

Egoism comes in two forms: teleological egoism and deontological egoism. Both teleological as well as deontological egoist may admit that certain things, such as pleasure or the satisfaction of desire, are intrinsically good, regardless of whose pleasure it is or whose desires are satisfied. The teleological egoist attempts to derive this obligation from an intrinsic good, whereas the deontological egoist does not. For the deontological egoist this obligation is ultimate and un-derived. In the literature, egoism is expressed in two variants: extreme version of egoism and moderate version of egoism. The extreme teleological egoist maintains that its source is that its fulfilment is either necessary for or else contributes to the attainment of one's own goods. Neoclassicism in economics is a hybrid of ethics of egoism, utilitarianism, libertarianism and liberalism that champions the values of individual liberty from undue interference, unfettered property rights of individual, aggregate human welfare, and constitutional public choice (Roth, 1974).

The moderate teleological egoist denies that the obligation in question is necessarily derivative from the fact that its fulfilment is necessary for or contributes to the attainment of one's own good. The moderate deontological egoist admits that there are certain non-teleological and non-egoistic prima facie obligations that do not issue from the fact that their fulfillment is necessary for or contributes to the fulfilment of one's unconditional obligation to promote one's own good. The extreme deontological egoist maintains that all non-teleological and putative non-egoistic prima facie obligations are in fact obligatory in particular situations if and only if an attempt to fulfil them is necessary for or contributes to the fulfilment of one's unconditional obligation to promote one's own good. The problem is that the claim that the only unconditional obligation anyone has is to act compatibly with the attainment of one's own good is inadmissible and contestable.

Axiological hedonism is a theory of intrinsic value, with two core components: first, all pleasure is intrinsically good; and, second, nothing but pleasure is intrinsically good. Ethical hedonism is the view that the moral rightness or wrongness of an act is a function of the pleasure the act produces. This view is logically distinct from axiological hedonism.

Genetic hedonism is the view that all of our present desires arose originally from our desire for pleasure. Psychological hedonism is the view that everyone is actuated, ultimately, by nothing but self-interest. Whenever a person acts, her ultimate aim is only to promote her own survival, her own pleasure, her own self-esteem, and so on. Epicurus, Bentham and Mill held the theory of hedonism. Axiological hedonism is not a theory about rightness or wrongness of actions though it figures prominently in theories of Jeremy Bentham (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1871).

Vilfredo Pareto (1971) remarked that the study of political economy is separate from that of morality, but it is not to assert that the former matters more than the latter. Political economy cannot be accused of not taking morality into account. It is a gross mistake to accuse a person who studies *'economic actions – or homo oeconomicus – of neglecting , or even of scorning moral, religious, etc., actions – that is the homo ethicus, the homo religious, etc.'* (Pareto, 1971, p.13).

A teleological conception is one in which the 'good' is specified independently of the 'right', though the 'rights' are distributed subsequently so as to maximize the 'good'. Teleology is thus an approach to ethics that evaluates actions on basis of the consequences of those acts, and utilitarianism is one kind of teleological ethics. In a goods-centric view in normative philosophy and economics, the goods are both means to an end (having instrumental value) and the ends-in-themselves (having intrinsic value). Consequentialism begins with a theory of the good and insists that the good ought to be promoted (Pettit, 1993, p. 231).

Questions of morality are largely questions of results. The dictum "ends justify the means" is an expression of this perspective on morality. Maximize benefits and minimize harms is the goal in teleological utilitarianism. A theory of ethics is a philosophical structure which together with some degree of empirical fact yields a decision procedure for moral reasoning (Williams, 1985), and consequentialism is one decision procedure. The 'felicific calculus' is the archetype of the decision theory that is accepted in economics.

Rational-desire teleology is the teleological conception of practical reason together with moral rationalism. The rational-desire teleology is centered at a view that the deontic status of an action is determined by the agent's reasons for and against preferring its outcome to those of the available alternatives. In the case that an agent is morally required to perform an action, then '*she has most reason to desire that its outcome obtains*' (Portmore, 2011, p.119). A rational-desire teleology contrasts with personal-value teleology as well as impersonal-value teleology (both are consequentialism).

Let us bring the matter in historical perspective! To revisit, Jeremy Bentham (1789) held that a person has a right whenever he/she stands to benefit from the performance of a duty. There are two points at which the individual rights and human agency figure importantly in Bentham's theory. There was insistence that *'the means to utility are privately produced',* and therefore, the role of the government is to create an environment in which people can enjoy the fruits of labour by *'protecting those fruits through the rule of law'.* The political party, Bentham established eventually became known as that of the "intellectual" or "philosophical" radicals - the party of "bourgeois doctrinaires". Second, Bentham embraced the idea that *'science allows us to understand and shape our destinies'* in much better ways than those *'based on religion, superstition, natural law, or blind impulse'.* Bentham embeds the Enlightenment aspiration to achieve freedom in *'a thoroughly determinist science'* (Shapiro, 2004, p. 36).

Classical utilitarianism as advanced by Jeremy Bentham was first and foremost a standard for judging the public action. The utilitarian ethic was pitted against the philosophy of natural rights and natural law. Utilitarianism had a lineage in the ideas and advocacy of British political and moral philosophy of the eighteenth century. Though the basic idea of moral theory of utilitarianism and the ethics of the 'goods' was pioneered by Francis Hutcheson (1725) and David Hume (1777) much earlier, this corpus of moral philosophy was eulogized and formalized by Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1871) and Henry Sidgwick (1874).

A distinction between the 'act-utilitarianism' and the 'rule-utilitarianism' was developed later in the writings of Richard Hare (1976; 1981) and Jack Harsanyi (1982; 1986). In

recent times, basic tenets of utilitarianism has been summarized by R F Harrod (1936), J C Smart and Bernard Williams (1973) and Amartya Sen and Bernard Willaims (1982). In the course of time, it ushered in the legal positivist tradition which now dominates Western jurisprudence (Charles Rowley, 1993, pp. 38-9).

Utilitarianism is committed to treating the good as an aggregative commodity, something that comes in greater or lesser amounts. The utilitarian conception of the public good embodies a definition of "good" in application to the whole community of persons rather than to individual members. It is a supra-individual 'good' to which is attributed the status of an independent existence and to which a goal is assigned that must be promoted. Most versions of utilitarianism have been welfarist, consequentialist, aggregative and maximizing. Epicurus, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill held the theory of hedonism. Axiological hedonism is not a theory about rightness or wrongness of actions though it figures prominently in theories of Bentham and Mill.

In the public sphere of the bureaucracy of the government, the foundation of utilitarian public policy analysis is based on the measurement of welfare. The utilitarian conception of the public good embodies a definition of "good" in application to the whole community of persons rather than to individual members. It is a supra-individual 'good' to which is attributed an independent existence and which must be promoted. In twentieth century, the utilitarian social welfare theory was advanced. Central to the social welfare theoretic enterprise is the distinction between efficiency in the sense of Pareto optimality and equity.

The social welfare theory has been based on two mathematised theorems about achieving Pareto optimality or efficiency in perfect and imperfect markets of the economy. The first theorem of the utilitarian social welfare theory is about the Pareto efficiency in a perfectly competitive market. The second theorem is about enhancing the Pareto efficiency in the imperfect market and the environment of externalities and public goods through lump-sum taxes and subsidies. Presently, the social welfare theory that is informed by a combination of utilitarianism and consequentialism deploys only one standard of moral appraisal of human action and working of social institutions, and that standard is called '*efficiency*' – better called the '*Pareto optimality'*.

Economics borrowed the concept of efficiency to refer to the competence and good organization *'in the use of and allocation of resources*' – principally the resources with a value or price in the market. In market setting, it is the standard that aims at "*getting the prices right*" as the desideratum (Roth, 2002, p. 12). The hallmark of efficiency in the uses of resources is the attempts at process '*cost minimization*' (Bannock et al., 1978, p. 144).

Economic efficiency, which is the exemplar par excellence of the idea of the morality of the goods in combination with the science of procedures of human action, requires that both the waste and technological cumbersomeness are avoided. In general, asking for efficiency is to inquire about the process of making the best use of limited resources of time, effort and money for a purpose and a task. It is measured by the output of goods and services divided by input, giving the maximum output of goods and services at minimum cost of time, effort and money. In general, efficiency characterizes the quality and attribute of the processes of activities of production, consumption and exchange in economics. While ethical equilibrium and political efficiency goes together, the competitive market equilibrium and economic efficiency goes together. In any economy, there are human agents and persons, but efficiency is an agent-neutral concept. It is applicable to human actions, and not the human agency – the performers of actions.

Economics has extolled the conceptions of '*exchange efficiency*' and '*allocative efficiency'*. Exchange efficiency refers to the production of goods that the consumer wants at the right time and in the right quantity and quality, providing for product innovation, variety of choice and so forth. In economics, what is popular is the concept of allocative efficiency which comprises of three efficiencies simultaneously: productive efficiency, product-mix efficiency, and efficiency in consumption. Allocative efficiency is of course a wider concept related to the economy as a whole as it refers to the maximum output of goods and services gained from available resources and existing technology at least cost (Daintith, 1983, p. 51).

Absence of allocative efficiency is the market failures, and the presence of allocative efficiency is possible without productive efficiency. The most popular conception of

economic efficiency has proceeded in the name of Pareto optimality. **Pareto optimality** criterion in the mathematised version is what is applied to estimate the allocative and otherwise efficiency in consumption, exchange and production activities in the economy. Pareto optimality and economic efficiency is the evaluative criterion which has been popular in other social sciences as well. Pareto efficiency refers to a situation when nobody can be made better-off without making someone worse-off, with a change. It can be there without allocative efficiency.

With domination of utilitarianism, the neoclassical political economy tradition of subscribing to a single goal-based moral theory began. The value of 'goods' trumped the value of 'rights' in moral discourse. A perceptive remark is that social welfare utilitarian theorists cannot give lexical priority to rights. The social welfare theory is unable to accommodate the moral force of rights, and therefore, cannot, mutatis mutandis, regard justice as respect for rights as emphasized by Robert Nozick (1974, pp. 150-153). The proposition that 'rights have priority over conditions like utility or desert because they reflect the conditions under which it becomes possible for an agent to recognize and act on considerations like utility and desert (Waldron, 1995, p. 19) poses a dilemma for social welfare theorists (Roth, 2002, p. 17).

Utilitarianism cannot justify on utilitarian grounds the respect for the moral equivalence of persons. Utilitarianism posits a conception of benevolent despot (self-interested in economic market but noble omniscient, beneficent and benevolent in political market arena) as a bifurcated man studied by omniscient observing economists-cum-policy-advisor and a hybrid moral theory of social welfare (positive theory of the state and normative theory of public policy) that cannot accommodate the moral equivalence of persons, respect for rights and correlative duties, and the promotion of just institutions in the economy and society - as a standard for judgment and appraisal of public actions.

According to the 'consequentialism' theory of rights, a right has the moral worth and value because it helps attain certain goals of the human agents. It helps attain the goodness of the outcome. It lays an instrumental role in the realization of goods. Utilitarianism in general does neither respect justice in general nor distributive justice in particular. The normative

category of analysis and prescription has always been singular - the utility and welfare as the goods to be promoted. It cannot however accommodate a duty to respect instrumentally important institutions. It cannot moreover deploy an operational conception of the public good (Roth, 2002, pp. 29-32).

In the school of moral thought of utilitarianism, the cause of the 'goods' of the aggregate welfare of the society through attainment of utility, happiness and pleasure of individual was championed as the supreme morality. In the beginning, the emphasis was on promotion of a priori the 'good' in the lives of free and autonomous individual beings. Subsequently, neoclassical economists identified the good of 'welfare' with utility and satisfaction of individuals. Utility, satisfaction happiness, pleasure and want-fulfillment (all interchangeable terminologies to signify a single thing) is the criterion of appraisal of human action.

The philosophical version of utilitarianism insists on at least three premises: one, the individual wellbeing ought to be the end of moral action; two, each individual is to count for one and no more than one; three, the object of social action ought to be maximization of general utility. The third premise is represented by Bentham's famous phrase: to promote the *greatest happiness of the greatest number* (Welch, 1987, p.770). However, the moral principle version of utilitarianism consists of three propositions: welfarism, sum-ranking, and consequentialism. This is the architecture of classical utilitarianism which consists of a conjunction of three theses: welfarism, maximalism, and consequentialism (Almond, 1993).

According to the thesis of maximalism, it is always wrong to fail to do the best thing available. The idea is that what is 'good' is the pleasure, or happiness, or utility, or 'welfare' only. The goodness of a state of affairs is a function of utility information alone regarding that state of affairs only. The thesis of sum-ranking requires that the utility information regarding any state of affair must be assessed in terms of the sum total of all utilities of that state of affair (Amartya Sen, 1987). Since welfare is the only valued 'good', utilitarianism advocates a duty to promote the 'good consequences' (Almond, 1993).

Consequentialism is then a thesis that a person should act with a purpose and a goal to achieve, and an individual action is to be judged 'right' or 'wrong' solely according to the value of its intended consequences. It requires that every choice of individual should be determined ultimately by the goodness of the consequent state of affairs (Amartya Sen, 1987, p. 39). According to the ideology of consequentialism combined with the theses of welfarism and maximalism, the comparative goodness of any option depends exclusively on the comparative goodness of the consequences of choosing that option over others. Principles of human action are weighed against consequence, and therefore, the utilitarian morality is justified by beneficial effects of goal-directed human actions. The consequence of all human actions is to be computed in terms of utility yield that in turn is to be measured in the units of chief human goods called 'pleasure' or 'satisfaction' of preference or in short, 'welfare'.

Justice was simply conceived simply as consistent with the maximal efficiency in attaining the good of welfare. The messages of French revolution and American War of Independence regarding the values of liberty and equality was sidelined, and in moral discourse influenced by utilitarianism, agrarian justice and liberal value of rights of men and women was considered implicit in the social welfare theory.

Ethics of Deontology

Deontology is a philosophical and ethical approach that asserts that matters of right and wrong ought to be assessed through reference to standards other than the results that are produced by certain decisions and actions. Treating person with respect is one deontological standard. The principle of integrity is another set of deontological concerns. Deontology requires that the 'rights' are to be distributed independently of the 'goods'. The idea of the 'rights' is prioritized over the idea of 'goods. In other words, deontology stands in contrast to consequentialism. The conception of the right is the moral law that is given by pure (as opposed to empirical) practical reason. Specification of what ends is permissible and what social arrangements are right and just is possible in the light of this

conception. The conception of the good ought not be given independently of the right (Rawls, 1999, p. 509).

Morality in deontology approach is not a matter of producing right results, but of meeting obligations that relate to features of acts themselves rather than their results. The deontological approach advocating the equal distribution of the 'rights' having an intrinsic value in its own right trumps the consequentialist approach championing the instrumental value of the equal distribution of the 'goods'.

A consistent deontological ethics was propounded by Immanuel Kant, based on the fundamental principle of Categorical Imperative. It expressed the idea that action should be chosen for their intrinsic features - especially the feature of being part of a policy for action that could be followed on every occasion by an agent who is rational in a special Kantian sense. Emmanuel Kant propounded the rule-deontological ethics. It defended the priority of rights over goods of action. The ethics of rule-deontology is the rights-based ethics and an ethics of categorical imperative - what one ought to do is what is obligatory. The maxim is: "*always act in such a manner that your actions can be taken as a universal maxim*" or "*always act according to a maxim that is at the same time valid as a universal moral law*".

In its original formulation, Kantian ethics of the categorical imperative is: "*act according to the maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law", and 'act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature*" (Kant, 1785, p. 422). This is the maxim of universality and reversibility. The maxim, or the reason behind our action, should be one that we wish to be practiced universally by others (universality), and one which we could reasonably wish to be on the receiving end of (reversibility). In another formulation, Kant says that: "*act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end*" (Kant, 1785, p. 429).

In deontological criterion of assessing the worth of an action through some definite righteousness features of the act itself, all human persons have certain rights simply by virtue of being and as persons and such rights that have intrinsic worth for human persons

qua persons are to be distributed equally. The capacity to produce a surplus (material and biological) as part of the capability set is a need that is to be accorded the status of a right and distributed rather equally among population of human persons. Persons have rights to resources or commodities or incomes that are consequentially good but rights to biological-and-economic-surplus-producing capacity that is intrinsically a claim and entitlement in its own right is much more significant.

2.4. A Consensus

'Reason and Morality' was published by Alan Gewirth (1978) and 'A Theory of the Good and the Right' was published by Richard Brandt (1979) with a gap of one year. It is interesting to compare these two moral philosophers and their works. Brandt has a theory of the rationality of desire that considers a person's desire, aversion and pleasure 'rational' if it could survive or be produced by carful cognitive psychotherapy for that person, and cognitive psychotherapy is the process of confronting desires with all available relevant information, by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time (Brandt, 1979, p.113). According to Brandt (1979), the psychological make-up and history of an individual determine what it is rational for that individual to want and to do. Brandt's theory is a rival to the self-interest theory (Postow, 1989, p.69).

According to Gewirth (1978), it is irrational for any agent, regardless of her psychological make-up and history, to deny any other agent freedom and wellbeing. Cognitive psychotherapy is an ideally rational deliberation, and a flawed deliberation leads to irrational desires. Alan Gewirth's 'Reason and Morality" and Richard Brandt's 'A Theory of the Good and the Right' are two contrasting paradigms today. In 1983, Richard Brandt published his 'The Concept of Rational Action' and in 1984, Derek Parfit published his 'Reasons and Persons'. Brandt requires that the rationality of actions be "a*ssessed not just by their promise of satisfying actual desires at the time"* but instead take into account and make some ruling about transient emotions that influence wants, and also *"longer-term fluctuations of interests"* (Brandt, 1983, pp. 157-8).

Rationality and irrationality set aside, it is the case that a moral right can be identified only by appeal to a particular theory of ethics. An institutional right is but one which is as a matter of fact, embodied within a particular society. To restructure the internal decision-making process, the internal rules of procedural rationality and strategies of pre-commitment as strictly intra-personal devices are designed. Such rules and strategies are *'imposed by an individual on himself'.* Institutional rules are but essentially inter-personal and social devices *'in the pursuit of some conception of a collective goal'.* Such Institutional rules are imposed *'from outside the individual'* (Hamlin, 1986, pp. 53-5: Hamlin, 1993, pp. 345-7).

It is light of such views and analysis that a profound assertion is to the effect of insisting that the moral philosophy needs philosophy of psychology. Morality is expressed by use of the term 'ought'. The terms 'should' or 'ought' or 'needs' relate to good and bad. These words acquired these special senses by being equated in the relevant contexts with 'is obliged', or 'is bound' or 'is required to'. The moral sense of 'ought' needs to be jettisoned. The difference between Sidgwik and contemporary writings on moral philosophy are of little importance.

In general, philosophical liberalism and utilitarianism as grand schools of thoughts are worth comparing. Liberalism is but just another tradition and it is no better than the other traditions, for example, virtue theory. The problem is that modern virtue theory is *'a kind of giving in' and 'a final retreat into voluntary obscurantism'.* The upshot of modern virtue theory is: *'we do not make ourselves', 'we are not responsible', and 'we are but vessels carrying the past into the future'.* A person is just the *'culture's child',* and therefore, it is the *'end of philosophy'* (Baumrin, 1990, pp. 781-2). On the other hand, utilitarianism fails to erect sufficiently strong protective boundaries around individuals and minorities; they are prepared to tolerate grossly unfair things being done to individuals when the utility sums require them. In the utilitarian framework, the rights appeared to be unacceptable since they impeded the unfettered pursuit of the social good as the consequences of actions (Almond, 1993, p. 266).

Jeremy Bentham believed that only utilitarian arguments could justify political decisions (Dworkin, 1978, p. 233). In the moral theory of utilitarianism, it is assumed that a human agent is not only self-interested in market situation but also both omniscient and beneficent in his political action (Roth, 2002). There is a 'benevolent despot' model of government that is implicit in the social welfare theory. The social welfare theory assumes that a benevolent despot[28] will pursue a supra-individual 'socially desired' outcome.

The utilitarian social welfare theory[29] which is normatively applied to develop an economic theory of the state, allocating public good, is nowadays often declared to be an inappropriate standard for public policy appraisal. Utilitarianism and Jeremy Bentham believed that society should seek to achieve '*the greatest good for the greatest number*'. This phrase is now considered incoherent, as it requires the two maximizations of two objectives at once. The right assumption must centre on the phenomena of bounded rationality, information asymmetry and opportunistic rent seeking by bureaucrats. The fact is that the conscious appraisal of public good or public bad reflects the intervention of individual rather than supra-individual values. The democratic institutions are just instrumentally valuable and not intrinsically valuable. Moreover, the problem is that the

---

[28] The utilitarian morality is the morality of *homo economicus* – the classically rational, narrowly self-interested agent of neoclassical economic theory.

> *Utilitarianism is a venerable theory of distributive justice, which maintains that the just resource allocation (in a world with a fixed population) is that which maximizes the sum total of utility over persons ……..The original Benthamite statement of utilitarianism was the view that society should allocate resources so as to achieve "the greatest good for the greatest number". This objective is not, as stated, coherent (one cannot maximize two things simultaneously), but it invites the question, What is the optimal population size for a world with a given finite resource base? (Roemer, 1996, p. 5).*

[29] To quote an observation:

> *' One philosophical objection to welfarism of utilitarianism is predicated on the view that individual utility is a measure of pleasure; the objection then runs that something as well as individual pleasures counts in assessing the goodness of a state ……. Utilitarianism is a meaningful concept for justice only when we have a conception of utility that is interpersonally comparable in a meaningful way …… A second, and major, philosophical objection to utilitarianism is its insensitivity to inequality: a utility allocation of (1, 99) is judged indifferent to one of (50, 50) ……. The theorems on utilitarianism, it turns out, do not challenge the usual kind of aversion to inequality (Roemer, 1996, pp. 127-30).*

government is modelled as a single, benevolent, decision-maker but in the environment of the institutional void.

All said about various theories, it remains undeniable that utilitarianism has produced some interesting casuistry in applied ethics. In a regime of market distortions and policy-induced regulation based distortions, corruption is posited to be a response to improve the allocative efficiency – casuistry. It is a wrong assumption to postulate a self-interested private agent in the economic market but a noble benevolent despot in the political/bureaucratic arena. Neoclassical decision environment as influenced by utilitarianism is frictionless and institutionless. There is institutionless and value-free normative enterprise of utilitarianism to build up a theory of public action with indifference towards moral force of rights of individuals and moral equivalence of persons as a priori commitments (Roth, 2002). Both the institutional fluidity of the utilitarian approach and the utilitarian conception of the public good are problematic.

Recently, while developing a critique, Timothy Roth (2002) put forward the view focused on ethical a prior commitment to the moral equivalence of persons. Timothy Roth (2002) in his work entitled *The Ethics and the Economics of Minimalist Government* has argued that the discipline of economics is a moral science that has yet not broken from the ethical moorings of the past, and put forward the following views: A person has an intrinsic worth and dignity of man, whose basis is in the 'autonomy' – free and equal persons. A person inhabits a natural world of spatially and temporally extended objects that are causally connected. A person is a rational creature – rational, autonomous beings and agents; a person thinks of himself as a being with an intelligence, a being endowed with a will, and consequently with causality. All moral conceptions have their seat and origins completely a priori in the reasons (neither feelings nor impulse). There ought to be ethically a prior commitment to the moral equivalence of persons (and, this is the idea that motivates the heuristic device of the 'veil of ignorance' in John Rawls' framework of the principles of justice). The imperative of moral equivalence of persons entitles human persons to equal impartial considerations. The equal impartial considerations of all persons ought to be respected by government institutions.

The argument is continued to the effect of asserting the moral stand that the government institutions ought to respect the imperative of moral equivalence of persons entitling human persons to equal impartial considerations since it is demanded by judgements concerning justice as impartiality (as grounded in Kantian categorical imperative). The principle of equal political participation of individuals is requirement for accommodation of a conception of justice as impartiality. The justice as rights protection ought to work together with normative principle of lexical priority of the greatest possible equal constitutional guarantees of liberty. The equal constitutional guarantees of liberty for all are the principle of equal political participation of all individuals. The principle of equal political participation of individuals ought to work under the constitutional constraint on political action. The constitutional constraint on political action is for the goal of attaining political efficiency through "getting the institutions right". The principle of equal political participation of individuals working under the constitutional constraint on political action leads to constitutionally constrained contractarian moral theory (neither based on consent nor bargaining) of minimalist government. The constitutionally constrained political action for the sake of attaining political efficiency and the contractarian moral theory of minimalist government result in establishing that the first and second theorems of welfare economics are false.

S M Amadae (2004) has taken it further. Within a social choice theory, whereas the rights are *'defined for individual agents',* the outcomes are defined for groups of agents *'due to the interdependence of agents' choices'.* Furthermore, whereas the rights pertain to *'the process of determining one's ends',* the social outcomes are *'evaluated in terms of consequences'.* In this endeavor, rights and social outcomes appear to be contrary concerns. A sort of complexity arises in the philosophical territory, if an additional concern of positive and negative liberty is *'superimposed upon the discussion of rights and social outcomes'.*

It is more difficult within the context of positive liberty to delimit *'a sphere of action over which an agent has the purview to determine that an outcome prevails'.* An agent's freedom is directly *'linked to what opportunity he has to realize his ends'.* In Amartya Sen's framework of arguments, freedom consists in the ability to realize self-determined ends and

this is incorporation of a substantive claim into analysis of freedom. It is a challenge for the market systems to resolve the *'problems in equity of distribution of substantive freedoms, and not simply distribution of commodity bundles'* (Amadae, 2004, pp. 387-9).

Let us enter the discipline of mainstream economics! Keynesian economics is not derived from the theorems of utility maximization; the demand for money is difficult to derive from rational utility maximization in the actual sense of the term; and, American institutionalism and Marxian economics are not derived from utility maximization theorems (Blaug, 1992, p. 230). The rationality postulate *'refers to individual motivation'*. The economists are but interested in *'the behavior of aggregates of consumers and producers in different markets'*. Once it is assumed that *'all individuals are alike'* and hence they have the *'same utility function' ,* the problem of aggregation is waived. In a similar way, once it is assumed that *'all firms are alike'* and thus have the *'same technology',* the problem of aggregation is waived. Add to it further auxiliary assumptions of *'perfect knowledge, equilibrium outcomes, perfect competition, and the like'*, and the standard evasion of the problem of aggregation is complete enough to yield interesting implications in the discipline of economics (Blaug, 1992, pp. 231-2). The postulate of rationality in the humanist causal essentialism of neoclassical economics is impotent because the resource endowments and technology are treated as natural constraints in the individual's pursuit of self-interest.

Whether it is standard moral philosophy or modern economics, it is the common observation that theories are constructed and advanced on the basis of a high degree of abstraction or simplification. A crucial degree of abstraction is involved in much of the quantification or proxy-quantification which is undertaken. Much of mainstream thinking in economics and agricultural economics have been concerned with abstract theorization in the name of scientific enterprise[30]. The most distinctive aspect of utilitarianism has been

---

[30] T W Hutchison (1977) had this to remark:

> *Methodological questions in economics have often been discussed in terms that are too abstract and too exclusively normative ……. Ideal epistemological models ……. Economic models of smoothly and ideally self-equilibrating processes are remote from the processes of the real economic world ……. Moreover, generalizations, normative or positive , are inevitably highly abstract, or stylized, when they relate to 'science' and 'scientific method' in general , or to 'the social sciences'*

simple: the utility considerations trump the rights. John Roemer (1996) remarked that the most powerful ethical criticism of utilitarianism is that it is *'insensitive to inequality of utility among individuals'.* The social welfare theory, championed by the consequentialist utilitarianism, could neither accommodate the moral force of "rights" nor offer a plausible conception of "justice"[31].

In the literature, either the value of human 'conscience' is exalted or the truth is defined so as to exclude ethical judgment from it (David Hume) or there is introduction of the idea of 'legislating for oneself' (Immanuel Kant). On the other hand, Bentham and Mill do not notice the difficulty of the concept 'pleasure'. David Locke took pleasure to be some sort of internal impression. According to ancient writings of Plato and Aristotle, *'the flourishing of a man qua man consists in his being good, that is, in virtues'.* There is but a huge gap, at present unbridgeable, *'which needs to be filled by an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and above all, of human flourishing'.* If a person is resolute, it is possible to discard the notion '*morally ought'*, and simply return to the '*ordinary ought' (Anscombe, 1958, pp. 232-3).*

It seems that if morality has to have the support of reason, moral reasons must be self-interested though morality and self-interest are frequently opposed. Undoubtedly, identity or at least compatibility of morality with prudence has a seemingly paradoxical connection. Thomas Hobbes developed this paradoxical connection. Ronald Dworkin (1992), while discussing the issue of equality proposes an alternative conception. The argument is that a particular person may aim at making his /her *'life as good a life as it can be'.* In this description, he/she appears in two roles of an agent and an object respectively. *'It is my life*

> *generally, or even to economics as a whole, which comprises theories and arguments of very varying epistemological types and calibres (Hutchison, 1977, pp. 34-5).*

[31] To quote another observation:

> *Utilitarianism is criticized by egalitarians for ignoring the boundaries between individuals, for it cares only about total utility and not at all about how that utility is distributed among individuals …… Harsanyi's theorems on utilitarianism have nothing to do with the ethically contentious doctrine of utilitarianism. Harsanyi's aggregation theorem remains a notable mathematical result and his impartial observer theorem is important as a pre-Rawlsian formulation of a veil-of-ignorance approach to ethics and distributive justice (Roemer, 1996, pp. 160-2).*

that I aim to make good'. It is in this way that *'utilitarianism and, indeed, all forms of welfarism are ruled out as acceptable conceptions of equality'* (Dworkin, 1992, p. 6).

Rationality and rational will in a communication setting among individuals requires the notion of 'discussion'. Impartiality is to be complemented with rationality, and together these have to ensue in equality to lead to justice as fairness. There is but a problem of the following sort: In human behaviour, three motives are historically traced: self-love, reciprocity and fairness. Self-interest is a significant motive behind human behaviour; reciprocity is also a significant motive. John Rawls and Brian Barry reiterate that justice is more than the pursuit of self-interest. It is fairness. Justice is conceived as fairness. Fairness is quite a significant motive behind distribution-of-socially-valued-goods-related behaviour of people. While justice and fairness is often used interchangeably to connote one and the same thing, fairness is decisively related with distributive motive. In real life, fairness is understood as preference and choice of people, however variously for either efficiency or equality or equity or needs-meeting (Miller, 1976; Deutsch, 1985; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992; Scott, 2001). Fairness refers to equity only in a narrow sense or to "good" including need and efficiency in a broad sense (Konow, 2003, pp.1233-5).

Is the notion of impartiality essential for the conception of equality? Impartiality is also considered an integral part of an ideal perfect maximal justice**.** In meta-ethical literature, impartiality is the most central characteristic of morality. Impartiality is one of the normative points of views (others are 'self-interest', 'law' and 'religion'). Impartiality is a defining characteristic of either an action or a person. A right action is an impartial action. Kantian impartiality as an imperative does not respect the notion of a particular "person" (Thomas Nagel, 1991). A morally good person is an impartial person. An impartial action is agent-neutral action. It is often context-neutral as well. Impartiality requires independence from the constraints of specificity of place and time and the identity of persons. An impartial thing is applicable anywhere, anytime and in case of any person. Impartiality is a Kantian imperative that is agent-neutral and that is based on context–free considerations.

Impartiality can be promoted by ensuring that people acquire certain disposition or virtues such as fairness and non-discrimination. It can be promoted also by ensuring that people adopt certain principles or action-guides. Impartiality requires that what anyone ought to do in any given set of circumstances is what anyone else ought to do, as long as his case is not relevantly different, and anything one ought to do on every occasion unless again there are factors present which are relevantly different. A closed impartiality remains confined within the borders of a sovereign state and proceeds along the territorial lines. An open impartiality is free of the borders of a sovereign state and proceeds along the territorial lines.

It is often argued that sympathy and compassion – motivating factors - are dispositions of persons, and Kantianism by assigning a major role to impartiality denies a substantial role to sympathy, compassion and concern in morality and moral motivation. Bernard Williams (1974) finds it that the Kantianism as well as the consequentialism are both untenable and implausible. In Williams view, reasonable partiality is revealed through the sympathy, compassion, and care. Compassion, empathy and disinterestedness are all sometimes appropriate motives. Partiality towards family and friends are inherent in human psychology.

Professional partiality if reasonable is necessary for social impartiality. Reasonable partiality is agent-relative and agent-centred and context-relative. It respects the agency and person. It is unreasonable that persons when deliberating about what is morally right distance themselves from everything that are essential to their identity, their personal relationship, ideals and ground projects. There should be motivational pluralism. Impartial principle should be limited and corrected by partial principles.

Morality requires incorporation of some substantive conception of the equality of all human persons in some initial respect of entitlement and claim to some definite capacity and capability. It is therefore that people should be treated the same in respect of the need for a threshold level of capacity to produce and reproduce a surplus for life sustenance and this capcity ought to be equalized across persons in a definite population. Both economics and

ethics must be concerned about this action or activity called “distribution”, specifically the distribution of “capacity”.

The chapter is divided into four sections.

The first section is devoted to elaboration of a plethora of conceptions on the theme of justice – retributive and distributive. Prominent among such conceptions is one of justice as individual and social action.

In the second section, the individual virtue and the concept of social justice are elaborated. There are pluralities of conceptions of aggregative distributive social justice in the literature, which are addressed.

In the thirds section, the liberal concept of ideal and maximal justice is discussed. The conception of liberal perfect justice is contrasted with the non-ideal imperfect transitional justice.

In the fourth section, the ideas related with the ownership and economic justice is dealt with. Modern economics has also addressed the issue of justice in utilitarian and liberal framework of ownership.

A long write-up is devoted to exercise in finding out a compromise on justice.

In a hybrid moral-theoretic framework of the doctrine of agrarianism, it is of practical significance to advocate the idea of promotion of the sense of imperfect transitional justice and minimization of concrete facets of agrarian injustices. Transitional justice is associated with attempts to remove material scarcity and human vulnerability, and such amelioration actions are given lexical priority over Rawlsian basic rights and liberty.

Amartya Sen (2009) in the book called "*The Idea of Justice*" favours curing particular injustices without the need to have a theory of perfect, ideal justice, and advocates piecemeal changes without a blueprint of perfection. The goals of individual may be to reduce injustices, in addition to the goals of maximizing the self-interested preferences, commitment, sympathy, charity and others. It is in view of such circumstances related with conceptualization and theorization regarding morality, practical reason and justice that the policies and course of actions to institute transitional justice ought to be preferred.

Lisa Fuller (2011) has propounded a model of 'transitional justice' that attempts at policies and courses of actions required for lifting-up the 'worst-off representative person' of a 'burdened society'. What is required is the bottom-up type of deliberation and thinking (Kamm, 2011). A 'worst-off representative person' is one who suffers from multiple intersecting 'vectors' of injustices that is not typically experienced and embodies as a set of distinct rights violation and lack of rights fulfillment in societal situations of extreme scarcity of resources, deeply rooted bases of discrimination, pervasive corruption, and severe social inequality (Simmons, 2010).

Transitional (non-ideal) justice is considered almost befitting to circumstances in which background institutions of society are either unjust or do not exist at all. In a very long statement, Amartya Sen (2009) has this assessment that many of the principal theories of justice concentrate overwhelmingly on how to establish 'just institutions', and give some derivative and subsidiary role to behavioural features. It is not warranted. A comprehensive and complete conception of justice ought to be ultimately connected with the way people's lives go, and not merely with the nature of the institutions surrounding them.

Of all human actions, a specific action that is aimed at, related with and culminating in fair and reasonable action is of paramount in significance. This action is justice. An idea of justice begins with the propositions that a human being is an agency, that a human being performs an action, and that in performing an action, a human agency is tied to the 'socially- beneficial' 'ought-abidance' – a morality of either the 'good' or the 'right'. A theory of distributive justice[32] addresses the traditional discourse on the phenomenon of inequality at two levels: societal level and interpersonal level. Justice is not merely an idea which has a history. Justice is an action which has certain specific distinguishing traits and features.

One of the most significant actions and interactions is that related with 'distribution'[33], and the act of distributive justice is the principal menu of the 'agential morality'. Justice as an action is the subject matter of practical deliberation of human agency. Justice is an object of intentions of agency as well. The subject of action of justice is always the human agency – either a private individual agency or a group of private individuals in a civil society or a manned public bureaucracy of the state (or government).

In our study, the theories of less-than-perfect, less-than-ideal, less-than-absolute justice do not therefore prescribe adherence to the standard two principles of Rawlsian justice. These theories are applicable to burdened societies that are characterized by phenomena of lack of political and cultural conditions, the human capital and know-how and the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered and where the institutions do not either

---

[32] The conception of distributive justice is dominant today in the literature of moral and political philosophy. Distributive justice is concerned with allocation of scarce resources and goods among individuals with competing needs and/or claims. Such allocation is warranted on either the presumption that fundamentally all men are equal or the presumption that persons cannot be held responsible for holding traits and be in the circumstances that are beyond their control. In the last forty years, philosophical way of thinking has led to propounding a variety of key new categories of primary goods, responsibility, mid-fare, functioning and capability as the equalisandum, and concepts of procedural justice and outcome justice.

[33] Significant among the various senses of distributive justice is the sense of positive justice that requires public action as a process of redistribution and assurance of entitlements to rights, resources, wellbeing and others benefits in a substantive sense. It is the redistributive justice that addresses the questions of compensation and outcome of actions and interactions among people, and such redistributive justice is generally institutionalised by a series of actions by a public agency (the government as a public actor).

exist at all or are rather unjust due to the natural limitations of human agents, historical contingencies and unfavorable conditions of extreme poverty. Policies and course of actions to institute transitional justice are centered at transforming a burdened society into a decent society.

The notion of transitional justice is geared to the service of transforming a burdened society into a decent society, and this is in contrast to instituting perfect ideal justice which takes it to the level of a liberal society - a well-ordered regime of just institutions and structure of a perfectly just liberal democratic society. This is in contrast to instituting the perfect maximal justice which takes a decent society to the level of a liberal society - a well-ordered regime of just institutions and structure of a perfectly just liberal democratic society.

It is worth arguing then that the notion of less-than-perfect, less-than-ideal, less-than-absolute justice requires first and foremost attempts at lifting-up the conditions of the 'worst-off representative person' through guarantee of subsistence rights and protection from the 'standard threats' of material scarcity and concrete vulnerability. Such a justice is possible and feasible through morally permissible, politically feasible and effective 'policies' and 'course of actions' in order to move from less-just to more-just conditions of life and institutions in a burdened society.

In transforming a burdened society into a decent society, the full range of basic rights and liberties for the worst-off representative person and equality of opportunity for all persons as principles of perfect ideal justice loses the lexical priority over the attempt to lift-up the worst-off representative person. The priority rules of justice of Rawlsian ideal theory is needed to be sacrificed in the course of human private and public mixed action geared to realization and attainment of non-ideal, non-perfect, less than maximal-justice but transitional justice. A hybrid conception of mixed morality is most conducive to the idea of transitional justice.

It is in this framework of hybrid morality of individuals and groups that justice is first and foremost a feature of an action – a doing – in an interactive setting of human society. All

mental actions and all such physical actions which originate by chance, fluke, reflex and habit are excluded. As an action, justice however does involve precedents in the form of theoretical and practical reasons, does involve in-between- processes of formation of intentionality and disposition of human agency, and are mostly clubbed with specific outcomes and consequences in the form of change in the state of affairs. Justice is an action or an ensemble of actions (both final events and processes) that orchestrates freedom and fairness in procedures and equality with respect to something as substantive outcome.

Justice is an action of distribution[34] that is undertaken either as the private autonomous individual actions by rational and reasonable human agencies that are disposed to follow the motives of fairness and impartiality in mutual interactions in the civil society or as the public collective actions by benevolent altruist enlightened government agency[35] which is disposed to establish a host of institutions of equality and equity in the society.

Justice is a free, fair and impartial procedural human action as well as the good, the virtuous and the right substantive human action in a framework of goal-right system of morality. Actions that are recommended, motivated and justified by moral reasons (practical reasons) do play a significant role in orchestrating and instituting the acts of justice, fairness and impartiality among interacting individuals and groups in human society. What motivates a human action and how it is subsequently justified by an agency-actor are crucial issues in moral discourse and justice study. Such a standard formulation of the relation of reasons with human actions and rationality with morality however evades the

---

[34] A central aim of political philosophy today is to evaluate competing theories of justice, to assess the strength and coherence of their arguments for the rightness of their views. Fundamental arguments of every political principle are "accept equality" as a value but each school of thought of each divergent political principle differs with regard to each other on "how to interpret equality". Marxism propounds equality in income, wealth and opportunity. Nozickean principle asserts equal rights over one's labour and property (Kymlicka, 2002).

[35] The political philosophy is concerned with criteria used in deciding who should be entitled to act on behalf of others. The political philosophy agenda is always an agenda having a normative content. It is a moral agenda. It is the agenda of attaining justice and reducing injustices in the society. In the political philosophy of justice, the proposition holds: each person is entitled to equal concern and respect and the governments to treat each person with equal consideration (Kymlicka, 2002). Political philosophy is concerned with the public conduct and public responsibility of the government, in which instituting justice is the core concern of the government.

issues of amoralist, the facts of apathy and passions, akratic behavior, and moral deficits that pervade the human society. A resolution is required.

Whatever be the variant of structured propositions and intentional states regarding justice – commutative, retributive and distributive, justice in moral philosophy constitutes the normative consideration as reason for action for a rational and reasonable human agency. The postulate of rationality and human reason[36] and the normative principle of human action are not only related to each other but have a direct bearing on the standard conception of goodness and righteousness of the principles of justice. The character and virtue of the individual practical reasoning person matters and interpersonal behavior governed by norms and principles as considerations in deliberation and desideration matters, and these considerations are in addition to the significance of the normative features of the institutions of basic structure of society.

In any scheme of distributive justice, there are three actors: first-order actor is the political authority which takes care of the efficient use of scarce resources. Second-order actor is the staffs of the allocating institutions who are concerned with both local efficiency and various non-instrumental norms. Third-order actor is the potential recipients of the scarce goods, who are motivated by interests. In addition to these three actors, there are mainstream public opinions in a democracy that is a core concern of political philosophy[37].

---

[36] The discipline of economics had but developed the notions of equality of marginal utilities of goods and services and equity in marginal productivities of labor, capital and other resources in production, and maximization of aggregate individual welfare. It was the so-called 'welfare economics' in early twentieth century that developed without references to justice as virtue and justice as fairness. The contemporaneous standard economic reasoning of modern neoclassical variant which has ever posited a narrow conception of means-ends rationality of human agency has not been able to accommodate a concern for the human rights of agents in general and distributive justice of institutions; it accommodates only the rights of individual economic agent to property and free exchange, and it addresses only the allocation of human and material resources and transfers of commodities from one hand to another as mediated by the institution of market in the society. There is only now a substantial body of works in economics which develops the idea that economic agents may display altruism in their behavior – something like a care and benevolence for others.

[37] Political philosophy is concerned with the political principles of moral arguments regarding just, free and good society. Traditionally, the foundational values of political philosophy has been the power, sovereignty and the nature of law while its modern categories are freedom , common good and justice. In political philosophy, the ultimate foundational political values are but many: utility, common good, right, freedom, contractual agreement and justice. The academic discipline of political philosophy has been preoccupied with developing the theoretical rationale and practical design of the institution of justice under the aegis of the welfare state.

When it comes to justice[38] as understood as the virtue of individual person and human agency and also the morality of interpersonal behavior in interactive setting, justice is to be conceptualized not merely as features of institutions but also as the good and the right action and interaction of human agency which in turn is motivated by and justified by human reason and rationality. It is only the second best option to bring into the picture the personae of the public agency and government of a democratic welfare state.

It is worth defending the argument that a transitional, non-ideal theory of justice is concerned with societies in which the institutions and basic structure of society are either unjust enough to live up to the requirements of the ideals of perfect justice or the institutions are simply lacking and deficient. A non-ordered society is one characterized by the failures of cooperation of individuals and political regime in realizing the two standard liberty and difference principles of Rawlsian justice. In such society, the ideal theory of justice that is an account of principles of perfect ideal justice appropriate to the liberal democratic well-ordered society that are laid out in 'The Theory of Justice' of John Rawls is not applicable. In transforming a burdened society into a decent society, the full range of basic rights and liberties for the worst-off representative person and equality of opportunity for all persons as principles of perfect ideal justice loses the lexical priority. The lexical priority is to lift-up the worst-off representative person in such a society, for example, the south Asian society where it is a befitting case for transitional justice through lifting up strategy.

While comparative injustice instances can be known by knowing the comprehensive outcomes, that is the process through which the end-state has come about as well as the end-state itself, and without knowing the ideal, perfect justice. The agent-relative,

---

[38] In historical perspective, Plato – the Greek philosopher - had often used Socrates – another Greek philosopher - to argue for justice in two applied senses of the '*just person*' and the '*just city-state'*. A just city state is one that is ruled by those who understand what is good and who are the 'lovers of wisdom' – the philosophers. A just man is the man in just the right place, doing his best and giving the precise equivalent of what he has received. Pioneering the conception of justice as individual virtue, Aristotelian justice consists in treating equals equally and un-equals unequally, that is, treating in proportion to the relevant differences.

comprehensive-outcome-sensitive, fair opportunity for capability formation as a moral principle of action is one such paradigm of imperfect justice, according to Amartya Sen.

A non-ideal theory of justice propounding the idea and agenda of transitional justice would have four areas of concern: first, costs involved in ensuring negative rights through agencies required to administer services, such as, the courts, police, social services and national defense, unfavorable societal conditions of sexism, racism, ethnic tensions, a culture of corruption, extreme poverty and historical legacy of exploitation and plunder, second, political feasibility of executing specific reforms in the backdrop of constraints posed by brute facts about human nature revealed in irrationality, craze for power and wealth, and constraints posed by the specific rigidity of social conditions, third, nature of path–dependence of transitional justice reforms requiring strategies of 'one step backward to take two steps forward', and fourth, policies of 'a little better situation than the status quo' on the path of getting there at the correct end-point from here. Practical concerns, no less than theoretical reasoning, seem to demand a fairly radical departure in the analysis of justice. An idea of justice is merely a consideration for action of justice.

3.1. Justice

To begin with ordinary sense, justice has been a prime concern since antiquity. It has been considered a virtue of human character, a virtue of private and public human action, and of late, a virtue of the institutions of polity and society as well. In antiquity, Aristotle was preoccupied with 'justice' as a specific virtue. In the ancient world of civilization, the Greek philosophers took up the idea of theorizing regarding justice[39] as the core of morality and ethical consideration - an ethics of virtue. It was the Greek philosophy that laid down the foundation of virtue ethics. In the Greek thought, justice was also variously considered the features of 'harmony', 'power', 'strength', and only finally, the

[39] The idea of justice is often construed in logical and etymological opposition to the notion of injustice. There is but seemingly no such obvious dualism between justice and injustice. In a perfectly harmonious world of a single individual, the idea and the concern of justice is redundant and irrelevant. It is only in the context of interaction among individuals that the possibility of cooperation and conflict arises, and thus, originates the problematic and circumstances of justice.

'virtue'. Classical Greek thoughts of Plato and Aristotle on justice as virtue still resonate and reverberate with a vengeance in the literature.

Plato had asked long time back in his work - the "Republic": What is justice? With the posing of this specific question in the dialectical method of discourse, a systematic and programmatic political and moral philosophy began in the West European world of religion and philosophy. In classical moral philosophy, there was enumeration of four cardinal virtues: courage, temperance or self-control, prudence or efficiency, and of course, justice. In the framework of classical philosophy and ethics of virtue, a society was posited to be constituted by persons, and individual persons were conceived to be learning 'virtues' through systematic upbringing and rigorous training in the society (Aristotle was keen on 'upbringing' and 'training' of individual citizens without which the art and science of practical reasoning could not progress).

In Aristotelian morality framework, first virtue of society is that individuals have self-control over desires (self-command over desires and wants); in turn, it provides mental freedom and autonomy to individuals. The second virtue of society is that individuals are moved by altruism and reciprocity; that in turn determines the quality of social relations in a nation. Both Aristotle and Plato had considered justice neither "the first virtue of society" (Serge-Christophe Kolm, 2005) nor the second virtue but rather the third best option.

The origin of the idea of and concern regarding one genre of justice called commutative justice is generally traced to the writings of Greek literature. Aristotle coined the idea of 'commutative justice' to capture the idea of fairness in the arena of exchange and market. The commutative justice stood for the practice of paying a fair wage, charging a fair price and conducting a fair exchange. In modern literature, there is conception of both 'negative' as well as 'positive' justices – not doing something 'unfair' and doing something 'fair'.

With the foundation of the Christian religion, there were four religious virtues that were emphasized in the medieval world: faith, hope, charity, and again of course, justice. Charity was though considered a desired virtue in the civil society but never a substitute of justice. Though often believed that charity is a virtue that is the soul of individual justice, justice in

general is certainly not a charity. Justice is a virtue of distinct kind and import. Justice was considered and still continues to be regarded as not merely virtues of a reflective sympathetic concern or other-regarding sentiments, altruism, sympathy, compassion, pity and care. Being distinct from benevolence, charity, prudence, mercy, generosity and compassion, the notion of justice demands something in excess of, and of course, beyond such values and virtues of human beings.

The idea of justice had its journey from antiquity till the dominance of classical liberal philosophy. Classical liberalism, whose foundation was laid down with the European Enlightenment project, construed justice in terms of '*individual rights*' and '*legal egalitarian values'*. In the European Enlightenment tradition, justice has been considered a provision of maintaining people in their perfectible rights, and distributing these rights rather equally among the people. Classical liberalism of Rousseau, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes prioritised liberal rights and claims of citizens. In the social contract tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Rousseau, justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone concerned in the backdrop of framework of prevalence of equal ground for all people concerned in situations of disagreement on the one hand and absence of bias on the other.

In later social contract tradition as influenced by writings of Immanuel Kant, the values of 'fairness' and 'impartiality' began dominating the conception of justice in western Christian philosophy[40]. Justice is therefore a concern for the 'liberty', 'impartiality', 'equality' and 'fairness'; such concerns[41] are contemporaneously the core of agenda of

---

[40] In medieval era, the Semitic religious tradition of Judeo-Christian thought developed the theological normative concept of justice as prescription in favour of the '*preferential option for the poor*' and the '*acts of forgiveness*'. There had also been the Islamic and Hindu views on justice – 'Adl' and 'Insaaf' in Islamic philosophy, and 'Nyay' and 'Niti' in Hindu philosophy (Sen, 2009). In late medieval European world of thinkers, reformers and philosophers, justice was however subsequently considered as part of the natural law, and therefore, justice was used as a synonym for 'law' or 'lawfulness'. Philosophy clubbed the concerns regarding justice initially with the notion of '*natural law'*, and only later, with the idea of '*natural right'*.

[41] An alternative tradition had also prospered side by side with the tradition of social contract in Europe. As per writings of both David Hume (1777) and John Stuart Mill (1871), a question of justice arise in a situation of the conflicts of interests, the limitation of human benevolence and competition for scarce goods. J S Mill considered two natural human tendencies from which justice is derived: one, our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us; second, our ability to put ourselves

distributive justice and social justice. In other words, justice is equal consideration of and treatment to individual human agency in its own right in the ethos of freedom – either negative and positive, and it requires for its attainment a commonly agreed principle for fair and impartial deal in procedures of interactions among human agents of free will under situations of no enticement, no duress, no compulsion, and no coercion. In a broad sense, it is fair and equal treatment of all in the backdrop of guarantee of individual liberty. Justice is inconceivable without conceptions of liberty, equity and fairness.

The association of justice with fairness is typically a modern innovation of the western world. Justice requires impartiality and fairness in procedures and equality in outcomes with regard to distribution of benefits/burdens and also distribution of rights/responsibilities (or duties or obligations)[42]. Some notion of fairness and impartiality in the procedures involved in the act leading to an event and outcome of establishing a socially agreed level of equality with respect to something good or right or both as the substantive outcome and consequence constitutes the defining elements of the idea of justice (Rawls, 1971, 1985; Sen, 1992).

Contemporaneously, justice is considered not merely a 'virtue' of the individuals but also the 'goods' of the state of affairs of the world and also the 'rights' of autonomous individuals in the society[43]. The contesting terrain of the morality of the goods and the

---

imaginatively in another's place. With utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1789), J S Mill (1871) and Henry Sidgwick (1874), justice was equated with the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the political eths of liberty of men and women as well, and all liberal rights were reduced to a single value of right to 'welfare' or 'happiness'. It was however in the thesis of categorical imperative of Emmanuel Kant that justice was equated, plain and simple, with the notion of impartiality.

[42] At the societal level, it is not the efficiency in resource allocation but fairness in resource allocation with which justice is concerned. Justice as it is understood in popular parlance requires it that individuals are seen not only as free and equal, morally responsible rational beings who has capacity to deliberate about considerations of others as alike but also the persons who treat others alike in action and who can thus be treated alike in similar circumstances.

[43] It is much later, almost after two thousand years of the pioneering of philosophy and ethics by the Greeks that John Rawls (1971) considered justice as the first virtue and bring forth the idea of justice as mutually agreed upon value of fairness in the rights perspective. Justice is a concept of moral goodness and rightness at the core of which lies a deep concern for a sort of equality/equity – fairness. Major theories of justice have however been expounded since 1950. The renaissance of theories of distributive justice however began with the publication of "The Theory of Justice" of John Rawls in 1971 (leaving behind the inheritance of the idea of "*distributive justice*" going back

morality of the rights in the conception of justice has variously been addressed as a research question.

Retributive and Distributive Justice

Justice in positive sense is characterised as getting what is deserved or needed, and it requires positive distribution of something valuable among human beings. Justice of distribution as positive justice is often considered a matter of pedigree. In addition to Aristotelian notion of commutative justice, the liberal European Enlightenment tradition has handed down to the present generation two further distinct conceptions: "restorative justice" and "distributive justice".

Restorative justice is also called the "reparative justice", "corrective justice" and also "retributive justice", whereby the offenders are responsible for actions to repair the harm they have done. A restorative/retributive/reparative justice is negative justice[44]. It is to protect from the goods and the rights of an individual from infringement by others. The retributive justice addresses the issues of law and punishment. Retributive justice attempts to answer three questions: why should one be punished? Who should be punished? What punishment should they receive? Justice delivered in the courts of law is the retributive justice, whereby the victim of injustice is paid back and compensation is awarded so as to restore the status of victim to its perfectible rights. Past injustice is rectified in the present.

---

to at least two millennia old writings of Talmud, Plato and Aristotle, the traditions of 'positive law' theory of justice of Socrates, 'natural rights' theory of justice of John Locke, and 'social goods' theory of justice of David Hume and JS Mill).

[44] In economics, there are two further concepts: "'conservative justice" and "compensatory justice". It is variously asserted that justice is not merely the rights-relationship among people (resource rights, welfare rights, property rights and freedom rights) but also the social-norms-relationship among people (fairness, impartiality, equality). Jeremy Bentham and David Hume stressed on the aggregate public utility. The advocates and practitioners of utilitarianism generally focus on the sum total of all individuals' utilities. Public utility requires that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules. This is the approach that Henry Sidgwick called 'conservative justice'. The economic goal-oriented behavior of individuals towards attainment of welfare, which ensures the so-called conservative justice is however again not sufficient to ensure that the advantages and opportunities are evenly distributed in the society. In the arena of 'conservative justice', it is claimed that the right to something creates the due shares and obligations.

Theories of retributive justice are concerned with punishment for wrongdoing. Wrongdoing must be made well in some way, though there is difference between revenge and retribution. In one interpretation, a retributive justice theory looks back to particular acts of wrongdoings and attempts to balance them with deserved punishments while the utilitarian theories of Jeremy Bentham, J S Mill and Henry Sidgwick always look forward to the future consequences of punishment.

In contemporaneous political discourse and theoretical literature on the idea and agenda of justice, there are two popular variants of conceptions - 'restorative justice' and 'distributive justice', and these two variants are in addition to Aristotelian notion of 'commutative justice'. Justice delivered in the courts of law is the retributive justice whereby the wrongdoers and offenders are responsible for actions and they are required to repair the harm they have done. The distributive justice is a form of fairness: an impartial distribution of goods through a fair decision procedure. In the account of distributive justice, people press for claims regarding goods, resources and interest and justify them by rules or standards[45].

Two principal versions of justice are the "compensatory justice' and "distributive justice", and but the former is distinguished from the latter. If the due shares arise as compensation to efforts and sacrifices, it is an issue of compensatory justice and if it arises as a reward to talent and skill, it is distributive justice. Compensatory justice[46] is the view that

---

[45] There has been attempts at conceptualising and theorising about justice by Luois Kelso and Mortimer Adler (1958) and Frederick Hayek (1993; 2000). Two prominent theory of justice were advanced by John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick (1974). Both John Rawls and Robert Nozick consider justice as a matter of rights and pedigree. Liberal egalitarian conception of justice is of three variants: historical conception, patterned conception (on some criteria), and end-state conception (consequentialism). Nozick's conception is neither end-sate nor patterned. It is entitlement-oriented historical conception of justice. Although Rawls is sometimes faulted for the abstract character of his reasoning, his basic method is comparative, not deductive.

[46] One may also consider the views of Frederick Hayek (1993; 2000) as part of contemporary theoretical literature on the theme of justice. Hayek argued that the property rights of individuals are required for the maximization of freedom and liberty and the minimization of violation of liberty. Hayek (1973; 1997) proposes the rules of just conduct and actions of persons towards other persons as a spontaneous order of actions in the same manner that market is a spontaneous order, independent of the desires and will of individuals and purposeful and intended actions. While clarifying the origin, genesis and relations of the lawyer's law (i.e. *nomos* of the ancient Greeks),

inequalities in income should be permitted to the extent that they compensate for differences in the advantages/disadvantages of different sorts of works (Joseph Carens, 1985, p. 39).

In its most general form and substance, distributive justice may be conceived as an action, a procedure and an outcome (consequence of actions) in terms of giving and receiving of something good or something right or both (as needed or as deserved or as entitled) by human persons almost simultaneously and essentially equally. Distributive justice insists that societies must be just, and interaction among individuals must be just. The distributive justice is concerned with which goods to be allocated in what context among which persons and through what rule of allocation/criteria. Distributive justice is concerned with allocation of scarce resources and goods among individuals with competing needs and/or claims. Such allocation is warranted on either the presumption that fundamentally all men are equal or the presumption that persons cannot be held responsible for traits and circumstances beyond their control. The distributive justice is a form of fairness: an impartial distribution of goods through a fair decision procedure.

In the account of distributive justice, people press for claims regarding goods, resources and interest and justifying them by rules or standards. Giving people rather equally what they need (need-based principle) is however a different proposition from the assertion of giving people rather equally what they deserve (desert principle or equity principle). The idea of justice is related with giving people either what they need or what they deserve, and of course, giving them rather equally. A need-based distributive principle however requires that the outcomes - level of productive capacity, for example, must be commensurate with the nature and degree of the basic needs of individual human being.

Whether commutative or conservative or compensatory or retributive or distributive, the concept of justice and propositional statements about justice has always conveyed a dual sense: justice as an episode at a point of time (a substantive outcome) and justice as a

---

decrees of legislators and judge-made law, Hayek says that a spontaneous order as the regularity of processes of rule of just conduct emerges. The aim of the rules must be to facilitate that matching or tallying of the expectations on which the plans of the individuals depend for their success in any settlement of humans.

process over a period of time (a procedure). In a society, whenever a person says that 'it is not justice', what is meant is an 'episode' (an event) with its attributes in terms of consequence (realising the aims and goals of individuals or restoring the claims and rights of individuals). Whenever a person says that 'justice has not been done', what is articulated is about the nature of a 'process' (a procedure) with its attributes in terms of the obligatoriness (meeting the needs or discharging the duties in a proper and fair way). In other words, there are substantive and procedural dimensions of justice.

Substantive dimension of justice requires the subjective assessment of the fairness of outcomes and the degree to which people feel that they are gaining or losing goods, welfare, resources, rights and respects in a group. Substantive justice is but contrasted with procedural justice. Within social psychology, a large literature has developed that focuses on the evaluation of procedural justice. It is often asserted that justice as a concept makes sense only when applied to the dealings between personal agencies[47]**.** Justice is a '*procedural notion*' (Scruton, 1994, pp. 424-5).

Procedural dimension of justice is related with the study of subjective evaluations of the procedures through which people coordinate their actions. It is evaluation of whether they

---

[47] According to Frederick Hayek (1973), the apparatus of law is developed *'in an effort to secure and improve a system of rules which are already observed'.* There is significance of customs here. It is of primary interest that the formation of an order of actions is conditioned by *'the factual observance of the rules'.* Whether these rules *'need to be enforced or how they are enforced' is of secondary interest.* Factual observance of some rules precedes *'a deliberate enforcement'.* The reason why the rules arose is one thing.
The reasons which made it necessary to enforce them are another. If a need arises to call in an impartial judge, it will be because *'such a person will be expected to decide the case as one of a kind which might occur anywhere and at any time'.* The judge will choose *'a manner which will satisfy the expectations of any person placed in a similar position among persons not known to him individually'.* The rules of just conduct will *'in the first instance be the product of spontaneous growth'.* Their gradual perfection will however '*require the deliberate efforts of judges'.* Such judges *'improve the existing system by laying down new rules'.* The system of rules as a whole does *'not owe its structure to the design of either judges or legislators'* (Hayek, 1973, pp. 96-100). Such rules of right conduct together with the laws of liberty can only prevent injustice but cannot secure justice. Within any organization in which the individual actions must be judged by their serviceability to the particular ends at which it aims, there is no room for the judge.

Frederick Hayek (1973) has further continued the argument to the effect of asserting it that law, liberty and property are *'an inseparable trinity'.* The classical formula is: *'the aim of the rules of just conduct is to assign to each his due'*. The classical formula is not what is called *'distributive justice'.* The aim of the rules of law is merely preventive: prevent *'the actions of different individuals from interfering with each other'* (Hayek, 1973, pp. 107-8).

are fair or unfair, ethical or unethical, and otherwise accord with people's standards of fair process of interaction and decision-making. Four elements of procedures are the primary factors that contribute to judgments about their fairness: opportunities for participation, a neutral forum, trustworthy authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect (Tylor, 2005, p. 602). The social contract perspective of Immanuel Kant (1785) and John Rawls (1971) requires the lexical priority of rights and respect for their correlative duties, recognition of the inability to perspecify endogenous and complex final ends and desires, and a procedural imperative to promote just and impartial institutions as the defining characteristics of justice.

3.2. Liberal Construct of Ideal Justice

A philosopher attempts to conceptualise an absolute and transcendental conception of perfect, optimal and maximal justice with a belief in a sort of vicious universalism. It is as if a single understanding and conception of justice with a fixed constitution applies to all people in all contexts of all cultures everywhere in an immutable way. Such a notion of perfect, optimal and maximal justice pervades the writings in liberal and libertarian traditions as well as in the tradition of absolute egalitarianism.

An absolute and transcendental rendering of perfect, optimal and maximal justice are however certainly not the facts of actual states of affairs and the actual procedures and processes of doing and becoming in the world. Justice to such an extreme level is not as yet achieved anywhere. It is a heuristic construct for analytical purpose that is used in evaluation of the ideal of a liberal and well-ordered society. The idea of heuristic construct of liberal perfect optimal and maximal justice is premised on absolute conceptions of categories of liberty and freedom; it requires "liberty" (negative and /or positive liberty) including the political freedom along with individual responsibility of each person. Such a conception of justice is built on an ideal conception of perfect individual liberty and negative freedom.

To begin with, John Locke (1689) and Adam Smith (1759) advanced a theoretical paradigm at the centre of which **liberty and freedom** of individual human being was prominent. This paradigm was called the 'classical liberalism'. John Locke (1689) in his work entitled '*Second Treatise of Civil Government*' remarked that men are *'by Nature, all free, equal and independent, and no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent'* (quoted in Nussbaum, 2006, p. 9). The Lockean and Smithian classical liberalism posits that there is a general moral right to negative liberty. At the core of this proposition, there is the assumption that individuals must be allowed to follow their own desires and interests, constrained only by the rules which prevent the encroachment upon liberty of others. In such a conception, liberty can be constrained only for the sake of liberty and that too for the sake of greater or higher order liberty and no other social good. It is the notion of maximal, optimal and extensive liberty.

David Hume (1777) as well as Adam Smith (1759) pointed out that the claim to right to free speech was historically prior to the demand for right to democracy, which in turn was prior to the right to free market in goods and services. In other words, the laissez faire in the market of ideas was emphasized much earlier than laissez faire in the markets for goods and services. In retrospect, J S Mill who propounded the notion of negative concept of liberty – free to choose, free to express and free to pursue individuality without coercion, compulsion and constraint by external agencies of man and institution (government).

Frederic Hayek (1973) contributed further in eulogising the concept of liberty and freedom within the rubric of classical liberalism. Frederick Hayek (1944) in his *Road to Serfdom* put the classical statement of economic liberalism. The economic liberalism is the application of the doctrines of the classical liberalism to economics, expressed as a preference for the competitive markets and for the use of price mechanism over the forms of more direct control and intervention, for example, of the government and the state.

The negative conception begins with seeking answer to the question: *freedom from what*? A negative liberty is the liberty to be not harmed and interfered with and /or the liberty to do and to become "something". The principle of liberty is that one ought not to interfere, without special justification, in the chosen course of any rational being or impose on any

rational being conditions which will prevent him from pursuing his courses of action. Individuals have the right to safety for themselves and their property (property is legitimate possession) – negative liberty. They have the right to do anything that does not infringe upon others' basic rights.

The classical basic rights (freedoms or basic rights) are the basis of our constitutions, and hence, the framework, and source of law. It is analysed by an elaborate theory. It is developed by a long tradition involving law, economics, and philosophy. Its oral endorsement is "process liberalism". Such basic rights are enshrined in historical declarations. They essentially protect the individual. Full process-freedom however means that process-freedom prevails throughout society (Kolm, 2005, p. 21).

There are two senses in which liberty has been used and conceptualised: negative and positive. The positive analysis begins with answer to the question: *freedom to do or become what*? Positive liberty of an agent is a sort of freedom to do and become something, while the negative liberty of agent is a sort of protection against the interference by other agents. T S Green propounded the positive conception of liberty – free to follow the rational moral conduct towards human realization. Liberty has got priority over all other values of human beings in the scheme of justice theorization by John Rawls (1971) and Robert Nozick (1974; 1993). Liberty - positive or negative - is an agent-related concept. It is not an agent-neutral concept. Liberty is a social relation and not a technological relation; it is a relation between persons and not a relation between man and nature; it measure is freedom-metric.

Freedom is broader than liberty. Freedom and liberty are however interchangeably used to connote one and the same state of the world. Liberty has fewer typologies but freedom has larger typologies. Being free irrespective of desires and feeling free with respect to desires are two different things. Freedom is freedom of someone from something to do something or become something. An individual's will, behaviour, choice and action, that is, in short, the freedom of individual is influenced and interfered by suggestion, persuasion, enticement, duress, offer, coercion, compulsion and disablement in increasing order. Freedom is the freedom from a class of persons to do a class of actions or become a class of things – no coercion, no duress and no compulsion. Gerald MacCallum (1967) opines that

freedom is always the freedom of someone from something to do something or become something.

There are three-fold distinctions of freedoms: means-freedom, act-freedom, and aim-freedom. Means-freedom refers to the availability of means. Act-freedom is reduced by forceful interference with acts, which use otherwise given means. For a given act with given means, aim-freedom is reduced by forceful interference with the intended aim. In classical liberalism framework of rights, process-freedom is defined as act-freedom plus aim-freedom. There is no emphasis on the means-freedom. Christophe Kolm (2005) remarked that the distinction of act, means, and aim has various echoes in a number of classical views. The various classical basic rights state act-freedoms, but imply aim-freedom.

Amartya Sen (2002) has distinguished between two valuable aspects of freedom: the process aspect and the opportunity aspect. The things we have reason to value are our objectives, and freedom gives us the opportunity to achieve these. *The 'opportunity aspect of freedom'* is concerned with *'our actual capability to achieve'*. The process aspect of freedom is concerned with the *'procedure of free decision by oneself'*. What Paul Samuelson (1938, 1947) as well as John Hicks (1939) emphasized in narrating the story of our implicit attitude to freedom in the consumer theory on the assessment of "budget sets" in the mainstream economics is "the opportunity aspect" of freedom. The opportunity aspect is concerned primarily with our ability to achieve rather than the process through which that achievement comes about. A comprehensive assessment of freedom must take note of both these aspects. It must take note of the *'irreducible importance of each of these respective features'* (Sen, 2002, pp. 506-7).

3.3. Individual Virtue and Social Justice

Justice is often considered a virtue of an individual. In the action of justice, a human agency performs an action in 'common interest'. Justice is an action of virtuous individuals

in common interest – a valued 'good', and it is also mostly a doing or acting with respect to distribution of goods, according to Aristotle – the Greek philosopher. It is posited since the days of Aristotle that individuals do acquire a specific virtue, and thereby, share a sense of private justice. In a prospective imperfective sense, justice is action of virtuous men and women in an interactive setting. Private individual justice is about creating the "social bases of self-respect". Aristotelian virtue ethics which propounded the idea of individual justice was further carried on by David Hume (1777) and Adam Smith (1759).

In individualising the conception of justice as human virtue, David Hume (1777) harped on the principle of 'sympathy' as a moral sentiment of human person. Humean sympathy is akin to empathy. In the framework of morality put forward by David Hume, sympathy is an empathy/fellow-feeling. We have but fellow-feeling for those who are like us. The sympathetic principle applies to physical equals, according to David Hume. In this fellow feeling, individuals are motivated to obtain the praise or approbation of those with whom they sympathize. Human beings are moral beings because they are motivated by the approbation that they receive from others with whom they sympathize. Such approbation comes from people who are like them. Approbation from those we are unlike is less powerful as a motivating force. The amount of approbation and disapprobation we obtain from those with whom we sympathize depends on the relation of the object to us.

Adam Smith (1776; 1976) had a lot to say on issues of the values of sympathy, compassion and sentiments of human beings. The system of empiricist ethics of Adam Smith broadly works through two operators: sympathy and the impartial spectator. Sympathy explains moral perception and motivation. Human sentiments are the foundation of the theory of morals. Sympathy is an act of imagination which only habits make it motivational. Sympathy is strengthened by habituation. Sympathy is an act of imagination in which we come to judge our conduct as others would judge it. Sympathy is a device to connect our concerns with those of others by imagining how others see us. Once sympathy takes the leap to affection we have a motivation for action. Sympathy is the foundation of rules of 'justice as reciprocity' which become internalized as conscience. We perform generous acts, and our motivation gets abstracted from our private interest (Levy and Peart, 2004).

Adam Smith (1759) has introduced the notion of 'generosity' also. Whenever individuals adopt these principles of sympathy and generosity as moral sentiments, and subsequently act, it leads to attainment and establishment of justice in society. Men are selfish but there are some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others. Such principles render the happiness of others as necessary to him for the sake of the pleasure of seeing it. This is called the pity or compassion, which enlivens joy. It also alleviates *'grief by insinuating into the heart almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at the time capable of receiving'* (Smith, 1976, pp. 9-14).

The Humean principle of sympathy/empathy/fellow feeling induces a sort of equality among human beings, according to Adam Smith. The impartial spectator plays the role of moral conscience and the faculty of judgement. Our notions of right and wrong arise from sentiments – sentiments informed by the impartial spectator. The key elements proposed are the moderation and realism in *'a system articulated by what Aristotle calls practical reason'.* While the styles of Adam Smith and Aristotle are different, they complement each other in some measure. Aristotle *'observed, noted, and alluded to',* but did not elaborate the *'psychological account of things, especially the sentimental side of ethics',* while Adam Smith gave impressively plausible account, according to Laurence Berns (Carrasco, 2004, pp. 115-6).

According to M A Carrasco (2004), the Smithian system integrates the elements of different traditions. There are studies about the Kantian features of practical reason found in his theory, and even about the appearance of some aspects of utilitarian instrumental reason. It is only from this reflective self-evaluation that a practical moral understanding follows. Moral perception in Adam Smith is not simple intuition rather it includes a blending of deliberation, understanding and insight. It is claimed that Adam Smith's system can be seen as an ethics of practical reason. It uses the figure of the impartial spectator as a metaphor for the faculty of judgement. It is a heuristic procedure to minimize presuppositions (Carrasco, 2004, pp. 94-5). Adam Smith in his system of morals starts from natural human drives of desire for pleasure and rises up to common world of objective order of the notions of individual right and wrong evaluated by the impartial spectator.

Microjustice concerns issues of justice that is specific in nature, object, people and often time and place. There are possibilities of pluralistic conceptions of justice in different spheres of life. Its scope is the quite large. Contemporaneous thinking is that the idea of justice does not have a single sphere of application of concept. It has at least further two levels of application: mesojustice and macrojustice. Mesojustice concerns issues that are individual and specific in nature and object but such issues affects and concerns all people at all times and all places. The demand for justice in matter of health-care, personal and social security and educational attainment that invariably affects all people at all times and all places comes under the framework of mesojustice (Kolm, 2005). The idea of mesojustice is best reflected in the historical social movement for social justice.

Brian Barry (2005) in his work entitled "*Why Social Justice Matters*" furnished a view of history of so-called institutional justice since last century and half till 1994. In a standard conception, justice was understood as *'a virtue of individuals'.* A verdict in a trial could be described as just or unjust, and the long-standing notion of retributive justice reflected *'persistent concerns about the appropriateness of the punishment to the crime'.* There had been a presupposition that everybody had a *'due',* and therefore, justice was treated as *'the constant and perpetual will to give each his due'* in its Latin tag. Since the medieval notion of the just price '*probed into the justice of a bargain that was not contaminated by force or fraud but entered into voluntarily by both the parties*', it reflected perhaps the closest approach to the contemporary concept of social justice. Justice consisted in *'not cheating, stealing or breaking contracts, within an established framework of property rights'* (which included property in other human beings as well in the times of Roman Empire). Justice could also *'be ascribed to institutions, but only on a very limited scale'.* It is only since last one century that it is considered a virtue of societies as well (Barry, 2005, pp. 4-6).

Social justice is a bit different genre of idea and action programme. A Sicilian priest, Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio, used the term 'social justice' in 1840 for the first time, and it was given prominence by Antonio Rosmini Serbati in 1848. The doctrine of social justice has become cardinal and paramount since the approaching of a welfare state in Europe and elsewhere. The modern concept of social justice emerged out of *'the throes of early industrialization*' in France and Britain in the 1840s. While social justice became the rallying cry of social

democratic parties everywhere in Europe, there was debate and arguments raging over the features of institutions that were required to realize social justice in Germany and Sweden. Many of the same ideas underlay Franklin Delano Roosevelt's '*New Deal'*, Harry Truman's '*Fair Deal*' and Lyndon Johnson's '*Great Socie*ty', and their rationale was expressed in terms of justice.

Most prominent modern defender and advocate of social justice has been John Rawls. A classic by John Rawls entitled 'A Theory of Justice' was published in 1971. Social justice has enjoyed a significant audience among theorists under the pseudonym of distributive justice since then. John Rawls' conception of social justice is probably the most influential. Rawls paid attention to those who were disadvantaged at birth with undeserved inequalities; his principle of redress required that those with fewer native assets should be compensated. In 1989, he brought further clarity to his views on the subject.

The idea of social justice which has gained currency recently insists upon it that justice must incorporate various means of achieving fair distribution of societal goods. Social justice is equally concerned about allocating the vulnerabilities of human beings; problem is to allocate not only benefits of the 'goods' but also burdens of the 'bads' and vulnerabilities of human species. Social justice is conceived today as principally redistribution of assets and incomes through a social policy of the government supported by responsibility-bearing and accountability-seeking civil society. Social justice is required because human beings are dependent beings and have dependencies – both natural dependencies and man-made dependency. In the lottery of luck and predetermined location of birth, one is not responsible for things beyond one's reasonable control, and therefore, one is not deserving of bad luck and inferiority of birth in a group, caste and community. It is therefore that one is not responsible for and deserving of distress and dislocation in life; rather one is entitled for "rights of man" and equal treatment and equal entitlement to get away from these ill-luck. Care is needed; altruism is needed.

This has been the principal claim of all 'social policy' theorists from Richard Tittmus (1956; 1970) to Robert Pinker (1971;1979) that a good life is the universal goal, and well-being is a need that requires altruism spirit and care work to address the issues of

dependencies of children, women, and elderly, deprived and excluded in markets for property and work opportunity. The concept of social justice is used in contexts where people understand social justice to be about fairness beyond individual justice. In contemporary time, distributive justice is concerned with distribution of benefits and burdens in equal and fair manner while social justice is concerned with the distribution of provisioning of public goods and services. Social justice is conventionally concerned with distribution of education, health-care and opportunities of gainful employment in equal and fair manner among all, principally by including the socially excluded. The concept of social justice takes within its sweep the objectives of removing all inequalities and affording equal opportunities to all citizens in social affairs as well as economic activities. Social justice seeks to ensure systematic and structural social arrangements to improve equality as a core social and political value. The term social justice is a blanket term so as to include both social justice and economic justice.

According to Martha Nussbaum (2006), a recent advocate of social justice, a theory of social justice should be abstract. These theories should have '*a generality and theoretical power*' that reach beyond the political conflicts of their time. Such theories must also be '*responsive to the world and its most urgent problems*'. These must be open to changes in their formulation and even in their structures in '*response to a new problem or an old one that has been culpably ignored*' (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 1).

Social justice[48] requires positive government intervention. Amartya Sen has put forward a view in which social justice aims to make society less unjust, rather than aiming to make

[48] In 1994, a political report entitled the "*Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal"* was published in England. It was based on the Report of the Commission on Social Justice that was set up by John Smith, the leader of the new Labour Party in Britain. It was however completed and published under the leadership of Tony Blair. Most devastating critic of social justice idea has however been the liberal economist, Frederick Hayek. Though being a liberal, Frederick Hayek argued about the mirage of social justice. While supporting the notion of justice of classical liberal tradition, Hayek termed social justice conception of twentieth century as a 'myopic delusion'. In his view, social justice is wholly devoid of meaning or content, and therefore, the very idea of social justice is necessarily meaningless within the context of an extended market order - a system of market order that is a spontaneous order. The idea of social justice has however withstood the scathing criticism, and survived. It was much more later that a hybrid conception of a combination of the virtue ethics, care ethics and Rawlsian liberalism was successively attempted to assert that individual virtue of compassion, altruism and benevolence on the one hand and free and fair

society perfectly just. The effectiveness of actions and institutions are judged in terms of reducing injustices rather than pursuing some transcendental perfect justice. A broad and systematic account of popular views of justice is actually an integrated theory of justice that is a multi-criterion theory of pluralistic distributive and procedural justice in which at least three principles of efficiency, equity and basic need are interpreted, weighted and applied in a manner that depends on context.

Macrojustice is the issue of social ethics, and it concerns the most general rules of society. It is mostly global distributive justice that concerns the general principles of endogenous, consensual social choice that are made by sufficiently informed, reflective, impartial and logic-following individuals in making deals and achieving outcomes in society. There are scarcities of resources and goods in society, and therefore, there are conflicts as regards the allocation and distribution of such resources and goods; such conflicts are to be redressed through concerns with principles of social freedom that are morally befitting and Pareto efficient, or more directly, principles of unanimity that derive from ethical reasons and whose direct valuation derive from process-freedom of individuals that are impartially applied to the distribution of benefits from the main resources in the society. Global distributive justice constitutes the global distributive aspect of functional public finance.

According to Serge-christophe Kolm (2005), macrojustice is built on the four foundation principles of classical liberalism, namely, basic rights, process-freedom, Pareto efficiency and unanimity among individuals, and it is facilitated by social freedom (a notion of relational equality). The idea of social freedom is the classical protective basic individual rights in "natural resources" since the classical liberalism praises the process-freedom. The classical liberalism is a moral theory in social ethics for last couple of centuries. It has insisted on the freedom of action and the freedom to act and to benefit from the intended consequences of one's acts without forceful interference – a consequence of process-freedom in the form of free exchange, free markets and legitimacy of property rights in economics (respect of consequences of past acts including that of right and property acquired through free exchange) - without interference by others, in addition to freedom of

---

institutional set up of society on the other are both needed for justice. More and more theories have come up recently in favour of the idea and political agenda of social justice.

speech as a basic political right)(as these political basic rights developed in the British constitutional monarchy, the American "no taxation without representation", the French destruction of absolute monarchy, or the German local city democracies) (classical prescription of basic freedoms to be equal for all and maximal while having priority over other considerations as constitutional basis of democracy).

It would lead to the principle of equal labour income equalization (a principle of allocation according to desert and not on merit) (equal sharing of the product of the same notional labour – reckoned in terms of wage rate of equalization labour in the neighborhood of the lowest normal labour time) which is equivalent to part-rent of the productive capacity (the "*distribuand*" available for global distributive justice in macrojustice, i.e., that the individual has to transfer as contribution to the public distributive agency since the individual is the tenant of his productive capacity (the quality of capacity reflected in labour productivity is a function of genetic luck, health care, education and training plus disposition to work).

Such a productive capacity is treated as one of the natural resource defined in the classical system)(the rent of an asset – the productive capacity defined independently of the choice of the specific use of this capacity, whereby "rent" is simply the economic value of the "availability" of a durable resource called "capacity"), measuring the degree of equal sharing of the wage income values of individual's productive capacity - a factor of proportionality, the coefficient as a proportion in which a deficit in given productivity is compensated by an extra income transfer - constituting the fraction of rent-value of the capacity of individual, a minimum of disposable income as a fraction of the average productivity of individual labour) (general labour reciprocity in productive capacity according to the principle of equal labour contribution whereby equality is derived from impartiality in the observed real-life absence of large-scale altruistic general reciprocity).

Global distributive justice in macrojustice results from the social and ethical judgments regarding the facts of social freedom that is grounded in classical liberalism (or process freedom that implies act-freedom plus aim-freedom of human agents, leading to respect of rights – process-liberal rights consisting of process-free legitimate rights plus complete

process-freedom for present acts respecting the rule) and principle of unanimity arrived at by a putative, imaginary , hypothetical free mutual agreement, that is, a consensual, endogenous social choice view that individuals are entitled to, or accountable for, all that concerns their capacities to enjoy income or consumption, that implies Pareto efficiency (efficiency of market systems due to interested incentives and a decentralized use of the relevant information) (Kolm, 2005).

3.4. Economic Justice and Ownership

Since the times of the ancient Greek philosophers, the ideas regarding justice, human action and reason (and rationality) has been favourite categories of study and themes of normative analysis in the disciplines of political science, political philosophy, moral philosophy and ethics. These disciplines of knowledge have kept on refining and developing the conception of and discourse regarding the nature and essence of justice,fairness and equity on the one hand, and moral action, moral person and moral reason on the other. It is but a historical tragedy that a mainstream neoclassical economist as a soft, human and social scientist has maintained a distance for a long time with the preoccupations of a political scientist, a political and moral philosopher and an ethicist.

Mainstream economics[49] has been a laggard in taking up the justice-preoccupation of political and moral philosophy. While Adam Smith and J S Mill had opined their views on the theme of justice, such opinions were advanced in the capacity of being moral philosophers.

[49] Many contemporary economists who work in the areas of social choice theory and welfare economics are quite unfamiliar with contemporary philosophical thinking on distributive justice. Most economists today are undoubtedly familiar with utilitarianism and the Rawlsian difference principles but that is the end of it (Roemer, 1996, p.1). A theorization about justice and freedom has not been the core preoccupation of the standard economic principles since these have always taken the former as given. There had been no mention of restorative, retributive and distributive justice throughout. Whatever attempts there are in economics in the name of impartial spectator's viewpoint (compassion and sympathy motives behind judgment) and impersonal and impartial equal exchange in the market as arena of liberty and freedom, these are all short of any mention of fairness motive of economic agents being accounted for in economic analyses and prescription of reduction of inequalities and attainment of any sort of equality and justice.

Adam Smith (1759) wrote that "*justice is, upon most occasions but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour*". In this sense, justice requires the claims of forbearance from invasive action by others - a sense of negative justice. Justice is an event and a process orchestrated and driven by human values of preservation of each individual in his/her own perfect rights without injury to his/her person, reputation and estate. It is the medieval legal conception of justice.

Morality and moral considerations are involved in performing a distinct class of actions call for 'free, fair and just actions' by a personal rational and moral agency - individual and relational justice. The idea of distributive justice requires equality in distribution of the human capacity for survival and material means of livelihood. In matters of distributive justice, human agencies in interaction have a capacity for the conception of material livelihood and a capacity to perform the requisite action of production of livelihood as well. Given the radically different accounts of justice put forward by Aristotle and David Hume, *'how is one to approach the task of deciding rationally between them'* is a question, according to the leading historian of moral philosophy.

One exceptional work of modern economics was that of Luois Kelso and Mortimer Adler (1958). In a monograph entitled "The Capitalist Manifesto", they claimed that economics as a moral science was sensitive to the question of economic justice that consisted of moral principles used in designing the institutions of the society. According to Luois Kelso and Mortimer Adler (1958), there are three principles of economic justice. Three principles of economic justice are the principle of 'participation', the principle of 'distribution', and the principle of 'limitation'. The principle of participation required equal opportunities in accessibility to property and seeking work is to be provided to all. Under the principle of distribution, justice required that there must be equal proportionate reward for contribution of labour and capital equal to the marginal productivity. The principle of limitation is the principle of harmony that requires a limitation over greed, monopolies, and building checks and balances within social institutions; it synchronizes the distribution with participation. The third principle is the social justice that balances and restores the participative justice

and distributive justice within a market based economic system to counter monopoly tendencies[50].

Mainstream economics is a newcomer to the proposition that fairness motives do affect the behaviour of a considerable number of individuals in an economy. There is now a wide set of distributive concerns, including the study of fairness preferences of people, that are part of the studies in economics – a sort of emerging consensus in economics over the relevance of fairness because of incorporation of the perception of increasing economic inequality. This newcomer status is worth celebrating.

There are now studies that quite often cite the impact of fairness motive (and not merely, self-interest motive) of people as revealed in the failure of the product markets to clear, the phenomenon of labour unemployment due to efficiency wages, working of the public utility regulations, and resolutions of social choice problems. Justice arguments are now widely invoked to improve the theoretical and empirical analysis in nearly all fields of economics (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). For example, the number of entries under the word "efficiency" outnumbered those under "*justice*" or "*fairness*" in studies documented on '*Econ Lit.'* under JEL classification system by sixteen to one in the 1970s but the hits under the code closest to justice outnumbered those under that closest to efficiency by almost two to one since 1991 till 2003 (Konow, 2003). Such a shift in economics is welcome.

In an interactive setting of a macroeconomy, the empirical surveys and laboratory experiments show that fairness motive of human agents is variously associated with a choice of not merely the principle of equity but also the principle of efficiency and the principle of needs-meeting in either the lexicographic order or as a matter of trade-off among the three principles of choice. In the literature of economics, the most cited descriptive study of justice as fairness today is that of Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). It is now realised that while self-interest may be crucial motive accounted for in the theory of individual planning, the fairness motive is to be accounted in a theory of social

[50] There are four pillars of economically just society, according to Luois Kelso and Mortimer Adler (1958): expanded ownership of productive assets, limited economic power of the state, the restoration of free and open markets, and the restoration of private property. The Centre for Economic and Social Justice in the American University, Washington (now Arlington, Virginia) pursues the paradigm.

interaction. The fact of the interdependence of utility functions is a good candidate for ethical belief on applying practical reason on cooperation and mutual care. There are possibilities of altruism and other-regarding behavior to exist where egoism and egotism are both self-defeating (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).

To begin with Marxist framework, neither Marx nor Engels saw themselves as moral philosophers. Karl Marx did not write a systematic work or a systematic treatise on ethics. Marx has had a reputation for anti-morality stance. Marx and Engels did not develop an overt ethical theory. Marx however talks about practical and sensuous humanity (not theoretical humanity). Marx does however say many things about law and this *'also bears upon ethics'.* In Marxian paradigm, the property rights and moral beliefs are posited to be '*embedded in the state*'. Particular notions of morality are specific to mode of production. The state exists to maintain these interests, hedged in Particular notions of morality. Morality as ideology is '*always a form of illusion',* and its chief illusion is *'its general inability to see its own class basis'.* Marx found *'this whole moral and justice scenario irksome'.* In fact, Marx considered the moral ideas of fellow socialists *'repellant, pouring scorn on Saint Simon'.* There is *'no impartial benevolence, no detached reason, no universal neutrality, no universal human rights, and no disinterested moral rules'.* Marx quite explicitly takes *'an antijustice, antirights, and antimorality stance'* (Vincent, 1998, pp. 115- 22).

G A Cohen (1981) asserts that the Marxists do not often talk about justice. When they do talk they tend to deny its relevance, or they say that the idea of justice is an illusion. The fact however remains that justice occupies a central palace in revolutionary Marxists belief. Its presence is betrayed by the particular judgment Marxists make, and by the strength of feeling with which they make them.

In a post-Marxist theory as propounded by G A Cohen (1981), there is a distinction between the concept of self-ownership and the thesis of self-ownership. Nozick includes *'luck as a legitimate means of acquiring assets'.* Inheritance is therefore *'a just means of acquiring assets' (*it is an instance of an exercise of the right of self-ownership from the point of view of the donor*).* Thus highly unequal opportunities of a real sort for the

generation of young heirs are condoned by Nozick. Rawlsian thesis is the *'radical reply'*. It says that *'a person has no moral right to two good eyes while others have none, by virtue of the moral arbitrariness of luck'*. The right to derive income from personal attribute is denied when those attributes are due to luck, whether of the genetic or the environmental variety. Pristine natural resources are, morally speaking, *'jointly owned by all, or owned in common'*. It is *'challenge the thesis of self-ownership'* (Roemer, 1996, pp. 232-4).

The famous second proviso of John Locke is a rule that everyone is entitled to use the common land if "*enough, as good"* is left available to others in common. None is allowed to exercise a use-right in a way that forecloses the ability of others to exercise it. Locke however favoured '*the enclosure of land on efficiency grounds'*. The argument was that the productivity gains would be so great so as '*to render the second proviso obsolete'*. The second Proviso is but supreme in the cases of lower productivity and failure of trickle down of benefits of enclosed land. The second proviso has lexicographical and lexical *'priority over the efficiency provision'*. In the event of a conflict, *'the proviso trumps'*. The distributive arrangements that work to the benefit of the least advantaged *'enjoys an analogous lexical priority to Locke's proviso'* (Shapiro, 2004, pp. 137-8).

To summarise the history of philosophy on the theme of justice as undertaken by Alasdaire MacIntyre (1988; 1991), it is clear that Aristotelian account of practical rationality is itself *'embedded in his larger scheme of thought'*. Humean account of the respective roles of the passions and reason in *'generating evaluative judgments and action'* is grounded in epistemology ad metaphysics account. There is thus *'a fundamental incompatibility of theories of justice, framed in terms of one of those schemes with theories framed in terms of the other'*. In both cases, the philosophical conversations moreover begin from *'the beliefs and concepts of the social groups within whose shared life the activities of philosophical enquiry are carried on'*. These narratives provide examples that *'no way of conducting rational enquiry from a standpoint of independent of the particularities of any tradition has been discovered'*. Rival traditions have *'rival conceptions of rationality and of progress in understanding'* (MacIntyre, 1991, pp. 149-52). Liberalism does not provide *'a neutral tradition-independent ground',* and turns out itself to *'be just one more such tradition with its own highly contestable conceptions of practical rationality and of justice'*. There is *'no*

place for appeals to a practical-rationality-as-such or a justice-as-such' to which all rational persons would by their very rationality be compelled to give their allegiance. There is instead only '*the practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-tradition'* (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 346).

3.5. A Compromise

To begin with, an abstract, standard and universal conception of theoretical and practical reasons that have been employed to the service of construction of the idealized heuristic and postulate of human rationality and formulation of moralities of the goods and the rights as the base of appraisal criteria of action, and the ensuing transcendental conception of abstract justice have been under conceptual strain. In the history of moral philosophy, the attempts have also variously been made to find a resolution. Among those attempts at resolutions and bridging the distance between the universal and the particular on the one hand and the abstract and the concrete on the other are the prescriptions of the category of hybrid morality and the category of imperfect transitional justice.

To put the perspective, while presenting the theories of justice the moral and political philosophers make considerable use of the existence of the human faculties (the ability to sympathise and the ability to reason). It is because of such basic human abilities to understand and to sympathize, and to argue that people are not *'inescapably doomed to isolated lives without communication and collaboration'.* An escape from isolation is not only be *'important for the quality of human life'* but also for *'understanding and responding to the other deprivations from which human beings suffer'* (Sen, 2009, pp. 412-15). These are the faculties and abilities which ought to be the base of arguments in favour of the notion of less-than-perfect, less-than-ideal, less-than-absolute justice.

Justice[51] as a value that guides the human action is embraced by a human agency not only as a goal to be achieved but also a right to be restored and protected. Justice as an event is

[51] To quote a survey of the literature:

> *Amartya Sen's (1979) initial attack on welfarism was based on examples in which some individual's welfares were offensive: a wellfarist must treat the welfare a sadist derives from whipping another as equally worthy , in the social calculus, as welfare derived from*

produced as an outcome by human endeavour. Justice as a process is orchestrated with mediation of human action. Justice is to be embraced as an overriding reasonable value guiding the human action, to be orchestrated as a social process involved with human action and to be achieved as a final outcome of human action. The mental faculties of our practical reason and rationality are to be freed from utter egoism, selfishness and greed! There is a need of training and education of human mind, and such training ought to be in the direction of justice being considered a matter of right and claim for the sake of human flourishing.

Justice is not an instinct, emotion and psychology of men and women but cultivation, nourishment and training of instinct, emotion and psychology do contribute to sharpening of the reasons for action, that is, justice. Therefore, the moral dictum is: cultivate, nourish and train 'moral sentiments' of charity, benevolence, beneficence, and 'human values' of sympathy and compassion since early childhood through the institutions of family, school and churches (temples, mosque)! That was what Aristotle said long time ago and this is what Martha Nussbaum says now.

The priority rules of justice of Rawlsian ideal theory is sacrificed in the course of action that is geared to realization and attainment of transitional justice. A partial-compliance non-ideal theory of justice requires a set of moral principles to govern the individual conduct in non-ideal conditions in a non-ordered society. The partial-compliance theory and transitional theory of justice do not prescribe the tasks of building up institutions and undertaking reforms to make basic structure and institutions just in a well-ordered liberal society.

---

having enough to east …… Ronald Dworkin's and Thomas Scanlon's attacks on welfarism are entirely different, being based on the view that welfare does not hold individuals accountable for certain kinds of choices they should be held responsible for: in particular, choices following from tastes with which they identify ..... The issue of responsibility was absent in the writing of Kolm, germinal in the writings of Rawls and Sen, and became focal in the writings of Dworkin, Scanlon, Arneson, and Cohen. ..... For these latter thinkers, rights of self-ownership trump any redistributive imperative deduced from considerations of responsibility …… This new articulation of responsibility in the theory of distributive justice, and of egalitarian theory in particular, is the signal achievement in the field of the last fifteen years (Roemer, 1996, pp. 308-9).

It is worth taking the cognizance that Burleigh Wilkins (1997) proposed a third principle of justice that is required to impart stability of just structure of a liberal democratic pluralistic society, in addition to and in supplement to two principles of Rawlsian justice that is built on the overlapping consensus regarding protection of the basic rights and liberties of individuals and provision for equality of opportunity for individuals. The purpose was to account for the rationale of reasonable pluralism of religious thoughts and beliefs in human society, particularly the comprehensive reasonable doctrines related with religious beliefs and acts of churches and church-related institutions in liberal democratic society. In a pluralistic society, there are "strains of commitment" that are troublesome and its alleviation would require protection of religious community from direct, foreseeable harms by so-called neutral state requirements that otherwise offers constitutional protections and institute justice by ensuring basic rights, liberties and equality of opportunities among individuals in society.

Justice as fairness[52] requires the third principle along the following lines as well: a constitutional regime ought to act in accordance with the protection of the basic rights and liberties and equality of opportunity. It should avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those '*comprehensive doctrines*' which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism. Such rules ought to include those which might be of general applicability but which might result in unintended but foreseeable harms against some comprehensive doctrine(s). Any "neutral" rule which substantially burdens '*comprehensive doctrine(s)*' could be justified only if it furthers '*a compelling state interest*' (Wilkins, 1997, p. 369). On the road towards transitional justice, this principle has a role to play.

---

[52] To quote an observation:

> *The theory of fairness with the purest economic pedigree, and the usual definition of equity in welfare economics, is the absence of envy criterion. The concept was first formally stated by Duncan Foley (1967) and was further developed by Hal Varian (1974), Elisha Pazner and David Schmeidler (1978), William J Baumol (1986) and others. ..... In the simplest form, an allocation is envy-free if no agent prefers (i.e. envies) the bundle of another ..... absence of envy is an appealing construct and seems like a reasonable goal. The question asked in this study, however, is whether it describes allocations people call fair, or whether it is distinct ..... Absence of envy is questionable not only as a description of justice but also of what is meant by envy in common parlance: it seems quite possible that I would like to have another person's allocation, but that I do not experience the resentful feeling about his advantage that the word envy typically connotes (Konow, 2003, pp. 1204-5).*

In addition, the fourth principle of justice, that is, equality ought to be probably chosen by default. It is a requirement *'to be vigilant about identifying the distinct role of justice among distributive forces'.* Justice should not be construed too broadly. It is a fact that fairness often *'competes with self-interest'.* The strategic environment may affect the domination of human motives. For example, in social interactions involved in parenting, *'the motives of love and unconditional altruism'* do figure more prominently. The kind and harmful acts among colleagues and neighbours are motivated by *'opportunities for reciprocity'.* One needs not forget that fairness rarely motivates the neighbours and colleagues. Justice may be only one part of the whole forces that impact allocations *(Konow, 2003, p. 1228).* Dealing with the analysis of a less-than-perfect justice may thus require a sort of marriage between ethics, political philosophy, political economy and development economics[53].

Professor Amartya Sen (2009) has been a vociferous critic of a conception of perfect liberal justice. In his words, what underlies most of the mainstream approaches to justice, including John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness, in contemporary political philosophy is the '*transcendental institutionalism*'. There is however a strong case for its replacement. An idea of justice and its violation, if it has not to create a wedge and distance between conception of a philosopher and a layman is required to focus on the assessments of social realizations, that is, on *'what actually happens'* rather than merely a focus on the *'appraisal of institutions and arrangements'.* Moreover, it is also of necessity required to focus on

---

[53] To Quote:

> *"The seeming disappearance of development economics as a separate discipline some quarter century ago could not have come at a more inopportune time. Some of the criticisms made by mainstream economists of development economics as it was often practiced at the time are valid: for instance, it underestimated the role of markets and rationality. But their arguments that developing countries are just like more developed countries, only lacking a much physical (and later, it was emphasized, human) capital and their assumption that competitive equilibrium theorem can be applied in a straightforward way is, if anything, even more misguided. In the last two decades, there has been a growing awareness of the limitations of the competitive paradigm, with its assumptions of perfect information, perfect competition, and complete markets, and with the correlate propositions that distribution and institutions do not matter" (Stiglitz, 2001, p. 2).*

'comparative issues of enhancement of justice' rather than trying to *'identify perfectly just arrangements'* (Sen, 2009, pp. 410-12).

Amartya Sen (2009) has been quite fond of the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft on the vindication of the rights of men and women who argued that actual disagreements among human beings may be removed through reasoning helped by way of questioning the established prejudices, vested interests and unexamined preconceptions. We go as far as we reasonably can go. Given the requirements of public reasoning and the demands of impartiality, a broad theory of justice has *'to rely fundamentally on partial orderings based on the intersection – or commonality – of distinct rakings'* drawing on different reasons of justice. Such different reasons can all survive the scrutiny of public reasoning. Such an approach to justice can be *'both entirely acceptable in theory and eminently useable in practice'.*

According to Amartya Sen that John Rawls (1971; 1992) went beyond the social contract tradition in focussing on institutions as the subject matter of his principles of justice as well as an interest in social realizations. The social realizations are assumed to be determined in Rawls's 'justice as fairness' by *'a combination of just institutions and fully compliant behaviour by all to make a predictable transition from institutions to state of affairs'.* The focus is however required to be on the life conditions of human beings. It is wortha memory that there are some common presumptions about what it is like to be a human being in a number of different theories of justice. All theories have *'something to do with the kind of creatures we human beings are'.* Unless such realizations are incorporated, the distance between the theory of perfect justice and the notion of transitional justice would remain unbridgeable. A broad theory is warranted.

Amartya Sen has argued in favour of a non-ideal theory of transitional justice to the effect of assertion that a broad theory of justice that makes room for non-congruent considerations within the body of that broad theory is always conducve to emergence of definite conclusions can emerge despite the plurality. It does not make *'itself incoherent, or unmanageable, or useless'.* The competing criteria will yield different rankings of alternatives. There would be some shared elements and some divergent ones. The

commonality of the shared partial ranking is to be seen as *'the definitive outcome of that broad theory'*. There are plurality of reasons, and these can *'pose no problem for a definitive decision'*, whereas it can pose a serious challenge in other cases. For example, the idea of justice does include cases of different types. In one type, there is easy resolution in some instances and very hard decisional problems in others. For a historical example, when Condorcet and Adam Smith argued that the abolition of slavery would make the world far less unjust, they were right. They were asserting the possibility of ranking the world with and without slavery, in favour of the latter. They were showing the superiority – and greater justice – of a world without slavery, even without its being able *'to identify the demands of perfectly just societies'* or exact nature of '*just institutions'* (Sen, 2009, pp. 396-401).

In contrast to the liberal construct of ideal and transcendental justice, the utilitarianism-consequentialism tradition[54] has addressed the issue of the most extensive or the maximal justice. The standard of justification for actions, institutions and the whole worlds has been the impartial welfare consequentialism. Welfare based principle has insisted on requirement of the maximization of the arithmetic sum of all satisfied preferences, weighted for the intensity of those preferences.

All said, it is of course warranted that transitional justice has to accommodate the concerns expressed in desert based principle as well as merit based principle of distribution as a matter of practical compromise. The desert based principle prescribe that people deserve

---

[54] To quote a perceptive remark:

> *Utilitarianism ..... the moral doctrine that one should act so as to produce the greatest possible balance of good over bad, where good is understood to mean happiness or pleasure. Jeremy Bentham ..... advocated what is sometimes called act utilitarianism……. John Stuart Mill ..... proposed that one act according to the general rules of conduct that produces the greatest happiness (e.g., never lie, never steal), even if the rules do not maximize aggregate happiness in every instance ……This raises the question of the appropriate metric of justice, that is, of the unit of account for justice evaluation, and whether it should be allocable variables such as goods and money, or derived values such as health, satisfaction, pleasure and happiness ……. Around the turn of the twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto (1906) defined a means for analyzing social welfare that does not rest on the strong cardinality and comparability assumptions of utilitarianism …….. Pareto himself did not portray his principle as a justice theory, but this version of his principle has been interpreted as such, e.g., by Richard Posner in his book The Economics of Justice (1981)……Posner defends the claim that justice be equated with economic efficiency, specifically, with wealth maximization (Konow, 2003, pp. 1200-02).*

certain economic benefits in light of their actions. People should be rewarded according to their contribution to the social product. They should be rewarded according to the effort they expend in their work activity. They should be rewarded according to the costs they incur in their work activity. According to meritocratic theories, the goods, wealth and social status should be distributed to match individual merit, which is usually understood as some combination of talent and hard work. According to contribution based theories, the goods should be distributed to match an individual's contribution to the overall social good.

According to need based theories, basic goods like food, shelter and medical care should be distributed to meet the individual's basic needs. It is important to distinguish between desert-payments and entitlements. Incentive –payments are forward-looking while desert-payments are backward-looking. It is of course difficult to identify as to what counts as contribution, an effort, a cost and it is more difficult to measure it in a complex economy. The productivity of a person is influenced by many factors over which person have little control. "Truncated" utilitarianism would require a common-sense conception of justice in terms of "maximization of total utility, subject to the limit of floor of individual welfare". It shall require the protection of the welfare of the poor. It was proposed by Jon Elster. A compromise with the truncated utilitarianism and theory of fairness is the rod ahead for a theory of non-ideal, non-perfect and non-maximal transitional justice in societies of South Asia where the institutions are either absent or not at par with those of the liberal and decent societies of the western European world.

The chapter is divided into three sections.

First section deals with the human agential action and its meanings. Private individual human action is distinguished from the public action of the government. Redistributive action of the democratic welfare state as the hybrid action is dealt with. The multiplicities of ideological stands on the categories of action in general, conundrum of public action, action deficits and governance failures are also dealt with.

The second section deals with the conception of human reason. The controversies and debates on the basic understanding of this human faculty are reviewed. Theoretical and practical reasons are contrasted. The idea of public practical reasons is elaborated and its role in explaining, recommending and justifying hybrid action is discussed.

In the third section, an attempt is made to resolve the tension that is so characteristic of the relation between action and reasons of human beings.

In this chapter, the second objective of the thesis is addressed, while we further attempt to test the validity of the first hypothesis.

In the pursuit of promotion of transitional justice through advocacy of hybrid moral framework of the doctrine of agrarianism and minimization of agrarian injustices, it is of foundational significance to model a conception of hybrid action with plural standards of normative appraisal of such mixed action framework. Governance is an example par excellence of hybrid actions of private and public agencies together. Governance is a practical action paradigm of contemporaneous modern world.

Governance is a hybrid action, involving both private as well as public actors. Governance is a discourse about the business–society interaction; it is about the prospects and possibility of private-public partnership and dialogue. It is a continuous process of steering, managing and delivering public 'goods' in the framework of public-private-partnership structure – a structure of agents, mechanisms and networks of governmentality working in association and accommodation with a whole set of new non-state actors, mechanisms and networks (scaled below the state at the level of civil society as well as scaled above the State at the level of the global organizations). Governance is then not merely confined to the formal agencies and mechanisms of the government within the state associated with regulation and intervention in society, polity and economy. Rather, it goes beyond the confines of the state to the sub-state and supra-state levels, and thereby beyond the conceptual trinity of civil society-market-state.

What is true in a concrete world of affairs is the hybrid action of human agency. In all human society, there is a public authority – a sort of government like organization which acts in public interest. In other words, individual human actions are never in a vacuum. Rather, these private individual actions are performed along with and side by side the public bureaucratic actions.

There are possibilities of private action deficits and failures. Failures of the civil society of private actors in interaction and their vulnerabilities have led to the rationale of a welfare state. The government intervention in the economy through the power of legislation is needed when the private actor fail to discharge their duties and carry out business in less than honourable way. There are but also possibilities of public action deficits and failures. It is in view of such deficits that hybrid action paradigm assumes significance.

In the standard formulations of political philosophy, moral philosophy and ethics, there is a very long tradition of discourse on the category called 'reasons', and such a discourse has always been significant because 'reasons are what presumably initiate, explain, recommend and also justifies action of human beings. Since 'reasons' are antecedents to human actions – private or public, it is also again of foundational significance to postulate a sort of hybrid reasons as antecedents to hybrid actions. A hybrid action motivated and justified by private and public reasons and rationality require an exercise in synthesizing the categories of person-related reasons of respect and value-centered reasons of concern about human happiness, pleasure, goodness and wellbeing. The hybrid theoretical-practical reasons that are simultaneously person-related as well as value-centered and conjoint instrumental end-oriented and principled act-oriented reasoning has a normative content.

A reasonable comprehensive doctrine of hybrid human action has three main features: first, it would involve '*an exercise of theoretical reason'* that covers the major aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. It organizes '*values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the world*'. Second, it involves the exercise of practical reason in determining priorities. Third, such a doctrine '*normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine*' (Rawls, 1993, pp.59-60). Theoretical and practical reasons are both required for a good doctrine. In a doctrine of hybrid actions explained, recommended and justified by hybrid reasons, it is needed to accommodate both theoretical as well as practical reasons and the plurality of value-centered reasons of concern as well as person-related reasons of respect.

It is the human reasons that are considerations after informed deliberations, and specifically the other-regarding reasons for action that is valuable in human life and for the sake of human life in an interactive social situation, that leads to and motivates the actions of enhancing justice. The theoretical conceptions and practical realities of human agency, human abidance to moralities of the good and the right and the features of human action are all made intelligible and sensible due to existence, and thus, consideration of facts and factitive entities called 'reason'.

Reason for intending to do something is a reason for doing it. Reason for trying to do something is a reason for doing it. A reason for action is, other things being equal, a practical reason. A rational human agency is moved by practical reasons. Practical reasoning gives rise not to bodily movements, but to intentions. When all goes well, these intentions result in bodily movements, and the end product is an intentional action. It is nothing but reason that is guiding action. Practical reason is the reason that allows for scope of cooperative actions in lieu of morass of acts of conflicts among the thinking individuals (Searle, 2001). Practical reason is rationality in action, which is always a matter of an agent consciously reasoning in time, under the presupposition of freedom, about what to do now or in the future. Practical reason is the reason for action - the *reason for performing action*. It is directed toward action. Reasons to perform an action are reasons to intend to perform that action.

Person-related reasons are reasons for respect and are considerations for the rights, freedom, justice, equal treatment and respect for persons, and fidelity to truth. The notion of a natural person is fundamental to the reason of respect or the principles of person-related reason. A natural person is identified as a moral person is to be recognized as a 'bearer of rights'. Reasons of respect identify persons as natural persons and autonomous persons with his rights and needs. The person related reason is the reasons of respect about freedom, justice and equal rights.

In contrast to person-related reason, the value-centered reason is the reason of concern about goodness, happiness and well being as the goals. Value-centered reasons are reasons for concern and are considerations of the goals in terms of goodness, happiness, pleasure and well being. Concern for human happiness, the sole reason for action admitted by utilitarian, is a subclass of value-centered reasons. The concern attends to a being's desires and wants. Value centered reasons require that we optimize. Richard Hare's preferentialist utilitarianism seems also to be conceived in this way.

There are many standard cases of a moral dilemma and moral quandaries that ensues from the varying conception of practical rationality. For example, the value-centered reason overrides the person-centered reason in the case of paternalism as a policy of the

government. The value-centered practical reason also again overrides the person-centered reason, whenever a claim is made regarding stopping cruelty to animal by animal-activists in the society. In addition to value-centered and person-centered reason for action, a respect shown to a dead human person signifies a "symbolic reason". Reasoning is central to the understanding of actions of justice even in a world which contains much *'unreason'*[55].

4.1. Action: Public and Crossbreed

Broadly understood, an action is an episode. It is an 'event' in Davidsonian sense. An action is 'bodily movement' (G E M Anscombe, 1957, 2000; Donald Davidson, 1963, 1980). For example, "I try to raise my arm and my arm goes up" constitutes a single event, and it is an action, according to Donald Davidson (1963; 1980).

Philosophically speaking, both the bodily movement and 'trying to move' the body constitute a single action (Jennifer Hornsby, 1980). In other words, "I try to raise my arm" is the agent's causing of bodily movement, "my arm goes up" is the causal consequence of bodily movement, and these two together constitute an action, according to Jennifer Hornsby (1980; 2004). An action is a series of events comprising of activities, performances, accomplishments and achievements (Hornsby, 2004).

In a comprehensive way, an action is then 'wanting to do' something, 'intending to do' something, 'planning to do' something, 'in order to do' something, and 'for the sake of doing' something - one or altogether. An action may be conceptualised as a subject matter of practical deliberation, an object of intention, and 'in some basic sense', an intentional doing of something, 'under some description' (Davidson, 1963).

[55] Unreason is mostly *'not the practice of doing without reasoning altogether, but of relying on very primitive and very defective reasoning'.* The assertion that *'reasoning can provide a reliable basis for a theory of justice is, of course, itself an issue that has been subject to controversy'.* There is however no doubt that it is implausible to see *'emotions or psychology or instincts as independent sources of valuation, without reasoned appraisal'* (Sen, 2009, pp. xvii-ix).

An adherent of moral philosophy of consequentialism insists that an action brings about a change in the state of affairs in the world – howsoever, infinitesimal. With intending, trying and wanting to bring about a change in the state of affairs of the world, howsoever infinitesimal, an action is always intentional. An individual action of a private human agency is directed at some aim or purpose[56]. In contrast to preordained divine and destined (fatalism) action, normal human action is intentional, and often purposeful.

Since action is mostly defined as intentional doing, the 'idleness' and 'non-doing' of a thing do not constitute an action. A purposive, intentional action is always motivated by a consideration which figures as the reason – theoretical and practical, a disposition and an intention always intervenes prior to initiation and completion of action, and an action is always evaluated in terms of the consequences generated by the action. The events of reflex, fluke and chance are exceptions. What a person does rather intentionally and what merely happens - mere occurrence, happening and happenstance - are two different things.

Critically speaking, performing an action does not however strictly require the actuality of events or state of affairs. An action needs not always fructify into achievements. Some action does not produce an outcome. What is counted as a human action may be realized not in events or happenings but in non-events and non-happenings as well. A person may not do anything, may not prevent and rather, on the contrary, may readily allow things to happen by keeping the body standstill. In such cases, omitting to doing and allowing things to happen is also an action[57]**.** An action is then orchestrated by an intention to allow and not

---

[56] A famous Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises (1998) in his classic work entitled "*Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*" remarked:

> *Human action is purposeful behaviour …….. Conscious or purposeful behaviour is in sharp contrast to unconscious behaviour, i.e., the reflexes and the involuntary responses of the body's cells and nerves to stimuli …….. If a man abstains from controlling the involuntary reaction of cells and nerve centres, although he would be in a position to do so, his behaviour is from our point of view purposeful …….. It is the merit of psychoanalysis that it has demonstrated that even the behaviour of neurotics and psychopaths is meaningful …….. but acting man chooses, determines, and tries to reach an end …….. Action therefore always involves both taking and renunciation …….. To consume and to enjoy are no less action than to abstain from accessible consumption and enjoyment (von Mises, 1998, Part – I, pp. 11-19).*

[57] Ludwig von Mises (1998) further remarked:

prevent what is happening. An action is then not only doing but also not omitting to do what possibly could be done, for example: 'she spoiled the show by not turning up'. To do nothing and to be idle is also an action since it also determines the course of events.

Action is the fundamental feature of a human life and distinguishing characteristic of a human agency. A human action is a distinctive defining feature of both private individual agency as well as public collective agency. In a paradigmatic case, '*what I do and what I am'* is subject to my will. In other words, action requires both strong freedom and strong valuation. An action is the manifestation of our freedom. An action is an expression of the freedom of will and responsibility bearing. In philosophical literature, the metaphysical conception of action and its event-cantered explanation of action is one thing and the ethical concern regarding the role of freedom and responsibility of human beings in action is another. Action, autonomy and responsibility are related to each other in intricate way. The actions of a wanton, amoralist, alcoholic, addict, neurotic, psychopath, lazy, bored, depressed, hypnotized, compulsive and vicious men and women are exceptions at the borderline.

Explanation and Justification of Action

An action is someone's action, in addition to being an event. An action is a doing of something - a deed - by a human being. A human being who responds to practical reasons, follows the traits of rationality and assumes the role of an agency is an actor – a doing entity. An action is a person's doing something for a reason. What merely happens, that is, occurrence, happening and happenstance are not of any concern. What is of significance is that a human agency – rational or akratic - has either complete or partial or incomplete but free will to do something and to become something through action.

For to do nothing and to be idle are also action, they too determine the course of events …… action is not only doing but no less omitting to do what possibly could be done…….. It is true that the changes brought about by human action are but trifling when compared with the effects of the operation of great cosmic forces (von Mises, 1998, Part – I, pp. 10-17).

What abounds in the corpus of theorizations on human action is the explanatory theory of action. In a complete theory of action, an action is however not only explained but also assessed and justified. The intentional action of a personal agency is the prime concern of not only the theories of explanation of action but also the normative theories of justification of action. An action is explained in terms of a reason or a cause but an action is justified in terms of consideration of values[58].

In theory, the positive explanation of action is contrasted with the normative evaluation of action. "Why a person did something" is not the focus of normative analysis of action. "Why a person ought to intend, want and try to do something (that is fair, just and egalitarian)" is the focus of normative analysis - a search for justifying reason. There is normative 'justification of action'.

There are causal explanation[59] and reason-explanation of an action. Explanation and causation of actions are inextricable since human agency is included in the world of nature.

---

[58] Jeremy Bentham prioritized happiness of individual as the greatest good and coined the moral dictum: '*greatest happiness of the greatest number*'. Jeremy Bentham, the scholar of Utilitarian ethic, believed that men are pleasure-seeking creatures, and pleasure was homogeneous across individuals, and therefore, quantifiable. A human action was posited to be oriented towards attainment of utility, satisfaction and want-fulfilment of individual economic agent, and the collective human action is oriented towards maximization of the 'goods' called the sum total of aggregate utility (welfare) represented through social welfare function at the level of the society. It advocated the principle that a society of humans should always act so as to produce the greatest quantity of 'happiness' as the only valuable 'good'.

[59] Ludwig von Mises (1998) in his classic work entitled "*Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*" remarked:

> *Human action is necessarily always rational …….. Man is capable of dying for a cause or of committing suicide. …….. In this sense, we may say that causality is a category of action. The category means and ends presuppose the category cause and effect ……. We must simply establish the fact that in order to act, man must know the causal relationship between events, processes, or states of affairs ……. There are for man only two principles available for mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality ……. Causality leads to a regressus in infinitum which reason can never exhaust. Teleology is found wanting as soon as the question is raised of what moves the prime mover……. the subject matter of praxeology is human action (von Mises, 1998, Part – I, pp. 17-19).*

A person does something for a reason and his/her action is a link in a causal chain which is understandable by reference to the causal working of the world.

Searching the reasons for and causes of human action (either private action of an individual human agency or public action of a public authority and government) is one thing, and assessing the worth, goodness and rightness and obligatoriness of the same specific action is another. In a normative theory of action, it is argued that it is through action that either the goods are attained, preserved and promoted or the rights are held, exercised and restored.

Conceptualised variously as an 'event', a 'process' and a 'change in the state of affairs' in the world, being attempted to be diversely explained through reason-explanation and/or cause-explanation, and appraised in terms of deontic principles and maxims of right and wrong and/or consequences of the goods and bads, it is human agency that is at the driving seat of action.

There are some binding features of an action – an 'ought-abidance of an action. An action is the primary target of accountability and moral evaluation. We do things to achieve something as either the 'good' or the 'right'. An action is either good or bad and righteous or wrong. An action is assessed as wrong/right, good/bad, obligatory. There is some sort of ought-abidance in performing an action as there are moralities of the good and the moralities of the rights in human society. The normative concern regarding human action is whether human agency has an active role in the action, and whether a justification exists in terms of autonomy and responsibility of agency participating n the action. A realistic normative theory of human action is to precisely deal with such a problem of justification.

In the literature of moral philosophy, there are two principal criteria of appraisal and assessment of worth of a human action – be that a private individual action or the collective public action or a hybrid of the two sorts of action: the generation of the 'goods' in society and the facilitation of the 'rights' of human agency.

An action is assessed and evaluated in terms of instrumentality to the realization of some goals, and appraised through some outcomes, consequences and results of performance of an action. An action of a rational agency is assessed on the basis of either the intrinsic worth or the instrumentality to some desirable consequences. What matters is the goodness of an action as it is evaluated variously in terms of either the enhancement of human welfare or augmentation of satisfaction, happiness and pleasure. This is the maxim of 'action-for-consequence sake'.

Another maxim of human action is 'action-for-action sake'. Action is considered as the identity of agency and the characteristic of person[60]. An action is appraised and evaluated in terms of the intrinsic worth of an action, assessed on some deontological principles of morality. In the appraisal of action, what matters is the righteousness of an action as it is judged variously in terms of either the protection and maximization of the desirable intrinsic features of the action, for example, righteousness, equality, justice and flourishing of life or minimization of undesirable harmful features of action, for example, wrongs, inequality, injustice and degradation of life.

Public Action

A public action is considered the action on behalf of the supra-organization called the State, which is mediated principally by various organizations of a government. A public action is a bit different genre of action which is undertaken and performed by public-rules-and-laws-bound disciplined functionaries of various organs of a State and a government. A

[60] Moral rationalism is a thesis that constitutes a view that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do. It is called alternatively, the principle of moral imperative, and also the overriding-duty thesis. In deontology, there is Kantian categorical imperative and practical reason is the moral reason. Morality is principally action guidance in matter of meeting obligations and duties, and such obligations may not coincide with the true interest of an individual. Deontology prescribes that commitment must be honoured, contracts must be adhered to, and promises must be kept, irrespective of results. Kantian ethics is often cited as the example of positive rights theory. Not all deontologists are however Kantian.

State is a public actor, and governance is a principal public action. A state governs the society, polity and economy through an ensemble of actions as a series of events[61].

While acting in so-called 'public interest', a State has a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographical area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents in a stratified society. Being an ensemble of administrative, policy and military organizations, any state, first and foremost, fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys those to create and support coercive organizations (Skocpol, 1979, p.29). It is the principal and defining action which is performed through a constellation of public functionaries in executive, bureaucracy, legislature, judiciary, police and army.

Additional but highly essential action of a capitalist state is related with the establishment and management of property rights[62] in the economy. The essence of property rights is the right to exclude, and an organization which has a comparative advantage in violence, that is the state, is in the position to specify and enforce property rights (North, 1981, p. 249). Libertarian school of thought tends to define the state with the help of two minimally necessary conditions. According to the first, to qualify as a state any agency must exercise the monopoly of coercive force over a given geographical area. The second asserts that the

---

[61] In medieval times, there had been direct intervention by the state in management and organization of both internal as well as external trade with the purpose of 'stabilizing society' against 'dangerous disequilibria' like quarrels and conflicts. The state *'as the administrators (again with a tendency toward institutionalization) of the public interest'* controlled and regulated the internal exchange so as as to keep under control the fierce competition and the *'resulting quarrels'* (Evers and Schiel, 1987, pp. 465 –6). There had been however no cinsistent and stable exrcise in policy making.

[62] The public policy envisaging role of the state in discharging certain economic functions in the classical economics was based on scientific techniques of analysis with moral presuppositions on the nature of state as paternalistic father. But, such paternalism in the economy is contingent upon the existence a legal framework already enacted by the state. The functions of the state as a supplement to the family find extensive recognition in the classical theory of policy. In such a policy framework, an appropriate legal framework and the system of economic freedom is considered as one and the same social process. It is not true that the Humean and Benthamite theory of property either in was constructed without an eye to its economic implications. It is not true that their conception of contract was a conception of something outside the sphere of economic relationships. Any idea of a distinction between an artificial harmony created by law and a spontaneous harmony created by economic behaviour would have rejected Jeremy Bentham as inherently self contradictory (Robbins, 1953, pp. 190-92).

coercive agency must claim legitimacy, that is, the right to exercise coercive forces (Haworth, 1994, p.100).

While there are a myriad of the possible forms and types of private actions, and what goes in the name of public actions in the name of public interests has been narrow, restricted and limited in size and scope[63]. Public actions are by far few, bound up with the nature of state and the government. The earliest school of economic thought called the classical political economy denied any role of the state in economy. It prescribed the philosophy of laissez-faire, that is, no intervention by the state. There had been theorists since the rise of capitalism who opposed the state intervention in economy[64]. The philosophy and economic ideology of laissez-faire philosophy dominated for greater part of 18th and 19th century. In eighteenth century France, the Physiocrats drew a principal policy conclusion from their distinctive model of the economic system (Deane, 1989, pp. 53-4).

According to Adam Smith (1776), the sovereigns who abided by the system of natural liberty has only three duties to attend: *'the duty of protecting the society from the violence*

---

[63] In antiquity, the economy was embedded in the society, according to Karl Polanyi. In Greece, the political society was natural to man, and the individual was a zoon politico and essentially a political being. The notion of a private or a non-statist sphere, where the individual could withdraw from public duties, or which could constrain the political community was almost unknown. The Roman era similarly regarded politicos as the primary activity of the individual. The state was thus identified with the community of citizens. There was no separation of the economy from the society, and no scope of state intervention. The Roman law however guaranteed the individual rights particularly the right to property, and led to a conceptual separation between the public aspect of an individual's life and his personal needs which became the subject of a separate law. The chief economic function of the state was then to protect the institution of private property and exchange contracts (Chandhoke, 1995, P. 79 - 80). The scope of economic functions was restricted.

[64] Originating from the interplay of dynamic forces of ancient chiefdoms and polis (city-states), one of the most significant public actions of the medieval state agency was in the realms of economy. In the budding capital market, the public intervention acts of the States were in the form of usury legislations which were concerned with the broad issues of allocation of resources and commodities of the time.
While the laws and moral codes regulating interest charges can be traced from *'the Babylonian code of Hammurabi of 1800 B.C., from Denteronomy of the old Testament through the Roman law',* usury as one of the varieties of medieval prohibitions was historically and geographically one of the most ubiquitous measures and pieces of economic legislation. There were a fair share of scholarly comment on the usury and usury control. Some of history's most astute observers, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Smith, Bentham and Keynes have commented on the subject (Blitz and Long, 1965, pp. 608-9).

and invasion of other independent societies', the duty of protecting from injustice of oppression *('the duty of establishing inexact administration of justice'),* and *'the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions'* which are beyond the profit-interests and technical capacity of any small number of private free individuals (Smith, 1976, Vol - II, pp. 687-8). In the framework of Adam Smith, an economic *`system of natural liberty'* was merely a vision. It was an abstraction, a goal to be kept in view rather than reached (Dean, 1989, p. 69).

The libertarian philosophers and economists have been prominent advocate of the minimal state and laissez-faire economy[65]. According to Lionel Robbins (1953), the classical economists were the first generation of utilitarian individualists, championing the cause of the system of economic freedom and liberty in the environment of institution of private property rights and delineated resource endowment positions of individuals guaranteed by public order and codes of legislation[66]. They were the classical economists who were the enthusiastic reformers because they were critics of some contemporary habits and institutions. Given the scientific and logical structure of the writings of the classical, there was a sort of coherence and force in their policy formulations (Robbins, 1953, pp. 173-79).

The early generation of marginalist economists was also not at all theorists of public policy or public action in the realm of economy. Alfred Marshall later was though sympathetic toward the economic role of the state, but failed to promulgate any theory of policy. Alfred Marshall was *'strongly anti-socialist and individualist in his approach to policy issues'.* There was an absolute faith in the potential of free competitive industry *'to raise the*

---

65 The libertarian philosophers and economists have been prominent advocate of the minimal state and laissez-faire economy. The concrete reality was however that the absolutist states were in some respect *'machines built overwhelmingly for the battle field'* as quite a good amount of Spanish state revenue went on military expenditure during the sixteenth century. The economic functions of Absolutism were *'not exhausted, however, by its tax and office system'. 'Economic centralization, protectionism and overseas expansion aggrandized the late feudal state'.* Mercantilism was the ruling doctrine of the epoch - *'a theory of the coherent intervention of the political state into the workings of the economy'* (Anderson, 1979, pp. 32-41).

66 The actions of a coercive state apparatus and functionary are limited to maintaining internal law and order inside the territory, collect forces exactions and taxes from the citizens, and protect the sovereignty of the nation against external aggression. It is the classical laissez-faire conception of public action. There had been theorists since the rise of capitalism who opposed the state intervention in economy. The philosophy and economic ideology of laissez-faire philosophy dominated for greater part of 18th and 19th century (Deane, 1989, pp. 53-4).

material and immaterial quality of human living standards generally' (Phyllis Deane, 1989, p. 139). Alfred Marshall was aware of the necessity '*to re-examine the role of the state and to detach economics from doctrinaires' opinions on laissez faire'.* This was in view of the expansion of large scale industry, and the extension of the vote and of educational opportunities to the working classes (Phyllis Deane, 1989, p. 140).

The neoclassical economists were the first ever generation of economic reformers who proclaimed a scientific and logical theory of policy. In the broad perspective of history of social philosophy, it was first ever attempt at formulation and promulgation of theory of the economic functions of the state. The neoclassical economic theories argued for no state intervention in the economy except on cases of market failure caused by externalities, increasing returns or market imperfections and in situations of distributional inequalities resulting from the unconstrained operation of the market creating problems of social cohesion (Skouras, 1994, P. 420). The classical as well as neoclassical arguments favored the *'laissez-faire'*, and confined the economic functions of the state to protecting private property rights as well as specification and enforcement of rule[67].

In contrast to the theoretical arguments of the academia, the European capitalist states have been responsive to *'societal needs and active on the welfare front - education and health sections'.* There was activism of the state in passing the welfare legislation and in expanding welfare expenditures. In educational legislation was passed in France in 1880s, in Britain and Germany in 1981-19, and in Italy in 1923-24. Bismarck's creation of a welfare system, the welfare legislation in the first Lloyd George government, and Mussolini's first six years in Italy are the examples (Hague, et al., 1989, P. 23 4).

---

[67] These economists derived it essential in the light of the facts tha tthe usury legislations in medieval Europe aimed at keeping the rate of interest at zero was to maintain a certain feature of stagnation so that it did not undermine the prevailing systems of 'fair wage' and 'just price'. No developmentalist state could ever shy away from such reforms for longer time. The state organs could not do without it in medieval times. It was there, at the regularly organized fairs which were mostly carried on by itinerant traders and Jews, around medieval towns and cities that trade in luxuries and other commodities, particularly to satisfy the needs of the ruling classes, developed (Pirenne, 1936). *'Forestalling, regrating, engrossing'* were condemned as unfair advantages extracted by particular individuals in privileged positions in production or trade. The *'just price'* was not merely an administered price to bring to various producers '*a return that was adequate to pay for their costs and efforts'* but especially an ethical notion that was advanced as a price to enable *'social reproduction'* (Bhardawaj, 1994, pp. 31-2).

The capitalist state has been interventionist in the economy. It has taken upon itself the tasks of performing economic functions with the aid of bureaucracy - a vital organ of economic management and control. Growing state interventions as myriad of public actions are typically associated with the strengthening of the executive at the expense of the legislative branch, the rise of functional (as opposed to territorial) representation closely tied to administration, the increased importance of the state economic apparatus and the growing dominance of economic criteria within no economic departments, and the decline of the substantive rule of law (as opposed to the simple maintenance of legal forms) in favor of more discretionary forms of intervention (Jessop,1987, P. 76). The capitalist state from its very inception has been facilitating capitalist accumulation with the aid of gigantic structures of bureaucracy. It is through performing the economic function of accumulation that it has been successful in reproducing the capitalist economic system.

The State has been active in the realms of public action in maintaining law and order and dispensing justice and welfare services in modern society. A state and a government do intervene in the economy as well. A capitalist state which is eulogized in the discipline of economics is a public actor, and it is defined by its functions – the public action - in the economy. The economic action of the state became highly popular since the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Keynesian revolution in economics discipline in 1936. While it is true that the political democracy as a form of government is better in delivering the ethos of freedom and respect of individual rights, it is as yet ill suited for justice. A precondition of attaining justice is the institution of economic democracy, which is closely related to the idea of economic equality.

A modern state performs contradictory roles in the lives of individuals and collectivities and accomplishes paradoxical actions in the society and economy. It is an instrument which maintains law and order at one pole, and on another, it acts as an institution which dispenses justice. It performs a number of welfare functions and implements a number of redistributive welfare policies. A State is a supra-organization that has sovereignty over a defined population of a defined territory, recognition by international community and regulation over society through a government, and a State is the public actor. A government

is an integral and vital active organ of a state. Though '*a score of intellectual ghosts*' comes into picture '*to obtuse our vision'* the moment we utter the word the "state" (Dewey, 1927, pp. 8 - 9), the state actions are often considered governmental actions through public policy framework.

In the realm of academic discourse and paradigm of policy, it was much later in the course of first quarter of twentieth century that the Keynesian economics rather opened routes of developing the theories of policies on money and market. It chalks out theoretically the economic functions of the state in regulating and managing credit and movement of commodities. There were arguments put forward to go beyond legislations and laws of control to policy making and piecemeal planning exercises by the state. In modern times since after the writings of Lord Keynes, the responsibility has been put on the shoulder of the government to ensure full employment for the labour class and full utilization of non-labour resources in the economy[68].

Two authoritarian states, Germany and Italy, were relatively early in their interventions in both arenas. Two democratic states, Britain and France, were but relatively late. Democratic states worry about consensus and are late for this reason (Hague, et al. 1989, pp. 271-78). The expansion and integration which had boosted the world economy of the 1870-1914 era gave way to widespread stagnation and disintegration in the inter-way years. Subsequently, a pervasive change occurred[69] in the '*popular perception of the role of government in the national economy'* (Deane, 1989, p. 145).

---

[68] Public actions of a welfare state are of recent origin in a democratic society and economy. Whether a capitalist state or a democratic or an authoritarian state, all states attempted to establish the welfare state intervening in health and education sectors in Europe. In the framework of active state thesis, the social welfare expenditures have been highly responsive to the combined impact of social needs, modernization and the power of the industrial working class in Europe. In education, the process of industrialization begins to impact in major legislation only toward the end of nineteenth century. In health, the logic of politics, rising demand and the logic of industrialization were decisive.

[69] Irrespective of the *'obstinacy of neoclassical theorizers with regard to minimal state',* there arose two distinct strands: the welfare strand and the centralized governments strand. The welfare strand reflected a tendency for national democratic governments to accept a measure of responsibility for *'redistributing incomes in welfares services for the underprivileged'.* Each of the two world wars constituted a major turning point in the social engineering strand as well. The propensity for highly centralized governments was for the purpose of intervening directly in the market system in order to promote national economic power and prosperity on the one hand and stabilize prices and incomes

What was different, however, about economic management, once the war was over, was that it focused on multiple objectives - not simply on the overriding aim of military victory or the more abstract utilitarian aim of maximizing general welfare. Four specific economic objectives were commonly invoked by the UK and other western governments after the Second World War. They were: stable prices, a satisfactory balance of payments, full employment and a rate of economic growth that matched the contemporary performance of their advanced economics. The last two of these represented additions to the traditional agents of government (Deane, 1989, P. 178). In short, the state intervenes in the economy through suitable needed legislations without having any intention of infringing on the liberty and freedom of individuals higgling-haggling in the market economy.

It is only recently that the realization has dawned that a proactive role is to be assigned if at all the social policy[70] has to serve its intrinsic value - the importance for redistribution. Throughout 1980s and 1990s, the residual role of social policy[71] had been invoked to

---

on the other. The weight and range of government's contribution to national economy have increased (Deane, 1989, pp. 145 - 53).

[70] A welfare regime is more reticent category than governance regime. A welfare regime is constituted by a government working in tandem with households, civil society and market under a welfare state in making social policy and economic policy oriented to the allocation of public resources with objectives of enhancing the dimensions of welfare of citizens. Social policy is often defined as social services such as education, health, employment and social security. It is about *'redistribution, protection and social justice'*. It is but also *'an instrument applied by governments to regulate and supplement market institutions and social structures'* (UN-DESA, 2007 quoted in Arjan de Haan, 2010). Joseph Stiglitz (2009) treats the policy of social protection and income distribution as *'core automatic stabilizers'*. These help in *'cushioning the impact of crises on people while maintaining aggregate demand'*. These facilitate and enable *'workers and their families to overcome poverty and social exclusion'*. Further, these enable the workers *'to find decent jobs'*. In other words, social protection and income distribution are not merely the *'pillars of social justice and peace'* (ILO, 2011, p.2).

[71] There have been at least two theoretical perspectives on the nature and scope of social policy as an academic discipline and discourse: social welfare unitarism and social welfare pluralism. In the theoretical perspective of welfare unitarism with which the name of Richard Titmuss (1956) is originally associated, the state should be the main funder and provide of social services and implementer of redistributive policies because the egoism of the private market alienated people from each other.
Freedom as a value was thus secondary to a guarantee of material welfare by the state. Beveredgean welfare state was founded on such a perspective. The name of Robert Pinker (1971, 1990, 2011) has been associated with the theoretical perspective connected with welfare pluralism. Pinker adopted

realize the instrumental value of it. A social policy model is constituted by a welfare state model. According to the political economy approach of Esping-Andersen (1990), there are three types of welfare state regimes (either Beveridgean or Bismarkean): liberal/neo-liberal, conservative corporatist, and social democratic. The liberal regime has a central role for the market and a truncated role for the state. The corporatist regime emphasizes the individual and family responsibilities, with a larger, yet relatively marginal, role for the state. The social democratic regime chooses more generous, universalistic policies, with a central role for the state[72].

In future, there is utmost need and requirement of an pro-active, inclusive and universal social policy in the regions of south Asia (in addition to the continuing economic policy of economic growth measured in terms of quantum and value of GDP/GNP of material quantifiable measurable goods and services and economic stability in terms of an acceptable level of inflation, unemployment and balance of payment deficit).

Hybrid Action of Governance

In ordinary parlance, governance in its managerial aspect stands for connoting techniques of 'steering' and 'management' and the practices established by use of such techniques in the society. Governance in its organizational aspect is the system of structures of regulation and also a process of management of flows and networks by accommodating diverse actors as partners in the continuum of power.

---

neither a dogmatic anti-statism nor an apologia for any normatively popular status quo. In theorizing the regime of welfare state and social policy, what was favored was the individualistic approach in theorizing about welfare in social policy rather than the collectivist approach.
In this perspective, it has been important to study the actual applications of altruistic thought and practice by ordinary people in their everyday lives, in their aspirations off social change and in their conceptions of for what and on what principle the state, as opposed to markets, families and community organizations should assume responsibility- public attitudes towards social services. Neither should there be a unitary system of privatized welfare nor a unitary system of statutory welfare.

[72] While social policy of the government is broadly concerned with public welfare and care, it also covers a policy of social protection, security and insurance of individual citizens and households against man-made and natural risks, vulnerabilities and harms by a third party. It also covers a policy of social service delivery comprising of services related with education, health, family welfare, welfare of child, women and elderly, and care of disabled/other-wise-abled population.

In its political aspect, governance is conceived to be a purposive action of state actors that aim at providing stability in socioeconomic flows. It is an action that entails more or less coercive system of regulation, and crucially relies on the '*networked active participation and self-management of non-state actors*' such as non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups (including business corporations and houses) (De Angelis, 2005, pp. 233-34). The political aspect of governance emphasizes the driving-seat role assigned to the state in promotion of governance practices as argued by Ritcher (2002), the conception of governance as power (Hunt, 1996) as "*actions upon other actions*" (Foucault, 1982, p. 220), and the relation between governance and coercive system of regulation as put forward by Weiner (2001, p. 473).

There are but in fact the extra-political dimensions of governance[73] as well. Governance is the initiation and development of those governing styles in which the boundaries between and within the public and private sectors is increasingly blurred, and the governing mechanisms do not at all rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government (G Stoker, 1998, p. 17). The Staff Paper of the World Bank (1992) remarks that how people are ruled, how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated, how a nation's system of politics functions in relation to public administration and law are all issues of governance. The concept of governance goes '*beyond that of government to include apolitical dimension*' (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1992, p. 304). Governance in its economic aspect is a continuing process as the sum of many ways in which the individuals and the institutions - public and private - manage their common affairs and through which conflicting or diverse interests is accommodated and cooperative action is taken (Commission on Global Governance, 1995, quoted in De Angelis, 2005).

[73] The World Bank introduced the notion of so-called 'good governance', and subsequently, this idea began to occupy significant spaces of major international publications. Since 1992 it has been widely used in the literatures of international donors, development agencies, the IBRD, the OECD, the IMF and the ADB. The 1991 Annual Development Economic Conference of the World Bank conceptualized governance to indicate the manner in which power and authority are exercised for development 'in the management of a country's economic and social resources' (World Bank, 1992, p. 1). The official texts of national governments in many countries now use it frequently.

The chief of poverty reduction section of UN-ESCAP, Mr. Yap Sheng, catalogued eight major characteristics of governance so as to qualify as good governance. These are: it is *participatory* in nature, it has orientation towards *consensus*, it accommodates a system of *accountability*, it establishes and maintains *transparency*, it is *responsive to needs*, it requires *government effectiveness and efficiency*, it establishes *equitability and inclusiveness*, and it allows for the *rule of law* to operate.

In view of the horizontal reconstitution of the state power through private-public partnership, governance is a diffused phenomenon and activity which is accompanied by increasingly fluid arrangements of a polyarchic mixed actor system. There is undoubtedly a clear phenomenon of increasing privatization of governance in the framework of private human agency-public human agency partnership.

The governance discourse is part of the arsenal of capital to boost the process of accumulation while there have been phases of emergence, consolidation and crisis of neoliberal policies all over the world over the last twenty five years of the last century. The network of local producer farmers as calculative agents, the network of social actors, network of international non-governmental organizations, international regulatory bodies of IMF, World Bank and WTO as well as the network of global transnational corporations participate to shift the earlier 'welfarist' focus on national growth to focus on the facilitation of the conditions for 'entrepreneurial self-governing'. Governance may be conceived as a 'structure' of regulatory system and/or a 'process' of management of flows where the social logics of the welfare bureaucracies of the state are "replaced by new logics of competition, market segmentation, and service management' (Rose, 1999, p. 260). It is in this sense that governance means 'global neoliberal governance' agenda (De Angelis, 2005, p. 229). It is considered as 'the apologia for neo-liberalism' (De Senarclens, 1998, p. 94).

A positive evaluation[74] of a government is premised on answers to the question: what it does and what it does not. The normative assessment is however premised on answers to

[74] While positive analysis of the concepts of 'governance regime' and 'governance paradigms' and public actions of 'governance', 'good governance', and 'good enough governance' are important preoccupations, there is lack of clarity on the 'content of governance'. Absence of consensus about

the questions: what it ought to do and ought not to do. The crucial normative issue is then the question of governance: how it does what it does. Principal question has ever been a crucial one: how does state and government do what they do? This is not merely an issue of positive analysis of empirically deciphering the modus operandi of the government and the state but also a normative problem of judging the public action. Governance as a terminology[75] has been resurrected from oblivion of centuries, reinvented and popularized recently[76].

Three decades back, the good governance reform agenda focused mainly on creating market forces and a marketisation process by adopting policies and providing institutions. In the 1990s, it was however recognised that in order to bring about good governance, reforms should take a holistic approach aimed at (a) maintaining the rule of law and contract enforcement; (b) minimising rent-seeking and corruption; (c) achieving and maintaining property rights; (d) minimising appropriation risks; and (e) achieving transparent and accountable provision of public goods (Mushtaq Husain Khan, 2006;

---

the 'contents of governance' continues to abound till date. There are at present no satisfactory answers to questions: Governance is of what? Governance is for whom? Governance is from where? Why governance?

[75] Historically speaking, the terminology and the conception associated with the governance are not new. It was used in the 14th century Europe to signify a lawful control over the affairs of a political unit, usually a nation, and was contrasted with 'colonization'. It was conceived as a lawful act of making decisions about and looking after of 'something' in general. In the contemporaneous conceptual-theoretical literature on governance, governance paradigm and governance regime, attempts have been made to link governance with market principles, operation of market, and market outcomes.

[76] While highlighting the governance crisis in Africa, the World Bank coined the concept of good governance. Good governance is today a buzzword and it is conceptualized as a politics that creates enabling conditions and environments for flourishing of the market and uninterrupted private investments by the corporate business houses in the economy – a politics helping to establish private-public partnerships in areas which has been hitherto state-dominated. Recently, the concept of agricultural governance has come into vogue in Europe, particularly in Australia and Netherlands and subsequently in the Asia-pacific region as well. "Good governance" as a term came into vogue in the 1990s with the World Bank literature.
It has now assumed the status of a mantra for donor agencies as well as donor countries for conditioning aid upon the performance of the recipient government. The need for governance reform and policy prescriptions is stressed *'to ensure transparency and rule of law, accountability in public finances, improvement in governance standards, and creation of a productive private sector'* (Bhagawati and Gambri 2005; Blitz 2005; Oppenheimer 2005; Wolf 2005).
The debt relief is now given only to countries *'with good performance and tolerable political accountability' (Wolf 2005).* The term remains is still ambiguous. There is as yet *'no consensus on the criteria for measuring good governance'* (Nanda, 2006, pp. 269-70).

Mushtaq Husain Khan, 2009). Alam and Teicher (2012) underline it that the governance be evaluated in terms of political, administrative, economic, regulatory, and legislative governance. Mushtaq Khan (2007) distinguishes between growth-enhancing governance capability and market-enhancing governance action of the state.

4.2. Reasons: Practical and Public

Reasons are antecedents to private or public or hybrid actions – for example, the actions of fairness and justice. Reasons are regarded as coordinate with, but distinguishable from, sensations, emotions, or will. Reason stands essentially in contrast with faith and experience. In rationalist philosophical literature, attempts are made to belittle and deny the claims of faith and the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge (Warnock, 1967). "Reason", with an initial capital letter, is taken to designate a mental faculty or capacity. In other words, reason is defined as '*the faculty and function of grasping necessary connections*' (Blanshard, 1962).

Reason is a faculty that comprehends and makes sense of the world through application of logic and appeal to evidence, and is held to be primary method of learning all truths. Reasons are considerations of facts. Reasons are factitive entities as well. Both reasons and '*the things they are reason for'* can be either facts in the world or the intentional states, such as, beliefs, desires, and intentions. Reasons are factitive entities as well. Reasons can also be considerations of propositionally structured entities such as *obligations, commitments, requirements, and needs*. These intentional states and propositionally structured entities are *factitive entities*. A reason is a set of factitive entities (Searle, 2001). In short, reasons are both propositional and relational, and therefore, factitive entities.

Reasons are what ought to be considerations for someone to do something[77]. Reasons are improved *guidelines.* A reason for an action is a reason only if it is, or is part of, a total

[77] David Hume (1748; 1775) however believed that reason is impotent to cause an act and the only role of reason consists in the judgment of the means that lead to the desired object or end. According to David Hume, people have natural 'desire' to act morally. In Humean perspective, there is importance of desire for the adoption of ends; an end is desired and reason merely discovers

reason, and a total reason is a set of factitive entities; and, a total reason, in principle, might be entirely external; we need to distinguish between external and internal reasons (Searle, 2001, pp. 114-17).

Reason is antecedent to an (intentional) action performed by a human agency, including the good and the righteous moral action, for example, 'justice'. Reasons are considerations for someone provided she is not only rational in disposition but also adequately informed.

Theoretical and Practical Reason

In philosophical literature from the days of Aristotle, reason for desiring and believing is distinguished from reason for acting. While a reason for acting is a practical reason, a reason for desiring is a theoretical reason for a person. While theoretical reasoning is used to guide thinking, practical reasoning is used to guide action. A theory of practical reasons tells us what we just plain ought to do, that is, what we ought to do, all things considered. It is often believed that the theoretical reason guides right cognition but practical reason guides right action. Theoretical reason is facts and considerations that are selected through application of cognition, logic and intentions like desires, beliefs, and passions by the human person[78]**.** Theoretical reason tries to assess the way things are. Practical reason should both justify and motivate action.

Philosophy as well as the art and science of rhetoric share the boundary of practical reason. Practical reasons of respect are facts and considerations that are selected through application of sense of empirical requirements, duty, obligations, experience, makers'

---

the best and easiest ways to attain it. David Hume assigned to reason the role in discernment or judgement of the means that lead to the desired object and considered the reason to be impotent in causing an action. David Hume believed that there are no normative practical reasons, or there is no such thing as practical reason at all. The Humean account of rationality concerning means involves the adoption of appropriate means to the attainment of whatever ends one pursues. The adoption of any given ends is no more or any less rational than the adoption of any other possible end (Ramon Lemos, 1986, p. 15).

[78] Theoretical reason is also the reason for belief. Since theoretical rationality is concerned with deciding what beliefs to accept and reject, it is a special case of deciding what to do - practical reason (reason for action). Reasons for believing allow for conclusive proof, in a way that reasons for acting do not. Moreover, a human actor does not have merely a goal but rather have capacity to appraise his/her own goals in the light of consideration of something to do something.

knowledge and propositions regarding rules, principles and norms of society(Roger Crisp, 1999). Practical decisions attempt to resolve contradictions and establish priorities. Practical knowledge is "maker's knowledge". On a digression, the discipline of economics does not talk of 'practical reason' as a category; it uses the terminologies of 'practical wisdom' and 'practical guidance'.

Both John Locke (1689) and Emmanuel Kant (1785), the philosophers and scholars of the Enlightenment project in Europe, held that fundamental questions of public right could be answered with public reasons. These reasons needed to be brought forward, articulated, communicated, and defended. Emmanuel Kant has a deep respect for the choices of autonomous persons. For Kant, freedom of individuals is the central concern for the exercise of public reason. These reasons emerge in the public process of justification and argument. Getting the answers right is a matter of citizens putting forward arguments that rise above private reasons to appeal to a general public. We must think in common with others. Each person has a duty to respect the intrinsic worth of others and of himself. In recent times, William Kymlicka (1993) concludes that all persons have *'a duty to promote just institutions'* and this duty is *'not derived from consent or mutual advantage'*. Rather, it *'simply owed to persons as such' (*Kymlicka, 1993, p. 191).

Practical reason as far as its existence is concerned is admitted in the literature since the days of writings of Aristotle only. Aristotle believed that virtue determines the end while practical wisdom deliberates on the particular actions that realize the end. The concept of practical reason, which was pioneered by Aristotle, was in complete disuse in the times of Adam Smith (1776) until Emmanuel Kant (1785) rehabilitated it at the end of the century. Thanks to the German Intellectual movement in the twentieth century! A reconsideration of the Aristotelian ethics was started around the 1960s, which was centered on the title of 'the rehabilitation of practical reason'.

Long time back, Aristotle had propounded an ethics that had a practical goal: to become good. Aristotelian ethics has a practical goal: to become good, and the Aristotelian practical reason is efficient in three cases: an adult wise man *'who follows his resolutions',* a continent man *'who overcomes his internal conflicts and follows its prescriptions',* and an

incontinent man who is moved by practical reason *'to originate new conscious, dispositional habituations'* (Kirchner, 1989, p. 71).

Contemporaneously, there are principally three major thinking on the issue of practical reason and its possibility, which are all basically attempts at refutation of the 'egoism' of Thomas Hobbes: virtue theory of Aristotle, desire theory of Hume, and Categorical Imperative theory of Kant. In retrospect, Aristotle did not deny the possibility of a rational discussion of the principles of morality, despite it that Aristotle believed that moral discourses are not able to make virtuous men.

Tom go back again to the views expressed in antiquity, there is always a necessity of a training for a person *'to respond to pleasures and pains in a definite way'* from the very beginning of human life. According to Aristotle, a *"good end"* is implicitly known after *'a long period of these experiences'.* An explicit knowledge of the end is reached through gathering of *'experiences in one inductive process'.* The good end is fixed only in the case of the dispositions being *virtuous.* Agent could have active knowledge of the good ends without the disposition being virtuous. In the case of the adult wise man who follows his resolutions, it is efficient. In the case of the continent man, who overcomes his internal conflicts and follows its prescriptions, it is efficient. In the case of the incontinent man as well, practical reason is efficient for it may *'move him to originate new conscious, dispositional habituations'* (Kirchner, 1989, p.71).

Aristotle stands 'on the fence' as between Hume and Kant. Aristotle stands to express the delicate equilibrium of reason and "*passion*" in the motivation of an action. Aristotle's doctrine on practical reason cannot be reduced to that of David Hume. In Aristotle's doctrine, *'practical reason is thought to be efficient'.* The similarity between Aristotle and David Hume is the assertion that it is the desire for pleasure that activates *'imagination and perception to find the best means to obtain the pleasant objects'* (Kirchner, 1989, p.71).

According to Kant, reason for action does not presuppose a desire. Emmanuel Kant believed that practical reason possesses a motivational power by itself, in addition to be able to justify the action. Emmanuel Kant perceived practical empirical reason simply as

the theoretical intellect cooperating with and serving desires as it is employed for practical purposes; it has the power to originate action, not simply to facilitate or influence it. The egalitarian requirement on practical rationality is absolutely fundamental for Immanuel Kant. Kant's ethics of reason in action has a pleasing simplicity and coherence to its architecture. Kantian maxims are those underlying principles or intentions by which we guide and control our more specific intentions. Emmanuel Kant affirmed that practical reason possesses a motivational power by itself (Kirchner, 1989, p.47).

Adam Smith (1776), while following Hutcheson and Hume, used the phraseology of "moral sentiments" to mean *'something much more elaborate than simple emotions'*, and introduced the notion of supposed impartial spectator *'to construct a system of practical reason'*. When Smith rejects reason as the foundation of morality, he only *'rejects theoretical reason, leaving practical reason untouched'*. Smith does not believe that our notions of moral good and evil arise from our brute or natural sentiments but rather from *'our sentiments informed by the impartial spectator'* – the appropriate sentiments or *'sentiments informed by reason'* (Carrasco, 2004, pp. 81-7).

Desiring something typically involves having a tendency to see something about it as providing one with a reason to desire it – likewise, for preferring. When it comes to the particular attitude of intending to act in some way, the reasons for having this attitude must always be grounded in the reasons that the agent has to desire that certain possible worlds or states of affairs be actualized. This is the teleological position. The schools of moral philosophy pursued by Kurt Baier (1978) and David Gauthier (1987) would have us believe that a fact is a reason for acting insofar as it bears upon one's best reply to the doings or expected doings of others.

Stanley Benn (1988) is of the opinion that practical rationality or practical reason is a better term than 'reason for action' because the latter is too closely associated with Humean instrumentalism, based on the presumption of means/ends rationality as a paradigm of rational action and all reasons of that form. Within instrumentalist theory of rational action it is difficult to distinguish between goal/value oriented action and principled action. According to Stanley Benn (1988), there are two forms of reason for action in the

deontological and teleological traditions: reasons of respect (person-centered reason) and reasons of concern (value-centered reason).

In sum, a unified theory of belief and rational action through the mediation of practical reason requires it that practical rationality of a being is conceived as requiring beliefs and commitments leading to belief commitment and action commitments, that is in turn, concluding into an action. The action cannot be explained by free-floating desires that are unrelated to beliefs and commitments.

Precisely speaking, a general account of the role of reason in practical rationality involves understanding of four features: *freedom*, *temporality*, the *self and with it the first-person point of view*, *language and other institutional structures,* and *rationality*. Practical reason is subject to rational constraints in the same way as theoretical reason. *First*, reasons for action have a kind of first-person status that reasons for believing do not have. *Second*, reasons for acting have a special relation to time that is unlike that of reasons for believing. A present reason for acting is always a reason for self to perform an action either now or later.

Third, reasons for action must be able to motivate an action. The notion of acting on a reason is the notion of making the reason effective in the performance of the action. *Fourth*, if the reason for acting is taken as a reason for the performance of a free action, it cannot be taken by the agent as causally sufficient (Searle, 2001, pp. 136-41).

Public reason refers to the role of the public as judge of public right and not simply to a set of reasons that an actual public happens to share. It is a reason that can serve as appropriate justifications (justification based on shared values, meanings and world views) for government action or public policy. It collapses into the expedient reasoning if a state intent on survival.

In recent times, a moral philosopher of the stature of John Rawls (1971) opined that public reason as the consensus or convergence view is a feature of democratic societies. Rawls's "political, not metaphysical" intuition is that people might agree on a set of principles

without agreeing on the reasons for their agreement. In his later book (1993) on "Political Liberalism", however, he was asking a new pragmatic question of how to construct a peaceful society. The shift was a reflection of time. In the globalised and liberalized climate of the world, the issue of class-based welfare and justice was replaced by preoccupation with identity politics and pace.

Way back to the eighteenth century, Thomas Hobbes considered public as made up of independent-minded citizens who could not be trusted to make judgments from the point of view of what was good for all, and therefore, prescribed a sovereign to make judgment from the point of view of all. In Locke also, public reason is the reason of the state but there are tolerance of the conscience of the citizens. Locke considered that we all have access to similar very general intuitions about public good. Locke's case for revolution shows that authoritative judgment of legitimacy resides with the people who reason from the point of view of the community.

For John Rawls, the Kantian categorical imperatives are the 'liberty' and 'social justice'. In the philosophical literature, Rawls views were opposed to utilitarianism. In a way, his work was a manifesto against both welfarism and utilitarianism. John Rawls advocated *'a maximandum of an index of primary goods'* (and not the 'utility'). It was a contrast with welfarism. Another advocacy was to look *'only at the minimum of a set of individual "welfare" levels'* (and not the 'sum'). It was a contrast with utilitarianism. Both of these objections are *'seen as ones against utilitarianism' (*Roemer, 1996, P.128).

4.3. Remarks

A hybrid of the person-related as well as value-centered and the end-oriented as well as act-oriented synthesized theoretical and practical private and public reason is a central, if not the central, concept in democratic plural society. The composite reasons point to arguments, reasons and justifications that a political community and its members share. Since human agential action in both private as well as public arena has a precedent of reasons for action - practical reason, the composite, mixed and hybrid actions and their normative appraisal require mediation of both theoretical as well as practical reasons as

requirement of a realistic doctrine. A set of hybrid actions that are motivated and justified by human reasons and rationality require an exercise in synthesizing the categories of 'person-related practical reasons of respect' and 'value-centered reasons of concern about individual goodness, happiness, pleasure and well being' in a hybrid framework.

I the literature of moral and political philosophy, there are many theories about what we have reason to do. There are again divergent theories about the causes of action. These are positive theories oriented towards developing either a reason-explanation or a cause-explanation of action. There is but normative and prescriptive opinion on human nature as well. It has long been observed that the views of human nature are strange beasts, neither fish nor fowl. It is nonetheless argued that practical reason is a normative reason for action, that is, it is some fact related with respect for person as well as related with concern for the goodness of goals of individuals that counts in favour of the agent's performing that action.

In the end-oriented account, practical reason selects actions or attitudes and policies that contribute to guiding actions towards certain subjective or objective ends and results. The central task of practical reason is the instrumental one of deploying our knowledge of causal relation to guide action. Instrumental reasoning is a necessary aspect of practical reasoning in such account. In the end-oriented account, instrumental reasoning in pursuit of individual preferences support the thesis of efficient egoism, strategic thinking and certain modern conceptions of prudence. In this account, practical reason does not select the ends; it is not a guide to reasoned choice; unreasoned ends are to be pursued by rational means and it is sufficient. In the act-oriented account, practical reason identify appropriate, reasoned norms and principles and allow actions to be guided by such norms or rules or principles without reference either to supposed objective ends or to the subjective ends of any agents.

It is therefore one extreme view that the *principle of self-anchored egoism* is according to Kurt Baier (1982): 'Do what constitutes your best reply to whatever others are or may be doing'. The facts showing that one's life would be more fulfilling if one did an act rather than another act constitutes reasons for doing that act. The self-anchored egoism is grounded in the satisfactoriness of the agent's own life. Distinct from the self-anchored

egoism, there are a category of 'overriding' reasons which are designed to adjudicate interpersonal conflicts of self-anchored reasons. Overriding reasons offer coordinating guidelines.

To continue the argument, therefore, the practical reason as reason of concern look primarily to the good consequences of an action, to whether it will bring about or reserve some valued and valuable state of affairs, sustain some valued and valuable activity or promote the survival of and wellbeing of some valued and valuable object.

It is in this framework of hybrid reasons and actions that it is required to articulate, probe and organize our considered judgement about hybrid morality and transitional justice. New images of a type of action of cooperation are to be forged. Images of social cooperation and reciprocity among rational and reasonable persons are in need of re-examination. An imperfect, non-ideal theory of justice that is oriented towards eliminating the instances of injustices through private actions and interactions of individuals, who enters into a contract on the basis of a weak ordering of preferences and choice in favour of fairness and equality in society, do require the complementary public actions of the government in effective manner order to produce the outcome of justice. Contemporary social contract theory is a rationalist scientific enterprise. The political legitimacy of the chosen institutions depends on the rational desirability of the institutions.

Private individual actions ought to be complemented with and ought to be orchestrated in collaboration with the public collective actions. In modern societies with State organisations as ensembles of condensate power, public functionaries often act with public reasons. A fully blossomed state as a mature public agency is an ensemble of institutions of governance that not only possesses but also exercises and enforces the monopoly rights over power and coercion. The capitalist state from its very inception has however been facilitating capitalist accumulation with the aid of gigantic structures of bureaucracy. The public agency of a capitalist state has been an actor- interventionist in the economy.

In a human society anywhere in the concrete world, the nation-state has not been dislodged as yet. On the contrary, it has grown in size though not in influence. State-led development

paradigms characterized the first three quarters of the twentieth century[79]. It is not to say nonetheless that the nation-state has been reduced to be a non-entity and the role of governmentality in governing the society and economy has been rendered negligible. Not at all! It is not at all the impending reality. On the contrary, a civil society resistance – both at intra-regional and national level as well as international level – has sprung up; the international non-governmental organizations have developed collaboration with national and regional outfits to clamor against the economic and social ills of globalization.

Given the assertions regarding the moral equivalence of persons, the democratic Constitutions must give lexical priority to rights, and there must be a set of constitutional constraint on political action. Such an ethical commitment may lead a constitutional democracy which can act a constraint so as to accommodate a conception of justice in the day-to-day real life conflictual politics based the practices of discriminatory rent seeking activities, which is characteristic of a majoritarian democracy. Justice is to be regarded as rights protection. It is however the case an institutional regime that is grounded in the *'moral equivalence of persons'* and relieved of the *'duty to promote good consequences'* ought to contribute in minimizing both the size and the intrusiveness of government. Accompanied by appropriate constitutional constraints, a rejection of the romanticized view of politics of the economists is then highly necessary for reducing the phenomenon of *'rent seeking and the concomitant growth of government'* (Roth, 2002, p. 13).

---

[79] It is worth quoting an astute remark of a radical political economist:

> **'***While controversy rages, and will continue to do so, concerning the causes, mechanisms and implications, including new contradictions, of changes in the world economy, politics and culture since the 1970s …… there is little doubt that important shifts with far-reaching ramifications have occurred. …… A familiar list would include: the deregulation of financial markets; shifts in the production, sourcing and sales strategies and technologies of transnational manufacturing and agribusiness corporations; the massive new possibilities attendant on information technologies, not least for mass communications, and how they are exploited by the corporate capital that controls them; ……..; and the ideological and political ascendancy of neo-liberalism in a highly selective rolling back of the state, including the structural adjustment programmes, economic liberalisation, and state reform/good governance agendas imposed on the countries of the South and, …… This is the context, and some of its key markers, that spelled the end of state-led development'* (Henry Bernstein, 2008, p. 247).

As private actions may suffer from apathy and akrasia, a public reason for action – social practical rationality – ought not be merely considerations and intentions of achieving the goal of maximization of the gooses of law and order maintenance but also the concern for instituting the rights of fairness, impartiality, liberty, equality and virtue of redistribution, that is, justice. The public policy envisaging role of the state in discharging certain economic functions in the classical economics was based on scientific techniques of analysis with moral presuppositions on the nature of state as paternalistic father[80].

All private and all public actions do not always succeed in achieving the beneficial and righteous. The human agency being the driver of intentional action suffers from lack of will, lack of disposition, lack of resolution or enchained with amorality and viciousness. It is not only the private rational personal human agency in civil society that suffers from the phenomena of "weakness of will" (Akrasia), a similar phenomenon is also a feature of public agency of government. A state and the public agency of government may witness deficit in effectiveness and may even fail. A mild failure of the effectiveness of the state has attracted attention to the notion of governance deficit so as to account simultaneously the failures of the action of public agents of the government and private agents of the civil society. A normative problem of judging the public action is the principal question: how does state and government do what they do?

A welfare state in a political democracy may embrace the truncated utilitarianism and adopt a policy of justice inclusive of the consideration regarding "efficiency" by seeking the goal of maximization of total welfare subject to the constraint of a floor of individual welfare. When the issue of welfare is rephrased in terms of the protection of the poor, truncated utilitarianism is the best principle. It is unacceptable to accuse the poor that they are responsible for their poverty. The principle of utilitarianism fails to take note of the

---

[80] An astute economist of continental tradition, Abba P Lerner (1961) remarked that the market can be considered as an instrument for distributing goods among different people democratically. Democratic distribution means a distribution 'in accordance with their individual preferences as shown by their willingness to vote for them by spending money on them'. This is a result 'brought about by the market as a kind of super-ballot system for achieving economic democracy'. The market is so enormously superior. In comparison to a barter economy, the market performs the democratic task without 'endless searching and exchanging and re-exchanging'. This is called consumers' sovereignty, and forms 'an essential part of economic democracy'. The conditions required are that there must be a free market 'without any restrictions' and a price-clearing market.

distinctions of persons seriously, that it is immoral to make people suffer so that there is a net gain for other people, and that there is no requirement for people to consent to the sufferings or sacrifices under the principle. Moreover, it is not possible to combine all the diverse goods into as single index of utility which can be measured for an individual; there is no conceptually adequate way of calibrating such a measure between individuals.

To stand for all these is however not to deny the possibilities of public action deficits and failures. Governance failure is mostly a social policy failure – a failure of the model of a welfare state. A governance deficit which is reflected in the deficit in the politics of inclusion of the excluded sections of the society is a social policy deficit in 'equity' and 'inclusiveness' in society whereby the public statements regarding projects, programmes and direct administrative actions of the government on maintenance, restoration and advancement of social cohesion through inclusion of the excluded are just vacuous.

Governance failure is a failure in matter of delivery of social services related with education, health, aids to poor, and administered gainful employment opportunity in a society plagued by pervasive corruption and rent-seeking activities. Governance deficits and failures are measured through governance indicators and indices related with the phenomena of rent-seeking, financial scams and corruption in the normative-empirical–prescriptive literature. There is an ever-expanding normative and empirical literature on the theme of 'governance deficit' and 'governance failure' which has got more prominence in the wake of corruption, financial scams and episodes of rent-seeking activities.

In the extreme case of the weakness and failure of the State, the nature of society has a role, and perhaps the most forceful general argument for the primacy of society in generating state weakness is one made by Joel Migdal (1988) in his work "*Strong Societies and Weak States"*. In the framework of arguments regarding failures of governance in developing countries, such collapses are primarily due to the ability of local, village-level elites to defeat the efforts of public human agency associated and clubbed with the governments to extend their control down to the grass roots level (Migdal, 1988).

This chapter is divided into three principal sections.

In the first section, an attempt is made to address the postulate of rationality of human beings. Means, ends, and belief rationality are contrasted with the notion of extended and purposive rationality.

The second section explores the conception and meaning of human agency as advanced in the normative theory of human agency. The notion of rational agency is addressed, and the link between rationality and agency is described.

Third section is devoted to the argument that there is fluidity in the understanding of foundational categories of reason, rationality, person, agency, action, action appraisal and morality as well as justice. A way out is warranted.

A brief concluding remark section follows at the last. The remaining part of the first objective of the thesis is addressed here in this chapter.

In the theoretical framework of the doctrine of agrarianism that prescribes a system of hybrid goal-right morality in appraising the mixed human actions and postulates a set of hybrid and plural reasons behind orchestration of hybrid actions of governance in attaining some measure of distributive equity and minimizing specific instances of injustices, it is of heuristic significance to assume and explore the possibility of a blended conception of rationality of reflexive and reasonable human beings. A human being who responds to reasons of thought and reasons of action is posited to be endowed with a specific trait but of the trait of comprehensive meaningful rationality. A blended conception of human rationality is one that unifies the postulate of instrumental (maximizing) rationality with those of procedural (bounded), expressive, creative, extended and meaningful rationality. A broad conception of individual rationality, which is essentially both the object-given and value-directed ends-rationality of human beings, is a facilitator of the concern for equity and justice.

It is with the prospect of hybrid action framework being appraised and evaluated in terms of mixed and synthesized goal-right system of hybrid reasons for hybrid action under the postulate of a blended conception of rationality that it is also of further heuristic and assumption-related significance to portray partly free-willed, partly- dependent, partly-rational and partly-akratic agency. Such a human agency is a persona of imperfect capacity and incapacity and stands in mid-way between perfect rational agency and imperfect akratic agency. It is arguable in the context of a transitional society that a human primate rather evolves through successive stages into an Aristotelian and Kantian rational agent. A rational agent evolves through three intermediate stages of a stimulus-response agent, a planning and strategic agent, and a norm-governed agent. A rational agent in contrast to all these three variants of agency has a capacity to represent something in the world as good/bad, better/worse, right/wrong and obligatory/discretionary because (s)he has normative concepts to deploy (Sayre-McCord, 2011).

In the literature of human rationality trait, Herbert Simon (1955, 1957, 1959) put forth the notion of bounded rationality to refer to satisficing behaviour of individual since a human agency has limited computational power. The notion of bounded rationality is the

incorporation of human imperfection into a theory of rationality. The point is that individuals are inherently imperfect and are therefore, psychologically incapable of being fully rational in the neoclassical sense (Hamlin, 1986, pp. 25-7; Hamlin, 1993, pp. 317-19). Herbert Simon (1976, 1978, 1978) further argued for a distinction between substantive rationality and procedural rationality. Procedural rationality requires it that the behaviour is the *'outcome of appropriate deliberation'.* Its procedural rationality depends on the *'process that generated it'* (Simon, 1982, pp. 425-42). As situations of cognitive complexity increase, the discipline of economics becomes increasingly concerned with procedural rationality (Simon, 1978, pp. 8-9).

The 'procedural rationality' postulate distances action from the ends altogether and portrays the individual as a rule follower. A person follows rules, roles, norms, recipes and procedures of action, and these are shared by several agents. Heap (1989) has however broadened this concept of procedural rationality, which becomes a building block in explanation of institutions and information sets. It is necessary that individuals must have freedom to collectively choose their procedures. It is important to know as to what is the nature of the rational reaction to the existence of the institutional rules and rights which form the conception of the state.

Karl Marx while developing a critique of capitalist economy and Amartya Sen while developing a critique of conventional welfare economics employs a picture of the individual, more or less endowed with procedural and expressive rationality in addition to instrumental rationality (Heaps, 1989, pp.3-5). Expressive rationality is intentional since actors follow ends that are deemed important in themselves. The expressive rationality is responsive to the ethical dimensions of human rationality.

Isaiah Berlin (1958) had later sufficiently hinted at the possibility of expressive rationality through his concept of positive freedom. Isaiah Berlin (1958) coined the idea of a positive sense of freedom and opened the ground for academic works in the arena of category of 'expressive' rationality. The 'expressive rationality' postulate is a reminder that action is implicated in the choice of ends; it is part of groping towards who to be and what ends to have. An individual express a concern with making sense of the world, being self-

consciously reflective about the preferences. The preferences of individual reflect an autonomous self.

Alan Hamlin (1986) (1993) suggests that the conception of "extended" rationality (incorporating the elements of altruism in addition to self-interest) is better equipped to deal with the rules and rights than "imperfect" rationality (based on pre-commitment). Extended rationality is defined in terms of *'the rejection of narrow self-interest as the sole motivator'.* It is rejected in favour of a view of rationality which *'recognises a number of distinct motivators or commitments (where self-interest may, of course, be included in that number)'* (Hamlin, 1986, p. 42: Hamlin, 1993, p. 335).

In a conception of united, blended and composite rationality of human beings, the idea of 'creative rationality' may be attributed to the authorities who make economic policies. It may also be considered as implicit in the heuristic model and visions of individual economists. This rationality treat human agents as the 'option-maker' rather than 'option-taker' when an agent select and realize adequate conditions for action, aiming at modifying the structure of the economic system and the conditions of surrounding environment that affect him (Alessandro Vercelli, 1991, p. 96). All such insights on procedural, expressive, extended and creative rationality are worth incorporation in a broad and blended conception of human rationality.

A human being endowed with rationality is also an agency. In the monist tradition, an agency is at the core of a conception of reason, action and human rationality. Agency primarily refers to an individual's role as a member of society. A human being does something and a person is capable of acting by exercising the agency. An agency exercises some privileged and direct control over the inception and execution of action. A human being is an agency. A human agency is free, responds to reasons for belief and reasons for action. A human agency is endowed with the disposition and resolution required for carrying out performance of action. A human agency is at the centre of reasoning, performing action and realizing the goal (whatever it is). In standard formulation, the categories and facts of reasons, intentionality and rational dispositions are precedents of human action. An action which is intentional by nature, and often, purposive enough by

orientation to bring about a change in the state of affairs of the world involves a person in the capacity of a rational agency.

A human being is in reality a mixture of free-willed person of capacity and dependent person of incapacity and a mixture of perfect rational agency and imperfect akratic agency. An imperfect and rather less-than-full-bloodied rational agency is a human primate who is on the path of crossing the initial stages of a stimulus-response agency, a planning and strategic agency, and a norm-governed agency, and who is still short of rational agency endowed with full capacity to make moral appraisal – a partly-independent, partly-incapacitated and partly-akratic agency. This hybrid conception of human being is realistic and relevant to the advocacy of transitional justice in a framework of hybrid morality. This is however not to undermine the dominance of alternative monist tradition in moral philosophy and political philosophy and economics.

A moral agency requires at least three rational capacities are involved: capacity to form a judgement supported by evidence or *capacity of evaluation*, capacity to form the desire or intention to do what one judges to be right or the best, in circumstances where one is not yet decided or *capacity of decision*, and capacity to resist reconsidering the intentions or to maintain one's intention or desire, in circumstances where one has already decided what to do or *capacity of resolve*. The capacity to cease and suppress deliberation is rational because it is beneficial and also because it is essential to the conception of agency. All the three rational capacities are essential to moral agency in agents like us. A moral agency with capacities however evolves across time, and therefore, the generalizations in terms of abstract features are fraught with danger.

A human agency is one who is capable of acting in accordance with his/her deliberative understanding and take responsibility for it. An agency is posited to be an entity, which is autonomous in deliberation and desideration, and whose action has an intimate relation with reason. It is this intimate relation between reason and action of a human person that makes for a rational agency. While a human primate evolves into a rational agent, (s)he has to acquire certain capacities to evolve further into a moral agent. In a rational human personal agency, reason and value must necessarily resonate. A rational agency does not

just have a goal but also a capacity to make an appraisal and choose a goal in the light of something. That something is a value that (s)he considers to be either a good or a right or an obligation.

5.1. Rationality

Rationality is derived from '*ratio*' – the Latin word. Rationality is treated as a feature of human judgment, human decision making, and human action. A being responding to reasons is a rational being under the postulate of human rationality. An action is rational means that an agent can give reasons for it. The meaning of rationality[81] ranges from the formal notions of efficiency and consistency in the discipline of economics to the substantive notions of autonomy and self-determination in the discipline of morl and political philosophy, and this is a source of plurality in understanding of conception of rationality. At one end and the dominant one, rationality is a conception to mean that human behaviour is goal-directed behaviour. At another end, rationality is also a feature of the discourse among human beings and a feature of the human agent himself/herself (in addition to being a feature of human action).

Rationality[82] is considered a physical phenomenon, and all thought and language, and hence, all human arguments presuppose rationality. In human discourse, communication

[81] The classical model is at the heart of mainstream discipline of neoclassical economics which uses 'rationality' as a heuristic device in analysis and explanation of economic phenomenon. The rationality heuristic which is a mental short cut is a meta-principle. Rationality is a very robust heuristic device to construct logical explanations of social phenomena in which specific level of description is of individual actor. According to the classical model, human rationality is merely an extension of chimpanzee rationality. The classical model of rationality which propounds a mathematical decision theory, one of 'maximizing expected utility', derives from a tradition representing 'human rationality as a more complex version of ape rationality'. We the humans are extremely clever, talking chimps. Animals can deceive but they cannot lie, and they do not have a language (a capacity to symbolize).

[82] Contemporary mainstream economics has been far too concerned with the nature of man - a self-interested, egoistic and individualistic entity. Mainstream economics is swayed over by popular neoclassical abstract concepts, tools and techniques in which the notion of economic efficiency occupies pride of place. The economic efficiency is the evaluative criteria to judge the worthwhile of any economic activity undertaken by the agent. It is arguable that this is a narrow criterion. In neoclassical economic theorization, the man-nature relationship is of fundamental importance. The

and interaction, the postulate of rationality is an indicator towards the rhetorical competence, having features of a 'self-perpetuating rhetoric'. Rationality is in actuality a biological phenomenon. Rationality in action enables organisms to have conscious selves but most significant is that it enables complex organisms to coordinate their intentional contents so as to produce better actions. Practical reason is '*the name of that capacity for coordination'*. Since rationality must be able to make a difference, it *'applies only where there is free choice'* (Searle, 2001).

John Searle (2001, pp. 12-32) insists upon that a general theory of the role of rationality in thought and action must be built upon the following premises: First, the operation of rationality presupposes that there is a gap between the set of intentional states on the basis of which I make the decision, and the actual making of the decision. In the normal cases of rational action, we have to presuppose that the antecedent set of beliefs and desires is not causally sufficient to determine the action. This is a presupposition of the process of deliberation and is absolutely indispensable for the application of rationality. We presuppose that there is a gap between the "causes" of the action in the form of beliefs and desires and the 'effect" in the form of the action. This gap is the 'freedom of the will'. The process of deliberation itself proceed on the presupposition of freedom, on the presupposition that there is a gap between the causes in the form of our beliefs, desires and other reasons, and the actual decision that we make.

In brief, there are eight common sense and philosophical points to clear about reason and rationality (Searle, 2001, pp. 116-26):

1. In order to function in rational deliberation, and in the rational processes leading to action, every element of an external total reason must be matched by an internal element;

---

economic activities are evaluated under the means-ends framework where man continuously strive for achieving material ends and nature is a source of provision of the means like land, labor, and raw materials. In this means-ends framework under the man-nature perspective, logic of balance between insatiable ends and scarce means is to be searched. A state of war of one against all cannot be permitted. Equilibrium is the consequence (end-result) of all activities and changes.

2. In order to show why such cases do not lead to an infinite regress, the introduction of the notion of recognition rationality is important. The irrational attitudes are departures from a simple rational recognition of the facts;
3. The set of factitive elements that constitute a total reason must contain at least one element that has the world-to-mind direction of fit. Every total reason must contain at least one motivator, and motivator can be either external or internal. Desires are internal motivators but needs and obligations are external motivators;
4. The requirement that reasoning has a motivator is as much true of theoretical reason as of practical reason;
5. External motivators are factitive entities in the world;
6. The list of motivators are of course heterogeneous but all of them are factitive;
7. Desire-independent motivators, under their description as motivators, always have the upward, world-to motivator direction of fit. Their recognition as motivators is already a recognition of them as reasons for action;
8. Rationality in decision making involves at least the following three things. First, the recognition of the various motivators, both external and internal, and an appraisal of their relative weights. Second, there must be a correct recognition and appraisal of the non-motivational facts that bear on the case. The third element in rational decision making, once we have assembled the total reason, is to appraise the set of motivators and non-motivational facts in such a way as to arrive at a decision.

In this elaborate design on the theme of reasons and rationality of human beings, it is also required to make a human subject metamorphose into a rational agency, the weights of deliberation and forces of desideration however must resonate in harmony (Petit and Smith, 1993). As a deliberating and acting human person, (s)he is endowed with a disposition to act – a disposition to act in order to see the fructification of a project of a rational design of life. In other words, such an agency does not merely produce a purposeful action but is also disposed to produce that action – intentionality. According to Frantz Brentano (1973), "intentionality" is a mental state 'about' something, and this "aboutness" is a capacity of the mental state (beliefs, desires) to aim at, to point at and to be about something beyond itself. It requires a first-person subject to have a mental state for there being an "intrinsic" intentionality (Searle, 1983), a disposition to act and action by an agency.

Rationality is often considered an attribute of a moral person and agency. A moral agent who is a person has two capacities: a conception of the 'good', and a sense of 'justice', according John Rawls. This is the basis of equal basic moral rights of moral persons (Arneson, 1998). The Lockean view is that morality commands respect for individual rights that express the idea that each person should be left free to do as she chooses with whatever she legitimately owns so long as she does not thereby harm others in certain specified way. There ought to be equal consideration for all humans or equal consideration of equal interest of all humans since there is equal capacity for rational, autonomous agency in all humans. All humans have the capacity to set an end, to choose a goal and decide on an action to achieve it, except the comatose and the anencephalic. In general, rationality - the ability to respond appropriately to reasons in conjunction with related abilities - is considered the basis of personhood.

It is in this backdrop of common sense and philosophical enquiry regarding rationality that it is also interesting to explore the meaning of the so-called 'meaningful rationality'. Advocating three economic domains of freedom, justice and care in the society, and four ethical capabilities of commitment to moral values, emotion, deliberation and human interaction for a human actor, Irene von Staveren (2001) has framed a conception of *'meaningful rationality'.* For human behavior to make sense and be considered rational in a meaningful way, it is warranted that *'actors have multiple capabilities in different value domains'.* In order to be rational, economic actors need to invest in all the virtues - *'all ethical capabilities in each of the domains'.* They need to develop *'value commitments to freedom, justice and care with their respective virtues'.* They need to acquire the capability, such as *'pride (freedom), rightness (justice) and affection (care)'.* They need to develop capabilities to deliberate and *'make choices (freedom), to agree on a legitimate distribution (justice), and to evaluate in relationship with other people's contingent needs (care)'.* The economic actors need to learn to interact with each other – *'to compete in exchange (freedom), to follow agreed rules (justice), and to share what they are able to give (care)'* (Staveren, 2001, pp. 150-1).

Classical Model

The concerns regarding human rationality are, historically speaking, quite old, and therefore, there exists a classical model since long. Rationality in economics and reason in philosophy have been par excellence categories which have ever been used as a heuristic to link practical human reasons with human action (either private or public). Rationality is a significant postulate in economics. Economics is a profession that is almost single-minded in its association of rationality exclusively with instrumental rationality. Economics is concerned with a class of decisions and general characteristics of those decisions and not a decision of an individual, according to John Hicks (1986) (quoted in Israel Kirzner, 1986). There is thus the preoccupation with '*explanation in principle*' rather than '*explanation in detail'*, according to Frederic Hayek (1973).

Philosophically speaking, rationality and prudence is close kin. Prudence is a concern for self-benefiting choice. It is claimed that prudence is a universal theory, applying to everyone. It is not a collective code rather it is a theory of individual rationality (Parfit, 1986, p.45). A human economic agent is rational, and thus, an economic agent is characterised by individual rationality. It is an implicit heuristic used in many theorems. It matters deeply to economics. There is a sort of centrality of rationality assumption to economic analysis. This assumption and heuristic generate different types of explanations and prescriptions in economics.

There are six assumptions that are constitutive of the classical model of rationality. First, actions, where rational, are caused by beliefs and desires. Second, rationality is a matter of obeying rules, the special rules that make the distinction between rational and irrational thought and behaviour. Third, rationality is a separate cognitive faculty. Fourth, apparent cases of weaknesses of will, what the Greeks called *akrasia*, can arise only in cases where there is something wrong with the psychological antecedents of the action. Fifth, practical reason has to start with an inventory of the agent's primary ends, including the agent's goals and fundamental desires, objectives, and purposes; and these are not themselves subject to rational constraints. Last, the whole system of rationality works only if the set of primary desires is consistent (Searle, 2001, pp.7-12).

According to Lawrence Boland (1982), it is still a commonplace viewpoint that humans are distinguished from other animals on the basis that *'humans can be rational'*. It is a relic of the late eighteenth century that *'rationality is a psychological process'*. It is a simple mistake. *'Humans cannot be rational – only arguments can be rational'*. An argument is rational only if it is not logically inconsistent (Boland, 1982, p. 38). A person's rationality is established by '*knowing and using the warrants indigenous'* to a special field and adhering to the *'particular rules of advocacy followed in it'*. A person exhibits its style, its style being *'fashioned by appropriate grounding of arguments on approved warrants'* and in respect to the *'accepted norms of argumentative interaction'* (Fisher, 1980, p. 128). This principle also holds in regard to reasoning in such fields of law, science, art, ethics, and business management.

Rationality is in essence actually a normative concept, and it is considered a part of the real world. In its normative standing, it points to *'what we should do in order to attain a given end or objectives'*. The common-sense notion of rational behaviour is a notion of *'a choice of the best means available for achieving a given end'* (Harsanyi, 1986). The concept of rational behaviour is a concept of practical rationality. While the concept of theoretical rationality is connected with problems in logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of science, concept of practical rationality plays an important role in moral and political philosophy. Both practical and theoretical rationality are important concepts in psychology and in the study of artificial intelligence, according to John Harsanyi (1986).

Concept of rationality does have important positive (non-normative) applications as well: *'it is used for explanation, for prediction, and even for mere description of human behaviour'*. There is really nothing surprising about this. All it means is that human behaviour is *'mostly goal-directed, often in a fairly consistent manner, in many important classes of social situations'* (Harsanyi, 1986, 82-4). The popular philosopher of science, Karl Popper (1967) remarked: "*agents always act in a manner appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves*". The principle of acting appropriately to the situation is called the rationality principle in economics, according to Karl Popper.

A philosopher as well as an economist of the stature of Richard Hare has championed the "prudential" rationality that is related with the attempt at maximizing the average income; John Rawls (1992) has advocated the "political" rationality that is concerned with the maximizing of the income of the worst off in society; and, economists have popularized the notion of "economic" rationality that is singularly oriented to maximizing the total income.

An agent is conscious being capable of deliberations and has a preference ordering. The preference arises from the desires and beliefs. Given desires, beliefs and preference (decision), an agent makes a choice, which in turn is the basis is of action. The agent can cite reasons for action, and therefore, he is endowed with rationality. Whether the reasons are true or respectable or real is not important. In other words whether the motive is real, true, respectable is not the point in economics discipline.

According to famous economist, John Hicks (1982), a merchant is a rational agent. These merchants are the simplest class of people who buy in order to sell. The simplest kind of mercantile dealing is one in which each transaction is separate. A merchant has a profit motive. A merchant is the original economic man. The mercantile behaviour is the purest type of economic behaviour.

The ability to act rationally is a general set of capacities involving such things as the ability to recognize and operate with consistency, inference, recognition of evidence, and a large number of others. Rationality means '*choosing in accordance with a preference ordering that is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information; where there is uncertainty , about future outcomes, rationality means maximizing expected utility, that is, the utility of an outcome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence'*. The postulate of rationality in neoclassical economics is an '*attempt to derive all economic behaviour from the action of individuals seeking to maximize their utility, subject to the constraints of technology and endowments*'. There is '*insistence on methodological individualism*' (Mark Blaug, 1992, p. 229; italics added).

According to Alan P Hamlin (1986), there are three key elements involved in an analysis of rationality. These are: belief, desires and decisions. The belief constitutes a model of the true nature of the world. The desires represent the ends – the driving force of decision making process. The action is evaluated in terms of conjunction of beliefs and desires. The decisions are the outcome of a process of choice. These are the three views on the theme of individual rationality that is at the heart of the neoclassical economics.

There are three distinct interpretations of individual economic rationality in neoclassical economics: means-rationality, ends-rationality, and belief-rationality. The rationality relating to the individual's desires is the ends rationality, relating to the individual's belief is the belief rationality, and that to the ultimate decisions of the individual is the means rationality. The ends-rationality relates exclusively to desires. Without any reference to the desires and beliefs, consistency of actions and absence of mutually contradictory decisions is the hallmark of individual means-rationality.

A rational agent is posited to be exhibiting either the means-rationality or the ends-rationality or the belief-rationality, and is therefore, as an omniscient, infinitely calculative and egoistical maximizing agent – *homo economicus*. Such meanings of rationality have in vogue in economics since the Marginal Revolution in 1870s and were reinvented in the 1930s to become popular later. In the neoclassical model of utility maximization, the emphasis is placed on the means rationality and ends rationality aspects while the belief rationality remains hidden from the view. The utilitarian action is commonly thought of in terms of ends and means. A utilitarian action may presuppose ulterior purposes for which it is undertaken. Neoclassical economics embodies strict objective belief-rationality. It also shares both senses of utility-maximisation which involve statements of ends-rationality and means-rationality (Hamlin, 1993, p. 20). The neoclassical conception of individual economic rationality requires that one cannot knowingly hold inconsistent beliefs but there is no such requirement for desires.

It is a point worth a remark that the individual economic rationality of neoclassical economics variant (means-, ends- and belief-rationality) is an instance of the notion of 'substantive rationality'. Substantive rationality refers to '*attributes of the equilibrium configuration of the system*'. It is to be contrasted with procedural rationality which refers to 'attributes of the dynamic process seen in all its dimensions (including disequilibrium)' (Vercelli, 1991). *'Behaviour is substantively rational when it is appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints'* (Simon, 1982, p. 425). A rational behaviour depends on the actor but with respect to a single criterion - his goals. Given these goals, what matters is *'the characteristics of the environment'* in which the behaviour takes place.

Thin and Thick Rationality

There are at least two genres of theoretical attempts at comprehending human rationality: thin and broad. In a thin theory of rationality, the beliefs and desires that form the reasons for action are stipulated to be not logically inconsistent. In short, consistency is what rationality in the thin sense is all about: consistency within belief system, consistency within the system of desires, and consistency between beliefs and desires on the one hand and the action for which they are reasons on the other. In the thin theory of individual rationality, rational action is action that stands in a certain relation to the beliefs and desires of the agent (Davidson, 1980). Such beliefs and desires are the reasons. The reasons are reasons for the action; the reasons do in fact cause the action for which they are reasons; and, the reasons cause the action '*in a certain right way*'. The consistency requirement is implicit in these requirements (Elster, 1983, p.3).

In a broad theory of rationality, it is however required that the beliefs and desires be rational in a more substantive sense. Substantively, rational beliefs are those which are grounded in the available evidence; they are closely linked to the notion of judgement. Autonomy is for the desires what judgement is for belief in a substantive sense. It is opined that rationality alone does not tell the agent what to do. It is required that causal considerations are to be invoked in addition to rationality to explain behaviour of a human agent (Elster, 1983, pp. 1-2).

In addition to classifying the discourse on rationality as thin and thick conceptions, there is a specific dimension. Reason statements have a formal structure. It is relational in three ways: first, the reason specified is a reason for something else. Second, reasons for action are doubly relational in that they are reasons for an agent-self to perform an action. Third, if they are to function in deliberation, the reasons must be known to the agent-self (Searle, 2001, p.99). The broad theory of rationality allows a scrutiny of the substantive nature of the desires and beliefs involved in action. There is however a room and need for a broad theory of the rational between the thin theory of the rational and the full theory of the true and the good. For the postulation of rational desires as hallmark of rationality, the requirement of consistence is too weak and that of ethical goodness too strong.

To summarise the points, the classical model of rationality and the standard neoclassical conception of the heuristic device of rationality however do not exhaust the literature. In addition, John Harsanyi (1986) has put forward a conception of rationality with an alternative model of rationality. The means-ends model is not the only model of rational behaviour. Another model of rationality is the criterion-satisfying behaviour model that *'envisages rational behaviour as choosing an object (or a person) satisfying certain stipulated formal (possibly non-causal) criteria'*. It is the preference-opportunity model which embrace a broader concept of rationality and *'defines rational behaviour as a choice among alternative ends, on the basis of a given set of preferences and a given set of opportunities (i.e. a given set of available alternatives)'.* Since this model includes both the means-ends model and the criterion-satisfaction model as special cases, the rational behaviour defined by the preferences-opportunities model becomes *'equivalent to utility-maximization theorem'* (Harsanyi, 1986, pp. 85-6).

Rational Choice

There are two conceptions of rational choice: ***normative and descriptive.*** The theory of rational choice as a normative theory tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims as well as possible. It does not tell us what our aims ought to be. It offers a conditional imperative, pertaining to means rather than to ends. While the rationality of an action is ensured by its standing in the right kind of relation to the goals and beliefs of the agent, the rationality of beliefs depends on their having the right kind of relation to the evidence available to him.

We may employ the normative theory for explanatory purpose. It is not sufficient to show that the action was rational; it is also needed to be shown that the action arose in the proper way, through a proper kind of connection to desires, beliefs and evidence. As a descriptive theory, choosing rationally means that one's observed choices fall into a pattern, characterised by consistency properties. This theory can yield prediction of action. There is

but a great deal of overlap between the normative and the descriptive conceptions of rationality (Elster, 1986, p.2).

In order to rescue the economic man from requirements of explicit over-riding moral behaviour, the postulate of rationality is combined with the invisible–hand theorem. Virtually all economic analysis rests the fundamental behavioural assumption: *'individuals pursue their own egoistic ends'.* This is an assumption in positive analysis, and it is conducive to *'a rich variety of predictions about human behaviour in organizations and in markets'.* A leap from positive to normative economics is usually accomplished by *'a wave of the invisible-hand theorem'.* The beauty of this theorem is to transform selfish individual behaviour into benevolent social outcomes. It is a short step to arguing that *'the normative implications of the invisible-hand theorem accompany laissez-faire economic policies'.* This beauty has captivated economics for more than 200 years (Mueller, 1984, p. 159).

In the literature, there has been preoccupation with the instrumental rationality but such a category has been conceived as too narrow a concept in terms of definition as well as operational use in the mainstream theorisation inspired by western philosophical tradition. In addition to the prevalent neoclassical variant of individual economic rationality, there are also the notions of 'imperfect rationality' and 'extended rationality' in the literature, according to Alan Hamlin (1986) (1993).

It is in this regard that the 'social rationality' covers family of conceptions of goal-directed behaviour that have one feature in common: the individual rationality is strongly influenced by social conditions. The social rationality contrasts with 'natural rationality' of the economists. Social rationality assumptions are quite old in sociology as Georg Simmel and Max Weber worked explicitly with such a conception.

5.2. Person, Agency and the Public

A human person is an entity which necessarily has two dimensions – mind and body[83]. A person admits both mental and bodily attributes. The materialist account identifies a person with a body and bodily continuity. A Cartesian account identifies a person with immaterial substance of mind and mental or psychological continuity. A highly sophisticated and technical way of conceptualization is that person is '*a type of entity*' in case of which the predicates '*ascribing states of consciousness*' as well as '*ascribing corporeal characteristics*' (for example, a physical situation) are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type (Strawson, 1959, p. 102).

A person is someone who is minimally rational, self-determining project maker and chooser, and who is but aware of himself under that characterization. A person as a maker of projects[84] is also in some measure the maker of himself. The autonomous person is the one who makes the choice of his own life and, by a process of reasoned internal criticism, created for himself a coherent set of principles and standards by which he regulates it.

---

[83] In the beginning, the notion of a 'person' was originally a theological term. Christianity is the first philosophical system to use the word 'person' in its modern use. After Thomas Aquinas (1999), the analytical Thomism has been the improved version carried forward by works of Elizabeth Anscombe, John Haldane and J F Ross. In the tradition of the Christian concept of rational intellect, a person possesses an intellect and a will. In the tradition of '*hylomorphism*' of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, a person is neither reducible to some bundle of bodily characteristics nor psychological characteristics; a person is rather a body with a "*form*" – a body and a soul in causal contact with each other (the rational soul of the Greek tradition). In other words, a person is the locus of immaterial rational soul – the "form" – within the material being – the body who is a subject of conscious experiences and intentionality.

[84] Philosophically speaking, there has been an old debate in the academic parlour on agency and structure. In sociology, Talcott Parson (1937) formulated the problem of the relationship between agency and structure in his monograph "*The Structure of Social Action*" (published by Free Press, New York). Action was analytically conceived of comprising the actor, ends, situations (means and conditions) and guiding normative orientation – a mechanical decomposition of the system of human actions into stratified configuration of subsystems. Subsequently, the dilemma of agency versus structure and the coordination problem was solved by positing either the action determinism or the structural determinism.
Action determinism asserts that the social actors perform a social event in unique ways while structural determinism first challenge the autonomy of individual actor in performing the action and then talks of the primacy of rules of society. On the contrary, the structural determinism insists that the actors cannot play social events in any way they want; they must respect social reality of rules and the games of life, in short, the structures (Kabele, 2010, p. 314). The structures are the beliefs, tendencies, and the practices of the group taken collectively. Along with the reproduction of structural qualities of social systems through human action, the human agents may also reproduce the structural conditions that make their activities possible, according to Arthur Giddens (1984).

There is free will of a rational and autonomous agent[85]. A human is a rational and reasonable being. A human agency is characterised by features of rationality. It is a fact that a human being is the animal that can both understand reasons and respond to reasons. A human agency is indispensable for morality (whatever it is) as well.

The ontological category of 'reasons' and the postulate of rationality have relevance for person and agency. There are standard postulates of a rational agency that is presumed to respond to theoretical, practical and public reasons. A human being who responds to a plethora of reasons and who is therefore characterised by the features of broad and comprehensive rationality is treated as a person with identity and an agency entangled in action. Persons considered individually are separate from one another. Beginning from utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick to the revival of liberalism by John Rawls, there has been a tradition of adherence to the doctrine of the distinctness of persons. This doctrine normatively ranks persons above other sorts of things, for example, non-persons or collection of persons.

A human agency is considered not merely the locus of causal pushes and pulls. An agent is rather considered the source of action[86]; an agent determines, directs, and governs the

---

[85] There are social frameworks that are both empowering and enforcing. There may be flexible agencies and there are stable structures. The dilemma of primacy of human agency (and action) and material product (and commodity) took the form of the social science dilemma of subjectivism and objectivism. In this field, there have been contributions of Pierre Bourdieu (1998) (author of *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, Stanford university Press, Stanford), H Garfinkel (1967) (author of *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Prentice-hall, Englewood Cliffs), Arthur Giddens (1984) (author of *The constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, University of California Press, Berkley), and E Goffman (1974) (author of *Frame Analysis*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge).

[86] An action is either caused by a prior event of the external world or an action has a reason-explanation grounded in the desire-belief of an agent. In economics, justification of action is advanced in terms of goal-achievement. A person acts rationally if the person is fully aware of his/her belief and commitments. A person deliberates about beliefs and acts with his/her commitments firmly before his/her mind. While philosophy treats action as intentional by nature, the mainstream economics considers all actions as necessarily rational and purposeful, in addition to being intentional by nature; actions have utility.

An action is the kind of happening that can be made intelligible, rationalised, assessed, and justified by appealing to reasons for it. Reasons (considerations of facts and factitive entities) of desires and beliefs as well as reasons of action are the response of a human person, who is by nature and training a rational agency. Considerations called reasons for belief and reasons for action motivates a rational being and such reasons move and guide not only the initiation but performance and

action. Michael Bratman (1984; 1987) finds that an intention is not reducible to a combination of beliefs and desires. According to Harry Frankfurt (1978), Michael Bratman (1984; 1987) and David Velleman (1989; 2000), therefore, a deliberative and reflective planning agent, who is capable of exercising self-governance, is a full-blooded intentional agency is at the seat of action.

A full bloodied intentional agency is the subject of action by acting intentionally. A full bloodied intentional agency is aware of what she is doing, why she is doing; she acts as a result of an explicit deliberation, and she sees her conduct as 'up to' her rather than as the product of 'alien forces'. Christian Korsgaard (2009) agrees with the thesis of a reflective agent in action for a reason. An action is necessarily performed by a unified agent, and self-consciousness creates the need for principles of reason. The motivated behavior of an agent is distinct from governing action by an agent. An intention is not a cognitive but a practical commitment.

Free Person

In academic parlance, a person is not simply a person with a personality but a 'free' person. A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. In respect of moral status, a person has certain capacities. A person has a certain psychological depth as well. The concept of person is intimately connected with the notion of not only 'free will' but also the structure of human volition according to 'first-order desire' and 'second-order desire'. There is a notion of a natural person that is fundamental to the principle of the conception of practical reason in the form a person-centred reason or 'reason of respect'.

Harry Frankfurt (1978) has proposed this feature that distinguishes persons from other beings by virtue of the notion that persons have 'second-order volitions'. A person has a capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. A person is one who desires that his/her second-order desires become his/her

---

completion of an action – an event. The explanation of action in terms of desire-belief duo as identity of agency has been advanced. On action and willing of agency in terms of desire-belief duo, the pioneering work has been done by H A Prichard (1945) and G H von Wright (1963).

effective will and give rise to action, proceeding from the associated first-order desire. In contrast to a person, a wanton is an agent that has first-order desires and possibly second-order desires but lacks second-order volitions. A being capable of second-order volitions, that is, a person has sophisticated perceptual and reasoning capacities.

A human being is a person – possessed of a personality with individuality. A deliberating human agency is a person. A person has capability of framing representations about the world, formulating plans and acting on them. Persons are deliberate actors. A person as a maker of projects is also in some measure the maker of himself. A person is one having continuous consciousness over time, have second-order volitions, and is a deliberate actor. A human is endowed with free will (autonomy), and therefore, a human is a personal agency. A human being is a person that is characterised by features of rationality. The autonomous person – the "truly self-made man"- is an ideal deeply rooted in the liberal tradition and is clearly one of the threads woven into the complex notion of a free man.

A person is a holder and possessor of second-order volitions; a person is self-aware that it is a person; and, a person is a bearer of rights in law. In law, a person is a being with certain moral status, and therefore a person is a bearer of rights. A person is recognized by law because the rights and duties are ascribed to him/her. The person is the legal subject of which bearing of the rights and discharging of the duties are attributes. Personhood is the status of being a person which figures prominently in moral and legal discourses nowadays.

A person is not merely capable of responding to a reason but also a being in whom reason and value necessarily resonate. The agent who is capable of being rationally autonomous is capable of being moved to action by her perception of good reasons for action including moral reasons that attend to the interests of other beings which is an affective capacity. It is through being embedded and enmeshed in the social relations that an individual human being evolves into a person and that too rather incrementally.

In the liberal tradition, there is a deeply rooted ideal of the "truly self-made man". The autonomous person is clearly one of the threads woven into the complex notion of a free man. As interpreted by John Rawls, Kantian '*moral law specifies a positive concept of*

freedom'. Human persons are free not only in the sense that they are *'able to act independently of our natural desires and needs'*. We as human persons entertain a principle that is '*regulative of both ends and means from which to act a principle of autonomy'* that is in turn appropriate to human beings as *'reasonable and rational beings'* (Rawls, 1999, p. 225). In the framework of Rawls, persons are '*free and equal*'. Persons have a right to '*equal respect and consideration*'. Moral persons are 'autonomous' in the sense that they are both '*rational*' and '*reasonable*' (Shionoya, 2005, pp. 122-23). Closely related with the notion of personality is the notion of rights to autarchy and autonomy (Benn, 1988, pp. 9-10).

The subject of practical reason is an individual ego with its own set of ends that it seeks to pursue. Peter Singer (1985) defines a person as being a conscious, thinking being, who knows that it is a person (self-awareness). A person is a being who has a sense of 'self', has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices, adopt life-span (Taylor, 1985, p. 97). In the moral tradition of the Enlightenment project scholars, for example, Rene Descartes, John Locke and David Hume, a person is one who possesses continuous consciousness over time.

In contrast to the liberal traditions of philosophy and ethics, the neoclassical utilitarian economics considers an agent not as a 'plurality of distinct persons with separate system of ends' but simply as dummies with prescribed attribute called 'rationality' (Rawls, 1972, p. 29). In addition to John Rawls, Bernard Williams and Amartya Sen have levelled similar criticisms against utilitarianism. Utilitarianism shows no other and no further interest in any information other than the '*person's utility'*. Utilitarianism sees persons with a metaphor of locations – locations of utilities and the sites '*at which such activities as desiring and having pleasure and pains take place'.* In the manner that an individual petrol tanks do count in the national consumption of petrol, the persons do count as individuals in the society in the framework of utilitarianism (Sen and Williams, 1982, p. 4). Such a conception is undoubtedly narrow.

Rational Agency

A person is a rational and reasonable being. A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Personhood is the status of being a person which figures prominently in moral and legal discourses nowadays. There is a notion of a natural person that is fundamental to the principle of the conception of practical reason in the form a person-centred reason or 'reason of respect'. An egotist person is a person capable of responding to theoretical reason, and a reasonable person is a person capable of responding to practical reason. A person endowed with theoretical reason is merely a necessary condition in the way of conceiving a rational agency who inescapably and inevitably responds to practical reason.

A human agency is a rational agency. A rational agency is not merely capable of responding to reasons but is also a doer of an action – a purposeful action explicated by a reason. To make a human subject a rational agency, the weights of deliberation and forces of desideration must resonate in harmony. Autonomy in desideration and deliberation and goal behind the intentional action are the two hallmarks of the identity of a rational agency. An agency is considered to be a finite, embodied, historical person who responds to reasons.

The mainstream literature of ethics and moral philosophy postulate an intimate relation of reason with agency and thereby the moral practice. Theories of practical reason address the question: why be moral? Whether it is rational to be moral? Is human inherently selfish? The 'teleological conception of practical reasons' is that whenever we act intentionally, we *'act with the aim of making the world go a certain way'.* It is through our actions that we *'affect the way the world goes'.* Facing a choice of what to do is actually facing *'a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize'.* An agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of the possible worlds to others. An agent has the most reason to do is to bring about a possible world, and this possible world, among all those available to her, is the *'one that she has most reason to want to obtain'* (Portmore, 2011, p.117).

In contrast to akratic, amoral and vicious person and agency, the dominant tradition in moral philosophy has been one of conceptualising a rational agency. A human agency is a

rational agency. An agency is an informed, rational and reasonable being that has the goals, preferences and choices over goods, and thereby, seeks the goods of either instrumental worth (happiness) or intrinsic worth (basic needs). An agency has a desire, an intention and a goal and s/he seeks not just any means or the only means rather searches for the best means (Searle, 2001) while performing an action.

In standard formulation, human persons are distinct as a class because they have desires and goals, and have capacity to deliberate and decide on course of action. A human agency, which is capable of and having the capacity to will, reason and deliberate, is the subject of action. If an agent does an action, either paradigmatically or via an action-surrogate, what he does is something of which he is the cause; this is so lies at the heart of the concept of agency. A rational agency is to be thought to be engaged in intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The desire-belief characterisation of action does not ensure such a characteristic of agency - the freedom to adopt ends which are not merely mine. Strong freedom may ensure that some actions may be represented a directed to ends which are not merely mine, but which are also freely adopted and pursued by me. In the domain of philosophy of mind and action while discussing a substantive theory of practical reason, a conception of rational agency is relevant because a relation between reason and motivation is to be debated.

In Aristotelian conception, a rational agency responds to practical reason as the overriding reason in attaining any reasonable goal or a goal of the rational design of life and universe. Such reasons have normative force in the performance of action. In Kantian framework of metaphysical conception of agency, the self of moral agency is a '*noumenal*' self, outside time and causality - a transcendental self (Kant, 1785). In classical literature, prominent conception of a rational agency has been taken to be either expressed in the conception of a '*noumenal self*' or expressed in 'how one should lead a satisfying life'. While Kant (1785; 1988) formulates the Categorical Imperative in a number of ways, the idea which animates it is the conception of the moral equivalence of persons. The idea which motivates the demand for impartial consideration is the moral equivalence of persons. In Kantian morality, all rational agents must always be treated not merely as means but as ends in themselves.

Amartya Sen has been one to point out that akrasia, rational fool and paradox of Paretian liberal are phenomena that constitute the problems of practical reason, practical decisions and moral action. To resolve these problems is to treat morality as reflexive and transitive ranking of preferences ordering but not complete ranking of the preference order of people – quasi-ordering of preferences. In the case that apathy, languor, lassitude, torpor, passion, unreason and irrationality abound, the question is as always: is action and rational action possible? In ethics, the failures of individual human agency, human person and human action on a repetitive basis have been a matter of concern. To revert back to the tradition of Greek philosophy and the classical literature, it is not merely the rationality, reasonability and virtues that are dealt with. Rather, the phenomena of akrasia, incontinence and viciousness of men also get sufficient attention. In view of all such features, one ought to tread cautiously before making any generalization.

Aristotle says that there is also a possibility of an akratic, amoral, and vicious man (and woman). *A-krasia*, the Greek word, means the 'weakness-of-will' - a lack of power. In the case of a-krasia phenomenon, there is practical reasoning but it does not lead to action. In this case, the practical reasoning does not supply the reasons for the action performed. A man suffering from the weakness-of-will is able to deliberate and thus reflects and arrives at the knowledge of what he has to do. Despite that he knows the right principle as well as his particular duty, the reflection is useless to him because his determination remains inactive; he is prevented by passion from keeping his resolution. In both cases, the man follows pleasure, and the desire for pleasure turns out to be more powerful than the desire to realize his duty. There is a lack of power to dominate the effects of passion. In case of former, he acts blindly whereas the second case acts with eyes open (Kirchner, 1989).

Aristotle recognizes two kinds of incontinence – impetuousness and weakness. The difference between the two consists in what precedes action. A man suffering from impetuousness does not deliberate and ignores the particular duty in a certain situation. The agent thinks but rushes under impulse towards the object of pleasure.

There is also a concept of a vicious man. A vicious man cannot see the good end; he has no clear general knowledge of the good end of life. If a human agent is vicious, (s)he cannot "see" the good end. An akratic man know the good principle the whole time he has no power to remain faithful to his resolution or is prompted by passion to act in the wrong way having no time to sop to deliberate about his duty. A new process of habituation is needed to change the behaviour. Practical reason can only give the first step. When the agent reaches the age of deliberation, he is able to "see" the good end, for his dispositional base has prepared the "induction" of it (Kirchner, 1989, pp. 68-9). The attainment of truth is indeed the function of the intellect, but the attainment of practical intellect is *'the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire'* (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6 quoted by Thornton, 1982, p. 66-7)

There is always a possibility that a vicious man starts from a correct deliberative process but with wrong premises; he is perfectly coherent with his own resolution. He acts willingly. He is responsible for his actions; he is responsible for the dispositions he acquired. It was in his power not to become vicious, at the very beginning. He cannot however repent; he has no pattern to do so. In contrast to a man suffering from the weakness-of-will, the vicious man does not have a chance to know that he acts in the wrong way. Any kind of rectification has to be external: good laws can punish excesses and tend to obligate citizens to act materially well (Kirchner, 1989, p.69). In the case of vicious man, Aristotle does not allow the possibility of a new process of habituation.

In modern times, a rational individual is variously equated with an economic man. Such a conception of individual as rational economic man has been championed as a category par excellence among the assumptions made about human behaviour in the discipline in economics, particularly in the neoclassical variant of analysis of economic agent. A rational behaviour is equated with and reduced to the maximising inclination of individuals, and that too with the assumption of action being propelled by the selfish, egotist and 'mind-your-business' attitude of individual. The specification of agents with well-behaved objective functions, which they set about maximizing, is a knee-jerk reaction of the profession to almost every problem. The means-end framework of analysis about intelligent behaviour of an economic man has dominated the literature. What is missing in the means-

end vocabulary of the instrumental rationality is the open-ended nature of action. What is also missing is the conception of behaviour of vicious man and woman in the modern economics.

A human rational agency and person often has theoretical reasons to behave morally and practical reasons to act morally. A rational agency necessarily responds to reasons. A Kantian rational agent is an agent in possession of the reflective and reflexive disposition leading him/her to an acquisition of a value and a capacity to respond appropriately to his/her normative judgments over options available. The rational agent has an ability to be guided in behaviour by his/her normative judgment of what is right/wrong, good/bad, and obligatory/discretionary and to act on the basis of such normative judgments since there exists not only universal nature of the principles of reason but also fact of autonomy of agency (Sayre-McCord, 2011).\

An agency has personal autonomy. In liberal thought, the autonomy of the individual is most usually prized. Personal autonomy requires appropriate mental abilities, an adequate range of options, and independence (Raz, 1986, p.372). An agency requires a number of disposition in which resolution is one of the disposition required for agency (Jay Wallace, 1999). The exercise of resolve is a constitutive habit of agency. An agency who is incapable of judging what is best and an agency that is incapable of forming the intention to do what is best is pathologically afflicted. When human agents choose to do otherwise and act akratically, it is true that '*they could have done what they ought, holding fixed the desires and dispositions to which they were subject*' (Jay Wallace, 1999, p. 238).

Public Functionary

In addition to private individual agency and person in the civil society, there is also the public agency. A State is a collective and public agency. In its discharge of public functions, it assumes the status of a public agency and functionary. In common parlance, the state is collapsed into the government though a government is merely one vital integral organ of the state.

The organs of the state and the government organizations are manned by executive, legislative and judicial bureaucratized personnel. A bureaucracy is a vital wing of the state – a public agency. A hierarchy of stratified personnel acts on behalf of the government and the state. A state as a public agency is a specific organization, which is separate from the civil society though drawing the distinguishing line between the two is difficult in practice (Mitchell, 1991, p. 77). \

Be that as it may. The state as public agency and collective actor has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without a state and power of this form of public agency. In a single definition, or even a cluster of definitions, the paradoxical role of the state is *'almost impossible to grasp'* (Chandhoke, 1995, pp. 48 - 9). The state as a modern public agency has evolved in stages[87]. In other words, the nature of public agency as an ensemble of institutions of governance has varied across history of human civilization.

In the history of evolution of states from chiefdoms, the first state was the **polis**. The city-state[88] emerged about 8th century B.C. in Greece. The rise of city-states did not involve the immediate triumph of territorial community identities over those of kinship. The story is

[87] **Chiefdom** was a tribal form of organization of the society which acted as a public agency, before the origin of the State and bureaucratized government. Across time, the tribal organization or chiefdom as a system of governance took the trajectory of either a decentralized stratified society or a centralized archaic state. The state proper evolves out of these stages crossed over. Fredreich Engels (1891) termed the decentralized stratified society as representing Germanic mode of production. Karl Marx coined the Asiatic state for centralized archaic state formation. It is in the decentralized stratified society that the basic features of the feudal state are gradually formalized. What was required was the private property and taxation. Without these being linked to it, the state cannot be permanently sustained in a decentralized subsistence production setting. In the decentralized setup, central to the new social form of stratification must be formalized ways to extract tribute, tax and labour (Engels, 1891, pp. 19-20).

[88] The **city-states** in Greece emerged over a relatively short-time, and the factors apparently influencing the emergence were the need for centers for cult worship, a population explosion, transition from pastoralism to agriculture and the relative independence of Dark-Age peasants, according to Ferguson (1991). About the nature and contradiction of such a state form as a public agency, it is worth arguing that there were more "primitive" political forms that influenced both the polis and interstate relations. Various inter-state regimes impacted on the 'polis'. A central fact was the coexistence and interaction of many entities located at different points along the political evolution continuum – the '*overlapping, layered, and linked authority patterns'* (Ferguson, 1992, p. 192). In the ancient times, the stratified societies lacked the developed bureaucracy though these were endowed with the basic features of state organization, such as strong social and economic divisions and an emphasis on territory (rather than kinship) (Kristiansen, 1991, p. 18).

different with the centralized archaic state. The centralized archaic state formalizes the '*tribal structure of the conical clan into ruling elite*', and it was legitimized by controlled '*ritual access to the super-structural'*. It also formalized the basic components of a developed bureaucracy '*to administer production, trade and religious activities*'. In comparison with the decentralized stratified society, the major difference it formalized as well a centralized economy with '*its potential for sustaining a state apparatus*' and the '*ritualized genealogical structure of the ruling class'* (Kristiansen, 1991, p. 21). The public agency of the city-state had these features.

What underlay the evolution of states was the structural change and transformations in the stratified society (Sanders and Webster, 1978). The abstract features of the state in contrast to stateless societies of ancient times are clear. The state became a necessity bound up with the split of society into classes at a certain stage of economic development. The state, first divides its subjects according to territory. Common to all states is this organization of citizens according to locality. Though the political recognition of property distinctions is not essential, the public agency of the State is an organization of the possessing class for its protection against the non-possession class in most of the historical states (Ferguson, 1992, pp. 167-70).

A fully blossomed state as a mature public agency is an ensemble of institutions of governance that not only possesses but also exercises and enforces the monopoly rights over power and coercion. A state is a condensate of power, acquires a distinct and irreducible specific ability in selecting between various forms of power, giving them legal recognition and downplaying other forms of power in the civil society (Chandhoke, 1995, pp. 67-8). A state (and therefore, a government) has the power to legislate, and it is the bearer of second-order rights in civil society. The state seeks and gets legitimacy for itself from the society. It acquires power to legislate, enforce and monitor the compliance of laws in protecting the rights of individuals. It protects the legal and moral rights of individuals (citizens), and this constitutes the second-order rights of the state.

The public collective agency of state under capitalism possesses at least three institutional features: it has an effective monopoly of coercive power, its resources are purchased with

money derived from taxation, and its activities are subject to the rule of law. Each of these features are highly compatible with the economic order, and at the same time rather potentially supportive of such order (Jessop, 1987, p. 75) by virtue of being capable of facilitating capital accumulation. The capitalist state from its very inception has been facilitating capitalist accumulation with the aid of gigantic structures of bureaucracy. While economic issues are generally influenced by non-economic factors and both national economies and nation-states are too varied, *'a theoretically informed account'* of the economic aspects of particular capitalist states has been certainly possible but *'a general economic theory of the capitalist state'* has been nearly impossible (Jessop, 1987, p. 77). The public agency of a capitalist state has been an actor- interventionist in the economy. As a public actor, it has taken upon itself the tasks of performing economic functions with the aid of bureaucracy - a vital organ of economic management and control.

A mature capitalist state evolved into a welfare state agency in late nineteenth century in Germany and early and middle twentieth century in America, Britain and Japan, with pervasive welfare actions associated with it. According to the political economy approach of Esping-Andersen (1990), there are three types of welfare state regimes (either Beveridgean or Bismarkean): liberal/neo-liberal, conservative corporatist, and social democratic. The liberal regime has a central role for the market exchange and a truncated role for the state action. The corporatist regime emphasizes the individual and family responsibilities, with a larger, yet relatively marginal, role for the state action. The social democratic regime chooses more generous, universalistic policies, with a central role for the state action and public policy. The social democratic welfare state was championed by T H Marshall, and Richard Titmuss, advocating that private as well as public agents are benevolent and altruist in human nature.

The coercive, secondary-rights bearing, welfare state is a complex entity, and any definition of it is but selective and strategic so far as its actions are concerned. Whatever be the definitional riddle, a modern welfare state institutionalizes the actions of benevolence and charity[89] in society.

[89] Benevolence is caring for others through extra-market redistribution. Universal redistribution is in the category of anonymous benevolence of welfare state, otherwise redistribution by welfare state

5.3. The Fluidity

Reason, rationality and agency are controversial categories. Unanimous agreement on the ontological status and meanings on these categories hardly exist in the literature. There are practical reasons and un-reasons in many situations of human life. There are instances of rationalities and irrationalities (and apathy and stupidities) of men and women in the practical world of happenings and events. There are agential successes, failures and deficits observed across the plethora of practical actions performed by human beings.

Recently, a moral philosopher, Phillipa Foot (1954; 1958) remarked that the idea of a reason for acting is sometimes difficult to understand. What is a reason for action is found to be frightfully difficult to answer (quoted in Cullity and Gaut, 1997; Searle, 2001, p. 97). In counter to such a thesis, a contarary opinion existed since long. Long time back, William Goodwin (1793) - an astute observer - put forth an important reminder in his "*Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*":

> *Men are capable, no doubt, of preferring an inferior interest of their own to a superior interest of others, but this preference arises from a combination of circumstances and is not the necessary and invariable law of our nature (Goodwin, 1793, Pp. 434-5).*

What if the very notion of rationality and human reason is considered fluid and not so settled? What if the universal idea of rational agency is category in flux and too gross an abstraction? Practical irrationality may invite more detailed explanations than theoretical irrationalities, because there is more to explain. No matter how efficient and expedient an action is if an action is dangerous and threatening to security, it is irrational from the standpoint of prudence. Some of the interest in practical reason comes from trying to understand its failures.

---

are mostly "named" benevolence – named persons with specific identities being the beneficiaries of benevolence. Named benevolence is an example of 'parameterized form of universalization'.

Rationality is often considered to be essentially oppressive, hegemonic, and culturally relative as well in the concrete world. Despite claims of universal validity of the postulate and standards of rationality across individuals and cultures, massive disagreements are found to be possible and inevitable because of existence of rationally acceptable but differing values and interests in society (Searle, 2001, p. xiv).

In the neoclassical framework, an individual is portrayed as a 'pleasure' machine and an economist studying the agency is told to be no more than a technician and a neutral commentator. It is of course too demanding and too restrictive; it is too demanding in the sense that individuals are required to perceive, evaluate and calculate with absolute precision and it is too restrictive in the sense that it limits attention to narrow self-interest as the sole motivator of individual action. There are failures of neoclassical rationality.

Moreover, the neoclassical rationality in either version of means-rationality, ends-rationality and belief rationality of individual - *homo economicus* (omniscient, calculative, self-interested egoist) - has been criticised for not allowing the justification of existence and the force of "rights" and "obligations" created under the "institutional rules" of the society. The neoclassical economic rationality cast in the utilitarian calculation of physical pain versus psychological satisfaction is a narrow rationality. In neoclassical economic framework, the notion of a rational economic man represents a selective pathological case, devoid of ethical dimensions of rational human behavior. Such a selective pathological case is not a representation of a healthy human.

It ought not be skirted away that there is a distinction between rational and reasonable. Rational is concerned with reason, desires and beliefs, self-interest and logic and purposes of men. Reasonable is concerned with rights, respect for person, virtue, impartiality, equality, morality and norms of action. Individuals cannot be expected to solve decision-making problems instantly and optimally. They have not the wits to maximize. The existence of bounded rationality and weaknesses of will points in the direction of failures of substantive rationality. What exists is the imperfect rationality of individuals in the society.

To reiterate, wisdom is also a standard of rationality. It is a higher standard of rationality than prudence. While including prudence, wisdom as a standard of rationality is broader and goes beyond it (just as efficiency includes expediency but goes beyond it). Something more than prudence of an agent, who is trying to maintain and develop personal well-being, is required in the notion of wisdom. Prudence is not rationality since there are contrasts between prudence and morality as argued by Derek Parfit (1986). In case of a *Prisoner's Dilemma*, there are psychological solutions related with changing ourselves as human. But, situations can be changed more easily than people. There are thus political solutions involving the government.

It is one extreme position to assert that man may be defined as the rational animal is an outdated philosophical fiction – a western prejudice. It seems that the concept of rationality[90] should be abandoned. There cannot be any longer a strong belief in the grand old thesis that human history is animated by 'reason'[91]. People are not perfectly rational but their behaviour is also not totally incoherent or random. Being neither omnipotent nor impotent, sometimes man effectively realise their goal. Being neither omniscient nor totally ignorant, men sometimes achieve a measure of knowledge. In other words, only some basic

---

[90] Peter Winch was a British Wittgensteinian philosopher who argued in 1958 that the very idea of social science was a deep error since the social studies are logically distinct from the natural sciences. There are different ways of attempting to understand reality and not all of them are of the same form or comparable with those of science. The appropriate conception of rationality as culture-free understanding is a philosophical fantasy since the standards of rationality in different societies do not coincide. A reaction is mounted on the traditional focus of moral theory on merely decision-procedures and strict action-guidance (Hamalainen, 2009, pp. 541-44). Elisabeth Anscombe (1981), Annette Baier (1985), Peter Winch (1972) and Barnard Williams (1981) have occasionally echoed it. Understanding is a matter of simply looking and seeing (Lukes, 2010, pp. 311-2).

[91] Derek Parfit (2011) has this to say about another utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick:

> *We can assess the strength of our reasons, Sidgwick seems to argue, from two points of view. When assessed from our personal point of view, self-interested reasons are supreme. When assessed from an impartial point of view, impartial reasons are supreme. To compare the strength of these two kinds of reasons, we would need some third, neutral point of view. Since there is no such point of view, self-interested and impartial reasons are incomparable ..... We should reject Sidgwick's argument. We ought to assess the strength of all our reasons from our actual, personal point of view, and we do not need a neutral point of view ..... Though there are truths about the relative strengths of these two kinds of reason, Sidgwick's view is partly right, since these comparisons are, even in principle, very imprecise (Parfit, 2011, p. 7).*

assumptions about rationality may constitute a privileged but fallible heuristic (Livingston, 1991, pp. 1-5).

While this extreme position is a bit untenable, it i ought to be accommodative enough to accept at least three genres of failures in human capacity. Michael Smith (2003) has described it convincingly. It is the failure of first capacity that an agent acts recklessly and *'consequently makes unreasonable judgement about what is right.* Agent qualifies as mentally incompetent. Due to failure of second capacity, an agent succumbs to weakness of will and thus *'forms the intention to do something contrary to her better judgement'.* An agent lacking the second capacity might be subjected to an overriding compulsion. Changes in temporal perspectives are *'a pervasive feature of human life,* and if we were subject to changes of behavioural orientation every time our current reasons changed, we would be crippled from achieving our longer term goals. It is the resolve that prevents this from happening. Similarly, life often involves cases of rationally underdetermined choice, and resolve is crucial in getting us through such situations without endless reconsideration and dithering. The tendency '*to resist reconsidering in these cases is essential to practical rationality in creatures like us'* (Cohen and Handfield, 2010, pp. 908-29).

Joan Robinson (1962) remarked that there was a time when *'things that used to be taken for granted'.* This is not any more. We have grown self-conscious about those things and the modern life has become uncomfortable and *began remaining in an impenetrable fog.* We have begun to ask: *'Why do I believe what I believe?' 'Why do I believe what I believe about what it is that makes me believe it?'* Freud exposed to us *'our propensity to rationalization'.* Marx showed *'how our ideas spring from ideologies'. The solution is: 'We must go round about to find the roots of our own beliefs'* (Robinson, 1962, p.1).

In a move to provide justification, a prominent economist, Joan Robinson (1962) remarked that all the philosophical systems of ethics are *'attempts to give a rational account of ethical feelings' – 'not of the fact that we have such feelings, but of what code of behavior is based upon them'.* It is not the task of the economists to tell us '*what to do*'; their business is to show *'why what we are doing anyway is in accord with proper principles'.*

The problem is that *'metaphysical propositions, without any logical content',* can yet be a powerful influence on *'thought and action'* (Robinson, 1962, pp. 11-21).

Frederick Hayek (1967) claims that there has been a long established philosophical tradition in which 'reason' had meant the 'capacity to recognize the truth', especially moral truth. This was the medieval tradition of evolutionary rationalism. This is only a recent tradition is one in line with Cartesian constructivism in which reason has meant a capacity of deductive reasoning from explicit premises (Hayek, 1967, p.84). An '*internalist*' philosophical paradigm view is that although reason is itself inert, yet a person must be moved by her acknowledged reasons because they relate to what is not practically inert – to her desires, wants, inclinations and interests (Gauthier, 1987). A reason is a fact that specifies means to the satisfaction of the agent's extra-rational concerns, according to the instrumentalist view.

Recently, Derek Parfit (2011) has advanced a specific conception of 'reason' and defended it: A person is rational insofar as he responds well to reasons or apparent reasons. Given the truth of beliefs, the desires and acts of a person are rational when he *'would have sufficient reasons to have these desires, and to act in these ways'.* If a person wants '*some event as an end',* but the intrinsic features of the event give him strong decisive reasons *'to want this event not to occur',* his *'wanting this event is contrary to reason, and irrational'* (Parfit, 2011, pp. 3-6).

According to Searle (2001), desires and beliefs themselves are not in general intentional, though in a few oddball cases they can be. Desires have two special features that make it impossible to have a formal logic of practical reason parallel to our supposed formal logic of theoretical reason: the '*necessity of inconsistency'* and the '*non-detachability of desires'*. Any rational being in real life is bound to have inconsistent desires and other sorts of motivators. A consistent set of premises may generate inconsistent secondary desires as conclusions. This is not a paradoxical feature of reasoning from beliefs and desires. Moreover, sets of beliefs and desires as premise do not necessarily commit the agent to having a corresponding desire as conclusion even in cases where the propositional contents of the premises entail the propositional content of the conclusion. Libertarianism is the

thesis of free will. It states that *'some actions, at least, are such that the antecedent causal conditions of the action are not causally sufficient to produce the action'.* Even if an action has occurred for a reason, there is always the possibility that given the same causal antecedents of the action, the acting *'agent could have done something else' (Searle, 2001, p. 277).*

There are possibilities of violations of rationality occurring at each link in the explanatory chain: *'in the action itself, in the formation of beliefs and desires, and in the accumulation of evidence'.* The *'weakness of will'* is a widespread form of irrationality at the level of action. Another is a phenomenon much studied in recent years – the *'non-expected utility'.* Another example of irrational action is *'a form of magical behaviour that has been called 'everyday Calvinism', after the paradox of predestination'.* Finally there are self-defeating forms of rational action. The states of spontaneity, forgetfulness, and sleep are such that *'an attempt to bring them about through instrumental action is likely to interfere with the goal itself'* (Elster, 1986, p.20).

There are many theories about what we have reason to do. Divergent theories about rationality tell us that we should try to act rationally. This should be our formal aim. Whatever be the theory, a theory can not apply to a single individual. For example, if it is rational for me to act prudently, it must be rational for everyone to do so (Parfit, 1986). Any successful theory must be successful at the collective level. Prudential reasons are prudentially supreme, and moral reasons are of course morally supreme. Morality conflicts with self-interest and some of these theories about what we have reason to do are, in certain cases, directly self-defeating.

A theoretical problem remains, however. Rationality and prudence has been declared analogous since long time. We all want to be rational. People generally behave rationally. There are strong a priori grounds for assuming it. Communication, discussion and exchange rest on the tacit premise that *'each interlocutor believes in the rationality of the others'.* In our dealings with other people, we are compelled to treat them as rational. People take no pride in *'occasional or frequent irrationality'* (Elster, 1986, p. 27).

Prudence is challenged from two directions: challenge of moral theories and the deliberative theory. The challenge need not come from the instrumentalist theory that '*appeals to the agent's aims at the time of acting*' and discusses only means, taking the agent's aim as given. The deliberative theory is time-relative, but not purely instrumental. It does '*not appeal to the agent's actual aims at the time of acting'*; rather, it appeals to the aims '*a person would have, if he/she knew the facts and was thinking clearly'.* There are different theories about rationality, and all asserts that *'we should try to act rationally'*[92]. This is '*our formal aim'.* The aims we have can mean *'substantive aims'* as well. There are moral theories in the same way, according to which *'we should try to act morally'.* A number of moral theories give us *'different substantive aims' (*Parfit, 1986, pp. 47-8).

To put the matter into a perspective, it is now well accepted viewpoint that an individual human agent is not an atom of physical world. An atom in physics is different from an individual in economics. In physics, it is not believed that atoms do attach subjective meaning to their experience. It is not believed that atoms do communicate it to other atoms and are guided in their actions by what they expect other atoms to do. There is thus no need for the physicist to care about *'the mental life of the atom'.* The physicist does not advise his atoms as to *'what values it would be best for the variables in the model to take and how to achieve their purposes better'.* When prediction fails, it is *'never because the atoms have behaved foolishly or, alternatively, have learned to outwit him'* (Hollis, 1984, p.25).

Human beings as human atoms are but different in all these respects with a material atom of the universe, and thus, it is difficult to agree with john Hicks that all these are merely good games. There is much of economic theory which is pursued for *'intellectual attraction'.* We have no reason to be ashamed of that *'it is a good game'.* It holds for *'many branches of pure mathematics'* as well (Hicks, 1979, p. viii).

---

[92] The challenge is to meet radical views on rationality and justice. Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) claimed that liberalism as cosmopolitanism prescribing universal standards of rationality and justice is bankrupt in front of the traditions of Aristotle, Augustine and Scottish philosophers. MacIntyre's idea on justice is one of emphasizing many traditions in addition to that of liberalism. All these traditions mean a sort of pluralist conception of justice, and thus undermine any claim to single universal standard of either rationality or justice. MacIntyre's book [Whose justice? Which Rationality?], is primarily *'an essay in the history of ideas'.* In MacIntyre's view, liberalism is not only the upshot of the Enlightenment but also the *'embodied social order of modern international culture'* (MacIntyre, 1988).

It is also argued that the apparent existence of altruism gas been seen by many as a string challenge to the neoclassical form of ends-rationality. A tension exists between rationality and ethics. It has been argued to incorporate altruism into rational egoism so as build up a more indirect, strategic and evolutionary appeal to self-interest. The problem is that the recognition of motivations other than own utility breaks the link between preference and behaviour so that it can no longer be argued that action reveals preference.

A rational individual is 'naturally' assumed to seek to exchange in order to augment their satisfaction in consumption and their resource base, if markets are competitive. In such markets, there is unconstrained freedom to pursue self-interest[93]. Markets function to bring about a result in which all trading partners are satisfied, *'in so far as each is able to 'maximize utility' subject to income, and technical constraints'.* When such a situation is arrived at, the market is said to be in *'equilibrium'* and each individual is said to be in *'equilibrium'* (Amaraglio etal. , 1991, p. 67). There is a sort of belief in the eternality and universality of rational intentions and scarcity – the basis of eulogising the institution of market[94].

---

[93] An economic man is a rational man, who is assumed to be consistent in economic activities of consumption, investment, production and other acts in the economy.

> *The term "behavioural science" was coined quite deliberately in the early 1950s to avoid the identification of the "social" sciences with socialism in the minds of the backwoods congressmen. Its slightly dubious origins are reflected in the vagueness of the word "behavioural" ……. Even though psychology has been the behavioural science pr excellence, economics has important contributions to make in this area ……. To the economist behaviour is "maximizing behaviour" ……. In its most general sense the theory of maximizing behaviour is a tautology …… Somebody at the Center for Advanced Study of Behavioural Sciences suggested, in a jesting mood, that economics is the study of the no-person group, being the study of the movements of commodities and prices in the absence of people ……. What all this involves is not a case against abstraction, which is essential, but a warning against mistaking abstraction for reality. We would be foolish to try to go for a walk across a map, but a map may be very helpful if we are going for a real walk (Boulding, 1970, pp. 53- 75).*

[94] The neoclassical economic theory of capitalist market in combination with the rigorous theorems of economic exchange built around the widely accepted postulates of need-scarcity view of price is a simple analytical and mathematised story today. It is in this setting that efficiency in exchange activity is to be achieved.

> *In both physics and economics and for that matter evolutionary biology, the object of theory is to explain changes: displacement, or motion in physics, diversification and*

Such an abstract universal formulation is required to be supplemented with the observation that the cognitive capacity and intelligence of humans may be just different (and not inferior or superior) from those of nonhuman animals. The mental capacity may differ in degrees across all humans themselves. Humans do have complex and rich interests that stem from their complex and rich mental life. There are truths of differing unlucky genetic inheritance and early childhood socialization experiences within human species. A favourable genetic inheritance and favourable socialization experience do bestow more of the capacity of a person on some humans. Cognitive capacities do differ across species as well as across individuals within specie. It is thus unsatisfactory to posit the equal moral worth of human persons until a principled way is found out to determine the moral status of human individuals that does not rely merely on species membership but is instead responsive to traits of the very individual whose status we are considering.

The most unrealistic feature of the so-called *'economic man'* is not his materialism (or selfishness). His most fatal limitation is *'his omniscience'*. In this respect, the so-called '*crises in economic theory*' may mark both *'a progress of ignorance or of the realization of the real state of knowledge'* (Hutchison, 1984, pp. 2-3). The conception of economic agent has a strong individualistic and legalistic connotation; better terminology is the 'actor'. Actor expresses the idea of an embodied and embedded action and the idea that economic behavior implies inter-acting with others in the social realm. The idea of human 'actor' is to be preferred over notion of human 'agent.

Individual rationality which is premised on consideration of the facts and situations that have a direct bearing on pursuance of the individualised goals originating from and informed by the desires and beliefs situated in self-love and self-interest ought to be wider enough to accommodate the scope for negotiation, bargaining and contract so as to lead to

---

> *evolution in biology, exchange of commodities in economics …… general equilibrium shows that a constant total quantity of goods is exchanged in trade in such a way as more nearly to satisfy a set of constant preference functions, and that once the trade s are made , in the absence of interfering forces, nothing more of economic interest will happen …… when it comes to explaining change there are few more appealing stratagems than reducing change to stasis …… the trouble is that the appeal to equilibrium is not well-founded in economic data the way it is in evolutionary or mechanical dynamics (Rosenberg, 2001, pp. 178-80).*

the concern for the other-regarding interests and adherence to the impartial principles of justice in society. The practical rational disposition on the part of an individual belonging to a producing household in a community requires an acceptance of a reasoned base of arguments, which are thoroughly scrutinised on the maxim of inter-positional invariance in opinions, on the one hand, and therefore, an acceptance of the desirability of instituting an arrangement conducive to a fair process of the distribution of benefits and sacrifices being shared equally by all in the social setup. As a compromise, it should be merely an operating assumption that at least sometimes it is possible to understand and explain people's behaviour in terms of reasons – the beliefs, desires and intentions that guide their activities. It does not embrace individual or collective reality.

A resolution is required since the abstract and transcendental nature of the standard notions of reasons, postulate of rationality, ideas of rational agency, intentional purposive action and normative standard of appraisal of such human action are all so foundationally related to conceptualisation of equity, fairness and justice. The fluidity is to be resolved. The private individual rationality leading to morality of impartiality, fairness and justice is the first principle. It is required to defend the argument regarding object-given and value-directed ends-rationality on the part of individual persons and public agency leading to choice of equality and fairness. It is not only operationally feasible but also morally desirable.

Alas! The economic theory cherishes its belief in value-neutrality. There is only one human value accepted: the value of freedom - free choice, free exchange and the idea of the free individual. The classical economics from Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill until the time of John Maynard Keynes presumed the social and moral embeddedness of economic behavior. Present-day economics however considers the disciplines of '*ethics, politics, or psychology*' as '*normative*', and therefore, disregard these as value-ridden disciplines (Staveren, 2001, pp. 202-4). Rational agency failure is not only apathy and passion but also disregard to human value.

Alan P Hamlin (1986; 1993) has the view that the neoclassical theory of rationality *'denies the possibility of any individualistic concept of duty or obligation' - 'denies the Hohfeldian*

relationship between rights and obligations'. It can accept *'no duty or obligation upon the individual to respect the law qua law'.* Free-riding of this sort is a common companion of the neoclassical theory of rationality. Obedience to the law is *'wholly contingent upon the calculation of self-interest'.* The law per se will have no direct influence on individual decision-making. Norms confirm with individually rational behaviour. Laws, by contrast, appear *'to operate in tension with individually rational behaviour'* (Hamlin, 1986: Hamlin, 1993).

The individual human person and the human rational agency may fail both individually as well as interactively in the free and autonomous interactive setting of the civil society. Theoretical reason may prove to be going in the frightfully faulty direction; weakness of the will may pervade to shatter the demands of practical reason; actions may suffer from perversity of morality; the exchange mechanism of markets may witness failures; the civil society devoid of fraternity, solidarity and cohesiveness may falter and collapse. In such extreme and moderate situations, the rationale of a state and government as seat of monopoly of coercive power and an institution delivering justice and welfare may be espoused and has been advocated in history on the basis of beliefs in pure public altruist reason and possibility of enlightened public action.

Given the impersonal intrinsic goodness of something such as happiness, the happiness of another has as much impersonal value as my own. Action in accordance with the claims of rational self-interest cannot consist in attempting to attain my own good regardless of the effect my action has on the good of others. Instead, it can consist only in my seeking my own good in ways compatible with the attainment of the good of those affected by my action. There are two views of rational self-interest: either a *'rational economic activity consists in acting compatibly with the maximization of one's profit'* or a *'rational activity in a game situation consists in making those moves which most probably will enable one to win the game'.* Accepting either of the two views seem to be strange to some philosophers. It is not that in other areas of life practical rationality consists simply in *'acting compatibly with the promotion of one's own good regardless of the effect one's action has on the good of others'.* Practical rationality in a real sense consists in *'action in accordance with the requirements of the moral law'* (Lemos, 1986, p. 40).

A person seeks his own good, his own rational self-interest in ways compatible with the attainment of the goods of those affected by his action. A person contributes to the attainment of a greater good rather than a lesser by sacrificing part or all of his own good for the sake of a greater good. It is this feature of human person and agency that allows this entity to be treated as one endowed with the capacity to have reasons and act according to the postulate of rationality. A human agency often reveals the expressive and extended rationality. Practical reasons of such agency are often the moral reasons behind actions.

To conclude, it is worth arguing that the equality of opportunity is basic to economic democracy. There must be no monopolistic and monopsonistic restriction. Taxes must not interfere too much with the "correct" prices and thus with the efficiency of the economy. There should be no depression or inflation. A democracy must maintain the dignity of every individual, including that of the worker. An authoritarian rationing technique of distribution of the goods would produce *'an inferior distribution of goods'* – a disregard of each person's preference (Lerner, 1961, pp. 59- 66). These are all possible, provided we allow a broad conception of rationality of private and public agency in action.

Rationality and reasonableness are essential ingredients and properties of rhetorical competence. A rational and reasonable person is a democratic person, having the attitude and ability of discussion in communicative interaction, and therefore, a rational, reasonable and democratic person has rhetorical competence – an art based on the 'logic of good reasons'. Rhetorical competence requires not only rational arts but also the art of invention, composition, presentation and criticism of rhetorical messages and interaction.

Rationality, reasonability and rhetorical competence in the setting of human interaction and communication require knowledge of, ability in and willingness to employ "the logic of good reasons". Reasons lead to reasonableness to rationality, in turn leading to rhetorical competence to logic of good reasons. How can there be rational decision making in a world where everything that occurs happens as a result of brute, blind, natural causal forces? How can it be the case that we perform free actions, given that every event has a cause, and causal determination makes free action impossible? There is existence of universal standards of rationality. There are perfectly rational agents with endowment of perfect

information available to them. Rational disagreements are nonetheless pervasive in this world.

Aristotle attempted to lay down the foundations of a plausible practical syllogism, and others tried to develop one further but still there is more to explain beyond syllogism. While interpreting Aristotelian practical reason and his view about the relation of thought to action, Thornton (1982) argues that reasons for acting need not contain the logical structure of practical reasoning since an action aims simply at what is good in some way. In theoretical reasoning we arrive at a theoretical conclusion and we affirm it as true. In practical reasoning we arrive at practical conclusion and we do it as good. Being concerned with praxis done for its own sake and in accordance with a principle, the emphasis here is on rule/case syllogism (the rules are ends and all ends are not universal).

The chapter is divided into three sections. First section deals with the things which are valued – the 'axiotima'. The prevalent and popular axiotima are the 'resource', 'commodity' and 'income'. since the possession and control of these are considered to be valuable in human life and contribute to some sense of individual and aggregate welfare in the society. The debate on the fundamental needs and prescription of basic income is reviewed.

The second section outlines the features of an alternative axiotima - capacity and capability of human agency to produce and realise the economic surplus. In recent writings in political and moral philosophy, it is the human capacity that is prioritized. It is prioritized over the material goods, services and resources. The real axiotima is the surplus-producing capacity of individual worker-owner-operator-producer in the countryside.

In the third section, the equalisandum is discussed. The equal distribution human reproductive capacity ought to be treated morally valuable and politically desirable. In an egalitarian scheme of arrangement of human society, the thing to be equalized – equalisandum – ought to be the human capacity.

A final write-up as a theme is added at the last.

In the moral-theoretic framework of the political agenda of agrarianism that is oriented towards the doctrine of advocacy of minimization of injustices and promotion of transitional distributive justice through prescription of hybrid system of goal-right morality of justification and recommendation of framework of governance in private-public participation mode as one genre of human actions, it is a matter of concrete material significance that the broad and comprehensive rationality of howsoever imperfect human agency does motivate human actions that are concerned with a floor-level benchmark human productive capacity as the 'good' to be promoted and the 'right' to be exercised and restored.

Among things and properties of things that facilitate the human lives to go well, the most valued concrete thing ought to be the human productive capacity and capability. In the science of axiology, this valued thing is called the 'axiotima'. It is the material-productive capacity of human agents rather than the command over and rights to the ownership and control over the material goods and services (including money, income and property), which are of ultimate value to and which is the fundamental claim of the human actors in the society. The agrarian egalitarian distributive justice in the framework of hybrid moral goal-right system of action and appraisal of human actions ought to accommodate the rights to surplus producing capacity of individuals in the society.

It is the human capacity to produce (rather than the command over commodities, resources and income) that is of vital value in both senses of being the good and the right. The productive human capacity is the competence of human labour to produce materially useful goods over and above subsistence requirements of essential consumption - an economic surplus. The surplus producing capacity of a peasant actor in the countryside is to be accorded the status of an overriding goal (the 'good') and a fundamental claim (the 'right') in a constitutional democratic welfare society. The surplus producing and reproducing capacity of a human agency ought to be considered the highest goods to be attained – a teleological goal of life that is instrumental in achieving many other capacities and function set.

Recent literature in political philosophy, economics and ethics has emphasized that the most valued goal of human life is simply to acquire the capability to function with an advantage in the society. Rationality is only one aspect of human being – *'a political animal'* as highlighted by Aristotle and a creature *'in need of a plurality of life-activities'* as emphasized by Karl Marx (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 155-9). What is valuable in human life is the ability to perform action and attain the essential objectives and goals of life in the long run.

A human being does value the resources that are means to obtain useful and worthy commodities and income. The earnings and income facilitate obtaining and exchanging resources and commodities, and such resources and commodities are to be used to obtain, maintain and enhance human capability. What matters is the human capacity and capability to be or become something in life and/or to act or do something valuable and useful. In treating the human capability as the most valued thing, the focus is neither on the resources of the nature and commodities of the market nor on money income; the focus is rather on human being themselves. It is an account of '*minimum core social entitlements',* and thus, it is compatible with different views about how to handle issues of justice and distribution (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 74-5). Capability may be treated as *'a substance intermediate between incomes and other "primary goods", on the one hand, and "welfare" or happiness, on the other hand'* – what G. Cohen (1986, 1989) called the "midfare" level.

In political philosophy and ethics, a sense of absolute and perfect justice is considered inconceivable without the notion and concept of liberty (positive and negative) and freedom (means, aim, act, process and opportunity) of each individual. Justice is also considered unimaginable without equal respect, treatment and liberty among individual persons and **equality/equity** in distribution of something valued in society. Equality and equity is an integral part of justice conception.

Under contemporaneous democratic framework of society, there is threefold norm of equality: equal citizenship, equality under the law, and equality of opportunity. Egalitarian theories of distributive justice hold that justice requires an economic distribution among persons that makes them equal in their life prospects or conditions of life. In the discourse

on the egalitarian normative framework of analysis, there has therefore been a requirement of accommodation of the positive analysis of a substance that is to be equalized in matter of its distribution among the population. A rational agency that is productive and involved in action of production and responds to reason of action ought to be motivated in bringing about equality in surplus producing capacity amongst all.

What is that thing that renders all humans morally equal? With regard to which entity should there be attempt at equalization? Different theories assign different roles to the notions of the goods, rights, needs, and deserts[95]**.** The human capacity as the most valued thing ought to be considered the equalisandum in a schema of orchestration and institutionalization of agrarian distributive transitional justice in the countryside. The axiotima ought to be the equalisandum since it allows the human life to go well[96].

John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Richard Arneson (1989) and G. A. Cohen (1989) believe in equalizing some kind of wherewithal that all people need to create meaningful and successful lives for themselves. Serge Christophe-Kolm (2005) informs that Amartya Sen (1985, 1993, 1999) and Martha Nussbaum (1986, 1992, 1995, 2000) have been at the forefront of advocating policies concerned with individuals' "capabilities" which permit their "functionings". The "opportunities" these political and moral philosophers advocate equalizing are much more encompassing than those equalized in the traditional "thin" conception of equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1996, pp. 1-9).

---

95 The credit goes to the egalitarian theories:

> *What the egalitarian theorists have successfully done, each in his different way, is to show us that unanimity in creating a constitution, if that is what we require, will only occur either among equals (Ackerman and Dworkin) or among people who if they are unequal don't know it (Rawls). In so doing they reveal the weakness of inegalitarianism as a philosophy, at least so long as we try to legitimize it by means of the choice criterion of value (Green, 1985, p. 979).*

96 The law and the public policies ought to correct the moral wrongs. Over-population, no medical access, illiteracy and famines are moral wrongs. Moral rights are to be without over-population, to be with medical access, to be with literacy and to be without famines and all such rights however create correlative imperfect duties of others. Imperfect duty is a duty not to ignore the important freedom of others with respect to something in deciding what to do, and other's freedom with respect to that thing is a consideration that must be added to all the other considerations, obligatory or not that one attends to in deciding what to do. Moral rights to have no famines, no illness, no illiteracy and no overpopulation do entail moral duties to avoid such moral wrongs, which are injustices according to Amartya Sen.

In our alternative formulation of the hybrid morality of the good and the right, it is the capacity and capability to produce an economic surplus in a social and economic ethos of equality of opportunity that ought to be the Axiotima. Our focus in the present work is narrow and limited to the Axiotima and equalisandum of human surplus productive capacity in the countryside. In the dualism between man and material, it is the human capacity to produce a material livelihood and nutritional surplus in the countryside that is more meaningful than the material entity of a surplus itself. A rational and moral human agency has a capacity for production of livelihood, and it is not merely a category for consideration in theoretical conception and reasoning about the good to be promoted but also a vital concrete capacity for real-life actions towards guaranteeing biological-nutritive-material survival as a matter of the right to be restored and maintained in the countryside.

6.1. Axiotima and Equalisandum

What is that thing which is valued by human beings (and therefore, which is the axiotima)? This is a pertinent issue in distributive justice. The answer is: it is the human capability, and in particular, the productive capacity. Capability is different from having goods and their characteristics to which it is posterior; it is also distinguished from having utility or satisfaction or desire-fulfillment to which it is prior. Human capabilities are the alternative combinations of functioning a person is feasibly able to achieve. The core focus of capability approach is what individuals are able to do or to become.

A human capability is a characteristic of individual advantage in terms of "opportunity freedom" to realize a "comprehensive outcome" of an action. While the combination of a person's functioning represents their actual achievements, their capability set represents their opportunity freedom (Sen, 2009). A human capability is a broader conception of a human capacity (that is, a set of functionings). A person's chosen combination of functionings – actual achievements - is just a part of the overall capability set (all opportunity-freedoms). The opportunity to enhance human capacity is much more significant opportunity.

According to Amartya Sen (2009), the paradigm of conceptualising human action ought to be not only consequence-sensitive but also agency-sensitive. Individuals ought to bear the responsibility for what (s)he is doing, acting and choosing. In judging the actions of a person towards achievement of goals and fulfilling of interests, a plural focus is necessary. The work of Amartya Sen (1984) in welfare economics argued for *'a rights-based moral approach'*, and such an approach was *'opposed to a utility-based approach'* and *'sharply demarcated from Nozick's 'consequence-insensitive' conservatism'.* It put forward *'an alternative characterization of positive freedom in terms of 'capabilities' (a concept that has an affinity with the Marxist notion of 'man realizing his potential')'* (Patnaik, 1998, p. 2856).

In the international literature on 'development indicators', the concerns for the 'basic needs' fulfilment, 'quality of life' index, and 'levels of living' calculations, longevity and literacy in particular occupies prominent attention. These two are examples of some of the human functionings. In such literature, the informational bases of these studies have been *'non-market non-questionnaire observations of the states of persons and their living conditions;* (Sen, 1987, pp. 29-30). A theory of justice is a substantive theory of ethics and political philosophy, and it should *'choose an informational focus'* – choice of some features of the world to concentrate on in matter of '*judging a society and in assessing justice and injustice'* (Sen, 2009, pp. 231-4). The capability of a person is a set of functioning vectors of a person of which only one he or she may choose. Both capability and advantage are freedom-type notions. The capability approach helps in evaluation of action and states of affairs.

Amartya Sen (1987, 1999, 2002, 2009) and Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) have propounded and advocated the capability approach in economics and philosophy respectively. Amartya Sen bases the case for capabilities on individual's varying needs for resources, and also on their varying abilities to convert resources into functionings. Martha Nussbaum has used this approach to argue that the capabilities are the central human entitlements in terms of which the basic social justice is to be defined. According to Nussbaum (2006), the best approach to the idea of a basic social minimum is provided by

'an approach that focuses on human capabilities'. The capabilities can become *'the object of an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good'.*

A human capability is a reflection of the freedoms to achieve valuable human functioning, for example, being healthy, being educated, and having income. The functional capabilities are the substantive freedoms that a human agency and a person have reason to value, and this is in lieu of the utility of goods (utilitarianism) or access to material resources (opulence-centered approach). In the capability approach, the focus is *on human life, and not just on some detached objects of convenience, such as incomes or commodities'.* Individual advantage in terms of opportunities is judged by *'a person's capability to do things he or she has reason to value'.* The concept of capability is linked closely with the opportunity aspect of freedom - *'comprehensive'* opportunities (and not just *'culmination'* opportunities) (Sen, 2009, p. 231).

The capability approach does not subscribe to methodological individualism, and it does not rank or assign weights to various functionings in some fixed list of relevant capabilities. It is accepted that the individual human beings with their various plural identities, multiple affiliations and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of societal interactions. A good human life and 'physical' wellbeing are nonetheless important central human capabilities of individuals in the perspective of works by Martha Nussbaum (2006). The capabilities are just not *'instrumental to a life with human dignity'.* They are principally *'ways of realizing a life with human dignity'.* Human dignity is not defined *'prior to and independently of the capabilities'.* It is *'actually intertwined with them and their definition'.*

Given his or her functionings, the freedom a person has in availing opportunities is his or her advantage. The advantage can be seen to be referring to the opportunities a person has, of which only one will be chosen. The examples of advantage are the real income, standard of living, level of freedom, etc. Capability is linked with the ideas of freedom in general and agency freedom in particular, and thus *'a notion of human advantage' – 'an effective power that a person has'.* Capability is also *'a central concern in understanding our*

obligation' (Sen, 2009, p. 271). Incomes or commodities are *'the means of satisfactory human living'* but these are *'not themselves the ends of good living'.*

While in the framework of Sen (1987, 2002), important capabilities are the capabilities in health, education and income, Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) has framed a list of ten central human capabilities, that is, real opportunities based on personal and social circumstances. These are: life (not dying prematurely and being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length), bodily health (adequate nourishment, being able to have good health and adequate shelter), bodily integrity (being able to move freely, secure against violent assault, having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and choice in matter of reproduction), senses, imagination and thought (being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain), emotions (being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves), practical reason (being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life), affiliation (being able to engage in forms of social interaction and having the social bases of respect and non-humiliation), other species (being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature), play (being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities), and control over one's environment (being able to participate effectively in political choices that governs one's life and being able to hold property, seek employment and pursue material benefits).

In the framework of conceptualization of Sen, there are five components in assessing capability: the importance of real freedom in the assessment of a person's advantage, individual differences in the ability to transform resources into valuable activities, multi-variate nature of activities giving rise to happiness, a balance of materialistic and non-materialistic factors in evaluating human welfare, and a concern for the distribution of opportunities within society.

A set of commodity vectors that a person can command is the entitlement; it is determined by the ownership vectors and exchange entitlement mapping in a market economy. The ownership vector can be enhanced through increase in resources and asset redistribution (i.e. capital accumulation and land reforms respectively). The exchange entitlement

mapping may equally be improved through guarantee of a better term of trade for poor persons, surety of employment of labor at a living wage and provision of social security protection (Sen, 1980, p. 78).

Given entitlement, the achievement of a person in terms of success of what he or she manages in doing or becoming is his or her functionings. The functionings are features of the state of existence of a person; it is not at all detached objects that the person happens to produce and own. A functioning is an achievement of a person in terms of what he or she manages and succeeds in doing or being with the commodities and their characteristics at his or her command. The freedom to live long, being free from malaria and not being ashamed to appear in public are some examples of capabilities and functionings.

Martha Nussbaum (2006) opines that the capabilities approach is not a comprehensive moral doctrine. It is a political doctrine about basic entitlements - a set of fundamental entitlements of all citizens that are *'implicit in the very notion of human dignity and a life that is worthy of human dignity'.* The capabilities approach uses *'an account of cooperation that treats justice and inclusiveness as ends of intrinsic value from the very beginning'.* The approach views *'human beings as held together by many altruistic ties as well as by ties of mutual advantage'.* The central capabilities are *'political liberties, freedom of association, the free choice of occupation, and a variety of economic and social rights'.* The capabilities cover the terrain occupied by both *'the so-called first-generation rights (political and civil liberties) and the so-called second-generation rights (economic and social rights)'.* The relevant entitlements are *'pre-political, not merely artefacts of laws and institutions'* (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 284-5).

All citizens must have entitlements based in justice to all the capabilities, up to an appropriate threshold level, according to Nussbaum. Though the capabilities approach is *'not intended to provide a complete account of social justice',* the basic intuitive idea of the capabilities approach is *'that of "truly human functioning", in the sense described by Marx in his 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'.*

Nussbaum's idea of capability is related with Aristotelian writings on the nature of *"the good life".* In line with the studies of "basic needs", Martha Nussbaum is satisfied with minimal "thresholds" of capabilities. Since higher capabilities of an individual extend the possible domain of choice and action, and hence, the freedom (a functioning for providing happiness – a specific good only), Amartya Sen however insists on '*the equality of individuals' capabilities'* (Kolm, 2005, p. 451). The idea behind focusing on the capability is to highlight the fact that the human have individual advantages and adversities – the vulnerabilities of men. In the duality of matter versus man, not only are there scarcity of materials, there are vulnerability of men. Men are vulnerable to selfishness, greed, sadism, masochism, fascism, genocide.

What is distinctive about the capability approach is that such an approach does not *'separate the right and the good in the Kantian way but, rather, operate with a richer and moralized account of the good'.* The right and the good seem thoroughly intertwined. The architectonic capabilities of sociability and practical reason play a guiding role throughout life as indices, where life is constituted by *'having the capabilities on the list'.* An idea of dignity is essential in the account of the good itself and the right (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 162-3).

To continue the argument of Martha Nussbaum (2006), there is *'dignity of the human beings as an ethical being'.* There is fact of *'human sociability',* and there are the *'multiple facts of human need'.* There is a political conception of the human beings as *'a being capable of ethical reasoning, and also a being who wants and needs to live with others'.* A central part of our own good is to produce, and live in, a world that is morally decent - *'a world in which all human beings have what they need to live a life worthy of human dignity'.* It is not always true that cooperating with others on fair terms is advantageous to all. In capability approach, a theory of the good is *'an account of basic human entitlements'* and the idea of sociability and the idea of the human being as a being with *'rich human need'* are included in it. The dignity of the human being is *'the dignity of a needy enmattered being'* (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 273-8). Giving all human beings the basic opportunities is required. Both legislative and judicial action is required.

Capacity

Capability is a broad conception while human productive capacity is a narrow one[97]. A human being has certain natural capacity, and this falls under two categories: eudemonistic capacity and productive capacity. A hedonistic capacity, also called eudemonistic capacity, is a propensity to derive satisfaction or happiness from a given situation or consumption of goods and services. It also includes the capacities to stand, suffer and endure, appreciate and enjoy, and like and dislike. These capacities can mobilize characteristics of various natures, including properties of the senses and epistemic capacities – capacities for knowing.

These capacities are represented by the classical philosophical and economic concept of a "utility" function, when the corresponding "utility" is taken as having the tangible psychological meaning of some level of happiness or satisfaction. All these may be clubbed under "consumptive capacity". There is a consensus for full self-ownership of eudemonistic capacities, for the endorsement of their "natural" allocation in society. The reason is found in the interrelated notions of privacy and the concept of the 'self'.

According to Serge-Christophe Kolm (2005), the eudemonistic capacities are *'basically capacities to feel and experience emotions'.* Such capacities are used *'to evaluate or discriminate',* and rest in part on habit, experience, and culture. The outcome of eudemonistic capacities is the *'happiness, satisfaction, pleasure, joy, sorrow, pain, anxiety',* and these are experienced by the capacity holder.

What is significant from the point of view of agrarian distributive justice is however the productive capacity of human agency. Productive capacity of a human individual is

[97] The capability approach uses a different political conception of the person; it is of course different from the political conception of the person in writings of Emmmanual Kant. Such capabilities are radically non-fungible. The social contract tradition does not require extensive benevolence. It derives political principles from the idea of mutual advantage. But, stability of society is contingent upon public cultivation of sentiments. The capabilities approach demands a great deal more from human beings, for example, the extension of benevolence - a conceptions of what people owe to self and others (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 408-13).

contrasted with eudemonistic capacity. A number of physical and mental capacities such as various skills, strength, stamina, intelligence, memory, relational abilities are used in production activity. A productive capacity permits transforming human labour into output of goods and services – say, into income or consumption one can buy with it – and equivalently, it also permits obtaining leisure for each amount of forgone earned income. A productive capacity is the capacity that can be used for production, notably for earning a wage income and for production for sale; production of products directly consumed is classically added. It is represented in mainstream economics by a production function where productivity of human labour is measured by the addition in output by a unit of physical and mental labour consummated and exhausted. Productive capacities are constituted of *'the capacities to act, relate, or even to know (cognitive capacities)'* (Kolm, 2005).

Being endowed with a set of 'good' (useful, valuable, desirable) human functioning and 'right' (correct, entitled, empowered) human functioning – a capacity, to be able to do or be something, is however not an instantaneous and unique phenomenon. While fertile libidinal competence of a human in association with opposite-gender humans (in addition to ability of human mind and body) is needed to be able to perform the actions related with biological procreation, the limbs-using skill-learning competence of a human being in association with the nature (in addition to ability of human mind and body) is needed to be able to do actions required for production of material food and beverage, and both competences are by their very nature acquired by a human agency over a definite period of concrete historical time.

It is a common sense observation that a human capacity as a set of functioning is acquired over the course of a life cycle, and it is to be endured over a long concrete historic time so as to be able to function in taking care of the baby/child in matter of his/her nutrition, clothing, housing, education, health, security, general insurance, peace, entertainment and restful life, and be able to function in taking care of the food and beverages in matter of its consumption, distribution and provisioning, transportation, marketing, storage for future need-meeting, and final outlet. In short, acquisition, maintenance and growth of capacity requires definite period of concrete historical real-time. Such human capacities as these are translatable into human actions of biological procreation and material food and beverage

production always concludes in the outcome of generation of a human surplus and material surplus of goods and services. A continuation of human race and material subsistence affluence is contingent on maintenance and promotion of such capacities in human person and agency.

There are a number of things a human being attempts to acquire, possess and hold so as to be able to do and act upon something and to be able to become something, and all these lead to building and creation of human capacity. The human capacity can be improved through education, training and otherwise. An active human always attempts to improve certain capacities through training, education and otherwise. It is a crucial human capacity to be (or become) an able fertile parent of an impending child and to be (or become) a competent surplus-producer of potential food and beverages in the countryside. Crucial to fundamental and basic identity of human capacity is the competence to do the act of procreation (doing of the biological-libidinal-reproductive fertile act of producing child and babies) as well as the ability to perform the act of material production (doing of the seed-soil-water-based fertile act of producing foods and beverages).

The eudemonistic capacities are often '*more intimate, more private, or more constitutive of the individual'*. The benefit from eudemonistic capacities is direct and inalienable (although possibly compensatable). The benefit from productive skills is however indirect and mediated by society. The product of productive capacities can be *'alienated, transferred to others and used or consumed by them, and it normally is with the standard division of labour'.* An individual is generally not at all held responsible for the given productive capacities – *'productivity for given labour'.* The distinctive aspect of eudemonistic capacities is that individuals can *'more or less influence them by training (getting used to, losing a habit), by education and culture, or by reasoning'* (Kolm, 2005, pp. 104-6).

According to Serge-Christophe Kolm (2005), human capacities are *'means which provide freedom of choice of actions',* and it is therefore the fact that '*such capacities 'constitute what one is'.* Choosing capacities for oneself is choosing what a person is. Capacity has connection with choice such that people are *'freer if they can choose not only what they do*

but also what they can do in choosing what they are'. Such a possibility of this choice *'constitute a liberty'* – a liberty that is logically prior to but deeper than that of choosing one's actions with given capacities. The deepest liberty is the realm of mental freedom. The availability of the means of formation *'enhances these particular freedoms'*, and this is largely consisting of general means (income) (Kolm, 2005. P. 450).

The material-productive capacities are preconditions of human survival and continuation of human race at the most basic and primary level of existence on this earth. Such capacity-building and capacity-creation in human person and agency ought to be the goal of a decent life and also the right to be protected by the supreme assembly of humans called the state and its executive body called the government. A goal-right system of principles and actions involved in needs-meeting that is conducive to capacity-creation may be justified on grounds of failures of principal institutions in the society. There are arguments emphasizing the situations in many societies whereby public goods (non-excludable and non-rival) exist, market (exchange mechanism mediated through the parametric role of demand-supply-determined-prices) fails, citizenship fails, and in such cases the values of autonomy and responsibility may not be so urgent as the principle of needs-meeting for the sake of creation, maintenance and growth of dual biological-procreative and material-productive capacities of human agency.

The Good and the Right to Productive (Surplus) Capacity

In the framework of hybrid morality that justifies a system of plural and mixed actions undertaken by less-than-perfect-rational but reasonable private and public agency of the government in the countryside, it is not thus the facts of equal distribution of income, commodity and resource per say that are significant and truly effective from the point of view of agrarian distributive justice. Significant is to obtain the consequences of equal distribution of human capability as outcome of human actions in the private realm and public parlance.

It is therefore the case that those are not only the means of material survival, for example, resources, commodities and money income that are required to be equitably distributed but also the human capability itself among rational and moral human agency. In other words, the finally valued thing is the human capacity and capability to do something and become something. The valued thing and the end must be the human capability itself. The commodity command and obtaining an income are merely means to the end of wellbeing of a person. These can therefore scarcely be the end itself, according to Amartya Sen.

The capabilities approach supplies sound guidance for law and public policies**.** The capability approach is *'informed by an intuitive idea of a life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being'.* Central human capabilities are *'implicit in the idea of a life worthy of human dignity'.* There must be the social goal centered at *'the idea of a single threshold level of each capability, beneath which it is held that truly human functioning is not available to citizens'* (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 70-71). It is the good to be pursued and the right to be upheld.

A choice of lexical priority between ensuring a floor level of a benchmark of human capability for all and decreasing, demoting and minimizing the magnitude and level of instances of injustices, inequities, deprivations and exclusions among human beings in the society amongst the worst-off is what is significantly required for instituting a programme of agrarian distributive justice. Most significant among capabilities and productive capacities of human beings is the capacity to produce a surplus[98], that is, over and above the consumption requirements and other minimum requirement for a decent subsistence. In

[98] The idea of '*surplus*' was developed by the classical and Marxian political economy. The idea had a lineage in academic and scholastic writings of Dr Francis Quesnay, who founded the school of economic thought called the '*Physiocracy*' in France during eighteenth century. In Physiocracy, the notion of '*net produit*' resembled with the notion of surplus. The *Physiocrats* deemed the social surplus as the "gift of nature" (Meek, 1962). The surplus producing capacity of agriculture was given the status of an analytical category and was thus extolled (Louis Dumont, 1980, p. 276).

Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo and Robert Malthus took it forward, and made the surplus product approach a dominant paradigm to analyze the nature of economic system. Adam Smith – the Scottish philosopher who laid the foundation of classical political economy in 1776 - emphasized the generation of the surplus product as a phenomenon that led to the crucial process of capital accumulation in the creation of a wealth of nation. The surplus in the classical political economy referred to an excess of income in the form of the gross value of goods and services sold in the market over cost involved in producing and supplying them in the market.

such an approach, there has been a direct focus on the capability of human beings as the axiotima in the late twentieth century literature while the idea of economic surplus as a valuable thing in human life is a construct of eighteenth and nineteenth century.

In Marxian political economy, the economic surplus has been defined as a residual after deducting the paid-out material cost and labour cost of production from the gross value of product output of goods and services in the economy. While the classical economist conceived the surplus product as the surplus quantum of output over and above the necessary conditions of social reproduction, Karl Marx analyzed this surplus product as the material expression of surplus value, which in turn, was explicitly conceived as unpaid labour time. It was a part of the net output value of goods and services over and above the necessary labour cost of production. In other words, it was the difference of net value added and labour cost of production. What was left-over after providing for the maintenance of the resources, the necessary consumption for labor and maintenance for capital and land, was considered the surplus[99](Patnaik, 1988; Patnaik, 1991)**.**

According to Piero Gregnani (1987), the follower of Piero Sraffa, the surplus consists of the non-wage portion of the share of national income in an economy. In retrospect, Piero Sraffa remained confined to conceiving surplus in physicalist terms, since the Sraffian social surplus approach was devoid of money, especially state money and the financial system. The social surplus was defined as a quantum of newly created wealth or value added or net product that is over and above that necessary for a social system to reproduce itself. A social surplus as a surplus product or net product is the newly created wealth the source of which lies in the productive power of living labour in both classical political economy as well as the Marxian political economy. It was conceived as a 'residual' (much in the

[99] In the Marxist economic analysis, it was the straightforward and logically complete concept of economic surplus, and it is invariably an estimation of the capacity of, and in turn influenced by the capacity for, 'economic reproduction' of a production unit. In other words, every definition of 'surplus' is simultaneously a definition of 'breaking even", or of "deficit" of a production unit and enterprise (Patnaik, 1988; Patnaik, 1991; also in Patnaik, 1999, p. 246). In the history of political economy, Karl Marx developed a critique of the classical political economy by distinguishing between surplus product and necessary product, and the notion of surplus being defined as the surplus product over and above the necessary product (excess of product over the necessaries). The human capacity to produce a surplus is this capacity to produce excess of product over the necessaries.

manner of Marxian economics). The social surplus is obtained by deducting and accounting for the societal necessaries out of the total end-of-period gross output. The definition of the 'necessaries' however differs between Piero Sraffa and Karl Marx[100].

In the positive analysis of the phenomenon of creation of surplus labour, surplus product and surplus value, the 'surplus' has been used as an analytic category to investigate into the sources of capital accumulation and the mechanism of market-mediated distribution among classes of people in wider economy. The size of the surplus product (what is available for appropriation and, possibly, accumulation) reflects the outcomes of the struggle between classes of producers and non-producers over the distribution of the social product (Bernstein, 1988, pp. 62-5). It is social stratification that allows the creation of the surplus and opens the way to accumulation (Celso Furtado, 1987, p. 213). In other words, the production of surplus and the mode of its utilization is not only a subject-matter of economic theorizing that is mostly based on consideration of purely economic forces and factors alone but also the whole array of social institutions and structures involved in it.

In modern times, a society is able to spend on education, health-care, social protection and insurance, maintenance of internal and external security and provision of basic utility services of water, roads and electricity only by virtue of being able to produce a surplus over and above the essential consumption of citizens. The determination of the amount of surplus and the mode of its utilization became the focus in development debates of modern times. In the contemporaneous development literature, it is not merely the quantum of surplus that is significant but also the mode of utilization of surplus. The mode of utilization and the distribution of surplus determine the possibility and path of growth in a

[100] In Marxist literate of twentieth century, there have been many variants of the idea of production surplus – in total, seven variants. In the twentieth century writings in the tradition of Marxist political economy, the principal contribution has been of Paul Baran (1958, 1962, 1968) and Paul Sweezy (1966), Ron Stanfield (1974) and Victor Lippit (1985, 1996). In the realm of reproducible and consumable material goods and services (economic categories), Paul Baran (1969) differentiated three variants of economic surplus from the production perspective in terms of comparative statics: actual surplus, potential surplus, and planned surplus. In the work of Ron Stanfield (1974), the surplus merged is the difference between potential or full-employment output and essential consumption (the consumption 'necessary to reproduce the extant productive capacity'). The surplus is either accumulated for re-investment or traded or hoarded or held in reserve or wasted away or destroyed. It is the 'discretionary' income and 'discretionary' fund in the society (Lippit, 1996, p. 266).

developing economy. The mode of utilization however crucially depends on the relation between man and man in all societies[101]. In the course of growth and development, the volume and nature of 'net investment' in an economy are dependent not only on the size of economic surplus but also the mode of utilization of currently generated economic surplus.

In the classical and Marxian framework of economic analysis, the process of agricultural production of material goods and services is not separated from the process of generation of the economic surplus of goods and services. The economic viability of a production process lies in its capacity to generate an economic surplus of goods and services since the initial stock necessary to carry out the next cycle of production is created out of the surplus of goods and services in current production. In short, economic surplus reduces to be equivalent to the unearned non-labour income in the form of profit, interest and rent minus labour income deficits. This is from the perspective of income side. In an agricultural society, it is the difference between the national income and essential consumption (where the essential consumption is equivalent to per capita income plus the value of government services available to a middle representative household multiplied by rural population). A surplus, however, needs to be distributed among the population.

In contemporary times, the agricultural farms everywhere are heterogeneous in matter of both land size and scale of production and operation among the peasantry. Given the diversity in the technical-organizational complex on heterogeneous farms, the output of goods and services is bound to vary. Given the differentiated pattern of the production process, the material paid-out cost and labour costs are also bound to differ with a wide margin across a cross-section of farms. This has implications manifested in the various sizes of economic surplus of goods and services across the cross-section of farms, after allowing for the deduction of the imputed value of labour from the net value added. The

[101] In the `Soviet industrialization controversy' in the 1920s, how to ensure a sufficient flow of marketed surplus of food grains from the agricultural sector to sustain a rapid rate of industrialization was a central problem to be dealt with. A problem that was the subject of a great debate, to which Mr. Praeobrazhensky, Mr. Bukharin, Mr. Trotsky and many others contributed, and which was to, a considerable degree, responsible for collectivization was the problem of surplus ((Bardhan and Bardhan, 1971, p. 255; Terry Byres, 1986, p. 270). It is this substance of surplus that is distributed among the classes of actors in the society. The analysis of surplus became a dominant paradigm of theorization of not only the phenomenon of production but also the distribution phenomenon in the economy.

surplus is a part of the output that is over and above the subsistence and other requirements of men and women in the countryside[102].

A class of affluent peasant-producer holds, therefore, more than the requisite current stock in cash and kind from the surplus of goods and services of the previous harvest at one extreme. At another extreme, the classes of petty, poor and small peasant producer are destined to struggle and eke out survival in the situation of falling short of the requisite stock of seed, animal feed and food for family consumption round the cycle and year of production. In the case of such initial stock held in cash and kind by a peasant falling short of requirements of necessary consumption on the farm and in the household, the agricultural borrowing is a dire necessity over the longer period of production. This bespeaks of the inequality of surplus producing capacity among rural human agency.

6.2. Prevalent Axiotima: Resource, Commodity and Income

In the conventional literature, a person is a being who has been modelled to be pursuing three significant goals to achieve and interests to fulfil: money-income, command

[102] In agriculture, a peasant household is both a producer household as well as a consumer household – almost coterminous. Agriculture involves a long 'period of production' over which a consuming household has to survive by consuming principally the accumulated stock from the previous cycle of production. This initial stock is created out of the surplus of goods and services generated in the last cycle of production. A family-labour farm in agriculture begins the farming operation with an essential threshold level of a minimum amount of stock of seeds, fertile land and accessible water. There is a further requirement of a minimum stock of manure and some basic simple tools of a hoe, spade and sickle in a rain-fed agriculture characterized by the ubiquitous application of a primitive technology.
There is no money in this primitive system. A minimum stock of cash fund must also be available to farming household to carry out the agricultural operations till harvest in a modern artificial-irrigation-based-agriculture, however. Such a fund is essential to enable the production unit to hire-in and/or outright purchase the minimum amount of a set of mechanized tools and equipment, high yielding varieties of seed (or genetically modified seed), chemical fertilizers, pesticide, herbicide and insecticide, and artificial source of irrigation water.
It is from the pool of this fund available both in kind and cash only that a farming family survives over the long period of production till harvest of the crop, plant and livestock product. Since agricultural value addition is an activity characterized by a long period of production where a couple of months must slip away after sowing the seeds in the soil before the harvest is reaped, there must be a surplus of goods and services created from the last cycle of production.

over the resources and the commodity for consumption. In the utilitarian calculus of pleasure, happiness and satisfaction of individual being (as well as that of the aggregate society), the resource (or commodity or income) is the valued thing – the axiotima. A resource is a useful thing since it is shaped and transformed into a good (endowed with some amount and level of utility – satisfaction).

In contemporary social sciences and primarily economics, the resources, commodities, income, utility, flourishing and welfare are treated as the 'goods' of life. In economics, a good is a material (physical) object that satisfies human wants. It possesses the tangible property and has utility. The conception of the good is more or less completely articulated account of what is of value. Happiness is the good to be pursued as per prescription of the utilitarianism. There are multiple types of goods (objects having utility and value and possessing the property of being rivalrous/nonrivalrous and excludability/non-excludability). The goods are either private or public.

Education is a service that has the characteristics of a public good while at the same time having characteristics of a private good. A good may also be intangible objects, for example, information, knowledge, atmosphere, defence, street lighting. In short, goods are both tangible and intangible objects of values, the popular examples of which are the happiness, pleasure, welfare, flourishing, virtue, charity and justice. The deepest problem is to measure the good (if it is the happiness, pleasure and satisfaction) while to measure the resource, commodity and income (which are proxies) is not so difficult.

In the normative economics, welfare[103] is the highest goal of rational individual actors which is measured in terms of attainment of utility and satisfaction from consumption of commodity and a measure of enhancement of the social welfare is the achievement of

---

[103] John Roemer has remarked perceptively that:

> *Welfarism states that, for purposes of distributive justice, only utility possibilities sets matter …… It rules out of court many allocation mechanisms that can only be defined with reference to economic information (such as equal division of all resources or Walrasian equilibrium from equal division) …… Philosophical integrity will require us to move beyond the "simple characterization" of social choice and axiomatic bargaining theory (Roemer, 1996, pp. 123-5).*

optimality and efficiency in the economic process and activity. Production and exchange of commodities being organized by the rational individual actors and mediated through the invisible hand of the free market ensure the attainment of economic efficiency and optimality (Boland, 1982; Caldwell, 1982). It is worthwhile to point it out that both paradigms of efficiency and equity remain however preoccupied with the material things – either production (adding-up material values) or exchange (circulating the ownership and control of natural material values or man-added material values) or consumption (exhaustion or destruction of material values) in the form of economic goods and services**.**

Amartya Sen (1979) calls this approach the 'welfarism'[104]. Most versions of utilitarianism have been welfarist, consequentialist, aggregative and maximizing. Such an approach implies that the resources are to be allocated first to the person who derives the greater marginal utility. The welfare comparisons is to be made, using the subjective values derived from goods and money. The calculus of utility is called felicific calculus. Utilitarian assumes that it is possible to sum every-one's utility to yield an overall utility total[105].

According to welfare utilitarians, public policy should promote 'welfare' or 'want' satisfaction. The impartial universality of the utilitarian principle is a problem. It constrains people to subordinate their private ideals, projects, interests and tastes to the goal of becoming maximally efficient promoters of the general good. It is committed to maximizing human wellbeing regardless of the identities of individuals. When public utility requires, one or two individuals do not matter and one can be asked to sacrifice. In this

[104] Utilitarianism is the leading consequentialist theory of ethics and the chief forebear in the lineage of welfare economics. Both Bentham's act utilitarianism as well as Mill's rule utilitarianism is committed to treating the good as an aggregative commodity, something that comes in greater or lesser amounts. Welfare economics is derived from act utilitarianism. Economic acts and choices are evaluated in terms of their consequences for social welfare, which in turn depends on a composite evaluation of individual welfare or utility.

[105] What is often sidelined is the fact that a society committed to equalizing the welfare of all individuals would have to give more resources to those with expensive tastes, and this is ethically unacceptable. Responsibility is not a focal point in the writings of Rawls and Sen, while it emerges centre stage in Dworkin's work. Dworkin brought to the fore in egalitarian thought the issue of responsibility. Richard Arneson (1989) and G. A. Cohen (1989), at the end of 1980s, took Dworkin's ideas a step further. The theories of Rawls, Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen advocate equality of opportunity.

framework of consequentialism expressed in either hedonistic or preference or welfare-theoretic form, the right action is that which maximizes utility summed across all those affected by the action. There are many ends that are worth pursuing their own sake, irrespective of the contribution they make to our happiness. Moreover, happiness is of multiform and happy lives can be lived in a large variety of ways in contrast to the utilitarianism of the goods of welfare[106].

Basic Minimum Income

There is at present a debate on the theme of 'unconditional' basic income proposal, whereby 'unconditional' means without either a means –test or status-test or a (willingness to) work condition. The distribution among human persons and agency ought to be as such that on a priority basis, the people at the lowest ladder of society gets the minimum basic income guarantees by the government under a public policy. Such a demand for distribution is premised on the basis of invoking the principle of liberal neutrality towards individual's non-invasive conceptions of the good life – respect for the autonomy of moral agents.

Philippe van Parijs (1992) has supported the admissibility of liberal justice, liberal neutrality, non-discrimination and the provision of the highest and maximal level of sustainable and substantial unconditional basic income for each individual, invoking the liberal neutrality towards individual's non-invasive conceptions of the good life – respect for the autonomy of moral agents by protecting the individual from invasion of other persons and property.

---

[106] Such view gains strength in view of the two weaknesses of classical utilitarianism, as it arose in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

> *Classical utilitarianism was beset by two profound difficulties. One is that the amount of information needed to implement it is staggering …… The second difficulty concerns the reality that the classical utilitarian scheme is insensitive to all moral boundaries among persons …… But utilitarianism was reshaped in ways that spoke to both difficulties, contributing to its resilience as one of the major political ideologies of our time (Shapiro, 2004, pp. 37-8).*

A society owes to each of its member a respect and support in the form of unconditional basic income, since anyone in the society has the right to primary goods required to pursue his or her own conception of the good and it is not conditional on the contribution of the individual towards the common good (Torisky Jr, 1993).

> *[A] defensible liberal conception of justice ..... needs to be real libertarian, that is, must maximin – possibly subject to some constraints - people's real freedom, that is, the means they require for the pursuit of their conception of the good life, whatever that is (van Parijs, 1992, p. 103).*

In public economics literature, the right to receive a basic income is made conditional upon the contribution of individual in the form of payment of tax. Determination of tax and benefit and the issue of its integration on some principles and theories belong to the academic subject of 'public economics'. The liberals have long advocated the integration of income taxation and social security benefit. The concern with liberty as a social objective long predates the welfare economics.

The earliest proponent of the "basic income" scheme of redistribution was Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams (1943) (author of *Something to Look Forward*). The economist James Meade (1948; 1972) developed it further, to be followed by A B Atkinson (1995). Beginning from the benefit approach of taxation of Knut Wicksell through the social accounting concepts of income by Eric Lindhal and the works of James Meade on the idea of "basic income", A B Atkinson (1995) had proposed the need for consolidation and integration a variety of areas of the discipline of public economics for the sake of developing an Arithmetical-Numerical model of Flat tax and Basic income benefit Transfer based redistribution proposal and policy, alternatively, to be called the 'public economics in action'. Eric Lindhal was, as per Sir John Hicks (1973), not only 'the father of Social Accounting theory' but also one who first introduced the term 'macroeconomics' into the economic parlance.

The most recent argument in favour of basic income policy was Hermione Parker (1989) (author of the *Instead of the Dole*), in addition to AB Atkinson (1995) continuing to argue in favor of this proposal. Such proposal and policy prescription has origin the public choice theory which in turn has origin in the writings of the Scandinavian scholars such as Knut

Wicksell and Eric Lindhal in the area of public economics. There ought to be a single flat-rate income tax, replacing all other taxes, and there ought to be a single guaranteed basic income, replacing all social security schemes and all income tax allowances programmes. All adult individual, regardless of marital status, should come under the obligation of single flat rate tax, but all individual should be entitled to the same basic income though differing amount according to age. There would not be any need of the means-tested and status-tested social security benefits.

According to AB Atkinson (1995), this BI/FT proposal, that would replace the social insurance/graduated tax (SI/GT) scheme, requires theoretical insights from: the literature of optimum income taxation (refer to the works of Jules Dupuit, Arthur Laffer and Arthur Okun in 1975) public choice theory, general equilibrium analysis of incidence of taxation, tax-benefit models, and econometric studies of incentives[107]. In 2005, a scheme of redistribution of a fraction of rental-value of productive capacity of individuals was propounded by Serge-Christophe Kolm. In the same year, a scheme of redistribution of a fraction of national income/per capita income was propounded by Brian Barry.

Brian Barry (2005) also put forth a scheme of distribution of income to attain the redistributive justice. Both schemes have a commonality: it is cash transfers of income value or money value of income finally. The schemes of redistribution from the rich to the poor as part of contribution to reduction of (and not elimination) of inequality (minimization of injustices, and not maximization of justice) propounded by Serge-Christophe Kolm (2005) and Brian Barry (2005) differ in three respects: What is to be

[107] A perceptive remark in this regard is that:

> *The poor want to tax the rich but that is not all what determines redistributive policies. Views about what is 'fair' and what is an acceptable level of inequality matters, above and beyond the individuals' position in the income ladder.1 The same level of inequality may be more or less acceptable depending upon different beliefs about how wealth has been accumulated, namely by virtue of effort and ability or, on the contrary, by virtue of luck, connections or corruption. In one word, it matters for individual preferences whether different levels of income and wealth are 'deserved' or not, as confirmed by extensive empirical evidence.2 These views about inequality and justice (which we label 'ideology') determine tax rates and the evolution of the distribution of income and wealth. The latter generates changes in the proportion of wealth inequality due to effort or to other factors including luck and government policies. As a result of these developments, individuals' preferences for redistribution evolve accordingly (Alberto Alesina, Guido Cozzi and Noemi Mantovan, 2012, p.1).*

redistributed – income or rent of productive capacity? How much of sum total to be distributed among the poor? What is the coverage of the scheme of redistribution – universal or targeted? Combining three models of Roth, Kolm and Barry and incorporating the main features of these models in a single framework, subscription to five components are desirable: Priority Model, Threshold Model (minimandum), Distribuandum Model (distribuandum), Equalisandum Model (equalisandum), and Outcome Model.

Brian Barry (2005) suggested a redistributive schema in which inequality is reduced as part of a move towards justice; inequality is not eliminated. Suppose per capita income is Rupees 10. This is the average income, that is, national income divided by population. The national income is rupees 1000, and the population is 100 persons.

It is distributed and divided as rupees 900 for ten persons and rupees 100 for 90 persons in the population of hundred people. This is the market distribution – an unequal distribution of income, in which the outcome is: each rich person gets rupees 90 each (900/10), and each poor person gets rupees 1.11 each (100/90).

In the project of bringing justice as equality, let there be a scheme of redistribution that ensure that each of poor person gets at least an amount that is above fifty percent of the per capita income. It is a public redistributive action based on pure appeal to public morality.

Let us assume that a poor gets at least rupees 6 (60 percent of PCI) where the per capita income for all is actually rupees 10. So, each of poor person gets rupees 6 and 90 poor get 6x90 = rupees 540 out of rupees 1000 national income. Since all the 90 poor were already getting rupees 100 before redistribution but gets rupees 540 in total after redistribution, redistribution requires actually transfer of 540 – 100 = rupees 440.

So original gross income of the poor = rupees 100

Gross public transfer = rupees 440

Let there be a fixed tax on the rich, involving equal sacrifice of rupees 44. This rupees 440 is then be taken from the rich, each contributing rupees 44 (44x 10 rich persons).

Result: after redistribution, the gross income of the poor = 100 + 440 = 540 rupees is divided into 90 persons, each getting rupees 6 per person, and the gross income post transfer among the rich = 900- 440 = 460 rupees divided by 10 persons, each getting 46 per person.

Pre-tax distribution: Rich: Poor = 90: 1.11

Post-tax distribution: Rich: Poor = 46: 06

The per capita income remains the same at rupees 10 but poor are having each rupees 6 (in lieu of rupees 1.11, so gaining 4.89 rupees) and rich are having each rupees 46 (in lieu of rupees 90, so losing rupees 44). The sacrifice by a minority of rich is certainly much larger than the benefit of the majority of poor. This is the demand of minimal redistribution under social justice. It is possible through consensual, endogenous social choice mechanism (i.e. voting or referendum or any other mechanism).

Fundamental Needs

There are fundamental needs of certain resources and commodities to sustain life and live honourably in a human society. To fulfil those basic needs of life, a resource or a commodity is either partly/fully owned or generally controlled before used. A resource is generally either owned in common or jointly owned by majority approval. In modern setup of society and economy, it is however often permitted to be owned through unilateral appropriation of un-appropriated resource. In other words, it might be permitted to be unilaterally owned and appropriated. There may be a stricture that such unilateral ownership is permitted to the extent that it is compatible with everyone having an equally valuable opportunity for a good life.

There may be two types of private unilateral ownership: ownership generally or full ownership. Self-ownership determinately rules out actions that are foreseeable highly to cause incursions on one's person that will significantly harm one and where avoidance of a social catastrophe is not at issue. Full ownership is a bundle of rights. Full private ownership consists of five kinds of rights: control rights (over the use of the object), rights to compensation (if someone uses the object without one's permission), enforcement rights

(to prevent the violation of these rights), and rights to transfer (by sale, rental, gift, and loan) and immunity to the non-consensual loss of any rights of ownership. The notion of full ownership is indeterminate with respect to compensation right, enforcement right and immunity to loss when a person uses an object over which another has un-waived ownership rights (Vallentyne, Steiner and Otsuka, 2005, pp. 201-10).

What is the '*Need Principle"*? It is that *'just allocations provide for basic needs equally across individuals'.* In reality, most divisions are unequal, with average allocations usually satisfying the differing needs of people. There has often been an appeal for *'the primacy of equality and basic needs'.* In the writings of Thomas Malthus (1798) and Henry George (1879), differing versions of the basic needs thesis can be traced. A concern for the least-advantaged is reflected in the core ideas of Karl Marx, John Rawls, and their followers.

The philosopher D. D. Raphael (1980) has claimed that justice demands there to be *'a basic minimum for all even if some of those affected could not achieve it by their own efforts'* (Raphael, 1980, p.56). Both D D Raphael as well as John Rawls implies *'lexicographic ordering of goals'.* While John Rawls did not concern himself with the issue of *'efficiency',* Raphael's comment is that *'basic needs take priority over other concerns but, once satisfied, attention turns to efficiency'* (Konow, 2003, p. 1199). Amartya Sen respects agency (freedom), choice (individual preferences) and still talks of rights and entitlements.

Adam Smith was of the opinion that benevolence as the altruistic acts of needs-meeting (though required for moral reasons) does often kill the autonomy and self-sufficiency of human agency. Benevolence of someone creates dependency in the person who is a beneficiary of benevolence. A classical view is that the needs-meeting is a "free lunch"; it creates dependency, encourages paternalism and harms individual autonomy and liberty. It is therefore that there should be a limit to needs-meeting by charitable organisations and the government in a society. Needs-meeting of the needy through benevolence does not help creation of a human capacity. Be that as it may. The surplus reproducing capacity of a rational and reasonable human agency ought to be considered the right as well that has an intrinsic worth and thus to be treated as an end-in-itself. It is to be treated as claim, entitlement, privilege and the power.

It is actually the case that the vocabulary of rights is deeply embedded in the vocabulary of needs in the normative political theory discourse. A capacity to produce (to do or to act) the surplus of food and offspring and reproduce the same and to be or become a producer and reproducer of food and offspring on a sustained basis may as well be considered the natural and basic needs of human individual and group in the sense of a thing one cannot go without it for long.

Many social theories employ a concept of need as one of the central ideas involved in a full account of justice (Wolf, 2005, p. 335). It is often said that the needs are objective category, are matters of priority and are unimpeachable values. These are more than the public goods (non-excludable and non-rival in nature). The concept of 'need' is essentially instrumental. No special moral priority is associated with this general sense of the term need, for some projects are extravagant and some aims are not worth achieving. People's needs are many and some are so trivial.

Human "need" is an ontological category as human action is another ontological category. Neither of these are proposition. These have no truth-value. Needs are very different from facts[108]. Basic needs are essential to living or to functioning normally; these are indispensable, essential and universal. Basic need is those things that are "indispensable to mind or body in performing the tasks assigned a given person requires under a combination of basic social roles, namely, the roles of parent, householder, worker, and citizen" (Braybrooks, 1987, p. 48). Some human needs and functional capacities are universal (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 212). Karl Marx in the 19th century, R Tawney and R Titmuss in the 20th century have talked of the needs, which the Beveridge's welfare state idea addressed

---

108 To quote:

> *Needs are very different from facts. One very important difference is that facts cannot conflict with one another, but needs can – both the needs of different people and different needs of the same person, because facts cannot conflict with one another, truth is unitary and indivisible. But goodness, it seems, is not like that ……. Needs constitute objective reasons for action they are what make actions good, analogously to the way facts make beliefs true ……. To put it another way, the world is not just, in famous words of Wittgenstein, 'everything that is the case'. Rather, it is a world that is also permeated by needs – to the extent, at least, that it is a world inhabited by agents who possess reasons for action (Lowe, 2005, p. 173).*

later. Recent works on needs are: Gilian Brock (1998), David Braybrooke (1987) and G Thomson (1987).

The concept of an "interest" must form an integral part of the concept of a fundamental need. We require the notion of an interest to explain what harm is, and we require the notion of harm to explain what a fundamental need is. Needs are interests of vulnerable human persons. Needs are states of dependency, in respect of not being harmed (Wiggins, 1998). Absolute needs refer to needs which, if unmet during a relevant time period, may blight one's life or cause serious harm. Basic needs are a subset of entrenched needs. While recognising that unmet needs may cause serious multiple harms to the subject, the proper objects are things needed.

Needs are goods, and non-satiety of needs lead to violation of liberty and incidence of serious harms, losses and affronts. It is thus morally important to ensure that the needs – basic and fundamental, are fulfilled and met. Fulfilment of needs is the promotion of the 'goods', therefore. Meeting of individual and social needs is indispensable in any adequate normative moral theory. This entails that both rights-based and obligation-based deontological theories must mention needs. Commitment to freedom, equality and justice entail a commitment to needs of capacity creation. Some needs are morally significant, and capacity building in humans is one of them.

It is arguable that the modus operandi, strategy and method of men have never been so offensive, so innovative and so zealous as to singularly promote, expand and maximize an advantage, a benefit and a profit. It has rather always been primarily to demote, control and minimize the harm, the disadvantage and the deprivation. The minimization of injustices, inequities, deprivation, exclusion, harms, envy and losses has been the "safety-first" principle of defense and escape for the majority of vulnerable persons being placed in the world of scarcity of materials and goods.

Social Goods

In the literature concerned with distribution of anything 'good' and 'right', there is a principle of prioritarianism. In the distribution of the 'valuable' either in the beginning or at the end of distribution, who should get 'priority'? John Rawls (1971) has proposed in the name of distributive equity and justice the principle of maximizing the minimum share of the least-advantaged member of the society. It is argued that inequalities must operate in the interests of the least-advantaged. Rawls's principle for distribution of income and wealth is called the difference principle, which is argued to be in fact a re-christened older principle of welfare economics called 'maximize the minimum share' (in short, "maximin").

Be that as it may. The so-called 'basic goods' in the Rawlsian framework is multipurpose instrumental goods that is proposed to be distributed according to the maximin principle to attain equity in society. Of late, Amartya Sen (2009) has asserted that a theory of justice requires it that it is alive to both the '*fairness of the processes involved*' as well as the '*equity and efficiency of the substantive opportunities that people can enjoy'*. In matter of social justice, the '*capability perspective*' with its pointer to an important way of assessing advantages and disadvantages has implications for both '*aggregative and distributive concerns*' (Sen, 2009, pp. 296-8). In the literature concerned with the social provisioning and services to people under a social policy of the welfare government, the category of surplus – social or economic- is quite significant. It is the surplus that is siphoned–off and redistributed in social provisioning and services.

6.3. Egalitarianism: Prevalent Equalisandum

In a scheme of distributive justice – ideal or transitional, the most valued thing is to allocated and distributed among human beings rather equally. Egalitarianism has been the core of theorization on justice. The egalitarian distributive system is mostly oriented towards the notion of 'distributive justice'. In an egalitarian ethical and political system, equality is a significant human value that is promoted as a societal goal. Egalitarianism is a thesis of which there are many variants in the social, political and philosophical literatures. Egalitarianism is the ideology of valuing equality. There are important questions to be resolved: What is equalizing? What is that which is to be equalized? What are those goods

that ought to be equalised – equalisandum? What are those rights that ought to be equalised – equalisandum? How ought we as rational and reasonable agent-actor to live the life - efficiently or equitably?

To begin with, it is widely agreed that all human persons share an equal moral status that is not rightly extended to nonhuman animals. Bernard Williams (1962) in his "*The Idea of Equality*" has discussed it. There are moral capacity, natural capacity and empirical capacity in humans. The moral capacity is the "intelligence, a capacity for sympathetic understanding, and a measure of resoluteness". Empirical capacity is the empirical characteristics of human beings, possessed in different degrees in different individuals. Human beings have conscious experience, can experience pleasure and pain, desire something and are averse to others[109]. A being with these capacities can be benefitted and harmed and so can be an object of moral concern. The ellipsis is: all humans are entitled to equal treatment or all humans are equal in their entitlements. The maxim of egalitarian ethics is that human persons have equal fundamental moral status. There is equal moral worth of persons[110]**.**

The idea of equality is construed in logical and etymological opposition to 'inequality' and 'inequity'. Inequality/inequity is a phenomenon of variation, differential, dispersion, dissimilarity and asymmetry in the allocation, division and distribution of something

---

109 The Kantian maxim (to treat persons as ends in themselves) implies not only that "one should respect and try to understand man's consciousness of his own activities" but also that "one may not suppress or destroy that consciousness" (Williams, 1962, p. 118). In Rawls' view the basis of equality is the binary property of being a moral person where a moral person is a being that has a capacity for a conception of the good and a capacity for sense of justice (Carter, 2011, p. 549).

110 In a very unequal society, the better off typically have more power and are more effective at pulling in resources for the public goods they value. A high degree of inequality makes it further more tempting for the better-off to opt out of public services altogether. Moreover, inequality of outcomes does not generate the right incentives when it rests on rents. In that case, individuals and households divert their efforts toward securing favouritism and protection instead of creating new wealth or innovating.
Last but not least, the existence of extreme inequality exacerbates social fragmentations and undermines social cohesion—the capacity of a society to manage collective decision making peacefully. Those suffering from extreme deprivation may turn to violence and conflicts as the last resort to address their concerns. This positive perspective is necessary to understand why inequality should matter even to those who do not attach intrinsic value to equality. The positive perspective also provides a framework to focus the attention of policy makers on the truly bad forms of inequality and to pay attention to the costs and benefits of measures aimed at reducing inequality in outcomes (Rama, et al., 2015, pp. 37-9).

valuable. Equality is good and right. Inequality is bad and wrong. Equality is fair and inequality is unfair. Equality is constitutive of fairness and justice and inequality is constitutive of injustice and wrong-doing. Equality produces beneficial state of affairs and inequality produces harmful state of affairs. Equality varies from one faith to another and from one theory to another (Sen 1992). Every normative theory of social arrangements that has stood the test of time also seems to demand equality of something. Inequality means different things to different people. Some forms of inequality generate costs to society, whereas others entail benefits. Inequality in outcomes has profound effects on how individuals and households behave. Inequality of outcomes may affect the capacity of households to borrow to accumulate human and physical capital. Inequality also affects the ability of people to act collectively, the institutions that they set up, and the ways in which resources are allocated for the benefit of the group.

A couple of modern adherents (Rama, et al., 2015) assert that equality carries an intrinsic value for most of the world's great religions, most other faith traditions and ideologies — religious or secular. In addion to the intrinsic value, every great faith attaches to some form of equality. It is argued that reduction/elimination of inequality has instrumental, intrinsic and empirical value. It matters instrumentally for poverty reduction and stimulation of growth to reduce/eliminate inequality. It has intrinsic worth in restoring human worth, respect and dignity. There is a common agreement that material inequity does exist in our world and this is not desirable from the perspective of either the 'good' or the 'right'. It is neither good consequential state of affairs and proposition nor right intrinsic prime mover value or entitlement to have and permit pervasive violation of justice in the society of human being.

Attaining equality requires that inequality that is a multidimensional phenomenon is not only to be measured – both quantitatively as well as qualitatively, but also to be decomposed to understand the set of factors influencing the phenomenon and changes in inequality over time and space. It may be measured by the coefficient of variation, statistically. Estimation of Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient is yet another measure. Nowadays, the Theil Index as a measure has become popular since it has the desirable

property of decomposability (for example, a decomposition of income inequality across groups of population groups)[111].

There are three important conceptual and empirical works on the inequality theme in the literature: Amartya Sen (1995), Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000), and World Bank (2001). The abstract theoretical values in terms of which the inequality is assessed are differentials in wellbeing, choice, opportunity and outcome. The concrete empirical-observable variables used in assessing inequality/inequity are education, health, nutrition, income, consumption, asset, social inclusion, vulnerability, security, and power. It is with respect to these abstract values and concrete variables that inequality/inequity is to be reduced and eliminated to attain equality/equity. Reduction of inequality is empirically critically important for the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) globally.

Inequality is the degree of dispersion and width of the distribution of something. Inequality as differences between individuals is as important as the inequality as differences between groups of people. What is a problem is the chronic, persistent and inter-generational inequality. Transient inequality reflecting life-cycle factors is not as such a problem. Some inequality in outcome is part of the normal functioning of a market economy. To attain equality/equity, it is argued that inequality/inequity needs to be eliminated.

According to Serge-Christophe Kolm (2005), the just allocation of the items to people is not influenced by the individuals' will. What is allocated is the effect or result of voluntary action, belonging to the field of economic exchange, and such an allocation constitutes the domain of commutative justice which in turn is based on bringing "geometric equality" - "in proportion to", and "as the relevant increasing function of". It depends on individuals' "merit" (axis). This is also called "retributive justice". According to Plato and Aristotle,

---

[111] The property of decomposability is that the overall inequality can be expressed as the sum of two terms capturing within and between group inequalities. Since various inequality indices reflect value judgments, conclusions reached by comparisons over time about the direction of change can be sensitive to the index chosen. The relationship of inequality with other variables, for example, per capita income, is estimated through 'regression' studies, statistically. Regression based decomposition methods can be used to try to account more fully for the factors behind inequality. Decomposition methods ultimately identify correlation which suggest but does not necessarily imply causality.

the second domain of justice is that of "distributive justice" - the distribution of items that do not depend on individuals' will but follows the principle of "arithmetic equality"- strict equality and, in particular, equal sharing. This principle is, in fact, not merely equality but is also of the concepts of aim-freedom, immanent (where "immanent" means reward according to effects of choice or action) merit or desert, and responsibility (Kolm, 2005, pp. 247-9).

Equality

The earliest proponent of egalitarianism was the Greek philosophy and ethics. Aristotle said that justice is equality is what everyone thinks it is. In ancient times, the Greek philosophers attempted to reproduce what the people thought about justice. Plato and Aristotle assert that they are merely reporting, possibly putting in form, common ideas of their society. They purported to describe what people think justice is rather than a theory of their own. They also represented the practical views held by the people on the distinction between commutative (or retributive) justice and distributive justice.

In Greek thought represented by Aristotle, justice involved comparative assessment of situations and principle of proportionality in distribution. In Aristotelian framework of arguments, justice was a principle that ensured social order by regulating the distribution of benefits. Plato said that justice was achieved when each person received goods they deserved based on their prescribed position in the social order. Both of them simply reflected the views about justice that was already popular among the populace in the Greek tradition. Equity principle, which originated with Aristotle's proposition that people are motivated to restore the ratio of outcome to inputs for two persons as equal, is with reference to desert[112] (incorporating contribution and effort). Desert is directly related to individual responsibility for contributions to outcomes.

---

[112] To trace the origin of the conception:

> *Theories of equity and desert are the intellectual progeny of two philosophical traditions: the distributive justice theory of Aristotle and the natural law/desert theory of John Locke ..... the political philosopher Robert Nozick occupies a position at one extreme in*

This principle works in association with the attribution theory that say that people infer causes of events and are motivated to assign responsibility to agents for those events; they hold an agent accountable only for those factors that the agent can influence. The accountability principle is a percept of justice based on the distinction between factors one can influence, or discretionary variables, and those one cannot, or exogenous variables. The equity formula is an entitlement formula. The equity principle is the fair allocations across individuals are proportionate only to the inputs they control. Equity is a phenomenon that is concerned about commensurate and proportionate allocation, division and distribution of something valuable, in addition to equal liberty[113].

In modern times, the ideology of social democracy requires it that the democratic state regulation of the economy is directed towards achieving the egalitarian goals. It is therefore that people should be treated the same in some respect and in some dimension. In modern times, the idea of responsibility has been brought to the core of discussion of the theme of rights and equal distribution of rights – an important aspect of egalitarianism.

In philosophy and ethics, there are principally two schools of thought on the theme of egalitarianism: telic egalitarianism and deontic egalitarianism (Parfit, 2002). According to Derek Parfit (2002), telic egalitarians believe that it is in itself bad if some people are worse-off than others while deontic egalitarians value equality for some other moral reason. Telic egalitarians value equality intrinsically, and they value equal outcomes and for intrinsic reasons in terms of intrinsic properties. In the deontic view, injustice is a special kind of badness involving wrong-doing and inequalities are unjust because they have been

---

this class of theories ..... A good point of departure for a discussion of desert is the justice theory of James Buchannan (1986) (Konow, 2003, pp. 1206-7).

[113] Quite early in history, Christianity contained an idea of equality and favoured it. John Locke, the champion of classical liberalism, was of the opinion that the core natural rights are negative in character in the sense that other persons are obliged not to interfere and as such each person has a moral right to have equality of natural rights – principally, the right to self-ownership and the right to private property. Immanuel Kant and his followers claimed that all humans are alike in the capacity of rational agency. The 'democratic citizenship' ideal of eighteenth-century held that all adult property-owning males should be equal citizens with a right to vote and to stand for office in free elections. In the course of time, the property qualification was subsequently removed and women were made also entitled to full citizenship rights.

produced in the wrong way and inequality undermines procedural fairness and is inconsistent with fair equality of opportunity. It is construed that Deontic egalitarians think equality is valuable for instrumental reasons.

The principle of equality propounded by telic egalitarians is that it is in itself bad if some people are worse-off than other; intrinsic badness is the core of the idea that inequality is bad. The principle of equality propounded by Deontic egalitarians is that we should aim for equality, not to make outcome better, but for some other moral reasons; inequality is not bad, but unjust (that involves wrongdoing).

In the literature, there are two more variants: conditional egalitarianism and constitutive egalitarianism. Conditional egalitarianism is the view that equality is valuable is conditional on other values. Equality has value if someone benefits from it. Andrew Mason (2001) and Martin O'Neill (2008) highlight the non-intrinsic yet non-instrumental character of equality. In the catalogue of conditional egalitarianism, a concept called the 'non-intrinsic egalitarianism' has been propounded by Martin O'Neill (2008).

A pluralist variant of non-intrinsic egalitarianism that accommodates that telic egalitarianism rather partially and combines the prioritarianism is favored in a substantive axiological political philosophy. It is argued that even if inequality is not unfair and unjust, inequality is non-intrinsically bad. Inequality is a political disvalue on plural substantive detailed considerations of being instrumental in creating unacceptable and objectionable forms and relations of power and domination, creation of servility, social status-stigma and inferiority (offensive to the dignity and standing of human agents), weakening of the self-respect of the worst-off, ignoring of basic needs of worse-off, and undermining the healthy social fraternal relations and attitudes of people – a detailed account of the variety of considerations in non-abstract fashion. Equality improves the states of affairs.

As interpreted by Martin O`Neill (2008), the views of Derek Parfit (2002) is that the 'Non-Intrinsic' egalitarian views are not forms of 'Telic' egalitarianism since they do not posit any intrinsic badness of inequality. Unlike Deontic views, however, they are concerned with the goodness and badness of states of affairs, and not just with rights-claims or

questions of justice. The 'Non-Intrinsic' egalitarianism is also not a form of the 'Deontic' egalitarianism, given its focus on the badness or inequality (rather than its connection to claims of right or justice) (O'Neill, 2008, p. 124).

In the egalitarian thought of non-intrinsic egalitarianism, distributive inequality is non-intrinsically bad. Priority is to be accorded to the worse-off since benefitting people matters more the worse-off those people are ad the goodness of some benefit enjoyed by an individual diminishes as the well-being of that individual increases. Since equality is a political value of tremendous importance but seen as merely one value among others, the egalitarians should be pluralists. There are many values that do not fall within the ambit of egalitarianism. A complete axiology or theory of value or a complete guide to ranking the goodness or badness of states of affairs is not provided by any plausible variant of non-Intrinsic egalitarianism, or of any another plausible form of egalitarianism.

The non-Intrinsic egalitarianism, which is a pluralist view, is not in conflict with the Priority View, construed as an axiological claim about the diminishing marginal moral significance of gains in well-being. There is thus no need to choose between the two sorts of views since one can be both egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians should accept such a combined view. In accepting this view, the egalitarians should reject any overly schematic understanding of egalitarianism and prioritarianism as mutually exclusive distributive views (O' Neill, 2008, pp. 153-55).

In short, a pluralist version of non-intrinsic egalitarianism that embraces the central insight of prioritarianism and thus accommodates the moral significance of well-being, understood as being subject to the diminishing moral significance of greater benefits is a novel beast within the taxonomy of possible distributive views. According to O'Neill, equality is extrinsically and non-instrumentally valuable because it brings about desirable states of affairs but nonetheless non-intrinsically valuable. Inequality is bad and distributive equality is valuable because of its effects since it brings about states of affairs that are themselves intrinsically valuable for egalitarian reasons. The argument of some other reason is not required. There is a value of equal states of affairs.

Table – 6.1

Commonness and Differences
among Left Egalitarians to Right Libertarians



Source: Reproduced from Vallentyne, etal. , 2005, p. 215

David Miller (1992) finds that there is *'potentially always an ambiguity'* in the case of equality. There is a doubt. Probably, equality is chosen by default, and it is '*being valued as positively the right thing'* in those circumstances where there is *'the absence of reliable information about desert or need'* (Miller, 1992, pp. 559-60). Morality requires incorporation of some substantive conception of the equality of all human persons. Equality is a properly intelligible political value; it often trumps the value of maximizing well-being, that is, sometimes and not always. Of course, such pursuit of equality may clash with the goal of efficiency and the ideal of self-ownership. Equality is at the centre of both liberal perfect justice as well as imperfect transitional justice, and men and resource of the world are at the centre of consideration about 'equality'. Equality involves equality in self-ownership of person and equality in ownership of resources of the world. There is however variety of ownership, and therefore, a variety of equality.

Why ought any good ever to be distributed equally among people? A presumably controversial notion of egalitarianism is that no person should possess more useful goods than any other. A version of egalitarianism as a doctrine calling for totalitarian forms of social control is that of Gracchus Babeuf's Procrustean doctrine for his Conspiracy of Equals, quoted in Lukes (1975). It was claimed that there must be '*no other difference between people'* than that of '*age' or 'sex'*. Everybody should have the '*same education*

and the same diet' because all of us have '*the same needs and the same faculties'*. There should be the '*same portion and the quality of nourishment'* because each one of us are '*content with the same sun and the same air for all'* (Lukes, 1975, p. 155).

The radical egalitarian concept of distributive justice, propounded by Kai Nielsen (1985) advocated the abolition of material inequalities[114]. A moderate version of egalitarianism demands 'moving towards more equality' rather than absolute equality. It proposes that 'no such good is distributed in such a way that it can be passed on to one's own children while being unavailable to the children of other' (Green, 1981, p. 80). On the other hand, elite egalitarianism in America however has just been content with the formal equal opportunity and protection before the law. In the concrete society that we live in, explicit egalitarian policy proposal has been however with regard to the demand for fair shares, wage supplements, distribution of social goods and against the institution of inheritance of privileges/dis-privileges.

In another variant, it is the claim that all human persons are alike in being equally members of the human species since humans have capacities of rational agency (Arneson, 1998, p. 124). Regardless of whether the egalitarian is a realist, an antirealist, or constructivist about properties, egalitarianism requires one to point to a morally relevant property that one ascribes equally to all the beings covered by one's egalitarian theory. There is need to identify a property of human beings the equal possession of which qualifies them for equal shares of the relevant good. The debate about whether welfare, resources, capabilities,

---

114 So far as egalitarianism prescribes resource egalitarianism in the name of equal fundamental worth of human persons, it has a problem.

> *The level of resources that I gain over the course of my life depends to a great extent on voluntary choices that I make. But it also depends on initial circumstances beyond my power to control. Responding to these points one might hold that the just society should strive to equalize not people's accrual resource shares but their opportunities to gain resources by reasonable and lawful conduct ……. Focus on an individual's resource share as the measure of her condition for purposes of distributive justice theory may be fetishistic,. After all , people do not ordinarily care about resources or the means for their own sakes, but with what a given level of resources enable one to be or do …….. Many of the things that people are enabled to be or do with a given share of resources are utterly trivial. They are things no one cares about (Arneson, 1998, pp. 122-23).*

opportunity for welfare, freedom, or some other good should constitute the currency of egalitarian justice has been pursued without reference to the possible bases of equality.

Amartya Sen (2009) has been of the opinion that equality has not been among the foremost revolutionary demands in eighteenth century Europe and America. There has also not been an extraordinary consensus on its importance in the post-Enlightenment world. In general, the demand for seeing people as equals relates today to the normative demand for impartiality, and the related claims of objectivity. Equality in this respect does figure prominently today in the contributions of political philosophers who would usually be seen as 'egalitarian', and in American usage as 'liberal', for example, John Rawls, James Meade, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon. There are however still disagreements on ways of answering the question: 'equality of what?'. In each theory of equality, a space is seen as having a central role and equality is sought in that 'space' - a variable related to respective persons (for example, income, wealth, utilities). Equality in other spaces (for example, rights, liberties or what are seen as just deserts of people) looks like anti-egalitarian claims (Sen, 2009, pp. 291-5).

According to interpretation of Martin O'Neill (2008), however, wherever and whenever the inequality in question has been produced by wrongdoing, the deontic egalitarianism claims only that there are reasons of right (or justice) to promote equality. The more substantive version of Deontic egalitarianism however holds the view that not only that we have a formal deontic duty to treat people on the basis of equality but also that the specification of the substantive content of that duty involves a duty to promote distributive equality (O'Neill, 2008, p. 143).

On the other hand, Jeremy Moss (2009) has argued for 'constitutive' egalitarianism that says that an object can have intrinsic value in virtue of being part of something that itself has intrinsic value. Something can be constitutively valuable if it is a part of something that is intrinsically valuable, without which that good would be less good and which is part of what is valuable about the good concerned. Equality gains its value because of its relation to another value; it is nonetheless intrinsically valuable, because it is part of what is valuable about an intrinsic good. Equality matters here for deontic reasons that relates to

another moral value – fairness. If equality is part of fairness, it will be intrinsically valuable in a constitutive sense.

6.4. The Finality

In an agency-centered paradigm, it is the capability and capacity of human beings themselves which ought to be the Axiotima. What matters is the substantive freedom of human beings to do a thing or to become a worthwhile entity. The criterion of guarantee of a threshold level of surplus producing capacity of autonomous rational human agency is to be preferred over other criteria of evaluating actions. It matters as to how we ought to live the life - efficiently or equitably or just meeting the needs, that is, it matters as to what we ought to value – prosperity or egalitarianism or needs-meeting. In addition to promotion of human (surplus) productive capacity, we ought to minimize the bads and harms of incapacity, inequalities and injustices. What is valuable need not be always promoted and maximized since the point is to demote and minimize the violation of rights to justice as valuable goal, breach of fairness in procedures and infringement of equity/equality in outcome.

Amartya Sen, in his various writings on egalitarianism has rightly pointed out that the question “why equality?” and the question “equality of what?” are though distinct but thoroughly interdependent issues (Ian Carter, 2011, pp. 542-3). There are two issues in egalitarianism: why equal treatment to people? Why equal distribution of goods? In general, egalitarianism prescribes that all persons should be treated the same in some respect. It asserts that people should be treated alike in some dimension. Why ought we ever to accord people equal treatment of some sort?

In an interactive setting of a human group and society, it also matters as to what we owe to each other – acceptance or rejection of the conceivable principles of cooperation and coexistence. In short, it matters as to how autonomous, rational and reasonable actions of one individual or a group of individuals in an interactive setting are judged, evaluated and assessed in terms of an appropriate and meaningful criterion of action. Rawlsian liberal

egalitarians share a normative focus on the question of the fair division of the fruits of social cooperation among people who are regarded as free and equal. They also insist on the fair division of some basic social goods – the axiotima. The left libertarians focus on the rights of acquisition of un-owned resources. The left libertarianism invoke egalitarian ownership of natural resources as an independent principle. Hillele Steiner (1994) and Peter Vallentyne (2000) are the champions of this left libertarianism moral theory. Strict egalitarians posit equality to take precedence over all other values or principles such as self-ownership or liberty or efficiency. It is often claimed that human agents have moral standings as self-directing beings but natural resources have no moral standings as these are not created by human agents.

Rationale of justice and equality is one thing and how to effectuate equality (criteria and methods to equalise) is another thing. There are bewildering variety of distributive criteria and mechanisms, including lotteries, queing, need-satisfaction, effort and merits, efficiency or some combination of these in different societies. In the standard literature, there have been schemes of redistribution of either income or resource or commodity. People have individual preferences for distribution mechanisms that range over three principles of justice: they either trade-off among efficiency, equity (or proportionality) and needs-meeting or have a lexicographic ordering of preferences for efficiency, equity (or proportionality) and needs-meeting in the name of being motivated by the principles of fairness in matter of choice. It is true for local (Elsterian), pluralistic (Walzerian), procedural (Rawlsian) justice as well. There are a number of trade-offs involved in the idea of justice. There are trade-off between needs and deserving capacity as principles of equalisation and equalisandum.

Amartya Sen has rejected the notion of preference-independent, consequence-detached rights. Amartya Sen favors the consequentialist-procedural approach. Sen's theory of justice in the framework of consequentialist-procedural approach demands equality of capability, whereby capability set is a matter of rights, functionings set is a matter of preference and choice, and equality in opportunity-freedoms as comprehensive outcomes is a matter of good consequence (goal). The distinctive aspect of the work of John Rawls (1971) in his "A Theory of Justice" is the argument in favor of both equality of

opportunities and equality of outcomes. In contrast, John Roemer (1998) made a case for compensating people for the disadvantages that are related to circumstances[115]. The Roemerian conceptualization has shifted the *'attention of development economics toward equality of opportunities'* — often defined in terms of access to basic services. The weakness of this paradigm is that John Roemer (1998) allows toleration of *'the remaining inequality of outcomes'* (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 37). Be that as it may. There can be no safe presumption other than this observed fact that the government can do better than the market in matter of allocation, division and distribution (be that 'goods' or 'rights').

---

[115] To quote:

> *I think that some egalitarian theory, or of the Rawls-Sen-Dworkin-Arneson-Cohen variety, is needed to justify the Marxian accusation that workers are unjustly treated under capitalism. It may be unjust, for example, for any small group to own a factory, if, in a market economy, that makes the equalization of opportunity impossible. Or the method by which the capitalist came to acquire the factory may have been unjust. In either case, we need a deeper theory (Roemer, 1996, p. 9).*

The Part – II is an exercise in application of concepts and theoretical-philosophical frameworks to the case of societies and economies of South Asia. This part of the thesis deals with the empirical features of social and economic existence of populations and the attendant features of public policy interventions in South Asia. In matter of methodology of description and analysis, there is a switch over from the conceptual framework to analytical-empirical framework. The Part – II of the thesis comprises of the present chapter and the eighth chapter. This part comprises of this chapter on 'Economic Existence in South Asia' as well as the next chapter - 8 on 'Social Existence in South Asia'. The description and analysis in these two chapters are based on use of a method of application of an analytical-empirical framework.

In the present chapter, the description and analysis is cast in terms of textual arguments and the tables of empirical data in the analytical-empirical framework. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the elements of the analytical–empirical framework. The sources of data and information are the published aggregate secondary quantitative and qualitative ones. In the second section, a discussion is set on the characteristics of economic policy and reformism history in south Asia. The third section is devoted to bringing into prominence the distressing phenomenon of deprivation, poverty (exclusion) and inequity in the region. A case study of India is also attempted. In the fourth section, the principal characteristics and features of the region of south Asia in brief is furnished. The chapter concludes with a brief commentary on the status with regard to the agrarian economic justice. A part of the third objective of the thesis is addressed, and a part of the second hypothesis is tested in this chapter.

In the concrete, applied and economic context of South Asian agrarianism based on practices of hybrid moralities that have guided the economic actions of private individual human populations as well as public bureaucracy towards 'growth with justice', it is of practical political significance to develop a critique of public reasons, rationalities and economic actions of agencies involved with the amended legislations, reformed policy formulations and creation of novel public organization. The critique ought to be in the direction of sketching the conceptual and otherwise weaknesses and deficiencies of public economic policy as well as social policy structure and processes and analysis of consequences of such policy regimes in terms of actual contemporary states of empirical estimates of poverty, deprivation, exclusion, inequality and asymmetry, and low achievements in matter of education, health, employment, and social security and protection to children, women and elderly in South Asia.

In South Asia, there have been attempts at bringing about the manifest equality through public endeavour and instituting schemes of redistribution of seed, land, water and food (income) among the rural populace. The method of developing the critique the prevailing practices and public policies of '*growth with justice*' in countries of the region is based on compilation of public documents on those social and economic facts which help to establish the critique.

Beginning with the utilitarian public morality and attendant practices under the framework of colonial British empire, the myriad of millions of private actions and a number of public policy actions of the governments of the region in recent years have been influenced by the hybrid moralities of the 'goods' of economic growth and development and human rights to equities and transitional justice – the national slogans of '*growth with justice*'. In the last six to seven decades in South Asia, the millions of episodes of isolated, cooperative and group intentional actions of private individual-citizens as well as planned collective public actions of the bureaus of the governments in the framework of hybrid public moralities of attaining growth with (social) (distributive) justice have been motivated and justified by the instrumental as well as purposive rationalities of choosing the best means to realize the ends of increase in national income.

A combination of instrumental and purposive private rationality of individuals and public rationality of bureaucracy and other organs of the national governments of the region have been in operation. In south Asia, such myriad of actions have ensued in good, beneficial and desirable consequences of fast rates of multiplication of aggregate volume of material consumable and investible produces. In a long saga of public practical reasons of negative actions towards elimination of poverty and inequality and positive actions towards creation of gainful employment, productive assets and sustainable income for the needy, South Asia however continues to be characterised as a region under distress with the largest concentration of poverty of the globe. It has the lowest per capita income of all developing regions in the world. Nearly two percent of global gross domestic product is produced but the region has the lowest per capita income of all developing regions. With such a stunted per capita income base, it supports nearly half of the poor of the world.

Agrarian crisis, rural distress, dismal spread of the Green Revolution technology in the eastern region of India and spiralling prices in all countries are only manifestation of declining human status of the toiling labour and peasantry in south Asia. Economic prosperity has thus been accompanied with distress, social exclusion, poverty and deprivation for a considerable number of people in South Asia. Rights to the secure livelihoods and decent life for millions of populations have been a casualty. While mass poverty, malnutrition and food insecurity still inflicting a majority of rural populace with a 'never-say-die' attitude at the backdrop of increasing agricultural cereal and non-cereal productivity and production, there has of late been public endorsement of the fact of country-wide agrarian distress and state-specific suicide trend of farmers in India.

7.1. Analytical-Empirical Methodology

It is a framework of analysis of empirical data and information of countries pertaining to South Asia from a few selected sources and from the point of view of an egalitarian rule of distribution of resources, commodities and human capacities in the countryside of south Asia.

The analytical-empirical framework comprises of an empirical critique of the existing justice practices of countries in the region, which in turn is based on the evaluation of actual prevalent conditions of private and public action as contrasted with a potential condition that could obtain if based on a correct equity/equality rules guiding the procedures of distribution of equalisandum across all rural producers by the government.

The conceptual framework guides the empirical analysis, and an empirical model is a reference in making assessment of the observed conditions in south Asia in our study. The conceptual design and theoretical constructs of the part – I of the thesis acts as backdrop in initiating the criteria of evaluation and a critique of concrete private and public observed actions regarding social development and agrarian justice so far followed and implemented in south Asia.

Data-Sources and Analysis Techniques

The sources of data and information in the present study are the ones that are mostly published and public. These are second-hand in nature, already framed, tabulated and organized. All such data are however analyzed, arranged and synthesized to harmonize with the conceptual framework as well as empirical-analytical framework. A field visit to either of the countries of south Asia to collect the primary data and information is not at all the data-source in the present work.

The secondary data comprises of concepts, categories, illustrations, paradigms and theories in the standard published books, articles of journals and memoirs, policy variables and public measures of government, core ideologies of the schools of economic and philosophic thoughts and other multiple disciplines and branches of knowledge, quantitative data of international surveys, national sample surveys and case studies pertaining to the south Asian countries.

A sample of data and information that pertains to distribution of resources, commodities, income and human capacities are chosen for tracing the circumstances of agrarian justice in

the countries of south Asia. There are sufficient amount of published secondary information on the themes of poverty, exclusion and inequalities available in the reports of international surveys, national sample surveys and case studies pertaining to the south Asian countries. In the present work, these second-hand published public data and information are reorganized and reframed to suit the purpose of the thesis. My own published papers and books are also a source of facts and figures.

There is but a constraint. A number of profound researches in south Asia point it out however that the "statistical infrastructure" of the south Asian region is in need of revamping to make it better. Though rich and systematic as far as the collection, tabulation and presentation of data is concerned, the income statistics is not sufficient enough in the region. There is further a dire need to compile the statistics on economic surplus – both actual and potential amount – at the aggregate level of this region.

In the framework of analytical-empirical method of study, the techniques of analysis are characterized by the uses of percentages, averages, tabulations of data, graphs and a couple of case-studies pertaining to individual countries of the region under study. The analytical technique is one based on juxtaposition of tables of data with the conceptual design.

Model of the Critique

In South Asia, the doctrine and practices of agrarianism has a history. The autonomous and publicly planned economic initiatives have been the main pillars of the structure of justice practices in individual countries of the region. South Asia carries the baggage of the legacy of colonial economic past. The colonial legacy survives with a vengeance. On the basis of scholastic and historical arguments put forth by the Evangelists (English and European Christian missionaries) and the advocates of utilitarianism, all the countries of south Asia have been subjected to strong British influence and establishment of institutions of utilitarian values (Veron, 2008, p. 21). Accordingly, the colonial policy paradigm was oriented to establish these institutions till the far end of the Indian subcontinent countryside.

All these state intervention in agriculture, and they were the district administrators and officially sponsored foreign experts and surveyors brought from Britain and elsewhere in Europe who were considered the repository of knowledge about Indian agriculture, and therefore, its principal reformers in the countryside. A regime of public policy of the past has induced economic growth and development in south Asia. South Asia inherited both the positive and negative legacies of 18th and 19th century colonial emancipation as well as colonial exploitation.

Map – 7.1

Map of South Asia: Location of Countries

Being a region of mostly democratically elected governments over the last few decades, a majority of countries have shared variously the public moralities of creation of public goods, utilities and welfare and the public moralities of restoring the privileges and rights to

life, liberty and property for the masses in recent few decades. A number of attempts at agrarian reforms have been witnessed. Crucial public policy initiatives as motivated by a sort of hybrid morality of welfare and rights has been in the direction of instituting land reforms, credit reforms and marketing reforms in the countryside so as to minimise the deprivations, exclusion and social insecurity. Attempts have also been made in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and recently, Nepal and Bhutan to institute a sort of transitional justice to undo the harms and injuries caused by concentration of land in the hands of large estate, landlord farms and princely states.

All these have not been successful, however. While growth with justice has been the stated national objective in most countries of the region, there has been a priority accorded to multiple set of actions towards accelerating the economic growth in the last six to seven decades in all countries of South Asia. The private individual doctrines based theoretical reasoning of policy-makers and public organizational actions and practices had been characterised by a number of weaknesses and deficiencies, and those were revealed in macroeconomic instabilities in the 1970s and 1980s, requiring the structural adjustment programmes and liberalisations of sectors of economy, including agriculture. Along with the purposive actions of private individual farmers and labourers towards securing a livelihood and a bit of a margin of profit in agriculture, such public bureaucratised and planned actions had been comparatively more oriented towards increasing the productivity and production rather than transitional and distributive justice in the countryside.

7.2. Economic Policy Framework

It was the colonial rule that provided the foundation for economic growth in the framework of traditional social structure of the region. All throughout the nineteenth century British colonialism in Indian sub-continent[116], the official catch words were: improvements, knowledge and welfare in the countryside through appropriate forms of government, taxation and administration of justice. These were the principal categories, through which Jeremy Bentham (1789) and James S Mill (1817) as the champions and advocates of the classical English utilitarianism analysed and advised the rulers in India.

[116] The British colonial system of rule began since 1765 in India and 1815 in Sri Lanka. Nepal came under British influence in 1815, while Maldives was a British protectorate since 1887 and Bhutan was a British protectorate since 1910.

The colonial administrators and bureaucrats found, supposedly to their dismay, the absence of the notions and concepts of private property, money and capital and a number of so-called 'civilised' institutions in the south Asian countryside (Mill, 1817).

In the colonial state project of creation of the knowledge about agriculture, they were not the peasantry and common masses themselves but the paternalistic government officials and expert-specialists who came to define agriculture and rural. They also found to their utter surprise the deficiency of scientific agricultural knowledge in India as well (Robb, 1988). The British colonial-imperialist public policy regime was devoted to the project of creation of modern knowledge about agriculture and land, and accordingly, the indigenous farmers and planters were compulsively exposed and made to hobnob with the imported scientists and experts. The attitude of inviting and seeking expert advice continued throughout the colonial era as an obstinate feature of the interface with the 'rural'. The basic structure of south Asian agriculture, irrigation, and cooperation departments in government, and also the agricultural research and college education institutions across the erstwhile subcontinent were subsequently established (Brown, 1971, p.2).

As elsewhere, national plans and economic policies in the Indian subcontinent had very much focussed on exchange and markets. In all countries of the region, the public intervention in agricultural markets has been pervasive. The sovereign post-colonial budding nation-states of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and later Bangladesh continued the tradition, and therefore, nationalist public interest was evident in the working of institutional practices and the changes brought in the agriculture. It is arguable that most national regimes around the world became more self-contained in the 1950s and 1960s, and South Asia was no exception (Robb, 1988; Ludden, 2005).

According to David Ludden (2005), a national development regime had already emerged inside British colonial India (including areas of present Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) in early twentieth century, specifically by 1920s in the backdrop of beginning of the modern age of vast labour migration to major sites of capital investment by 1880s (Ludden, 2005, pp.4043-46). According to Samuel Lieberman (1980), the British seemed to have disturbed the social framework of agriculture and left little impression on production

technology. Productivity was at its low. A sort of progressive proletarianization occurred. The rural society was in a state of flux. The village economy was weakened. The cultivators were exposed to the market based insecurities, and the subsistence options were narrowed down. The customary forms of reciprocity were at its erosion, and the landlord-tenant ties lost their protective content. Though the movement was towards a new social structure but the transformation was not complete. A sort of amorphousness and diffuseness characterized the new modes of organization.

In 1915, the Report of the Committee on Cooperation in India was out. According to the 1928 Royal Commission of Agriculture, the Rothamstead Research Station (1843) and the Cirencester Agricultural College (1845) were at the forefront of what might be called, in retrospect, a nineteenth century English invention in India. It earned the distinction in the field of application of scientific investigation rather than empirical methods to agriculture (Robb, 1988, pp. 206-222). Be that as it may. The demographers working in the 1930s and 1940s believed that a tentative linkage existed between fertility decline and structural changes in the economy. In the dual economy models of Arthur Lewis and others of 1950s, agriculture was supposed to perform the role of contributing 'men and nourishment to the burgeoning industrial society'. It was believed that major investments in agriculture were to be ruled out because it would have stimulated population growth.

The economies of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka] share the legacy of British colonial rule. The present-day legal systems and administrative and political structures of each still 'exhibit striking similarities to those of the British colonial period'. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as parts of the former British Empire in the subcontinent share a common administrative, legal and economic heritage. While the legacy of British colonial policies that post-colonial south Asian countries inherited was a boon in establishing a tradition of 'fiscal conservatism', a modern civil service structure, and advanced nature of industrialization of colonial India relative to world norms (Hossain, Islam and Kibria, 1999, p. 4), the British colonialism had also been instrumental in the disruption of the process of domestic industrialization, ruin of traditional handicrafts and artisan units and indebtedness and de-peasantization of rural mass. The consolidation of the

national development regime was triggered by a set of economic policies that were decisively short of ay concerns for fairness, equity and justice in the countryside.

Broadly speaking, South Asia as it stands today has been shaped by two elements: the erstwhile colonial history, and the recent cold war history. There have been 5 models of agricultural development in post-colonial south Asia. Such models have been followed from time to time since early 1950s. The frontier model has stipulated an expansion of the cultivated area through clearing the new land and increasing the irrigation. The diffusion model has been based on creation of a network of extension agents so as to transfer technology from the developed countries to the region. It was practised in the 1950s. The high pay-off input model was experimented on 1960s. It was based on introduction of High Yielding Varieties of seeds of wheat and rice in south Asian agriculture. The induced innovation model was based on treating technical and institutional changes as an endogenous factor. The conservation model has been based on the prescription of an integrated system of crop-livestock husbandry. The urban industrial impact model has given a prominent place to growth in the industrial sector so as to pull labour out of agriculture. Side by side, institutional reforms pertaining to land, credit and marketing have gone on.

In retrospect, there is hardly any doubt that the national and local strategies of private individual and public collective actions have created the condition of self-sufficiency in food grains in India and general affluence across South Asia terms of availability and enhanced output of many non-agricultural goods and services. Under the aegis of mostly state-led regulations and control, the orchestration of the modern large-scale industrialization and import-substitution events through the decades since fifties and sixties of the last century have created the outcomes of fast and high pace of economic growth and social development. The governments in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have allowed the import-substituting industrialization strategy, patterns of extensive state intervention in financial and labour markets, significant reliance on state-owned enterprises and a predilection for detailed planning and regulation.

It was also believed that developments could provide conditions favourable to fertility decline in rural settings[117]. The inspiration came from the experiences of developments in Japan and Taiwan (Lieberman, 1980). In contrast, the gloomy opinion has been to the effect of asserting that the social and economic characteristics of human populations and geographical spaces of human settlements have not however decisively changed and transformed so much that someone could not move a few hundred years backward or forward in time and find conditions familiar enough.

While the green revolution that began in the late nineteenth century in Japan was carried through in a small-farm setting, there arrived the green revolution technology on the large farms to assure that improved varieties of food grains and the rest of the package of inputs ad agricultural practices in the 1960s in South Asia. The miracle new varieties of seeds have performed much as promised in selected areas of Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and helped to stabilize food output at higher aggregate levels. Since the 1970s, agriculture was no more seen to be stagnant and unresponsive to policy initiatives. In short, there has been a sort of optimism regarding the future of South Asia.

In the framework of agricultural-food provisioning system in most of the countries of south Asia, the distribution of food grains made through a network of rationing and fair price shops at fixed prices has also been pervasive. The system[118] has been supported by large

---

[117] The critical assessment has been captured in the following profound remark:

> *Perhaps it will prove useful to keep in mind two features of the South Asian landscape: first, the six-millennium history of the civilization and, second, its sheer demographic fecundity. On the face of it, neither is consistent with the notion that we are dealing with a society that sagacious onlookers must unanimously judge a transient failure of history; nor does either feature imply that we are witnessing the horrific last hours of an enfeebled people's death throes. The Spanish, Italians, and Japanese will soon disappear from the planet, applying a demographic time scale, but not the Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis. South Asia's longevity and procreativeness are hardly signals of a steep societal nosedive (Adams, 2001, p. 157).*

[118] Food as a commodity has a high organic component of the production and consumption processes (Finn, 1994); it involves laws of biology. Food has nutritional value for human beings; it is not like another thing that just meets the want. The production of food is affected by natural conditions of temperature, rainfall and overall climate; it involves a play of nature that is not completely amenable to manipulations by science and technology.

Agricultural-food system is a system of social provisions of raw food, biotech food and industrial food. The social provisioning of food involves necessarily a chain of activities from production to

scale public stock holdings ad monopolistic control of import and export of food grains. Similar arrangements had been prevalent in the markets for modern agricultural inputs. Import of fertilizers has been a public monopoly. Prices of fertilizers have been fixed by the governments. A cost plus pricing at the domestic factory gate implied a huge subsidy to the fertilize industry. Irrigation water from large surface irrigation projects has been supplied almost free of charge. Such traditions have continued till date. It has however witnessed increasingly lower and lower effective coverage. Bangladesh has been first to abolish the rationing system, followed by Sri Lanka and Pakistan later. In Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the pre-liberalization practices of public intervention in agricultural markets were similar to those in India in most respects. While all countries have undergone significant reforms in agricultural markets since 1980s, the movement towards completely free markets has been very slow and marginal (Ahmed, 2002, pp. 3-6). In India, there have been leakages in the public distribution system, and the beneficiaries have been the non-target population..

To be precise, there had been deficient policies through the ages in the past and what has as yet not changed is the deficiency in policies that are targeted specifically at eradicating hunger and augmenting incomes at the lowest levels. There is today a whole lot more food available globally than the actual requirements of mankind. It is also rather much easier today to address food emergencies very quickly by virtue of global connectivity. In such a case, it is tragic to allow the incidence of widespread hunger in the world. Poverty and hunger are but here before our sight in sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia. There is an industrial food system introduced in the world. The industrial system requires food to make a journey from farm-fields to the shops of traders, food processors, stores and

---

preservation, preparation, packaging, transportation, delivery to the table and a sequence of actions that are in the nature of collective action – a composite of actions of farmers, plant genetists, chemical process engineers, microbiologists, biotechnologists, nutritionist, capitalist, bureaucrats, traders, middlemen commission agents, and consumers. In the chain of activities, constituting collective actions, the provisioning of food is a mixture of the social, the natural (or organic) and the technical (or inorganic). These three are mixed up to such an extent that separating them becomes almost impossible.

It is matter of investigation as to how the actors, entities and phenomena interact with each other (Murdoch, 1994). The political economy of social provisioning of agricultural-food is distinct from the political economy of agriculture. No other areas of hybrid actions of human beings are a better exemplar as the governance of agricultural-food social provisioning system in the region.

supermarkets, and in this journey, a third and a half of all the food is produce is discarded. What is lost and discarded is enough to feed the world's hungry six times over.

Recently, the US experienced its worst drought in 2012, which, combined with lack of rains in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, significantly raised world maize, soybean, and wheat prices. The increased frequency and intensity of weather events is making it harder to produce enough food for the world's growing population, which, combined with projected rising demand and the inherent slow responsiveness of the food system, is leading to high food price volatility.

7.3. Shortages, Malnutrition and Poverty (Hunger)

Presently, South Asia has the potential to produce and supply a number of non-cereal food stuffs to the temperate Europe. It has also the potential to act as comparatively huge unexploited market to absorb a number of globally produced and supplied handy-food and non-food provisions. It has the world's largest working-age population and almost a quarter of the world's middle-class consumers. There are tremendous possibilities of augmentation of human welfare and the 'goods' - the 'goods' of supply of not only the cereals but also non-cereal food stuffs so as to meet the requirements of both domestic and global consumers on board.

South Asia has of late been one of the fastest growing regions in the world. Going back to the nineties of twentieth century, the outcome of sum total of private and public actions has been the growth rate of gross domestic product at 5.6 percent in the region. It surpassed the world average of 2.6 percent - second only to the East and Southeast Asia at 7.0 percent during 1990-2000. The annual average growth rate of the gross domestic product in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has varied tight from the beginning of 1990s and continued to fluctuate through the first decade of the new millennium (refer to table – 7.1). The growth rate of regional gross domestic product at market prices was 7.3 percent during 2003-2012; it was 5.0 percent in 2012 and 4.7 percent in 2013 (World Bank, 2014).

Table – 7.1

Rate of Growth in Gross Domestic Product
in South Asia: 1991-2005 (in percentage)

Countries	Annual Average Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate		
	1991-94	1995-96	2000-05
Bangladesh	4.3	4.7	5.4
India	3.9	6.8	7.7
Pakistan	5.5	6.1	4.8
Sri Lanka	5.2	3.8	5.3

Source: Adapted from Hossain, et al., 2010, p. 23

Agriculture as a sector of economic activities and home to human populace grew but at a modest rate. In south Asia, the growth rate of agricultural sector had been 2.9 percent in 1960s, 1.7 percent in 1970s and 2.6 percent in 1980s and 3.2 percent in 1990s. In the early years of twenty-first century, the growth rate of agricultural sector in the region began with 3.0 percent annually (Christiansen et al, 2006). In this backdrop, there has emerged a gap in the per capita income between rural and urban areas and between agricultural and non-agricultural workers.

Notwithstanding all such positive features, a considerable number of people are as yet poor, deprived and excluded in terms of access to resource, commodity and money income. Their agential capability and capacity to produce and reproduce a material livelihood is narrow and condensed. Material deprivations, social exclusions and structural injustices are extensive. There have been decisive failures of public policies in addressing poverty, inequality and incapability of human beings in the countryside over the years.

With GNP per capita at 1,474 US dollar, about 571 million people in south Asia still but survive on less than 1.25 US dollar a day. Despite an impressive two-decade decline, extreme poverty remains high in South Asia. In 2004, there were then 445.2 million poor in the region, which represented some 31 percent of the aggregate population of the region. The total number of South Asians living below poverty line was 600 million in 2007. In the global perspective, it is the home of almost 44 percent of the poor of the world, with more

than 200 million people living in slums and half a billion people going without electricity. In addition, the region continues to be characterized by widespread shortage of the safe drinking water, the incidence of high malnutrition and food insecurity, deprived state of the health and hygiene. It also has the lowest rate of access to sanitation facilities, standing at 36 percent. Moreover, it is a region with several fragile states that has implications for livelihood of human beings.

A critique of prevalent agrarian economic policies of justice and fairness is warranted since such policies have affected the conditions of lives of human populaces in south Asia over the years gone by. Crucial is the profound observation: the accumulated material benefits of economic growth and material development across the last century have not percolated down to the population at the bottom and such gains has not been properly and fairly distributed across the human population. The material economic conditions of existence are the conditions of the private and public policies affecting the livelihood, capability and prospect of a decent life of rural populace, and such conditions of existence of populace is a reminder that while the so-called 'trickle-down effect' of economic growth has variously failed, the opportunity freedom to make the human life go well is up till now quite limited and truncated.

Food Shortages

South Asia harbours the vast economy of India, with a population of more than 1.2 billion, which ranks fifth in the world in terms of industrial production, on the one hand and also the tiny economy of Maldives, with a population of about 300, 000, which is an economy primarily based on fishing and tourism, on the other. In late 1980s, a prominent economist, John Hicks (1989) noted that there was a time when a number of well-known economists predicted that countries such as India and Sri Lanka would be the economic success stories of the post-Second World War period (Hossain, et al., 2010, p.3). It did not happen, however.

Being a region of a number of states of very disparate size and complexity, it bears the dubious distinction of being home to more than 400 million of the world's poorest people.

It also accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the world's malnourished children (Haq and Haq 1998:14). In the granaries of public organizations, the buffer stock of food grains has been considerable however the access of hungry to it has decisively been worse, giving credence to the proverb 'Packed Storage-houses and Empty Stomach'. In 2007, there were 820 million hungry people in the world, and 450 millions hungry people resided in south Asia. The World Food summits of 2002 and 2009 highlighted that more than a billion people suffered from hunger in 2009. The Global Hunger Index of 2010 showed that the endemic hunger continued to affect a large section of the people in India, and India was in the category of "alarming".

In south Asia, the harvest area under the cereals has been 1,24,120,000 hectares, and with an average yield of 25,244 kilograms per hectare the production of cereals had been 3,13,329,000 tons in 2005. The production of cereals increased to 3,44,020,000 tons in 2009. With an yield of paddy standing at 31,175 kilograms per hectare, the production was 1,81,251,000 tons, and with an yield of wheat standing at 26,164 kilograms per hectare the production was 94,472,000 tons in the year 2004. In the region, the average value added in agriculture as percent of gross domestic product was 18.5 in 2009. The annual per capita supply of cereal was merely 956 kilograms in 1999, for example (refer to tables – 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4).

Agriculture ought to provide adequate amount of cereals and foodgrains to the masses and the nutrition level must substantially be raised to a level that should in turn provide resilience of incomes and employment for most of the world's poor, 75 percent of whom live in rural areas and most of whom rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. At the same time, widening rural-urban income disparities has been increasing the risk of social and political tensions. More exacting standards continue to pose challenges and opportunities for producers and especially smallholder farmers to compete in growing high-value markets. All these trends continue to call for greater attention to agriculture to ensure it fully contributes to food security, poverty reduction, and green growth. Higher short-term food price volatility is increasingly becoming a longer-term phenomenon.

Table – 7.2

Harvest Area, Output and Yield of Cereals in South Asia: 2005

Country	Harvest Area of Cereals in Hectares (Unit 1000)	Production of Cereals in Metric Tons (Unit 1000)	Yield of Cereals (Kilograms per Hectare)
Bangladesh	11,729.6	3,9232.0	3,3447
Bhutan	63.9	97.3	15,242
India	95,870.0	2,33,360.0	24,341
Nepal	3,344.4	7,590.6	22,697
Pakistan	12,325.0	30,508.5	24,753
Sri Lanka	787.3	2,541.4	32,280
All Countries	1,24,120.2	3,13,329.8	25,244.1

Source: http://www.fao.org quoted From SBSAD (Statistical Bulletin of SAARC Agricultural Data) (2005), "Table 104 and 105 of Chapter 3: Agriculture & Food Trade" in Mohammad Abdullah (Ed.), Compilation, SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC), Dhaka

Table –7.3

Rice and Wheat Production in South Asia, 2004

Country	Paddy and Wheat Production and Yield Particulars			
	Production of Paddy in Metric Tons (Unit 1000)	Yield of Paddy (Kilograms per hectare)	Production of Wheat in Metric Tones (Unit 1000)	Yield of Wheat (Kilo-grams per Hectare)
Bangladesh	37,910	34,464	1,253.0	19,523
Bhutan	45	22,500	4.8	11,707
India	129,000	30,496	72,060.0	27,070
Maldives	--	--	--	--
Nepal	4,300	27,574	1,387.2	20,873
Pakistan	7,486	29,910	19,767.0	24,177
Sri Lanka	2,510	33,220	--	--
All Countries	1,81,251	31,175.5	94,472	26,164.8

Source: http://www.fao.org quoted from SBSAD (Statistical Bulletin of SAARC Agricultural Data) (2005), "Table 104 and 105 of Chapter 3: Agriculture & Food Trade" in Mohammad Abdullah (Ed.), Compilation, SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC), Dhaka

With regard to the supply and accessibility to food, the public distribution system, originating as it was during the colonial past has been in all countries in the region in a shocking shape. **India** has been drafting a food security law which has aimed at fighting hunger and extreme poverty. At one time, it sought to make the families below the poverty line (BPL) entitled to 25 kilograms of wheat or rice at rupees 3 per kilogram. The per capita

annual availability of rice in India has reached the lowest 64 kilograms in 2008. The requirement per year per person has however been 84 kilograms. Though there had been lack of appropriate measures of food requirements and also lack of consensus on identifying the below-Poverty-Line people at the state level, nearly 720 million people in India needed food security (Barah, 2012, p. 2).

According to the report on state of Food Insecurity in the World, the IFAD, WFP and FAO has concluded that

1. The total number of undernourished people in India during the period 2006-08 was 224.6 million, while that for China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan during the same time period were 129.6 million, 41.4 million, 3.9 million and 42.8 million, respectively.
2. The total number of undernourished people in India increased from 167.1 million during 1995-97 to 208.0 million during 2000-02 and further to 224.6 million during 2006-08.
3. The proportion of undernourished in total population in India during 2006-08 was 19 percent, while that for China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan during the same time period were 10 percent, 26 percent, 20 percent and 25 percent, respectively.
4. The proportion of undernourished in total population in India increased from 17 percent during 1995-97 to 20 percent during 2000-02 but fell marginally to 19 percent during 2006-08.
5. During the world food crisis of 2006–08, domestic prices of rice and wheat were very stable in China, India and Indonesia because of government controls on exports of these crops.
6. Public research institutes in countries such as Brazil, China and India are providing an increasing share of public goods in the area of agricultural research.
7. In India, farmers under-invest in bullocks due to volatility in income.
8. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of undernourished was essentially constant in Asia (an increase of 0.1 percent), while it increased by 8 percent in Africa.
9. Prices of food commodities on world markets, adjusted for inflation, declined substantially from the early 1960s to the early 2000s, when they reached a historic low.

They increased slowly from 2003 to 2006 and then surged upwards from 2006 to the middle of 2008 before declining in the second half of that year.

10. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2011–2020 projects that world prices for rice, wheat, maize and oilseeds in the five years from 2015/16 to 2019/20 will be higher in real terms by 40, 27, 48 and 36 percent, respectively, than in the five years from 1998/99 to 2002/03.

In India, food is the largest sector with a large number and variety of retailers. There has been growth of the organised food and grocery retail sector quite fast in India. In 2001, the food retail outlets numbering 36,82,900 accounted for about one-third of the total retail outlets whose aggregate number was 1,11,65,000 in the country. While the agribusiness network has witnessed a spurt in the country, the performance of fruit, vegetable, dairy and poultry processing industry has not matched the feat of non-food sector of agriculture; there has been need of increasing the installed capacity and capacity utilisation in this industry. There were almost 6000 industrial units involved in processing the fruits and vegetables (IASRI&ICAR, 2008).

Table – 7.4

Agriculture and Cereals in South Asia: 2005-2011

Countries/Particulars With Years Of Observation In Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Agriculture Value Added (Percent Of GDP) (2009)	17.8	21.6	18.7	33.8	12.6	17.6	5.0	18.5
Agricultural Productivity (Value Added Per Worker In 1995 Dollars) (1998-2000)	397	630	296	188	453	..	..	407.3
Annual Per Capita Supply Of Cereal (Kilograms) (1999)	155.6	158.7	189.1	186.3	150.2	..	116.4	956.3
Cereal Yield (In Kilograms Per Hectare (1980)	1350	1613	2005	1687	2501	1425	850	11432
Cereal Production (10000 Metric Tons) (2009)	24677	3837	4681	811	379	16	0.38	34402
Cereal Exports (1000 Metric Tons) (2008)	6499	3205	8.8	5.0	149	0.2	0.0	9867
Food Export As Percentage Of Merchandise Export (2009)	8.0	17.0	7.0	25.0	26.0	6.0	98.0	9.0
Cereal Imports (1000 Metric Tons) (2008)	22	1860	2287	50	1144	8	52	5423
Food Import As Percentage Of Merchandise Import (2009)	4.0	11.0	23.0	15.0	16.0	15.0	16.0	7.0
Total Availability Of Cereals (1000 Metric Tons) (1999)	173557	25730	27425	5178	3121	..	34141	269152

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; MHDC-HDSA, 2010-2011, pp. 155-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 216-22

India has one of the largest numbers of hungry and malnourished people. The proportion of undernourished in total population in India during 2006-08 was 19 percent, while that for

China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan during the same time period were 10 percent, 26 percent, 20 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Average calorie intake per diem in rural area India has declined from 2309 kilo calorie in 1983 to 2011 kilo calorie in 1998. Per capita yearly net availability of foodgrains has declined from 199.0 kilograms during 1897-1902 to 141.50 kilograms in 2002-03. Micronutrient deficiencies have resulted in vitamin A deficiency (VAD), iron deficiency, usually assessed as anaemia and iodine deficiency disorders (IDDs). After registering impressive gains during 1990–92 and the mid-1990s, the progress in reducing hunger in India has stalled since about 1995–97.

Pakistan has been importing significant amount of food grains like wheat, sugar, edible oils, pulses and other grains to meet the domestic shortfall in consumption. The high food inflation during 2007-2010 had driven around eleven million people below the poverty line. Pakistan has never developed a food security strategy. The utter lack of safe drinking water and weak sanitation facilities has always resulted in poor food absorption and utilization in Pakistan over the years. The flood of 2010 had further worsened the poor food security situation (MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 1-9). The continuing inflation has been disproportionately affecting certain segments of the society in Pakistan – landless workers, daily wage; labourers in the agricultural sector and domestic workers of low income.

In 2008, wheat price in Quetta and Peshawar increased by over hundred percent and eighty percent respectively compared to about 30 percent and 40 percent increase in Karachi and Lahore. In 2010, the heavy monsoon that struck resulted in flooding and causing large scale destruction all across the country. The flood also damaged health and educational infrastructure - 7600 schools and 436 health facilities. Destruction of property and loss of livelihood also forced 8.1 million people to migrate out of the flood affected areas. Almost forty percent of these were internally displaced people. In short, the food shortages have ever plagued a large mass of population in the country, and the situation has remained the same more or less over the years. It is in view of such situations that Pakistan initiated a number of programmes to help the poor. The safety net income transfers consisted of three schemes: "*Zakat*", "*Pakistan Bait-ul-Maal (PMB)*" and the recently established "*Benazir Income Support programme (BISP)*". Zakat and USHER schemes have been a cash transfer programme that have provided a monthly subsistence allowance of rupees 500 and

rehabilitating grant of up to rupees 5000 to the needy and poor. These have but not been highly successful in ensuring food security on a comprehensive scale.

In addition to food, water has been a necessity. According the projections, per capita water availability is projected to decrease from 5,000 cubic meters in 1951 to estimated 659 cubic meters by 2025. In 2009 alone, 200,000 children died because diarrhoea disease. The unemployment rate in Pakistan had gradually increased over the years from being 3.5 percent of the total labour forces in the 1980s to 4.9 percent in the 1990s, which further added to the situation of vulnerability with regard to access to food and drinking water in the country. It is presently around 5.5 percent in 2008-09 (MHDC-HDSA 2010).

Bangladesh by virtue of its geographical location has been prone to flood, draught and cyclones. There are almost 40 percent of population who are below poverty line. The availability of food is dependent on imports in addition to domestic production. After the disaster of flood of 1998, Bangladesh imported 3.5 million tonnes of rice and wheat to cope up with the shortages. The increase in income inequality was moderate in the 1980s but it has become worse in the 1990s. There were many programmes initiated, for example, “Food for Work”, Food for education”, “Vulnerable Groups Development”.

The food insecurity in Bangladesh has largely originated from the natural calamities like flood, cyclones and draughts which have often visited the country. The increase in food prices during 2007 and 2008 have impoverished 2.5 million people and left 6.8 million people malnourished in the country. In 2008, an additional 7.5 million people became food insecure in Bangladesh. South Asian women constitute the highest percentage of women suffering from acute energy deficiency (MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 1-9).

Bangladesh has comprehensive portfolio of both food and cash based social safety net programmes. In fact, there are fifty eight such programmes, including Bangladesh Rural Advancement Community (BRAC). Public Food Distribution system (PFDS) has changed significantly over the last two decades. The number of rural poor declined from about 50.3 million people in 1983-84 to about 45.8 million people in 2005. The number of urban poor, however, increased by about 4.1 million people in the same period. During the severe flood

of 2004, the remittance sent by the migrant workers was particularly useful when livelihood was disrupted and houses and properties were destroyed (MHDC-HDSA 2010).

In the recent history of south Asia, shortages have been pervasive. In Bangladesh, there have been shortages of basic utilities, such as water, gas and electricity; only 40 percent of population has access to electricity currently. Nearly 40 million people remain vulnerable to exposure to unsafe levels of arsenic in drinking water and food. Its rivers are losing navigability because of intense water pollution. A nation-wide referendum was organized in 1990 to set the agenda of bringing an amendment to the Constitution in Bangladesh so as to shift from a presidential form to a parliamentary form of government in Bangladesh (Percy, 1992). In 2009 election in Bangladesh (that was organized after a two-year long hiatus of a caretaker government), the campaign promise was to promote "Digital Bangladesh" reaching to rural areas by 2021. The Chittagong Hill Tracts is one of the troubled spots in the world. For allowing the transport of heavy machinery and turbines via Bangladesh's Ashuganj seaport for an upcoming power project in landlocked Tripura state in India, a joint communiqué between India and Bangladesh allowed India to have access to Chittagong port and allowed Bangladesh to have access to markets in Nepal and Bhutan (D'Costa, 2011).

In South Asia, the average per capita consumption of food items has been quite low (refer to table – 7.5), and these have not improved substantially over the years. Whatever arguments might be forwarded with regard to the thesis regarding the shifts in consumption pattern towards the high value food items and manufactured foods, the facts remain that traditional items of food grains has been in shortages with inflation increasing over4 the years in all countries of the region. It is specifically since 2008 when the food, fuel and financial crisis have visited the south Asian countries that the food insecurity for a vast majority of the South Asians has become a major concern. The challenges have been the declining availability of food, run away food inflation, violent conflict, high level of job losses, and the adverse effect of climate change on food security. Access to adequate supplies of food has been a more severe problem than the availability of food in the region.

Table – 7.5

Per Capita Consumption of Food Items in
South Asia, 1980-2000 (in Kilograms)

Crops and Plants		Years of Observation		
		1980	1990	2000
1. Foodgrains	Wheat	49.2	57.3	59.4
	Rice	71.4	80.3	76.4
	Other Cereals	30.2	26.5	22.00
	Total Cereals	150.8	164.1	157.8
	Pulses	11.2	12.1	10.1
2. Non-foodgrains	Roots and Tubers	4.5	4.2	4.7
	Edible Oils	5.1	6.4	7.6
	Sugar	19.6	21.7	23.2
	Vegetables	41.7	46.2	51.9
	Fruits	26.0	26.9	35.0
	Milk	42.5	55.8	69.1
	Meat	4.2	5.2	5.3
	Eggs	0.8	1.0	1.5
	Fish	3.5	4.2	5.8

Source: Kumar et *al.,* (chapter - 5) using FAOSTAT data.
Note: The roots and tubers are measured in dry- equivalent

In addition to food shortages and food insecurity for large mass of populations in the countries of the region, South Asia had been notorious for inadequate feeding and caring practices for young children. There were almost 86.0 million children afflicted by malnutrition in south Asia alone in 1995. In total, there were in total 294 million undernourished persons in 1996-98, representing nearly 23 percent of all population of south Asia. At the turn of the century, the average life expectancy was at 63 years – lowest in the entire world. There were 95 infants out of 1000 who used to die before reaching the age of five, and nearly half of the children under the age of five were chronically malnourished. Malnutrition was prominent amongst the vulnerable groups of infants, pre-school children; pregnant and lactating mothers.

Table – 7.6

Underweight Children and Malnourishment
in South Asia: 1960-2007

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia

Underweight Children (Percentage under Five) (1995-2000)	47.0	38.0	48.0	19.0	33.0	19.0	43.0	45.0
Child Malnourished (Weight for Age) (Percentage of Children Under Five) (2006-08)	43.5	31.3	41.3	38.8	21.1	14.1	25.7	41.5
Undernourished People (Number in Millions) (2005-07)	237.7	43.4	41.7	4.7	4.5	3.8	0.0	331.1
Undernourished People as Percentage of Population (2005-07)	21.0	26.0	27.0	16.0	19.0	..	0.7	22.0

Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

Almost 79 million children used to suffer from malnutrition in the year 2000. The region was host to the highest proportion of stunted, underweight and wasted children in the entire world (MHDC, 2002). The number of undernourished persons was 294 millions in 1996-98 which increased to 331 million in 2005-07. The percentage of undernourished persons in population stood at 22.0 during 2005-07. There was one-percentage decline in the undernourished persons in population which was 23.0 during 1996-98. The average percentage of underweight children (under the age of five) was 45.0 during 1995-2000 which has decreased only slightly in the first decade of the millennium (refer to table – 7.6 and table 7.7).

A large chunk of south Asian poor populace and children suffering from the malnutrition are concentrated in India. Almost 300 million were chronically malnourished in the region in 2010. South Asia has one of the highest child malnutrition rates in the world. Out of the estimated 113 million malnourished children in Asia almost 83 million was there in south Asia. Almost 1,53,500 women used to die every year as a result of pregnancy in south Asia at the turn of the century (MHDC-HDSA, 2012).

Table – 7.7

Malnutrition and Undernourishment in South Asia, 1975-1998

Region	Number of Under-nourished Persons in Millions	Percentage Share of Under-nourished in Population	Number of Children under Malnutrition in Millions		
	1996-98	1996-98	1975	1985	1995
South Asia	294	23	90.6 (67.7)	100.1 (61.1)	86.0 (49.1)

Source: World Bank (world Development Report, 2008), 2007; FAO (The State of Food Insecurity in the World), 2000; Smith and Habbad (IFPRI Discussion Paper- 30), 2000

Roughly, almost 42 percent of Indian children under age five suffered from malnutrition. Child malnutrition, measured by comparing a child's weight with that of other children of similar age, reflects a shortfall in food energy, poor feeding practices by mothers, and lack of essential nutrients in the diet. Malnutrition in children often begins at birth, when poorly nourished mothers give birth to underweight babies. Malnourished children develop more slowly, enter school later, and perform less well.

The share of children under five who had been stunted among the poorest quintile had been above fifty percent in Bangladesh and Nepal and reached sixty percent in India. India and Pakistan also had some of the highest infant mortality rates and fewer than five children mortality rates among the poor across all comparators. Of one thousand children born in India's poorest population quintile, it has been projected that almost 82 will keep on dying within twelve months and 117 within five years. In the case of Pakistan, the figures has been projected to be 94 and 120 respectively (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 3).

While the proportion of population in the world suffering from malnourishment was 20 percent in 1990-92, it declined to 16 percent in 2010. In Pakistan, however, the proportion of undernourished increased from 25 percent in 1990-92 to 26 percent in 2005-07; it increased from 29.6 million people to 43.4 million people. India saw the increase in the number of malnourished from 172.4 million people to 237.7 million people between 1990-92 and 2005-07. In Nepal the Maoist insurgency and in Pakistan the terrorist attacks have

all contributed in further deteriorating the food security. In recent years the Targeted Public distribution system has led to a high incidence of exclusion of the more vulnerable groups and even a sizeable section of even those whom the government defines as income poor in India. In India, the unprecedented phenomenon of large scale farmers' suicide, amounting to 16,700 in number in the previous decade, is a grim reminder. A continuous rise in prices in recent years has further exposed the poor to deprivation and exclusion in the country.

South Asia has been politically and socially disturbed region over the years. The social strife and political militancy has plagued the region for continuity. The civil war in Sri Lanka and Maoist insurgency in Nepal and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan also contributed to the increasing number of malnourished there. In Blochistan province of Pakistan, a five year spell of draughts during 1997 and 2001 has led to the conflicts between sedentary and migratory pastoral communities over grazing rights to land that had traditionally been shared by both. In Sri Lanka the government initiated the mid-day meal programmes for over 1.5 million school children. The opening up of the private food grains exports from India to Bangladesh in 1994 helped Bangladesh in reducing its reliance on Thailand rice. In south Asia, the health impacts of increasing food insecurity has shown themselves in the poor state of child and maternal nutrition. Iodine deficiency has often led to still births, miscarriages and preventable mental retardation. Vitamin A deficiency has led to blindness and weakening of the immune system's ability to fight malaria, diarrhoea and measles (MHDC-HDSA 2010)

It is in this backdrop of situations that a SAARC Development Fund was launched during the SAARC summit held in 2011in Bhutan. Roughly ninety percent of South Asia's global trade is sea-borne. India has so far settled its maritime boundary with six of the regional states. It has yet to settle its sea boundary with Bangladesh. The principles and methods for delimitation are to be settled. The International Tribunal for Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is attempting to adjudicate Bangladesh's maritime boundary negotiations with India and Myanmar. It is expected that these boundary issues will be resolved within the next three to four years ((Jabed, 2012, pp. 750-1), that will assist to make further inroads towards attaning the food security through free flow of trade and commerce.

Poverty

Poverty has been an endemic phenomenon. Income poverty, inequality in incomes and wealth, and social exclusion have predominated in south Asia. Despite efforts of private human agencies and public bureaucracy over decades, poverty has not been eliminated. In addition, illiteracy has not been wiped out; low mortality, high longevity and recent hygiene have not been achieved; employment guarantees in decent work avenues are yet short of requirement; inequalities in wealth and income have rather magnified and increased in south Asia.

Poverty snatches away the crucial freedom and liberty from the human persons and agency in South Asia. In 2002, about one-third of the population of the region was below the poverty line. There were almost 515 million south Asians living in absolute poverty – constituting 40 percent of the world's poor. Poverty was mostly a rural phenomenon. There was increasing feminisation of poverty and gender inequity (MHDC-HDSA, 2002). In 2008, while 22 percent of aggregate population of south Asia was undernourished, the percentage of underweight children under five years of age was as high as 42. There had been variations across the countries of the region. On different dimension of poverty measurements, the position of Sri Lanka and Bhutan has been comparatively better, the performance in India and Pakistan has been worse.

Towards the close of twentieth century, the percentage of population suffering from multidimensional poverty was as high as 57 in Bangladesh while the same was 53 in India and 49 in Pakistan. There has been more poor and deprived in Pakistan and India in comparison to the smaller countries of the region. The intensity of deprivation in percentage terms was above 50 in Indi, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The percentage of population in severe poverty was in the range of 25, 27 and 28 in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India respectively while the same was low in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan during 2005-09 (refer to table – 7.8).

Poverty is often conceived as not merely a phenomenon of income poverty or consumption deprivation but also shortages of assets. More significantly, it is conceived as structural

injustice and exclusion that is sustained in the ethos of inequalities of opportunities and unjust social order. According to Rahman Sobhan, there is an urgent need to redefine poverty as a process which '*excludes significant segments of the population from opportunities to participate on equitable terms in the opportunities for development and decision making in society'*. The excluded are '*embedded in certain inherited structural arrangements*'. A significant part of exclusion does not derive from the play of market forcesIt originates in the unequal command over both economic and political resources within the society and the unjust nature of a social order which perpetuates these inequities. Such injustice remains pervasive in most societies exposed to endemic poverty and is particularly manifest across South Asia. The structural arrangements are characterised by insufficient access to productive assets as well as human resources, unequal capacity to participate in both domestic and global markets and the undemocratic distribution of political power. Any attempt to reduce and eradicate poverty has to focus on changes in the '*opportunity structures for the excluded*' (Sobhan, 2010, pp. 2-3).

While inequitable and unjust social and economic universe is to changed, it would also require to change the system of unjust governance in South Asia. The system of governance has been effective in discriminating against the excluded and effectively disenfranchising them from the political benefits of a democratic process. To quote an eloquent critic:

> *The judicial system in most South Asian countries denies the excluded elementary justice because of their poverty as well as the social bias of most South Asian judiciaries ……In such a social universe, the excluded of South Asia remain tyrannized by state as well as money power and have to seek the protection of their oppressors, within a system of patron-client relationships, which perpetuates the prevailing hierarchies of power……. Representative institutions tend to be monopolized by the affluent and socially powerful, who then use their electoral office to enhance their wealth and thereby perpetuates their hold over power …… This lack of an appropriate political response to the voices of the excluded reflects a form of political market failure in South Asia (Sobhan, 2010, pp. 8-9).*

In south Asia, poor rural households[119] tend to have larger families, with higher dependency ratios, lower educational attainment and higher underemployment. Their

---

[119] To quote a perceptive remark:

> *South Asian households are periodically exposed both to individual shocks and to economy-wide shocks, such as natural disasters, food price spikes, and armed conflict.*

access to credit, inputs and technology is severely limited. They also lack basic amenities, for example, the provisions of piped water supply, sanitation and electricity. They are mostly deprived of the power needed to interact on equal terms with the other, generally larger and stronger market intermediaries because of the constraints of lack of information about markets, lack of business and negotiating experience and lack of a collective organization. Of all the poor population, the rural countryside was the home for about 75 percent of them. Being landless and having just limited access to land and other productive resources, the endemic poverty is one of the principal features in the catalogue of general economic, demographic and social characteristics defining the population in South Asia, according to one report of IFAD (2001).

Table – 7.8

Poverty in South Asia: 2005-2009

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	Sri Lanka	Maldives	India	Bhutan	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Nepal
Multi-dimensional Poverty Index	0.021 (2003)	0.018 (2009)	0.283 (2005)	0.119 (2010)	0.292 (2007)	0.264 (2006)	0.217 (2011)
Population in Multi-dimensional Poverty (Percentage)	5.3 (2003)	5.2 (2009)	53.7 (2005)	27.2 (2010)	57.8 (2007)	49.4 (2006)	44.2 (2011)
Population in Multidimensional Poverty (In Thousands)	1027 (2003)	16 (2009)	612203 (2005)	198 (2010)	830207 (2007)	81236 (2006)	13242 (2011)

The region's frequent exposure to shocks relates to geographic, historical, and socioeconomic factors. South Asia has a high population density; 23.8 percent of world's population lives on 3.6 percent of the world's land—and approximately 68 percent of the region's population lives in poverty. South Asia's economy is strongly oriented toward agriculture, which makes countries more vulnerable to natural disasters and weather-related shocks. Indeed, roughly 70 percent of the South Asian population lives in rural areas and about half rely on agriculture for its livelihood. In addition, the region experiences frequent conflicts, including guerrilla warfare, riots, and antigovernment demonstrations (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 153).

Intensity of Deprivation (Percentage)	38.7 (2003)	35.6 (2009)	52.7 (2005)	43.9 (2010)	50.4 (2007)	53.4 (2006)	49.0 (2011)
Population Vulnerable To Poverty (In Percentage)	14.4 (2003)	4.8 (2009)	16.4 (2005)	17.2 (2010)	21.2 (2007)	11.0 (2006)	17.4 (2011)
Population in Severe Poverty (In Percentage)	0.6 (2003)	0.3 (2009)	28.6 (2005)	8.5 (2010)	26.2 (2007)	27.4 (2006)	20.8 (2011)

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

All said about prevalence of poverty in South Asia, there has been controversy with regard to the estimation procedures. Studies on poverty in South Asia have a long and distinguished pedigree. In spite of considerable work of both conceptual and empirical nature undertaken on this subject at the academic and policy-making level and a large number of concomitant poverty alleviation programmes carried out by governments, nongovernmental organizations and other development agencies, following the models propounded by the World Bank, the situation is frustrating. A profound observation in this regard has been to the effect of assertion:

> *The central premise of this work seeks to move away from the visualization of poverty as a measure of income deprivation. Within the prevailing conception of poverty, changes in the level of poverty are measured through the rise and fall of the incomes of households above and below the poverty line. This poverty line may be set on the basis of a nationally determined budget needed to meet basic needs or a globally comparable standard of a dollar a day or even two dollars a day …… Measuring the success or failure of public policy through the reduction or enhancement of the percentage of people above or below the poverty line is both conceptually challengeable as well as problematic as a guide to policy (Sobhan, 2010, p. 2).*

It is almost difficult to know in an accurate reliable sense as to how many were poor in the region. In the case of Bangladesh, the estimate of percentage of population below the poverty line has varied from 50-51 (national measure) to 35-80 (international measure). In the case of Sri Lanka, it has varied from 20-25 (national measure) to 6-42 (international measure). India may be cited as an example. It is the largest country in the region. In India, though the percentage of poor declined from 50 in early eighties to 36 in 1994 and 29-31

during 2000-2004 (national measure), the number of poor population declined marginally. The international estimate of percentage of population below the poverty line has varied from 33 to 80. There are four different national estimates for the number of BPL households: one by Prof. Arjun Sengupta, another by Dr. NC Saxena, yet another by the World Bank, and finally, the Planning Commission estimates (refer to table – 7.9).

Table – 7.9

Below-poverty-line (BPL) Population
in Countries of South Asia: 1991-2005

Countries	National Measures (Population Percentage below-poverty-line)				International Measures (Population Percentage below-earnings-of- US $1-and-US$2 per person per day)		
	Years	Percentage	Years	Percentage	Years	Percentage (at US $1)	Percentage (at US$2)
Bangladesh	1996	51.0	2000	49.8	2005	35.0	84.0
India	1994	36.0	2000	28.6	2005	33.5	80.0
Pakistan	1993	28.6	1999	32.6	2002	17.0	73.6
Sri Lanka	1991	20.0	1996	25.0	2002	5.6	41.6

Source: World Bank data of 1990, 2001, 2004 and 2007 quoted in Hossain, et al., 2010, p. 34

According to Prof. Arjun Sengupta, who chaired the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector, the percentage of the population of India living below the poverty line was declared to be as almost as high as 77. Dr. NC Saxena, a retired civil servant acting as a Commissioner appointed by the Supreme Court, was of the opinion that half the country's population of 1.15 billion was below the poverty line, and the poverty line was defined by the benchmark of a monthly per capita income of rupees 700 in rural areas and rupees 1,000 in urban areas.

While the Planning Commission of India estimate put the number of below poverty line (BPL) families at 62.5 million, the various estimates of the state governments in the country was a pointer to the fact that the number of poor was closer to 107 million. The

World Bank's figure for the percentage of population below the poverty line in India was 42 percent, based on 2005 data.

The 2007 *South Asia Economic Report*, prepared by the Asian Development Bank, concluded by suggesting six broad actions for the governments in the region to meet the dual challenges of accelerating progress toward the achievements of most of the goal related with reducing poverty and simultaneously responding to the opportunities and risks of globalization and economic change:

(1) focus on the poor,

(2) respond effectively to the new global opportunities and challenges with support from the private sector and civil society,

(3) enhance the responsiveness and agility of the social sectors through comprehensive sector governance and greater management capacity,

(4) proactively address the potential inequity of the transition through strengthening human capabilities to enable individuals to qualify for productive and remunerative employment,

(5) strengthen the public institutions, improving governance and the quality of public services, and

(6) prepare the social sectors for a "borderless world" through new forms of regional cooperation. Being a cluster of divergent demographic features, diversified geographical characteristics and heterogeneous economic landscape, south Asia is globally an attractive arena.

South Asia has but the potential to play an important role in the global development story. With inclusive growth, South Asia has the potential to change global poverty (World Bank Annual Report: South Asia, 2014). The real challenge is to improve the ranking in human development indicators. Though different countries of the region have occupied varied ranks in HDI, overall human development index has been low. In addition to poverty and pretty low income for a significant section of the population, a large number of populations have not been brought to the provisions of education, health and longevity of life till date[120].

Table – 7.10

South Asia: Human Development Indicator
and Headcount Poverty, 2005-2010

Countries	Human Development Index (HDI), 2010	Human Development Index (HDI), 2012 (Inequality adjusted)	Headcount Poverty Percentage (At US $1.25 /Day)
1. India	0.519	0.392	41.6 (2005)
2. Pakistan	0.490	0.374	22.6 (2004)
3. Bangladesh	0.469	0.356	49.6 (2005)
4. Nepal	0.428	0.304	55.1 (2003)
5. Sri Lanka	0.658	0.607	14.0 (2002)
6. Bhutan	--	0.430	26.0 (2005)
7. Maldives	0.602	0.515	--
South Asia	0.511	-	--

Sources: ADB, 2007; UNDP, 2009; UNDP, 2013; Arjan de Haan, 2010; C Brassard, 2010; Human Development in South Asia, 2010-2011

Table –7.11

Indices of Human Development and
Multidimensional Poverty in South Asia: 2013

countries	Human Development Index	Multidimensional Poverty Index
Sri Lanka	0.715	0.021 (2003)
Maldives	0.688	0.018 (2009)
India	0.554	0.283 (2005)
Bhutan	0.538	0.119 (2010)

[120] To Quote:

> *Programmes for promoting education and skill development, expansion of micro-credit, a variety of employment generation programmes and safety net programmes based on transfer payments along with subsidies targeted to particular excluded groups remain common to all South Asian countries ……. In all of South Asia's anti-poverty strategies, the divide between a privileged class of property-owners and providers of wage employment and those who depend on them for employment has been accepted as an immutable feature of society ……. The inherited structural arrangements ..... left unaddressed in the policy agendas of South Asia (Sobhan, 2010, pp. 42-44).*

Bangladesh	0.515	0.292 (2007)
Pakistan	0.515	0.264 (2006)
Nepal	0.463	0.217 (2011)

Source: UNDP-HDI, 2013, pp.17-8

In 2013, while Sri Lanka had the HDI stand at 0.715, it was as low as 0.463 for Nepal. While India was identified with 0.554 HDI in 2013, its multidimensional poverty index was 0.018 in 2009. In Pakistan, the multidimensional poverty index was 0. 264 (refer to table – 7.10). Adjusting the human development index with inequality accounted for, the countries slide down in terms index with much lower figures (refer to table – 7.11).

In short, the autonomous individual private actions as motivated and justified by a host of practical reasons and the government actions under the framework of planning and policies to improve the livelihood conditions of populace have not moved in the direction of instituting agrarian justice for all. Quite a large chunk of population has suffered from the shortages, deprivation and poverty. While the economic growth in recent years at a fast rate has been observed, it has not percolated down to enhance the human productive capacity and opportunity to consume the decent minimum for a large section of populace in south Asia. The inequality[121] has increased along with poverty.

7.4. South Asian Economy Today

South Asia is a highly populous region, and with the man-land ratio standing at 3.16 persons per hectare, one of the most densely populated regions of the world (MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37). It is presently home to almost 1.7 billion people. The region

[121] To quote an observation:

> *Gini coefficients of the most recent available years ranged between 0.28 and 0.40 in South Asian countries .....The conclusion based on international benchmarking needs to be assessed with several caveats in mind, however. The first is the already mentioned distinction between inequality in consumption per capita and inequality in income per capita. Not many household surveys in South Asia collect accurate data on both, which would allow a direct comparison of measures of inequality based on the two variables. ..... A second caveat is that household surveys may not capture well the income or the consumption of the richest members of society (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 71).*

gives shelter to almost 34 percent of the aggregate human population of the continent of Asia. In 2013, there were 1,671 million persons in the region – constituting almost 22 percent of the aggregate human population of the globe. It is said that one in every four people in the world is a South Asian (World Bank, 2012, p. 42). India has the largest population of around three times the combined population of six other countries in the subcontinent. Nearly three-quarters of the region's inhabitants live in India. While the aggregate population in South Asia stood at 1,592 million persons, India was home to 1,198 million persons in 2009 (MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62). The smallest country is Maldives which had a population of just 3, 06, 000 persons, while another small nation of Bhutan had the human population of only 6, 58, 000 persons (whereas the population of one of the 29 states of India, that is, Sikkim was 5, 40, 000 persons)[122].

Geographically, South Asia is a major landmass of a peninsula in the sub-Himalayan region in the south of the *Himalayas*, east of the *Hindu Kush* and west of the *Arakans* range of mountains. Indian and Arabian oceans ringing the southerly perimeter, its spatial boundaries are geologically framed by the Himalayas to the north, hills and jungles to the northeast, and deserts to the northwest. Resting geologically on the Indian Plate, harbouring a climate both of the tropics and the temperate and depending critically on the Monsoon rainfall, it is a region bound by the Indian Ocean in the south. It used to be designated as the *Indian Subcontinent* in the past literature created by the erstwhile British colonial empire. The 562 erstwhile princely states of India that were not directly ruled by the British

---

[122] To quote a perceptive remarks about statistical infrastructure regarding population enumeration in the region:

> *The three most densely populated countries, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have taken regular censuses since the end of the nineteenth century. India has held one every ten years since 1871 …….. Pakistan took its first post-partition census in 1951 …… After its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh held four censuses in 1974, 1981, 1991 and 2001 respectively ……. Nepal has held ten censuses since 1911, the most recent being in 2001. Bhutan has taken a series of censuses but these are really citizenship censuses for checking the nationality of populations in the wake of intense migration. However the government carried out a full population census in 2005…….. In five pout of eight, census information is complemented by demographic and health surveys …….. the most densely populated country in the region is also the one for which we have the most demographic data, thanks in part to India's Sample Registration System (SRS) which constitutes a valuable additional source (Veron, 2008, pp. 12-3).*

Raj and colonial empire during the first half of twentieth century are also spatial part of the region today.

South Asia is a group of seven countries comprising of three plain countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, two island countries of Maldives and Sri Lanka, and two mountainous countries of Bhutan and Nepal (though Afghanistan is also included in most of the SAARC literature and the literatures of UN-ESACAP, SAFTA and World Bank since 2006). Bounded by seven countries, it is spread over 412.09 million hectares or 5140 thousand square kilometres of surface area – constituting just 4.8 percent of the land area of the world. India is by far the largest country in south Asia, covering around three-fourths the land area of the subcontinent.

Economically, it is a region that has for long continued to be characterised as primarily an agricultural region of uncertain monsoonal rains, dispersed canal and well irrigation, and heavy use of draft animals for ploughing and carting. The land has always been a vital resource, significant form of property and a measure of social power and status, and its concentration in a few hands has been a historically inherited feature. In the technical framework of mixed local agricultural practices in many geographical pockets within the region, it is from the common-property resources that crucial foodstuffs of fish, game, fruits, fodder, and firewood are mostly harvested. Depending on ambient conditions, the principal crops of rice, wheat, or millet still serve as the staple for a majority of rural populace. It is as yet a region with specialization in the export of primary goods, mainly food grains and food-stuffs.

Politically, South Asia has been exposed to public policy paradigms and regimes since long. The Turkish slave dynasty and Mogul dynasty had devised government policies with regard to agricultural improvements and welfare of peasantry. A system of agricultural reforms and agenda of improving the rural scene, howsoever naïve and piecemeal native, had always been there during the regimes of both the pre-colonial as well as the colonial state. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Portuguese transferred new seed varieties and new crops here from other countries. Since mid-eighteenth century till mid-twentieth century, the British colonial empire was engaged in initiating a number of

periodic agrarian reforms to counter famines, increase the revenue paying capacity of farmers and expand the markets in the countryside.

South Asia is as yet largely a rural landscape. In 2003, almost seventy-two percent of aggregate population of the region was rural while agricultural population comprised almost fifty-three percent of the aggregate population in south Asia. It is not at all an urbane society as yet. In 1980, population residing in the urban space was 23.3 percent of the aggregate population of the region. Despite a fast pace of urbanization[123] observed during last couple of decades, just about 28.2 percent of total population resided in the urban space in the year of 2000 AD (it was not even one-third of the aggregate populace of the region) (World Bank, 2004). Pakistan being the most urbanized country of the region had the proportion of city-dwellers in its population standing at 36, which was certainly three-times higher than in Bhutan – the least urbanized country characterized by the proportion of city-dwellers standing at 12. In the largest and biggest country of India, the urban population was 29 percent (within India, the proportion of city-dwellers in a small state of Goa was nearly 50 percent while it was just 10 percent in Himachal Pradesh).

---

[123] In view of the backdrop of global phenomenon of urban population overtaking rural population in the world in 2007, a fast pace of urbanization was however observed during last decade in south Asia as well.

> *The countries of south Asia are still not heavily urbanised ..... in Pakistan, the country with the region's highest percentage urban in 2005, only 35% of the population lived in towns or cities. The lowest levels of urbanization are observed in Sri Lanka and Nepal, where barely 15 % of the inhabitants are urban dwellers. In India, less than 30% of the population today lives in towns or cities, which is three times more than in 1901 and twice the level in 1941, but still a small proportion compared with the world average (50%) ..... the total urban population in south Asia has grown sharply over fifty years. It numbered 73.7 million in 1950 and 433.2 million in 2005, representing nearly a six-fold increase ..... India accounted for much of this urban growth, since of the 433.2 million urban dwellers in south Asia in 2005, three-quarters lived in India (Veron, 2008, p. 59).*

Table – 7.12

Land in South Asia: 1999-2009

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Land Area (Thousand Square Kilometres) (1999)	2973	771	1209	143	65	..	..	5161
Agricultural Land as Percentage of Land Area (2009)	60.5	31.4	70.3	29.6	41.6	13.2	26.7	..
Arable Land as Percentage of Land Area (2008)	53.2	26.4	60.7	16.4	19.9	3.3	13.3	49.8

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; MHDC-HDSA, 2010-2011, pp. 155-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 216-22

Agriculture contributes 23 percent to the gross domestic product of the region. A majority that is nearly 70 percent of the aggregate populace resides in the countryside. Well above half that is about 60 percent of all labour force is still employed in the agricultural sector alone. Though being one of the fastest growing regions in the world in the past, it is at present characterized by relatively much lower agricultural growth rate (that is accompanied with much higher incidence of poverty and malnutrition all around). Well above half that is about 60 percent of all labour force is still employed in the agricultural sector alone.

In south Asia, there has been the phenomenon of expansion of land under crop and under irrigation over the years. In the first stage from 1850 to around 1950, cropland expansion was moderate. From the middle of the twentieth century to 1980s, there was however rapid expansion. Over four million hectares were added every year during this phase. Since

1990s, the cropland expansion has however reduced. In absolute terms, the area under crop is still expanding with about two million hectares added between 1992 and 2002 in south Asia, and the maximum increase was in Nepal, followed by Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.

According to FAO (2005), the average per capita available arable land in south Asia is only 0.23 hectares and the crop land as percentage of geographical area is 44.8 percent while the permanent pastures is 10.3 percent and the forest and woodlands is 16.3 percent and the rest miscellaneous land is 28.6 percent in south Asia. There is a parallel process of the loss of forest and woodlands through encroachment for cropland and the loss of prime agricultural land to settlements, industries, and communication lines of roads and railways and other infrastructural expansion. Almost eighty percent of crop land in Pakistan is irrigated while in Bangladesh about half of the cropland is under irrigation. Sri Lanka, Nepal and India had each nearly 33 to 34 percent of crop land under irrigation. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh together account for about ninety five percent of irrigated area of the region. Almost 33 percent of the irrigated area in Pakistan is subject to water logging, and 14 percent is saline. In India, almost 4.5 million hectares of irrigated land is saline and a further six million hectares are reduced by water logging. Water logging, soil toxicity, salinity and formation of hard pans in the subsoil are major problems (FAO, 2005).

In the predominantly rural setting of South Asia, the number of agricultural holdings has nearly been about 125 million, spread over the operated agricultural land area of roughly 200 million hectares. South Asian society and economy is dominated by two big nations of India and Pakistan where the average size of holdings is bit better; it is 1.41 hectares in India whereas it is as high as 3.04 hectares in Pakistan. To be precise, South Asia is an agricultural and rural constituency of small peasantry. The small farmers are as yet the largest section of rural population, but operate merely one-third of the agricultural land. The small size of holdings varies from an average of 0.3 hectares to 0.6 hectares. This is particularly the case in the countries of Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh; it is here in these countries that up to about 90 percent operated land area is in the category of marginal and small holdings alone.

Table – 7.13

Distribution of Land Holdings
in South Asia: 1995-2002

Countries and Year of Observation	Average Size of Holdings (Hectares)	Percentage of Farm Holdings (in Number)			Percentage of Farm Area (in Hectares)		
		Size-Classes in Hectares			Size-Classes in Hectares		
		Less than 1.0	1.0 to 2.0	Greater than 2.0	Less than 1.0	1.0 to 2.0	Greater than 2.0
Bangladesh (1996)	0.5	87	9	4	43	26	31
India (1995-96)	1.4	62	19	19	17	19	64
Nepal (2002)	0.8	75	18	7	39	30	31
Pakistan (2000)	3.0	26	22	42	6	10	84
Sri Lanka (2002)	0.8	62	-	38	28	-	72

Source: P.K. Joshi, Ashok Gulati And Ralph Cummings Jr. (2004), Agricultural Diversification in South Asia: Beyond Food Security

According to B H Farmer (2002), the old school geography room dictum is: 'rice flourishes when it has its feet in the water and its head in the sun (provided, it should be added, that there is sufficient fertility, natural or added)'. For most of south Asia, the monsoonal rainy season for kharif crop of rice in high and medium rainfall areas is that of south-west monsoon in June or July. The rice tr4aditionally mature for harvest after the rain have gone in November or December. The floods, water logging and difficult soil condition have all been responsible for poor adaptability of the high yielding varieties of rice in the region. The rainfall is apt to be unreliable and disastrous draughts strike from time to time. The climatic conditions are far from uniform over the vast areas subject to the south Asia monsoons.

There has been traditionally a practice of deep water rice cultivation in many areas. These areas are something like two million hectares in Bangladesh where 18 million farmers are involved and together account for about ten percent of national rice production. In India, deep water conditions obtain during monsoon floods over 1.7 million hectares in parts of Assam and west Bengal and also in Godavari delta of Andhra Pradesh ad north Bihar. There is no room for complacency about present or future rice production given south

Asian population trends. Accurate information about adaptability and non-adaptability of the HYV seeds from farmer to research station must be hastened, and it must be acted upon (Farmer, 2002, pp. 305-18)

South Asia has been one prominent region of the world where Green Revolution technology has been experimented on a wide scale. Being a cluster of principally rural economies and primarily a rice-wheat agricultural belt, South Asian countries have made remarkable progress in food production during the past three decades, transforming the region from a food-deficit to a food self-sufficient region. There has been quite divergent contribution of technological progress as measured by the annual growth of total factor productivity in agriculture across the countries in south Asia.

Table – 7.14

Cropping and Irrigation in South Asia: 1979-2008

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Permanent Cropped Area as Percentage of Land Area (2008)	3.8	1.1	6.1	0.8	15.1	0.7	13.3	3.8
Irrigated Land as Percentage of Cropped Land (1979-81)	22.8	72.7	17.1	22.5	28.3	..	..	26.9
Irrigated Land as Percentage of Cropped Land (2003-2008)	31.0	73.0	62.0	28.0	..	..	7.0	39.0

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; MHDC-HDSA, 2010-2011, pp. 155-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 216-22

From 1970 to 1990, the two decades of most rapid Green Revolution expansion, the total food available per person in the world rose by 11 percent. The estimated number of hungry

people fell from 942 million to 786 million, a decline of 16 percentages. Per capita food production increased by 8 percent in South America and 9 percent in South Asia between 1970 and 1990, but the number of hungry people rose by 19 percent and 9 percent respectively in these regions.

Aggregate production of cereals was 31, 33, and 29,800 metric tons in 2004 in the region of South Asia. Green Revolution technologies have been adopted in India and other countries of the region in the 1960s. Such a technological change and transformation was but not very useful. The World Bank economist, Wolf Ladejinsky, who carried forward the General MacArthur's programme of land reforms forward in South-east Asian countries as well as south Asian countries, was alarmed by what he called giving '*biology priority over sociology*' (a priority of technology farming without institutional reforms and preparation) (quoted in L J Walinsky, 1977). Moreover, the application of new technologies tragically remained confined to a few crops and a few geographical areas within the region. Whatever aggregate growth has happened has not fully trickled-down. The frustrating fact of failure of the trickle-down phenomenon has in turn led to suggestions of adoption of a strategy of 'redistribution through growth' throughout 1960s and 1970s. A saddened Dudley Seers (1969) coined the oxymoron '*growth without development*' – a characterization so apt for the south Asia.

Given the scenario of food being reduced to be treated just another commodity to be bought and sold in the pursuit of profit in the market organized under the global economic model dominated by neoliberal economic principles, the phenomenon of malnutrition increasingly afflicted the poor population. In 2009, for the first time in human history, over a billion people were officially classified as living in hunger in the world. There has been a large mass of poor populace, almost forty percent of world's poor residing in south Asia only. Such poor do not have the availability and access to a primary building block of human life and a source of livelihood, that is, food. In the year of 2008, the total reserves of rice and wheat kept under the SAARC Food Bank scheme was only 2,41,580 metric tons (this scheme came into force with the replacement of the Food Security Reserve scheme of SAARC which was operative during 1988-2007). In south Asia, a large untapped production potential in rice and wheat crops still exist and is to be harnessed through appropriate technology and policy intervention.

South Asian population and foodstuff at disposal for consumption by populations is to be located in the global context. The global human population has increased from 3.7 billion people in 1970 to 6.8 billion people in 2010 while the global rural population itself has increased from 2.4 billion people in 1970 to 3.3 billion people in 2010. The global agricultural population has accordingly increased from 2.0 billion people in 1970 to 2.6 billion people in 2010. The pace of growth in rural and agricultural population has been slow. The food crisis of 1973-75, which was a result of the bad weathers and increase in the price of petroleum, had given rise to the problems of food insecurity[124], famine and hunger in the world. The food fuel and financial crisis of 2007-09 have further worsened the situation. In 2004, the global foodstuffs production was 3.96 billion tons comprising of the cereal production standing at 2.3 billion tons, the meat production standing at 0.26 billion tons and the global fruits and vegetables production standing at 1.4 billion tons. In 2004, the South Asian population was 141.25 million while the rural population was 101.50 million and agricultural population was 74.41 million (SBSAD, 2005). The absolute number of agricultural population is 0.7 billion persons, which is almost 53 percent of all persons residing in south Asia.

A Case Study of India

In South Asia, India is a prominent country being the largest in terms of geographical space, human and livestock population, and volume of economic activity. Spread over 297.3 million hectares of geographical space (occupying 72.07 percent of the regional space), it is home to 1065.46 million human persons (sharing 75.42 percent of the regional population). In 2007, population of India stood at 1.17 billion people. Nearly 82 percent of regional gross domestic product is produced in India, and 68 percent of the global financial inflow and 99 percent of foreign direct investments outflow is shared by India. In 2003, the man-land ratio was 3.58 here. A large section of population still resides in the countryside.

[124] It was in the World Food Conference in 1974 that the term ‘food security’ originated. In 1983, FAO revised the definition of food security. In 1986, the World Bank distinguished between the chronic and transitory food insecurity. The world food summit in 1996 gave a comprehensive definition of food security. It was incorporated by FAO in 2001.

Gaining independence from the British colonialism, the social and economic landscape in India has been considerably transformed in the last six decades. It is but as yet predominantly a rural and agricultural society. In 2003, the population residing in rural areas was 7638.22 million persons, constituting 71.68 percent of the aggregate populace in the subcontinent. Though agriculture contributed merely 26 percent to the gross domestic product in 2005, it is still the sector with which a little more than half of the aggregate populace is attached. In 2003, the agriculture population was 5565.92 million persons, constituting 52.24 percent of the aggregate populace.

Table – 7.15

Land and Population in India, 2003-04
(In Number, percentage and Hectares)

Land and Population Variables	Year of Observation	India	World
1. Agricultural Land (‘000 hectares)	2003	169739	1540572
2. Agricultural Land as percentage of Total Land	2003	57.1	11.8
3. Agricultural Population (‘000)	2004	559656	2600301
4. Agricultural Population as percentage of Total Population	2004	51.8	40.8
5. Ratio of Agricultural Land to Agricultural Population (hectare per person)	2004	0.30	0.59

Source: IASRI&ICAR (2008), Agricultural Research Data Book- 2008, New Delhi, July, p.317

India shares almost 11.8 percent of the total arable land in the world, and the arable land constitutes nearly 57 percent of the geographical area of the country itself. It has approximately 169 million hectares of arable land, and the average size of holdings is approximately 1.4 hectares. It is still a rural regional space pervaded by the mass of small peasantry. Round the mid-nineties of last century, almost 62 percent of the holdings used to be of marginal size of less than one hectare and such holdings were operated over merely 17 percent of all holdings area.

Table – 7.16

Production of Cereals, Vegetables and Fruits
in India, 2005 (In Metric Tons)

Cereal, Vegetable and Fruit Crops	India	World	Indian position
Paddy	137620000	629881000	21.8 percent ; second position after China
Wheat	68637000	625151000	11.0 percent; second position after China
Maize	14172000	712334000	2.0 percent; sixth position
Cereals/Pulses	253131000	2319258000	10.9 percent; third position after China and USA
Banana	18702000	76436000	First position
Mango	12538000	31251000	First position
Papaya	2317000	8055000	First position
All Fruits	58740000	536591000	Second position after China
All vegetables	109050000	917563000	Second position after China

Source**:** IASRI&ICAR (2008), Agricultural research data Book- 2008, New Delhi, July, pp.309-318

India is largely a food self-sufficient country. A successful Green revolution has contributed much in this regard. It is presently but attempting to diversify into production and supply of vegetables, fruits and dairy products. Attaining self-sufficiency in food grains and being an occasional exporter of it, it has witnessed considerable progress in the agro-processing sector as well during the last two decades.

Producing almost 230 million metric tons of foodgrains, the country is the third largest producer of agricultural commodities in the world. Just lagging behind the countries of China and United States of America respectively, it is the third largest producer of cereals and pulses and second largest grower of not only rice and wheat but also the fruits and vegetables in the world. It occupies first position in the production of fruits of mango, banana and papaya in the world. It produces 21.8 percent of rice, 11.0 percent of wheat, 41.0 percent of mango, 23.0 percent of banana, 16.0 percent of the milk, 24.0 percent of cashew nut, 36.0 percent of green-pea, 30.0 percent of cauliflower, 10.0 percent of onion, and 28.0 percent of tea in the world. Whereas the paddy mills together could process two-

thirds of paddy produced domestically, the pulse mills processed almost three-fourth of the pulses produced in the country (Chengappa, 2004).

There is however a concern. During the early-1990s, slackness in investment on agricultural research and technology development was observed. In the context of continued increase in population coupled with diminishing land, diminishing fresh water resources (leading to expanding biotic and abiotic stresses), increasing soil salinity and water-logging problems, this has led to deceleration in productivity growth in India. The deceleration in total factor productivity in India is alarming since India accounts for roughly three-fourths of the sub-region's economy.

India is the major producer and consumer of food in the South Asian region and possesses huge potential that remains highly under-realized. India has to play a major role not only to maintain its own self-sufficiency in food production but also to meet the additional requirement of its neighbouring countries. This being not happening, South Asia may experience a deficit in agricultural production to match its domestic need for most of the food commodities in future.

Table – 7.17

Markets and Mills in India , 2006 (In Number)

Markets and Mills	Numbers and Capacity
1. Number of agricultural markets (primary plus wholesale)	28497
2. Number of Regulated Market yards (principal plus submarkets)	7566
3. Number of cold storages (public plus private plus cooperative)	5101
4. Capacity of cold storages(public plus private plus cooperative)	21693986 tons
5. Number of rice mills	150000
6. Number of floor mills	266000
7. Number of dhal mills	20000
8. Number of oil expellers	50000
9. Number of fruits and vegetable processing units	6000
10. Number of dairy products processing units	530
11. Output of fruits and vegetables processing industry (2000)	9.90 lakh tons

Source: IASRI&ICAR (2008), Agricultural research data Book- 2008, New Delhi, July

At the backdrop of a short history of neglect of agriculture following the completion of the project of the Green Revolution in India, a sudden spurt in the construction of mega-infrastructure in general and rural power, road and irrigation structure in particular had also been observed right from the beginning of nineties. With the Bharat Nirman Programme (2004-2009), financed by the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) in India, the significance of rural infrastructure was resurrected at the centre stage. To modernise the technological and engineering dimension of agriculture, the outlays has been increased tremendously; the Department of Agricultural Research and Education spent as aggregate of both plan and non-plan expenditures worth rupees 22750 million in 2006-07. In the age of globalisation under the aegis of guidance and control of the public authority, the framework of developing Indian agriculture is being increasingly replaced by the strategic role of public-private partnership. A new phase of structural change and institutional transformation has been under way. An enhanced role of the corporate sector in agriculture by way of infusing new technologies and accessing new markets has been observed.

Table – 7.18

Population and Labour in South Asia: 2005-2011

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives
Population living on degraded land (in percentage) (2010)	10.0	4.0	11.0	2.0	21.0	..	..
Employment to population ratio (percentage) (ages 25 and older) (2011)	61.0	55.4	74.0	86.4	58.2	80.3	64.7
Youth unemployment (percentage) (ages 15-24) (2005-2011)	11.5	10.5	13.6	..	24.7	10.9	30.5

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; MHDC-HDSA, 2010-2011, pp. 155-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 216-22

India continues to be home to one third of the world's underweight children and the situation has further worsened since 2007, with the prices of food grain, pulses and vegetables hitting the roof. South Asia not only hosts booming India, but also four of the least developed countries in the world: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. While the World Bank has been "working for a world free of poverty", it is a tragedy that it continues to assess the economic performance of south Asia in terms of gross domestic product growth rate, fiscal consolidation and capital inflows. South Asian farm-producers have but little access to improved technologies mainly due to (i) lack of knowledge, (ii) weak input delivery system, (iii) lack of appropriate technology suiting the resource endowments of producers, (iv) lack of credit, and (v) high risk and absence of insurance management. It is for these reasons that a majority of the producers in these regions are resource-poor and poverty-ridden, and therefore, technologies, policies and institutional support need to be tuned to their socio-economic profile.

7.5. Epilogue: Agrarian Economic Justice

In the mental landscape of conscious and enlightened (often, indoctrinated as well) individuals and their collective platforms (interest groups, vested pressure groups, professional associations, and political organizations and parties), there have been a plethora of reasons - both economic and political, which have been normative guide to actions of resistance against the capitalist globalization. Prime among these has been one related with the deliberations of private as well public agency about the rights to agrarian justice – elimination of inequity in access to resources and food, security against violations of effective liberty, avoidance of casualties of the processes of impartiality and fairness. In south Asia, private and public rationalities and reasons for action have been focussed at resolving the problems of the asset-less-ness, in particular resource-less-ness (and not house-less-ness though provision of decent all-weather houses are scanty to a large majority) – the problems having its origin in non-accessibility to gainful employment for a

large majority. The macroeconomies of South Asia has variously attempted to attain equilibrium and stability in the back drop of poverty, resource scarcity and commodity deficits for a considerable chunk of the human population.

The hybrid moralities associated with the national objective of 'growth with justice' and the autonomous actions of free individuals in their private capacities in the civil society as well as public actions of government functionaries during execution and implementation of developmental programmes, welfare schemes and redistributive policies and programmes in every nations has led to attainment of material growth and development as the beneficial good consequences. There have been as much contributions of the government policies and programmes as the initiatives of the market and civil society in boosting the gross domestic product, human development and distribution of the fruits of growth and development among the populace in south Asia. The trickle-down effects of economic development and welfare programmes have not been in the direction of reducing poverty, food insecurity and inequality in the region[125].

In south Asia and specifically India, global capitalism has though been slow in establishing its hegemony; it is persistently and irreversibly advancing in each nook and corner of the region. Monopoly capitalism has always been notorious in enhancing injustices but globalization policy of capitalist states in connivance with the multinational finance and

---

[125] Arthur Lewis ushered in a tradition in development economics, and published paper in the Manchester School in 1954 and further developed his views on unlimited supply of labour being a source of economic development in developing labour surplus economies in the same journal in 1958. It was a supply-side approach in which Lewis drew an optimistic picture of a steady process of expansion of the organized economic sector, constrained only by the eventual rise in wages. Much of that optimism was questioned frequently. In 1972, he reflected back on his own thesis on unlimited supply of labour and economic development. In 1979, he revisited his thesis on the dual economy model in the Manchester School journal again to remark:

> *A number of writers have expressed surprise and disillusionment that the rapid expansion of modern sectors that has concurred in LDCs over the past two decades has not 'trickled-down' to bring equal opportunity to the traditional sectors…… Actually, there is no reason to expect the traditional always to benefit from expansion of the modern. There are forces working for benefit and forces working for loss; the net result will vary from case to case……Expansion of the modern sector may benefit the traditional in four ways, each of which has its loss counterpart: through provision of employment, through sharing physical facilities, through modernization of ideas and institutions, and through trade (Lewis, 1979, pp. 211-29).*

merchandise corporations has been instrumental in enhancing the level of injustices to unprecedented heights, almost unbearable height. Global food insecurity is the lone result of uncontrolled globalizing finance, capital and commodity - imperialist globalization. The neoliberal framework of governance and the neoliberal globalization has resulted in increasing inequality within and between countries in the world. The impacts in terms of food security, household incomes, and inequality within and between countries have been varied and uneven across countries in the south Asia (Borras, 2007).

A major chunk of growth in goods and services has been pocketed by a minority of population. The concentration of assets and wealth in few hands has increased many folds. Very little has been left over for the class of poor. The World Bank is now convinced that poverty and inequality[126] feed each other. The empirical data on the per capita national income and the income share ratio estimate as well as the estimation of Gini's coefficient in diffrenet countries of South Asia in recent years have confirmed it (refer to table – 7.18). In many case, most of the anti-poverty policies have helped the rich and middle-income groups more than they have helped the poor, and these had been so even in cases of no graft, corruption, diversion or stupidity in their execution.

The Asian Development Bank [ADB] has been a major contributor of development finance in south Asia. In influencing development policy in the region, however, it is the World Bank which has been the strongest voice. The World Bank had argued variously in its flagship publication, the World Development Report (WDR) (World Bank 1990), that rapid growth was the best solution for eradicating poverty in the developing countries (DCs). The policy advice of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the World Bank and the

---

[126] The monetary measures have been underestimating these. An astute observer remarks:

> *Standard monetary indicators underestimate the true extent of inequality in South Asia. ..... The numbers suggest that countries in South Asia are much less unequal than China, Mexico, or South Africa ..... Inequalities in human development outcomes such as infant mortality, under-five child mortality, or educational attainment are wide and make the extent of inequality in most countries of South Asia look similar to that of other developing countries. Several countries in the region are among the most unequal for which comparable data are available ..... Beyond subjective assessments, any thorough assessment of the dynamics of inequality in the region, and the policies to address it, needs to focus on opportunity, mobility, and support[126] (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 93).*

International Monetary Fund (IMF) had continuously argued that growth-sustaining policy reforms, inspired by the Washington Consensus, supplemented by temporary safety nets for those who were most vulnerable, was expected to reduce the proportion of those living in poverty.

Table – 7.19

Gross Domestic Product, Income Share and Gini Coefficient in South Asia: 1991-2007 (In Dollars and percentage)

Countries/ Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Total GDP (billion US Dollars) (2009)	1377	1620	89	12	42	1.3	1.5	1686
GDP Per Capita (PPP Constant 2005 International Dollars) (2009)	2993	2369	1286	1049	4333	4643	4972	2731
GNI Per Capita (US Dollar) (2009)	1220	1000	580	440	1990	2020	3970	1126
Income Share: Ratio of Highest 20 Percent to Lowest 20 Percent (2003-2007)	5.6	4.7	4.4	8.9	6.9	9.9	6.8	5.5
Gini Coefficient, 2002-2005	0.362	0.312	0.341	0.473	0.402	0.341	0.410	-

Source: UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 145-74; MHDC-HDSA, 2010-2011, pp. 155-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 216-22; ADB, 2007; UNDP, 2009; Arjan de Haan, 2010; C Brassard, 2010; Human Development in South Asia, 2010-2011

The success story of growth and poverty reduction in the Asian Tigers as well as Chile provided the substantive foundations for this hypothesis. After ten years, the World Bank

through the World Development Report 2000-01 (World Bank 2000) however argued that structural concerns, of a rather more fundamental nature than the structural adjustments demanded by the Washington Consensus, were constraining the efficacy of policy reforms and inhibiting the reduction of poverty in many developing countries, including those in South Asia. To quote an observation:

> *The original models of the World Bank, linking reforms such as trade liberalization with high growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), were flawed (Rodrik 2006; Stiglitz 2002). The cross-country empirical analysis linking growth with reforms was far from conclusive ……. Income inequalities have widened, which induced further rethinking on policy within the World Bank. The more recent World Development Report (WDR) 2006 (World Bank 2005) captured the outcome of this rethinking …… WDR 2006, for the first time, took on board the growing concern among both analysts and civil society that while poverty in many DCs may have declined, income inequalities and social disparities were widening. WDR 2006 was indeed premised on the assumption that equity matters for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons ……. The recommendation in WDR 2006 seeking to enhance the property rights of the poor are hardly a point of departure from those articulated in WDR 2000-01 or WDR 2004 titled Making Service Work for Poor People (World Bank 2003) …… The discourse on poverty had over the last 15 years moved beyond the conventional approach to reducing income poverty (Sobhan, 2010, pp. 13-18).*

The endemic corruption and rent-seeking process have further marred the prospects of equity and justice in south Asia. Recent years have seen a growing appreciation of the close association between public procurement and corruption. The procurement activity has been identified as the 'area of government activity that is most vulnerable to corruption' (OECD, 2007; Transparency International, 2006). The link between corruption and procurement has become stronger in view of the high degree of discretion exercised by the public officials, politicians, and parliamentarian, the amounts of money involved in high-value transactions, and non-commercial spirit of the public oversight and control.

In India, the government has recently been plagued by a series of corruption scandals, some of which have been subject to judicial scrutiny. In reaction to these developments, a strong civil society movement has emerged to demand the creation of a strong ombudsman (Lokpal) and the passage of an anti-graft bill to ensure transparency, accountability and corruption-free government. The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General has also been at the forefront of public debate, as it has relentlessly pursued cases of graft in government accounts over the past year. Opinion among civil society groups is similarly

fractured. Democratic institutions are strongly entrenched in India, and indeed have enjoyed heightened legitimacy in recent years, but public trust in elected institutions (including parliament) and the apparatus of government (primarily the police) has steadily declined.

In a comprehensive conception, the land - a key productive resource as a basis of capital accumulation, includes the water, forests, mountains and mines. In south Asia, they were the British colonial entrepreneurs who facilitated the change in the Indian traditional land ownership and land use pattern for the purpose of mining, plantations and other economic pursuits. An elaborate property rules and regulation has governed the possession and ownership of land. Given the backdrop of low productivity of land and oppression of tenant at the time of independence, the land reforms were initiated with two objectives of growth with social justice. The land question however remains unresolved till date. The notion of land as the basis of subsistence, survival, social justice and human dignity has largely been lost. The land has become a matter of housing, investment and building of infrastructure for the urban, educated elite.

A case study of India is highly informative with regard to volition of justice and increasing trend of injustices in the countryside. Recent phenomenon has been one of declining operated area under farming in India. A trend of decline of more than a million of hectares in the area operated under farming has been witnessed while the number of agricultural holdings has continuously been increasing due to subdivision of ancestral ownership land into small pieces in the countryside. The National Sample Survey of 1999 in India indicated that nearly 63 percent of the population dependent on agriculture owned small holdings of less than one hectare while the large parcels of 10 hectares of land or more are in the hands of less than 2 percent of the population. The absolute landless, or the near landless (those owning up to 0.2 hectares of land), account for as much as 43 percent of total peasant households (NIRD, 2000).

In India, another trend has been the phenomenon of forceful acquisition in the name of public purpose by the government. Under the modern laws of Indian constitution, the disposed and the landless have been treated as encroachers – one who either move into

cities and occupy urban land, or move onto village common property resources, such as the grazing fields, burial ground, or some other patches of forests or wasteland. In actuality, the encroachers on state land have often been the one who are also the large capitalists with expansion plans, including the rich plantation owners or ministers in the government as well (Pimple and Sethi, 2005).

A number of laws and actual actions of individuals have also been contributory to the process of dispossession and alienation from the land for the poor. The Indian Forest act of 1878 empowered the government to declare any land covered with trees or brushwood a government forest and to make rules for its management. The emphasis has been on exploiting forests to augment state revenues. Certain areas under the Indian Constitution was designated as the Tribal Areas in the northeastern region and as the Scheduled Areas in the rest of the country. Certain regulations under the Fifth schedule have not permitted the sale of tribal land to outsiders, except to a government body or tribal cooperative. Under the process of reservation of forest, the cultivable and wastelands were declared out of bounds of the tribal. Under the World Bank supported project of the 'Joint Forest Management', an attempt was made to regularize the encroachers in forest villages. Upon announcement of the project, 476596 people presented their application for regularization, but subsequently only 148000 were identified as eligible for land possession papers under the Forest Conservation Act of 1980. Second process was set in with the giving of degraded and waste land for industry. In 1977, the state of Karnataka gave 30000 hectares of fallow land to two companies, Mysore Paper Mill and Karnataka Pulpwood. The purpose was to undertake the regeneration of forest land so as to produce raw materials for the paper industry.

Third process was set in with the Land acquisition amendment Act and the fourth with the Wildlife (protection) act of 1972. The enclosures of areas demarcated as the national parks and sanctuaries invariably displaced the communities. In 1995-96, it was estimated that some 726 Bhil tribal were cultivating 4493 acres of land in 18 villages by payment of rents to the forest department. In one study conducted in seven states in the semi-arid regions of India, the village commons were seen to account for 9-26 percent of the households income of the landless and marginal farmers, 91-100 percent of their firewood needs, and

69-89 percent of the grazing needs (Jodha, 1986). There were "Maharvatan lands" in the western region of Maharashtra. It is estimated that the strong and powerful have grabbed nearly 24000 acres of these lands. The Tamil Nadu Watershed Development Agency was created that identified nearly 10,000 hectares of land as wastelands by the Kancheepurm distract administration but out these almost 8,000 hectares were grazing land. The Tamil Nadu Land Ceiling Act has fixed the ceiling of land one ca possess at 15 standard acres or 6 standard hectares, and the programme intends to hand over the rest of lad o corporate bodies in violation of Panchayat Act (Pimple and Sethi, 2005).

In response to all these, a wave of occupation began in India. In the 1960s, a wave of occupation began in the districts of Bhandara, Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Gondia and Nagpur. In 1980, under the rule of "One Kayda", it was decided that no further encroachment would be honored but those who occupied the land would be regularized. In Gujarat, there were approximately one hundred landlords who owned three quarters of total cultivable land of Pardi in 1952. Satyagrah was started by the tribal in 1953 to enter the private land of a landlord and started tilling the land. In 1967, an agreement was reached with the landowners whereby they would surrender 14, 000 acres of land to the government for distribution among the landless tribal.in Bihar, some 125 villages from four blocks participated in the struggle in the alate 1970s in Bodhgya. In 1978, mobilization of peasants against the Hindu math which occupied the land began. In Chattisgarh, there have been ongoing Satyagrah in some 700 villages of Raipur district.

In a survey of tribal hamlets in the Bundelkhand, Baghelkhand, Chattisgarh, Mahakaoushak, Malwa and Chambal regions of Madhya Pradesh, it was discovered that the problem of occupying government lands and cultivating without having a patta was rife over 11000 acres of land. The pattas which were give n during the Janata Party rule in 1977-80 were cancelled when the Congress party came to power in 1980. Many of these social movements and organization clubbed with these have taken a lead in organizing the Asia Social Forum in 2003 and the World Social forum in 2004. The National Alliances of Peoples Movement and the Bharat Jan Andolan are active organizations on the anti-globalization plank (Pimple and Sethi, 2005). The Asia Social Forum meeting took place in January 2003 in Hyderabad. First general assembly of South Asia Alliance of Poverty

Eradication (SAAPE) took place in Colombo in June 2003. There has been a demand for a people's SAARC. A demand for the pro-people form of governance was also put forth. More people-friendly institutions of governance at all levels was also the demand drafted (Chlam, 2003, PP. 4220-21)/

South Asia is a case today of a fertile ground for alternative policy formulation and practices based on an alternative conception of agrarian justice at the centre of which the attempts at the equalization of productive capacity of producer-populace in the countryside ought to occupy a prominent concern. Financially, the sub-continental region has a potential to collect relatively more taxable resources from the consumers, producers and other subjects than it has presently been collecting so as to be able to incur more welfare public expenditures on enhancing the capability and productive capacity of working-age population.

In the beginning of the new millennia, the report on the Human Development in South Asia 2002 prescribed that a broad based model of agricultural development was but required. All policies, institutional and governance reform ought to adopt the goal of expanding the capabilities of people and emphasizing the centrality of human initiative and participation in all activities (MHDC-HDSA, 2002). What is required as post-2015 welfare and development agenda in south Asia is a social policy of agriculture that is well-funded and preferably financed from the earned revenues from the mining and natural resource sector. Such a social policy ought also to be one that has universal coverage across geographical regions and classes of peoples and is inclusive and transformative in impact and rich in governance outcomes measured in matter of reduction in inequalities in income and wealth in south Asian society.

Imagine a New South Asia (INSA) define a work program of a people-centered South Asian development and cooperation process based on the following five key principles: one, freedom from the economic, social, and political deprivation experienced by the socially excluded under the ruling paradigm; second, empowerment of the socially excluded through quality education, training, basic health services, and access to resources, employment, information, and appropriate technologies; third, equitably shared economic progress, which requires a reorientation of investment and production patterns toward those

sectors in which the excluded can most easily find employment or undertake economic activities; fourth, unity in diversity, which means celebrating diversity while promoting unity on the basis of shared goals and aspirations; and last, participatory democracy at all levels of society, from central to local, so that people can participate in governance and socioeconomic processes. These principles are essential for an inclusive, equitable, and sustainable social transformation in South Asia.

The chapter is divided into four sections. First section deals with the aspects of social policy as it has historically evolved in the region and the prospects of its further evolution are elaborated. The description proceeds in terms of the affirmative action and history of social protection and security in India and other countries. It is in the second section that the failures of the operation of social norms and deficits in the moral social agency are highlighted. The governance failures and the deficits in income redistribution policy and the social service delivery mechanisms are dealt with. The status of the social policy and working of the welfare state regime are elaborated, and their weaknesses are brought to light. There are instances of deficits in and failures of policy of delivery of societal justice in the countrified pockets of human settlements and terrains of south Asia. Third section evaluates the social context of south Asian countries. An account is furnished in terms of the status of education, health, general insurance, livelihood, employment, social exclusion and inequality phenomena in this region. In the fourth section, the features of south Asian society are furnished as such characteristics are the outcomes and consequences of private actions and public actions through social policy. A summary on the social existence of population in south Asia, and the resultant failures to achieve the social agrarian justice in the countryside is outlined.

In the concrete, applied and empirical context of South Asian agrarianism practices, it is again a matter of practical political significance to develop a critiques of reasons, rationalities and actions of individuals, families and civil society organisations as well as public actions of the tiers of bureaucracy and governments in contributing to social protection, welfare and compensatory social justice in South Asia. It is of significance to develop a critique of public actions of agencies that have been involved with instituting the main pillars of the structure of justice practices through amendments in legislations, reformulations of policy formulations and creation of novel public organizations in individual countries of the region.

There are social policy frameworks of respective welfare sates in all countries of south Asia, but there are hardly comprehensive, universal and inclusive policy framework for all sections of poor, deprived and excluded citizenries. In both Bangladesh and India, social policies are in a safety-net and residual mode, and often piecemeal. A proactive, non-residual and universal social policy of the government in the context of wider framework of national policy of 'growth with justice' has been a casualty.

A morass of private and public human actions over the decades in a framework of hybrid morality of achieving social development and welfare on the one hand and ensuring social justice through restoration of right to education, health, pensions, social security and protection against natural and civil hazards, and south Asia continues to be characterised by comparatively lower life expectancy of humans, high infant and maternal mortality, high illiteracy and quite low social protection and security. South Asia is till date a region of the highest rate of youth illiteracy. Female illiteracy has been quite a problem. South Asian private human agents and their groups have shown the rationalities and responded to reasons for action in minimising the social insecurities and vulnerabilities over the years but the consequences and outcomes have not been quite encouraging.

It is as yet a region with the largest number of internally displaced populations and distress migration; the number of internally displaced populations has been approximately two million people. It is as yet a region characterized by political conflicts, recurrent natural disasters, climate change and demographic shifts. Devastating effects of natural hazards of

floods, droughts, earthquakes are also common. While the public welfare and development measures orchestrated in the name of hitherto past concerns for instituting justice in south Asia have benefited a number of rural actors and agents in terms of guaranteeing the legal entitlement of a minimum of resources and commodity, the societal impact of these in transforming the rural and agrarian institutional setup has been minimal only. The deprivations, exclusions and injustice still prevail.

The social protection and justice related structures and practices have moreover become nearly outmoded by the repeated implementation failures in the region. Such patterned concerns with equity has been not only incomplete but also fragmented and disjoint by virtue of being an amalgam of multiple concerns running from some form of resource-equity to commodity-entitlement to income-levelling. Populist political concerns and public reasons have allowed multiple objectives and interests to pollute the host of actions related with bureaucratic programmes and schemes. These have been all practised moreover almost simultaneously without any regard to the relation of precedence and succession, and the sense of proportion among them. Such an almost simultaneous, nearly overlapping and much-publicised though vacuous pursuit had led to the phenomena of duplication of initiatives, wastages of resources and mis-targeting of beneficiaries accompanied by a noticeable lack of direction. Such hitherto existing measures undertaken by the welfare state still leaves people hungry and thirsty for the agrarian social justice in the south Asia.

8.1. Social Policy Framework

In south Asia, the action of social policy has a history. It has been the resistance against the British colonialism that has led to the quest for individual liberty, autonomy and justice for individuals in the society. With political independence from the erstwhile British Empire, the governments have also come forward to institute public care and security to citizens. India is the home to one of the oldest and most complex policy regimes of social justice through affirmative action, which dates from the late 19th century[127].

[127] To quote an observer:

The old welfare states in the region in early 1950s laid the foundations of land reforms, credit reforms, marketing reforms, and chalked out food policy, employment policy, family welfare policy, instituted provident funds for government employees, pensions for government employees, established public hospitals and public schools. The supported legislations were passed in the Parliaments and the Constitutions have been amended from time to time in response to the global drive for a human rights agenda. With the motive to establish the "developmentalist" welfare states, the motto of 'growth with re-distribution' or 'growth with social justice' was publicized throughout South Asia (Bhutan and Nepal has been late starter in this direction).

Social growth and development of the sector is a saga of outcomes of actions not only individual social agents but also government functionaries. In addition to autonomous strivings and efforts of individual agents in isolation as well as members of the family and community groups, the developmentalist welfare states have also been at the forefront of social development, growth and welfare in south Asia. The specific composition of welfare state has differed as a function of dynamics and nature of power politics in different countries of south Asia**.**

India adopted the goals of a welfare state[128] immediately after the Independence in 1947 from the British colonial empire, and enshrined the social justice as clauses of safeguards

---

> *Colonial traditions continue to influence approaches to social welfare, primarily by the state in India, and much more strongly determined by the large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bangladesh. Political democracy and the way this emerged from the colonial period gave a particular shape to the implementation of the social policy model in India, including in the dualism between modern (organized) and informal (unorganized) sectors, its many "centrally sponsored" schemes, and notably , through the "reservation" policies for marginalized groups (Haan, 2010, p. 12).*

[128] The concept of a welfare state has strong normative connotation and is conceptually associated with a commitment to both democracy and social justice. The potential for income redistribution and environmental regulation is an important element with regard to social justice. Social disabilities rather than economic deprivation have been the focus for rectification and compensatory justice. Welfare state has many rationales, ranging from nation building to economic progress to enhancing the domestic market to political stability. All countries are but driven, in their welfare state approaches, by a combination of instrumentalist, competitive and progressive rationales (Gabriele Koehler, 2014).

under the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution. The Indian Constitution of 1950 explicitly sanctioned preferential treatment for disadvantaged groups of the 'Untouchables' (achhut), Scheduled Castes (dalits) and Scheduled Tribes (adivasis). The purpose was their 'upliftment' and closer 'integration' in the national progress. Right from the late 1940s and early 1950s, there had been institutionalised attempts at formulation of welfare state policies[129] in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. This has as such been the case in Bhutan since 1960s, in Bangladesh since 1970s and in Nepal since 1990s.

Affirmative action[130] has been the principal instrument if achieving social justice. It has simply been a sort of **reverse discrimination** against the majority. The popular type of affirmative action was often the setting up a quota -- designating a specific number of hiring decisions, admission positions, or contractor awards to racial/ethnic minorities or women. Affirmative action programs now generally rely on giving **preferences** (preferential consideration) to particular underrepresented groups in their decisions. This principle has guided virtually all affirmative action programs since the late 1970s in the United States of America[131]. There has been a sense of consequentialist justice that informed the provisions of quotas and reservations in jobs and employment. Quotas were

---

[129] There are five pillars of welfare state functions: education, health access for all, social protection including the social security and assistance, active labour market policies to generate employment, microcredit and insurance provisions, and family policy related with child policy and welfare services. There are social goods and services. These are in the nature of public goods and merit goods, viz., education, health-care, housing provisions, guarantees of employment, family welfare of children, women and aged, social security and insurances, social solidarity and protection against crimes, violence and foreign aggression. Significant phenomena and processes of the social sector of a political system are those related with education, health-care, housing and hygiene provisions, employment guarantees, family care and care of children, women and elderly, food and water security, social solidarity and peace, and basic income guarantees.

[130] The slogan and the practice of "affirmative action" were first developed in the early 1960s under President Kennedy in America. That was the appeal to take public action to address the inequality and discrimination that the Blacks experienced. President Johnson strongly supported this policy and expanded it. Later, President Nixon was the first to set up specific federal guidelines to implement affirmative action policies.

[131]In recognition of a kind of group right, the social groups and castes were recognized for preferential treatment thorough the introduction of the employment/job "quota" and "reservation" in India. It was argued that under-representation of lower-caste in the educational institutions and bureaucracy was indicative of social injustices. Quotas were rendered consonant with principles of merit and equality of opportunity. Quota meant quota in bureaucracy and legislature. It was required that the social justice plank must break the cycle of inequalities in educational and employment opportunities associated with caste-based discrimination.

the compensation owed to the victims of past injustices and were a form of reparation – a form of atonement by the current generation for the misdeeds of their ancestors.

In India, a number of affirmative action, including the job "quota", for the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe was started subsequently. The need to reconcile growth and social justice was explicitly recognized at the early stage of India's planned economic development (Kurien, 1992). In India, the quota and reservation policy continues as part of affirmative action programs[132]**.** The system of quotas from the beginning has however been very controversial in nature and generated much resentment from the citizens belonging to the majority group who felt that they were arbitrarily and unfairly being denied access to such opportunities. In the case in favour of 'other backward caste' quotas, it has been argued that the under-representation remained an indicator of disadvantage and injustice. The backward castes have however felt left behind the institutional social welfare. Subsequently, the government decided to implement job quotas for the OBC (lower caste Hindu groups and also equivalent non-Hindu groups) in line with the recommendations of the second Backward Classes Commission (popularly, known as the 'Mandal' Commission)[133].

It was not the political participation in democracy but the representation through guarantee of admission quota in educational institutions and job quota in bureaucracy that was asked

---

[132] In India, social justice has not been construed as distribution of economic resources among individuals. It continues to be construed as fair distribution of social status (respect and power), employment and education. Since beginning, social justice connoted that social groups, rather than individuals, were the units of justice calculation and benefit allocation that in turn was based on the assumption that individuals were disadvantaged on account of belonging to a group or a caste. A new movement for social justice through affirmative action for disadvantaged groups, mainly lower castes called the 'Other-Backward-Castes' (OBCs) began in 1990. In the 1990s, the disproportionate 'representation' of lower-castes in bureaucracy and legislature was seen as evidence that inequalities in opportunities persist. The politics of social justice in the 1990s has been one informed by growing political clout of lower-caste parties and leaders in Indian politics who have been arguing on the basis of caste inequalities, social justice and job quotas.

[133] In 1992, the Supreme Court upheld quotas for OBCs but asked for the exclusion of economically well-off OBCs – the creamy layer. Since 1993, the job "quota" of Indian Constitution of 1950 for the SC and ST was extended for the 'Other-Backward-Castes' (OBCs). The education quotas in higher education institutions which was instituted since 2006 was extended to the admission of 'Other-Backward-Castes' (OBCs) in institutions of higher education in 2008. It was the culmination of the landmark parliamentary debate in 1990. All these constituted the state policy of group preference through legislative quotas of job/employment for castes in national bureaucracy.

for. There was decline in the religious disabilities of a caste as the criteria of backwardness, and it was replaced by a secular profile of a caste that involved the criteria of literacy, poverty and representation in administrations and legislature (Bajpai, 2010, pp. 675-708). In India, the social policy on social justice has recently been as such that caste census was introduced for the first time in the country. The politicization of 'caste' has been a recent phenomenon. Caste-based politics received its official sanction with the acceptance of recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1990. The government announced in early part of the year of 2010 that the enumeration of caste – recording the names, addresses, and caste of some 1.2 billion citizens at an estimated cost of 30 billion - 40 billion rupees would be carried out in 2011. The government agreed to add "caste" to the census exercise for the first time in 80 years. With this, some sort of legitimization was added to the caste-based politics of "quotas" and "reservation" (Mishra, 2011, pp. 113-4).

The affirmative action has not yet covered the working migrants and displaced populations in south Asia. Moreover, there has been affirmative action for the caste and gender but yet not for the faith-community and Diaspora community in the region. The reservation debate in India is largely an intramural debate among partisans of equality. In India, social justice[134] has meant the idea of favouring the notion of equality in social status and power, and not the equal distribution of wealth and income in society. For the community leaders and politicians, the movement for social justice has meant the struggle for a share in state power rather than the struggle for livelihood for the leaders and politicians. Social disabilities rather than economic deprivation have been the focus for rectification and compensatory justice. The social justice argument has centered at achievement of non-discrimination, general welfare and compensatory justice.

---

[134] An Indian economist has put a perceptive remark on the notion of social justice in the following words:

> *I think social justice demands that all of us, particularly the poor, should be entitled to some form of income security or safety net, and in the case of job dislocations, all employees have the right to an adequate programme of retraining and redeployment ..... Globalisation is about market competition and efficiency. For social justice, in which we all have an interest, to be sustainable it has to be based on a reasonably efficient economy. Productivity is extremely important from the point of social justice (Bardhan, 2001, pp. 471-77).*

In recent years, the palliatives have often been offered to the excluded and deprived majority through various nationally and internationally designed poverty reduction and social development projects and programs, which are implemented by nongovernmental organizations. Various motivated citizens' groups are working to empower some of the most deprived segments of the population in South Asia by promoting self-help and highlighting people's abilities within their communities. In the fields of education, healthcare, housing, social solidarity and cohesion, there has been a tradition of private care and welfare provision by private charitable organizations and occupation–specific-friendly-societies in the region. The informal arrangements such as intra-family transfers have for centuries been the primary source of old-age income support. That remains true even today. The demand for social justice has been the political plank in the mobilization of support from the masses for quite some time in the recent past[135]. The social justice argument has centered at achievement of non-discrimination, general welfare and compensatory justice. Attempts have been made to make steps towards creating a transformative and rights based developmental welfare states in the region as a tactic to assuage citizens and pacifying policies to orchestrate the palliative effects.

With growing middle class population and a surge of vibrant civil society organizations, political situations across the region are transforming (Koehler and Chopra, 2014, p. 6). That had forged a certain degree of aspirational adherence to overarching norms and values of social and economic justice (Gabriele, 2014b). The affirmative action of the states has taken the forms of reservation in educational institutions and job reservation for the disadvantaged – an attempt to bring equality in opportunity[136] as key component of social

---

[135] To continue to quote:

> *Let me end with a plea for accountability at all levels: local, national and local. ..... Social justice has to be looked at from the ground level, where the poor live. ..... Democratic decentralisation that utilises local information, initiative, and ingenuity is thus extremely important for the poor ..... Finally, social justice has to be ultimately demanded and achieved from below, not from above ..... Ultimately, if the demand for, and achievement of, social justice has to come from below, the people to whom these institutions are to be accountable have to play their part in terms of responsible behaviour (Bardhan, 2001, pp. 471-80).*

[136] This has influenced the reality of the idea of equality and distributive justice in south Asia:

justice. There is now demand of the corporate responsibility for the disadvantaged, requiring a move from the corporate governance to social governance in the business sector in south Asia. South Asia is today a hotbed of new direction, innovation and experimentation in framing strategies of social development through social protection and social policy of a resurging welfare regime.

The origin of social policy of social provisioning of education, health and hygiene and infrastructure (roads, bridges and power satiations) and employment of labour and public distribution of food was not only there in the incorporation of the provisions of the Directive Policies of the State Policy in the Indian Constitution and the passing of the subsequent laws in the parliaments in the countries of south Asia, but also in the dialectics of the Cold War era of second half of 20th century (particularly, 1950s to 1980s) that provided easy access to the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) of the United States of America. In other words, the social policy in south Asia has been influenced by two factors: the parliamentary thinking and the provisions of the Constitutions on the one hand, and the access to the easy ODA from the US and other European countries on the other.

Thanks to the ODA of Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and the World Bank and IMF! Such ODA was in the nature of the precursor to social policy that had been pursued vigorously during 2004-2014 in India. In the wake of the Cold War between US and erstwhile USSR, there was an attempt to bribe countries in south Asia through easy flow of IDS of the US. Such a strategy of the Cold War helped establishing a number of rural

---

Equality of opportunity is considered a key condition for a society to ensure distributional justice ……. Equality of opportunity requires compensating people for disadvantages related to circumstances so the distributions of outcomes can be entirely attributed to efforts …….. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) all reflect this consensus. The idea of opportunities as equal access to basic services by children is also consistent with the "rights approach" upheld by several countries in South Asia …… The idea of opportunities as equal access to basic services by children is consistent with rights-based approaches to service delivery..... More recently, four South Asian countries joined the Scaling-Up Nutrition movement, which had been launched in 2010 and renewed in 2012 with updated goals. These four South Asian countries are Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Complementing the MDGs, Scaling-Up Nutrition aims at saving and improving lives through greater availability of nutritious food. Despite this widespread commitment to rights, access to services related to health and nutrition tends to be limited in South Asia (Rama, et al., 2015, p.95-7).

development schemes and programmes, which in turn was certainly conducive and instrumental in laying down the origin of Social Policy in respective countries of the region.

In addition to affirmative action that has concentrated not only on the marginalized caste such as scheduled caste and tribe and also other backward caste but also children, women and disabled in recent years, there has been social protection measures as part of the social policy in India as well as other countries of south Asia. While the welfare provisions under the aegis of the welfare state has been available since 1950s in India, there has been a surge in making of a social policy innovations in the region since 2004 – last ten years.

A decade of measures of social protections, mostly stated under nomenclatures of poverty reduction, food security and employment guarantees and basic income guarantees, is a new direction of social policy- through still residual, fragmentary and non-universal one – of developmentalist, welfare states of south Asia. Different from earlier phases of social policy of 1950s, many of the current social policies in the region refer to citizenship as a notion, and even to the rights of citizen as normative framework (Gabriele, 2014, p.5). Whatever private and public rationalities of individuals and governments have been in operation, a hybrid morality motivating palliative actions is a new phenomenon.

Table – 8.1

Social Protection in South Asia: Some Commonalities, 2009

Countries	Social Security			Social Assistance			
	Formal Sector Sickness, Unemployment, Old Age, Health, Insurance Services	Poverty Related Social Assistance	Child Benefits Assistance (Girl Child Grants)	Health Related Transfers (Maternity Benefits)	Educated Related Transfers	Employment Related Transfers (Public Works Schemes)	Transfers To Cope With Conflict And Natural Disasters
Bangladesh	√	√		√	√	√	√
Bhutan	√	√			√		
India	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Maldives	√	√			√		√
Nepal	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Pakistan	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Sri Lanka	√	√		√	√	√	√

Source: UNICEF ROSA Fiscal Budget database, 2009

In south Asia, the panorama of social protection[137] measures of the welfare states range from food-related measures (cooked school meals in India, subsidized grain prices and subsidized PDS in India, Nepal and Bangladesh) to social assistance (universal old age pensions in Nepal, Benazir income sup[port programme in Pakistan, child benefit in Nepal, unorganized sector health insurance in India) to public works (NREG in India, Karnali programme in Nepal, Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest in Bangladesh) to affirmative action (secondary school stipend for girls in Bangladesh, education for all in

[137] The idea of social protection and security for individual citizen is rooted in the realization that men/women/children are always vulnerable in the lottery of blind luck. Since birth, an individual is vulnerable by virtue of being a powerless child, a dependent woman, a weak/sick/ageing man/woman. In addition, an individual human being is vulnerable not only against a stratified, private property and inheritance respecting society but also against the recurring risks and uncertainties of the natural hazards and the volatility of global finance and markets. The blind lottery of luck at birth means the lottery of mental and physical health as well as the material inheritance of external property. It is the provision of social security and protection that compensate for such vulnerabilities, frailties and defence-less-ness.

Nepal, child grants for girls in India, rural development and community based interventions in India) to human rights (national food security act in India, mid-day meal in India, right to work in India, right to information in India, Nepal and Bangladesh, and right to education and health service) (Bonnerjee and Koehler, 2011).

The best documented recent policy innovation is the *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme* in India, introduced in 2006. In Bangladesh, an *Employment Generation Programme for Hard-Core Poor* was introduced initially in 2008-09. In Nepal, the *Karnali Employment Programme* was adopted in 2010. In Pakistan, the Benazir Income Support Programme was introduced in 2008. In addition, the right to information acts have been adopted in India, Bangladesh and Nepal recently. Most of the social policies are disjointed poverty policy and food policy. Food policy is an important constituent of social policy in south Asia.

With an eye to limited social-insurance coverage, the Indian state has long provided subsidized goods and services as a counterpart to social protection available in developed countries. This has included subsidized food through the public distribution systems (and the allied fair price shops), free education and health care in public facilities, and subsidized energy. However, the poor quality of free public services encourages even poor people to opt out; moreover, massive leakages (most prominently in the PDS) spread the benefits to individuals who do not need public support (Croissant, et al., 2014).

Table – 8.2

South Asia: Social Protection Panorama and Design

Food-Related Measures	Social Assistance	Public Works	Affirmative Action	Human Rights
Cooked School Meals	Universal Old Age Pension (Nepal)	National Rural Employment Guarantee (India)	Secondary School Stipend For Girls (Bangladesh)	National Food Security Act (India)
Subsidized Public Distribution System (India, Nepal, Bangladesh)	Benazir Income Support Programme (Pakistan)	Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest (Bangladesh)	Education For All (Nepal)	Mid – Day Meal (India)
Subsidized Grain Prices	Child Benefit (Nepal)	Karnali Programme (Nepal)	Child Grants For Girls (India)	Right To Education (All) and Right To Health Service (All)
	Unorganised Sector Health Insurance (India)		Rural Development And Community Based Interventions (India)	Right to Work (India) and Right to Information (India, Bangladesh, Nepal)

Source: Based on Bonnerjee and Koehler, 2011 quoted in G Koehler, 2014a, p. 5

South Asia has been a region as one centre of policy innovation with a series of programs designed to advance inclusive human development, which are cast as "rights-based". New innovations are marked for introduction of rights-language, backing-legislations, universalization, diversification, food-security-centeredness, affirmative action and reservations for the excluded marginalized class of people. Since 2004, there has been a surge in social sector policies - social policy and social protection measures as part of innovations in intent and design of welfare policy of the governments in south Asia.

Though under-funded, inequitably resourced and non-synchronized in design format, the innovation nature of recent social protection measures of social policy is the provision of "rights" based or citizen-beneficiary centered, judiciable or judicial-activism-tolerant,

food- entitlement directed measures of social protection in south Asia. Though mostly means-tested social provisioning of basic income, assured minimum employment, and essential student stipends for girl child or general free-bees, initial pilot schemes are all implemented universally throughout all regions of a country on south Asia[138]. All in all, there has been small size of social assistance benefits.

In south Asia, social security has typically been perceived as residual, with a strong emphasis on targeted safety nets[139]. The dominant social policy approach in India has been one of 'welfarism' and 'residualism'. This approach has ever aimed to limit social protection to a small part of the population, the "deserving poor". In this approach, the public funding has been treated a cost and not investment (for example, in human capital) and as a "safety net" (Haan, 2010, pp. 204). It is also the case with the employment guarantee scheme in India – a recent rights-based policy. Except in Sri Lanka, the inclusive

---

[138] A pertinent remark is to the effect of the critical observation:

> *Recent health and nutrition indicators show extremely poor implementation of public services, except again in Sri Lanka, which before 1950, introduced general public health interventions and after 1950, also modern obstetric interventions which brought down maternal mortality ..... public spending on health and education is very low in Pakistan and Bangladesh, though increasing rapidly during the 1990s in the latter ..... Remarkably poor nutrition indicators and health records have been observed for India, leading to a label for India as "economic powerhouse and nutritional weakling" ..... South Asia's political democracy, and how this has evolved since the late colonial period, has provided a particular shape to the evolvement of social policies (Haan, 2010, pp. 191-8).*

[139] India is the representative example:

> *In south Asia, targeted interventions like public works existed under Mughal and British rule ..... in India, targeting has been a common element of a wide range of social policies, carried out on the basis of a well-developed system of categorization, of social (SC, ST, Other Backward Castes) as well as economic ("Below the Poverty Line") categories, and on the basis of the post-colonial pact with businessmen that realized the need for anti-poverty programs .....One of the best known example has been the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, which provided rural employment on the basis of "self-targeting", in which wages provided are low enough so that better-off would not apply for the scheme ..... Food aid played a big role in the 1974 famine in Bangladesh ..... In Bangladesh, particularly following the war and natural disasters, international organizations have played a large role, with a big impact on targeted food distribution schemes, and the support to "national" NGOs ..... The big challenge for social policies in the region, in the context of continued economic transition and globalization, is for transformative forces to find strong anchors in public institutions, and to shape a more inclusive social contract (Haan, 2010, pp. 204-7).*

provision of social security and the universal primary education has been very slow to emerge (Haan, 2010, p. 191).

The design of social protection measures has been fragmented, the delivery has been minimal and the governance of the schemes has been corrupt. Howsoever poor outcomes and low reach of the under-funded, inequitably resourced, laundered and grabbed and leaked finance of social policy, there are complementary affirmative action of the state, social assistance programmes, public works projects, food related legislations and measures, and ratification of human rights and rights to information in south Asia in last one decade - 2004-2014.

Table – 8.3

Social Policy Panorama South Asia – Selected Examples

Social Policy Programmes		
Hunger	• Cooked School Meals • (India) • National Food Security Bill (India)	•Subsidized Grain Prices and Open Market Sales (Bangladesh) •Means Tested Food Subsidy (Sri Lanka)
Health	• National Rural Health Mission (India) • Free Basic Health Services And Medication (India, Nepal, Bhutan)	•Health Insurance (India, Maldives)
Income Insecurity	• Benazir Income Support Programme (Pakistan) • Child Benefit (Nepal) • Social Security Bill For Unorganized Sector Workers (India)	•Samurdhi (Sri Lanka) •Universal Old Age Pension (Nepal) •Social Pension (Maldives)
Un-/under-employment	• National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and Scheme (India) • Employment Generation Programme For The Poorest (Bangladesh)	•Karnali Employment Programme (Nepal)
Social Exclusion	• Secondary School Stipend For Girls (Bangladesh) • Education For All and Dalit Education Grants (Nepal) • Child Grants For Girls • (India)	•Rural Development And Community Based Interventions (India) •Recognition Of Forest Common Rights (India)

Citizenship	• National Food Security Act (India) • Mid-Day Meal (India) • Right To Education (All Countries) • Right To Free Health Services (Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka)	•Right To Work (India) •Right To Information (India, Bangladesh, Nepal)

Source: Based on Koehler 2014; Chopra 2014 reproduced in Koehler, 2014b, p.5

Current policies primarily tend to make women responsible for their own children's care. Those benefits that are provided by the government cater to women in the organized sector and in government jobs. The recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission (2008), which revised pay scales for government employees, recommended increasing the period of maternity leave provided to women to two years; however, this retains the framework of women serving as primary child care providers.

None of the countries in south Asia has ratified the fundamental ILO convention on 'employment promotion and protection against unemployment'; none of the countries in the region has yet been a party to the ratification of 'social security (minimum standard) convention of the ILO (Gabriele, 2014b, p. 8). Civil service schemes still dominate the pension landscape in most of South Asia. The design of formal retirement income schemes in South Asia was influenced by the region's close historical ties to the United Kingdom, and for the most part the system has changed little during the past half century. Formal pension schemes for civil servants were introduced in the first half of the 19th century by the British colonial administration. In the second half of the 20th century, influenced by universal coverage in the industrial world, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka introduced separate retirement savings plans for the private sector. Participation in these programs remains limited, however, with coverage generally extending to less than 10 percent of the population ages 15-59-and less than 5 percent in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal.

8.2. Social Sector Spending in South Asia

The movement of funds, functions, and functionaries away from central governments to local authorities is a phenomenon that has been witnessed across South Asia and the rest of the world. Shifts in the locus of decision-making and responsibility for public sector activities has been driven by a broad range of factors – one of which has been the expectation that the shift will engender more responsive and effective use of public monies and authority. Reducing the space between decision makers, implementers, and the communities they serve is seen to be a fundamental step towards more accountable government that better serves the needs of the people.

In south Asia, the per capita expenditures in the social sector component of the fiscal budgets increased from US $ 30 to US $ 90 per person between 2002 and 2010. The allocation of fiscal budget in recent years has been as such that almost 35 percent has been allocated to the social sectors (education, health, social protection/social security and community development) while only 20 percent is allocated to economic sectors. (Bonerjee, 2014 quoted in Gabriele, 2014). It has been found that South Asia countries have been spending more on direct subsidies for households to purchase food, fertilizer, or electricity. These subsidies have ever been justified on poverty reduction grounds. These spending are not always progressive. The assessment has been to the effect of the findings that these have often ended up in being unambiguously regressive. There are additional features of social protection expenditures of the governments in the region, for example:

> *Maldives and Sri Lanka rely more on contributory social insurance than on social safety nets (DNP 2013; MoFP 2012). With the exception of these two countries, spending on social insurance tends to be small because a majority of workers in South Asia are informal sector employees who are not eligible to participate in programs such as old-age pensions and health insurance. The bias toward food and price subsidies is especially marked in India and Pakistan. In India, the Public Distribution System is responsible for the provision of subsidized food (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 162).*

A liberal estimate by the World Bank asserts that India spent 4.4 percent, while Sri Lanka 3.0 percent, Pakistan 1.4 percent and Bangladesh 1.1 percent of their respective gross

domestic product on social protection in the first decade o the new millennium. The UNICEF ROSA has given much lower estimate while the Asian Development Bank has given higher figure. In all case, not more than five percent of the gross domestic product has been spent on the social protection in either of the countries of South Asia. In south Asia, the proportion of national income devoted to the education sector has been just slightly above that of America which spends just around 5.5 percent of GDP each year on education but much below Cuba that spends almost 13.6 percent of GDP on education. While Nepal devoted 4.7 percent of gross domestic product to education sector, the countries of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been spending slightly above two percent in the year of 2010. Not even two percent of GDP has been spent on maintenance of health of population in either countries of south Asia (refer to tables – 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6). In south Asia, much is still needed to be done.

Social protection spending in South Asia is characterized by low to moderate coverage[140]. Such low spending has negative implications for the poor, destitute and disadvantaged section of societies. Only very recently, there has been some improvement in the coverage.

> *In Nepal and Sri Lanka, a little more than half the poor receive support. In most other countries, the coverage rate of social assistance spending is between 20 and 30 percent. However, coverage has improved over time. In Bangladesh, for instance, 33 percent of the poor benefitted from at least one social assistance program in 2010, compared with 21 percent in 2005 (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 162).*

India is a representative example in the health sector. In India, the public health care system has been characterized by far too little public expenditure the country has been spending an average of around 1.1 percent of the gross domestic product. With such low expenditure, it

---

[140] To quote an observation:

> *Bangladesh provides a clear example …… Among its public safety net programs, the Female Secondary Schools Stipends Program - the precursor of modern conditional cash transfers—is known worldwide. But Bangladesh is not alone. In India, the MGNREG Act represents a significant milestone in the design and execution of public works, supported by massive government resources. The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana health insurance program for the poor is also path breaking in its design though still in an early stage of development. In Pakistan the BISP, introduced in 2008, helped increase spending on social safety net programs from 0.3 percent of GDP in 2003–04 to over 0.7 percent of GDP in 2010. When assessed on the basis of absolute spending per person, social protection programs are progressive in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 159).*

has moreover been providing only poor-quality health care. The medical services are inefficiently organized. Public facilities suffer from shortage of doctors, nurses, midwives and other staff. This has been a chronic problem in the rural areas. The medical colleges have been severely overcrowded, but the primary health-care units and hospitals block and district have been underused because of (perceived) poor quality.

Table – 8.4

Social Protection Expenditures in South Asia, 2006-2009

Countries	Percentage Share of GDP		
	World Bank Estimate (2006)	Asian Development Bank Estimate (2008)	UNICEF ROSA Estimate (2009)
Bangladesh	1.1	5.3	0.2
Bhutan	-	1.4	2.0
India	4.4	4.0	1.0
Maldives	-	1.5	2.0
Nepal	-	2.3	1.0
Pakistan	1.4	2.0	-
Sri Lanka	3.0	5.7	3.0

Source: World Bank, 2006; ADB, 2008: UNICEF ROSA Fiscal Budget database, 2009
Note: The data for Pakistan pertains to the year of 2002-2003 and 2004-2005, while the data for Sri Lanka and India pertains to the year of 2004

In addition to all these problems, the issues of underinvestment, poor training and even poorer diagnostic and therapeutic capacities are also serious problems. Even poor patients have lost confidence and try to avoid public hospitals (Croissant et al., 2014, p. 58). The public health system has decayed even as the purchase of health services in the private sector has become more expensive, and unemployment continues to be a worry. Privatization within the health and education sectors has led to increases in inequality and differential access to public health system resources and higher education institutions. A number of health related programmes have not been able to mitigate these evils in either countries of south Asia. In recent years, such problems have aggravated in both urban as well as rural areas.

Moreover, there has been a severe problem of mis-targeting. A number of empirical researchers have found it that around 60 percent to 80 percent of the beneficiaries have not been poor. Poor have been receiving between 50 percent and 80 percent of the funding. A

disproportionately large fraction of resources have been captured by the better-off. This high rate of leakage has significantly weakened the impact of social protection spending over the years in South Asia

Table – 8.5

Social Expenditures as a Share of GDP, 2010

Country	Social Expenditures as a share of GDP, 2010	
	Health expenditure as share of GDP	Education expenditure as share of GDP
Bangladesh	1.2	2.2
India	1.2	3.1
Nepal	1.8	4.7
Pakistan	0.8	2.4
Sri Lanka	1.3	2.1

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2013

In south Asia, a detailed case study of India is highly informative. In India, there are three kinds of transfers from the central government to subnational governments: tax shares and grants decided by the Finance Commission, grants and loans from the Planning Commission for implementing the state development plans, and the discretionary grants of central government Ministries to the counterparts in the subnational government ministries for specified projects (centrally sponsored schemes). In addition to these transfers, a number of hidden and implicit transfers arise from the large subsidies provided by the central governments for food and fertilizers. The discretionary transfers and the subsidies (highest levels of subsidies given to the leading states of Punjab, Haryana and Maharashtra) put together have been as large as the tax shares.

Table – 8.6

Expenditure on Education in South Asia: 1970-2009

Countries/Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Public Expenditure on Education (Percentage of GDP) (1995-97)	3.2	2.7	2.2	3.2	3.4	4.1	6.4	3.2
Public Expenditure on Education (Percentage of GDP) (2006-09)	3.1	2.7	2.4	4.6	..	4.8	8.1	3.0
Public Expenditure on Health (Percentage of GDP) (1995-99)	0.8	0.7	1.7	1.3	1.7	3.2	3.7	0.9
Public Expenditure on Health (Percentage of GDP) (2009)	1.4	0.9	1.1	2.1	1.8	4.5	5.2	1.3

Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

In India, the subnational states have broad responsibilities in the provision of health care, education, social welfare, infrastructure and agricultural assistance. They finance around 57 percent of public expenditures, a higher share than subnational governments in any other developing country aside from China. There is however a considerable gap (around 40 percent) in their ability to finance these tasks through their own independently derived resources.

There has been a practice of filling such deficits by transfers from the Finance Commission (via grants and a program of interstate tax sharing) and grants/credits from the Planning Commission (as generic gap-filling and/or for the execution of a wide variety of specific central-government programs). This is a rather complex, opaque system, which in some sense diminishes incentives for subnational state governments to raise their own tax

income. Poor states are hardly able to finance their operational expenditures (absorbed mostly by salaries for public employees and deficit-running public sector enterprises), leaving little or nothing left over for necessary investments. In the history of the Centre-State relations, some states‟ debts have reached unsustainable levels, to the point where they have been forced to adhere to a financial responsibility act that demands a gradual decline in state budget deficits.

In 1992 through the 73rd Amendment Act, the Panchayati Raj institution came into existence through a constitutional amendment and established elected local governments at the village level with express intention to develop local participation in governance. The panchayats are presently centrally funded, which is to say the central government is responsible for providing resources to meet development requirements in rural areas. More recently since 2007, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj has operated a so-called Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF), under which the government provides financial resources for development schemes in “backward” districts whose needs are not being met through existing inflows. The BRGF program is implemented through the Panchayati Raj Institutions and the municipalities. The MNREGA is a centrally funded scheme administered at the state level. While state governments may have considerable notional autonomy in terms of developing infrastructure, they depend on the center for funds to keep their programs afloat. The central government controls the quantity and quality of public services by running more than two dozen central programs, with funds dependent on the acquisition of matching funds by the states and on performance. For nearly every other task, there are nationwide guidelines, frameworks, or other such standards-setting force. Monitoring of effective implementation is an important weak point, however. State governments are also monitored with regard to the development of fiscal deficits, credit demand, and other issues of economic stability.

There are in addition the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) created under the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution for the administration of scheduled areas in the states of Assam, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya, and for the promotion the welfare of the scheduled tribes. The ADCs are funded by the central government, with funds drawn from the consolidated national budget. In June 2011, the ADCs in Meghalaya opposed the

suggestion by a central government inter-ministerial team that grassroots elections be tied to ADC fund disbursement.

The Standing Committee on Rural Development has suggested that the funds thus provided are not sufficient to needs. The committee said its examination of Eleventh Five Year Plan projections and allocations had revealed that the Panchayati Raj Ministry was not getting "much needed funds" during the entire plan period. Subnational governments at the local levels (Panchayati Raj institutions and autonomous district councils) are totally dependent on the provision of funds from the center. Conformity with the center and the national agenda is therefore mediated through the purse-strings. In December – January 2012, the appointment of the anti-corruption ombudsman (Lokayukta) in Gujarat by the governor of the state became a political battle, with the chief minister demanding in a letter to the prime minister that the governor (who is appointed by the central government) be recalled. BJP leaders in the center reiterated the demand. The appointment became a major contested point between the state government and the center, and between the BJP and the Congress Party in the center. The High Court of Gujarat upheld the appointment in January 2012 (Croissant, et al., 2014, pp.122-27). Social policies in India for the most part fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively, and do not ensure equal opportunities. There is a high level of social and economic inequality, although government policies aim at differential inclusion and minimal rights for disadvantaged populations.

To bring back the aggregate scenario in South Asia, it is undoubtedly a fact that social protection helps individuals, households, and communities create assets, cope with risk and volatility. The social protection measures help in cushioning the impact of crisis, structural transformations, and other shocks[141]**.** It is thus heartening to note that on an average, most

---

[141] To quote another piece of observation:

> *Bangladesh is the most effective in directing social protection resources to the poor. In 2010, the poorest 40 percent of households received a little over half the social assistance and over 75 percent of the social insurance, whereas the wealthiest 20 percent of households received about 12 percent of both types of assistance. In contrast, resources are more tilted toward the better-off in Afghanistan, Maldives, and Nepal. However, because poorer households consume less, the same level of public spending makes a greater difference in their case. When assessed relative to the consumption level of the beneficiaries, social protection spending turns out to be largely progressive across the entire region (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 159).*

of the developing countries have been spending around 1.53 percent of their gross domestic prod cuts on the safety nets for the citizens. With the exception of Sri Lanka, most South Asian countries fall within the 0.25 percent to 2 percent range. This, in itself, reflects the '*recent strides countries in the region have made*' (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 159). Much more recently, the World Bank has however come to the conclusion that South Asian countries collect exceptionally low levels of tax revenue. The tax revenue collection has never exceeded the average of ten to fifteen percent of the gross domestic product in either country. This has been quite low in comparison to the developed countries of the world. In addition to the low tax collection, the severe problem is one related to the laws and infrastructure. Most South Asian countries have outdated tax laws and inadequate institutional arrangements unsuitable to the growing complexity of their economies. To quote:

> *In most South Asian countries the major source of revenue is the value added tax. Some are changing their tax structures—India is adopting a goods and services tax, for example—but the main problem remains low collection rates for the value added tax and income tax..... South Asian countries all need to upgrade their infrastructure and improve social services such as education and health care, which will require a substantial increase in fiscal spending and better sources of revenue [observations of World Bank 2012] (World Bank, 2013, p. 67).*

South Asian governments need to increase the amount of "revenue collection" to at least 25-30 percent of the gross domestic product so as to be able to increase the public expenditures on agrarian justice programme. The countries have to assume ownership over their policy agendas. This is possible because of the longer democratic tradition in the region. This is urgent in view of the facts that Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have sufficiently been dependent on foreign aids for many years, and such dependency have exposed them to considerable pressure from donors in the area of human rights and democratic governance (Sobhan, 2004, p. 8).

8.3. Multiple Vulnerabilities, Insecurities and Hazards

South Asia is home to population of both *Aryan* and *Mongoloid* stocks since long. In course of time, it became home to Arab and Afghan migrants as well. It has inherited and carries a multiplicity of religious influences as cultural and social baggage. It is home to approximately 63 percent Hindus, 30 percent Muslims and rest of 7 percent of approximately 2000 ethnic entities of population.

It has for long been characterised by a mosaic of racial and ethnic compositions of populations and division of human society along these lines as well as caste stratification and continuing differentiation. Population is principally divided by caste, in addition to being divided by ethnicity and race including the settlement of a number of tribe. There are a significant chunk of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, including the other backward caste population who are in the category of socially excluded in population. Over the years, the heterogeneity of the social structure has got exacerbated rather than diminished. There had been social divisions among the population since long past and such divergence has further been concretized and expanded.

In addition to caste-stratified populations, there is a significant chunk of socially and economically excluded and deprived populace. In south Asia, the tragedies of social exclusion of a number of caste and tribe and degenerate status of women have been historic. The socially excluded in South Asia include landless and other asset-less labourers as well, whose ranks include large numbers of unemployed and underemployed persons as well as employed persons who earn very low incomes. Other socially excluded groups include small and marginal farmers, small artisans and informal sector operators, disadvantaged women, ethnic minorities, hill people, and people with mental and physical disabilities. Disadvantaged people living on marginal lands such as riverbanks, coastal areas, and *chars* (riverside flood-prone areas and low-lying sandy islands) or arid or semi-arid lands, and hence on the frontline of severe types of natural disasters such as cyclones, floods, and river erosions, also belong to excluded groups. Of these groups, some are more excluded than others. For example, women are more excluded than men in the male-dominated poor families in South Asian societies.

South Asia has moreover earned notoriety for a number of other negative social features that has affected everyone in the masses of populace. It has attracted the global attention for its civil disorders, terrorism and political turmoil. It has over the decades been characterised by internecine battles and conflicts and a hot bed of international terrorism. The social protection of populace from crimes, disorders, accidents and disasters has been at low level. Whatever low levels of social cohesion and solidarity have been there as inherited from the past has variously been challenged by anti-social, anti-community and anti-national forces in recent years.

While accounting for more than 30 percent of the world's terrorist incidents between 2004 and 2008, the region continued to account for almost 40 percent of the world's terrorist incidents in 2009 and 2010. More than 900 disasters have been reported in south Asia since 1970, with floods constituting almost half the events. Natural disasters affected more than 750 million people in the region between 1990 and 2008, resulting in approximately 2,30,000 deaths of human population (Rama, et al, 2015, p. 154). In India, the ethnic clashes have been going on since 1952. The federal government has continuously been challenged by autonomy rebellions by Nagas, Mizos, Tripuras, Bodos, others in Assam since 1952, by the Sikhs in Punjab from 1982), and the Muslims in Kashmir from 1989. There has been a saga of a series of political concessions that have been instrumental in checking some rebellions. In Bangladesh, there have been periodicity in matter of floods, famine, and breakdown of law undermining the parliamentary democracy. Brief experiment with strong presidential rule ended as 'anti-Mujib' officers stage coup in the early 1970s. During 1974-75, there was collapse of parliamentary democracy.

It is in this backdrop that the social vulnerabilities and insecurities associated with illiteracy, poor health and unemployment are to be analysed. To begin with, the longevity of life of adult men and women, an average fertility of women in the family and survival of siblings are to be ensured in general as a matter of dire need and as a matter of self-dignity – the natural right. Men, women and their siblings ought to survive longer on this earth. There is no single determinant of fertility transition across regions within a country and across the countries in south Asia. In the demographic literature, the total fertility rate is the

sum of age-specific fertility rates over a given period that can be interpreted as the average number of children that a woman would bear throughout her reproductive life if she were to experience the fertility rates of the period at each age. It does not take mortality into account. The net reproduction rate is the average number of daughters that a woman would bear throughout her reproductive lie if she were to experience the fertility and mortality rates of the period at each age.

Alas! Fertility, that is the number of children per woman, has declined sharply in all countries in south Asia over the fifty years period of 1950-2000. In 2005, the average fertility ranged from 2.02 in Sri Lanka to 3.68 in Nepal. In most of the countries, women still begin their reproductive life very early - 18 years of age in Bangladesh and 23 years of age in Sri Lanka. There is a close direct relation between fertility and infant mortality; there is a positive correlation. In Sri Lanka, the population is not replacing itself since the net reproduction rate is lower than unity.

In each country of South Asia except Bhutan, the life expectancy at birth was in general quite low and specifically it was lower for women than for men in the 1950s. The most favourable relative situation for women is in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the mean length of life is presently 71 years in 2000-2005 that is above the world-average. In other nations of south Asia, the lengths of life are between 61 and 66 years.

Table – 8.7

Life Expectancy, Mortality, Underweight Children,
DTP Immunization Coverage and Prevalence of Anaemia
in South Asia: 2000-2010

Countries/Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Life Expectancy at Birth (2012)	65.8	65.7	69.2	69.1	75.1	67.6	77.1	..
Infant Mortality Rate (Per 1000 Live Births) (2009)	50.0	71.0	41.0	39.0	13.0	52.0	11.0	51.0
Under Five Mortality Rate (Per 1000 Live Births) (2000)	96	110	82	100	19	100	80	95
Underweight Children (Moderate and Severe) (Percentage of Children under Age Five) (2006-2010)	42.5	31.3	41.0	38.6	21.1	*12.7*	17.3	-
Maternal Mortality Ratio (Per 100000 Live Births) (2008)	230	260	340	380	39	200	37	245
DTP Immunization Coverage (Percentage of One Year Old) (2010)	83	90	98	85	99	94	97	-
Prevalence of Anaemia in Pregnant Women (Percentage) (1985-1999)	88.0	37.0	53.0	65.0	39.0	30.0	-	78.0

Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

Table – 8.8

Social Sector in South Asia: 2005-2009
Perception of Individual Well Being and Perception of Society

Countries/Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	Sri Lanka	Maldives	India	Bhutan	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Nepal
Perception of Individual Well Being – Life Satisfaction (On a Scale of Ten) (2007-2011)	4.2	..	4.6	..	5.0	5.3	3.8
Satisfaction with Freedom of Choice (2007-2011)	81.0	..	80.0	..	78.0	34.0	43.0
Satisfaction with Job(2007-2011)	84.7	..	71.2	..	76.4	73.2	87.3
Perception of Society - Trust In People(2011)	17.0	..	20.0	..	15.0	20.0	17.0
Satisfaction with Community (2007-2011)	89.7	..	82.6	..	91.3	83.6	86.7
Trust in National Government (2007-2011)	86.0	..	58.0	..	79.0	28.0	33.0
Perception of Safety (2007-2011)	77.0	..	70.0	..	80.0	46.0	61.0
Homicide Rate (Per 100,000 People) (2004-2011)	3.6	1.6	3.4	1.0	2.7	7.8	2.8
Suicide Rate (Per 100, 000 People) (2001-2010)	..	0.7	20.8	..	..	..	..

Source: Based on Gallup World Poll Survey, 2012 quoted in UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 175-76

Since 1950, mortality of human beings in all countries in south Asia has declined. Women are today living longer than men in south Asia. The male advantage has disappeared in every country over the last fifty years. Sri Lanka has the highest life expectancy in the region. Other countries in the region are closing the gap with Sri Lanka. Infant mortality

fell throughout the region between 1960-65 and 2000-2005 though it is still relatively high(refer to table 8.7).

Child mortality levels reflect the persistent disparities in child health in south Asia. The proportions of deliveries attended by skilled health personnel, the percentage of malnourished children and the levels of child vaccination coverage provide further proof of this diversity. In India, the impact of area of residence ad mothers' level of education on child health is clear. Health inequalities thus remain extremely large in south Asia as yet. Reduction of inequalities in access to healthcare associated with urban versus rural residence and differences in economic status of citizens need to be reduced. The sex inequality in the levels of care, attention and education still continues, and discrimination against girls still survives in India.

It is in this situation that it is interesting to read the result of subjective evaluation furnished by the Gallup World Poll Survey, 2012. In South Asian countries, the suicide rate per lakh population has been as high as 21 in Indi and of course as low as one in Maldives. The homicide rate has been in recent times ranging from 1.0 in Bhutan to 7.8 in Pakistan. Overall perception of individual well-being and life satisfaction in the scale of ten has been ranked 3.8 in Nepal, 4.6 in India, 4.2 in Sri Lank and above 5.0 in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Certainly, South Asian population lags behind in matter of life satisfaction and parameters of decent life conditions in the face of vulnerabilities – both man-made and natural.

Education and Health

Adult literacy in south Asia is the lowest in the world, even below that of sub-Saharan Africa. The rate of illiteracy has been standing at 23 percent for males and 40 percent for females. Literacy level in India was slightly above 60 percent while it was around 50 percent in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. In Bangladesh and Nepal, the average educational attainments are particularly modest. In the human development report on south Asia, it was remarked at the turn of the century that almost 39 million children

lacked even primary education in south Asia. In the early nineties, the literacy was 46 percent which increased to 54 percent of the population at the turn of the century – lowest on the global scale.

Maldives and Sri Lanka had both achieved the literacy rate of well over 90 percent however. There were 366 million illiterates in south Asia in 1990 but in 1997 there were almost 388 million illiterates. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were together estimated to account for nearly half of the world's illiterate adults in the year of 2000 AD – 387 million people (out of which 289 million illiterates were in India alone). The number of illiterate women was 365 million. In the region, almost two-third of the illiterate adult was woman, and two-thirds of the out-of-the-school children were girls[142]. In 1980, the combined enrolment for all levels of education in the region was 37 percent. In 1999, it improved to 53 percent in south Asia.

Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh are below the regional average. There is acute shortage of properly trained teachers everywhere. Only 35 percent of primary teachers were females in 1997-98. At the turn of the century, south Asia entered the medium human development index bracket. In the nineties, there was improvement in HDI in Maldives and Bhutan. Sri Lanka was having HDI far excess of the regional average but Bangladesh and Nepal was at the bottom (MHDC-HDSA, 2002).

In South Asia, the average years of education of adult men and women have been increasing significantly. Benefitting from larger crop yields, income gains for rural families

[142] The pertinent observation is as follows:

> *A substantive equality of opportunity remains an elusive goal in South Asia. In terms of access to basic services, many children are still suffering from discrimination because of their socioeconomic background. For example, in Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan, girls have fewer chances than boys to study because of cultural and social reasons. Girls 12 to 18 years of age have both lower secondary school attendance rates and lower completion rates than boys of the same age group. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the difference in attendance rates between boys and girls is as high as 25 percentage points and 14 percentage points, respectively. In India, the difference between girls' and boys' completion rates reaches 11 percentage points. Similarly, in parts of South Asia, some children receive services of poorer quality because of their caste, ethnicity, tribe, religion, or community. Although children who belong to certain groups are no longer systematically denied schooling today, they remain vulnerable to bias and prejudice by teachers (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 40).*

and lower food prices subsequent to introduction of the Green revolution have resulted in better educational outcomes. Given the variations in parental education levels being strongly associated with the children's educational attainment (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982), a large proportion of newly enrolled children are the ''first generation learners'' in their families. In Sri Lanka, poverty prevents children from remaining in school beyond the primary level though the universal primary education was available to 90 percent of population. Maldives have achieved literacy rate at 96 percent in the year of 2000[143].

The well-being of the vast majority of the poor in the region, defined multi-dimensionally on both quantitative and qualitative considerations did not at all improve at an acceptable pace[144]. The Indian situation has also not been very encouraging. The goal of providing free, equitable and high-quality education in India has been unevenly and inadequately achieved. A new right to education (RTE) has become effective since 2010 but the practical consequence of this new right (which is incorporated as a part of Article 21 of the Indian

---

[143] There are however reasons to be conservative in deriving an optimistic picture about all these. To quote a finding:

> *By international standards, the health outcomes of the poor in South Asia are among the worst worldwide. The share of children (under five years old) who are stunted among the poorest quintile is above 50 percent in Bangladesh and Nepal and reaches 60 percent in India (figure 2.7). India and Pakistan also have some of the highest infant mortality rates and under-five child mortality rates in the poor across all comparators. Of 1,000 children born in India's poorest population quintile, 82 will die within 12 months and 117 within five years. The figures for Pakistan are 94 and 120, respectively. Inequality in educational attainment is large as well, although showing wide differences across the region ..... Gaps in learning outcomes are large in other countries of the region as well. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have achieved a high level of equality in years of schooling, but learning outcomes differ significantly across income groups (Rama, et al., 2015, p. 75)*

[144] To quote:

> *Assessing inequality of opportunities in the space of access to basic services is not sufficient, however. Social circumstances and initial endowments matter, of course. But between them and actual well-being lies a range of internal and external factors affecting how individuals function. Even children having the same access to basic services, building the same skills, and sharing the same aspirations may not be able to attain the same level of well-being. The extent of economic mobility is one of the factors determining how opportunity is converted into well-being in adult life. Work opportunities, job transitions, and migration are among the mechanisms through which economic mobility materializes (Rama, et al., 2015, pp. 40-41).*

Constitution) has remained imperfectly sketched out. With regard to Indian situation, the assessment has been to the effect of a summative observation:

> *The professed aim of the Ministry of Human Development is to provide universal, inclusive and accessible education to all; this prompted the establishment of specific programs such as Education for All (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan), a shift to gender-neutral universal primary education, and an attempt to improve accessibility for marginalized populations, including disabled persons. The Ministry also launched the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan program in the secondary education sector, with the aim of achieving 75% enrollment within five years of the program"s launch, and of improving the quality of secondary education more generally. Programs catering to specific groups have also been launched, including the National Program for Education of Girls at Elementary Level (NPEGEL), which is to be implemented in educationally underdeveloped regions, and the Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalay program for girls from the scheduled castes and tribes, "other backward classes" and Muslim communities (Croissant et al., 2014, pp. 80-1).*

It has been argued by many researchers that increased financial input has always been highly urgent. Critical findings have however shown that there should be a focus on improving quality. The educations system has functioned in such a way over the past years that the success in developing cognitive skills in Indian schools has been rather limited. The students have lagged an average of two years behind the required skills for a given level, and such has been the case due to the irregular presence of pupils and teachers, the moderate level of training supplied to teachers, a lack of modern teaching methods, and insufficient spending on teaching materials,. In essence, the whole education system presents a failure of governance, which is only slowly being corrected by decentralization, parent participation and the creation of transparency. In recent years, the idea of a national accreditation regulatory authority for higher educational institutions has been attempted. Specific proposals for the improvement of higher education have included the introduction of a bill, introduced in parliament in May 2010. Other attempts have been in the direction of:

> *..... a proposal to establish a National Commission or Council for Higher Education and Research tasked with prescribing academic quality standards; and most recently the introduction of the Foreign Educational (Regulation of Entry and Operations) Bill 2010, governing the regulation of foreign educational institutions within India. Additionally, new institutions for higher education and research, including new IITs and IIMs, have been proposed and set up in some*

> *cases. Reserved admission places for members of scheduled castes and tribes and "other backward classes" within institutions of higher education have been implemented. However, the focus on inclusion has not been commensurate with a substantial improvement in education quality, nor has there been any significant decrease in dropout rates. Though government spending on public education has increased, there has been a progressive privatization and commercialization of education at all levels. Preference for private schools, due to their reputation for a higher-quality education, and for expensive private professional colleges due to the inability of government colleges to support demand, has led to parallel systems in education. Similarly, the exodus to private education, as suggested by a study by Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, has also led to institutions abroad. The "overseas purchase of higher education" has been on the increase, especially after liberalization, which means that a large amount is spent by Indians for "purchasing" education abroad (Croissant et al., 2014, pp. 80-1).*

In India, the National Health Insurance Program (*Rashtriya Swasthya Beema Yojna*), seen by the government as an effective instrument for providing health care coverage to marginal workers, has been extended to beneficiaries of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), and to unorganized workers in hazardous industries such as mining, lead, pencil production, bromide, mica and asbestos. The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was launched by the government in 2005 to augment primary health care in rural areas of 18 states, including the eight empowered action group states (Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, etc.).

The government's 2010 – 2011 Economic Survey suggests that from 2010 on, the NHRM has been a significant contributor in the increased employment of health-care workers and specialists. However, the NHRM has been at the center of a political storm in the past year, with reports of corruption coming from states such as Uttar Pradesh. The poverty risk associated with falling ill has now declined thanks to the introduction of a new health insurance program covering hospital treatment. The quality of low-end public facilities has increased due to the broad-based National Rural Health Mission (Croissant, et al., 2014). According to WHO, India had 1.27 doctors per 1,000 people in 2006. The country had just 0.5 physicians as compared to a world average of 1.5. In the same year, the country had 0.9 nurses per thousand persons, compared to a world average of 1.2. These ratios had been projected to remain below the world averages even in 2016. Broadly speaking, the health-related and medical facilities have for long years been unevenly distributed between rural

and urban areas. The shortages of specialized personnel have further added to the divide and the spatial cleavage (Croissant et al., 2014, p. 58).

> *In South Asia, access to health and education services has improved in recent times. However, the lack of access for children remains acute in relation to health and nutrition. Access is better in the case of primary education but remains low in secondary education. The picture becomes more diversified in the case of infrastructure services: access to improved sanitation is dismally low in most South Asian countries, with the exception of Maldives and Sri Lanka; access to electricity is also limited in most countries, while countries with a relatively high coverage face the challenge of improving the quality of access. Several population groups receive systematically lower coverage of basic services because of their circumstances. Not surprisingly, rural areas fare worse than urban areas. Gaps in coverage are also pronounced when comparing children whose mothers or parents have different levels of educational attainment. Differences in coverage between girls and boys are small, however..... Several factors explain South Asia's lackluster performance in ensuring equality in access to basic services. Importantly, public spending on education and health is relatively low in comparison with other countries at a similar level of development. Equity requires committing additional resources to disadvantaged groups to offset their otherwise more limited access to basic services. However, the opposite is often observed in South Asia. In health, public spending is directed more toward the better-off than to the poorest population groups. In education, public spending tends to be progressive at lower grade levels but regressive at secondary and especially tertiary levels (Rama, et al., 2015, pp. 96-7).*

Table – 8.9

Literacy, Schooling and Social Sector in South Asia: 1970-2009

Countries/Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Total Estimated Population (In Millions) (2000)	1,014	138	129	24	19	2.10	0.30	1,326
Adult Literacy Rate (Percentage Age 15 And Above) (2005-08)	63.0	54.0	55.0	58.0	91.0	53.0	98.0	61.0
Adult Literacy Rate (Percentage Age 15 And Above (1970)	34.0	21.0	24.0	13.0	77.0	..	91.0	32.0
Adult Literacy Rate (Percentage Age 15 And Above) (2000)	57.2	43.2	41.3	41.8	91.6	47.0	96.7	54.4
Combined Enrolment for All Levels of Education (Percentage) (1980)	40.0	19.0	30.0	28.0	58.0	7.0	..	37.0
Percentage of Children Dropping-out from Schools before Grade Five (1995-1999)	48.0	50.0	30.0	56.0	3.0	14.0	2.0	46.0
Children Not in Primary Schools (In Millions) (1997)	27.0	7.0	5.0	0.60	0.0	0.22	0.0	39.0
Percentage of Children Dropping-out from Schools before Grade Five (1995-1999)	48.0	50.0	30.0	56.0	3.0	14.0	2.0	46.0
Illiterate Adults (Number In Millions) (2000)	434	78	76	14	1.6	..	0.01	604
Mean Years of Schooling (2010)	4.4	4.9	4.8	3.2	9.3	2.3	5.8	..
Pupil-Teacher	40.2	39.7	45.8	33.3	23.1	27.7	12.7	40.4

Ratio at Primary Level (2009)								

Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

Table – 8.10

Social Sector in South Asia: 1984-2008
Safe Water, Sanitation, Doctor and Expenditure on Health

Countries/Particulars with Years of Observation in Parentheses	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia
Total Estimated Population (In Millions) (2000)	1,014	138	129	24	19	2.1	0.3	1,326
Population Per Doctor (1992-95)	2,083	1,923	5,555	20,000	4,348	5,000	5,263	2,273
Population without Access to Health Services (Number In Millions) (1995)	143	63	68	..	1.3	0.6	0.1	276
Population with Access to Safe Drinking Water (Percentage) (2008)	88.0	90.0	80.0	88.0	90.0	92.0	91.0	87.0
Population without Access to Safe Water (Number In Millions) (2008)	142.0	17.7	32.0	3.5	2.0	0.05	0.03	197
Population with Sanitation (Percentage) (1990-96)	16.0	30.0	35.0	6.0	52.0	70.0	66.0	22.0
Population with Access to Sanitation (Percentage) (2008)	31.0	45.0	53.0	31.0	91.0	95.0	98.0	36.0

Source: MHDC-HDSA, 2010, pp. 152-62; MHDC-HDSA, 2002, pp. 228-37

Unemployment

The south Asian labour market is overly complex, with around 50 different governing laws that often protect jobs in the formal economy. The south Asian labour market is overly complex, with around 50 different governing laws that often protect jobs in the formal economy. Some of these laws date back to colonial times. A complex array of existing laws needs to be rationalized and simplified, and the infrastructure for the enforcement and implementation of labor laws improved at all levels. There is a need of changing the role of labor commissioners and simplifying labour regulations.

Rural public works programmes are substitutes for unemployment benefit or income support systems in countries that cannot afford such systems. Age and location are the two key defining characteristics of rural youth. Distinguishing between who is rural and urban is increasingly difficult, especially with the expansion of 'peri-urban' areas where large proportions of the population rely on agricultural activities to meet their livelihood needs in south Asia. With regard to IFAD programming, in the past, rural youth has not been identified as a high priority group.

In India, According to the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), using 2009 – 2010 data, the unemployment rate in India was at that time 94 persons out of 1000 persons in the labor force, or 9.4%. In the rural sector, the unemployment rate is estimated at 10.1%, compared to 7.3% in urban areas. Women showed an unemployment rate of 14.6%, compared to 8.0% for males. The unemployment rate for youth continues to be high.

There is no system of unemployment insurance in place apart from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, introduced in 2005 in India. This relatively moderate scheme has helped to stabilize employment and put upward pressure on agricultural wages. The government set up a National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector under the chairmanship of Arjun Sengupta on September 20, 2004, tasked with "review(ing) the status of (the) unorganized/informal sector in India including the nature of

enterprises, their size, spread and scope, and magnitude of employment." The commission, which completed its term in April 2009, submitted a Report on Social Security for Unorganized Workers in May 2006. The report recommended legislation providing social security for unorganized workers, a proposal enacted by the government in 2008. The findings of the commission also noted that the need to improve the quantity and quality of employment in the unorganized sector would require a new approach to economic planning in India, in order to attain the objective of "maximizing employment" and ensuring inclusive growth. Seeing the popularity of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which helped the Congress to win the 2009 parliamentary elections, the newly constituted Government has thought of bringing out the Food Security Act within the first 100 days of its stay in the office for the second time.

While the crisis of 'youth unemployment' (particularly in urban areas) has been a persistent concern of politicians and policymakers since the 1960s, youth development has remained at the margins of national development strategies in most countries. It is certainly the case that, with a few exceptions (such as South Africa), youth as a target group is not a major policy priority of most governments in low-income developing countries. Ministries of Youth are generally very poorly resourced and are usually subsumed (or combined) with other government responsibilities, most commonly culture, sports and education. The 2007 World Development Report on youth concludes that 'youth policies often fail'. Almost one-quarter of young people live in households where income per head is less than one dollar a day.

FAO estimates that that around 70 percent of youth reside in rural areas in South Asia. Young people aged 15-24 comprise 29 percent of the entire labour force in South Asia. Youth unemployment has been 10 percent of all youth in South Asia. Unfortunately, breakdowns of rural and urban youth unemployment rates are not available. Particularly high rates of youth unemployment are closely linked with high rates of landlessness in rural areas. Recent research shows that migration from rural to urban areas will continue on a large scale and that this is an essential part of the livelihood coping strategies of the rural poor.

Temporary migration and 'commuting' are also a routine part of the combined rural-urban livelihood strategies of the poor across a wide range of developing countries. Rural survival strategies demand that young people fully contribute to meeting the livelihood needs of their households from an early age. Most rural youth are either employed (waged and self-employed) or 'not in the labour force'. The issue, therefore, is not so much about unemployment, but serious under-employment in low productivity, predominantly household-based activities.

General Insurance and Pensions

Until recently the entire region maintained the civil service pension systems inherited from the British-defined benefit schemes run on a pay-as-you-go basis. The benefit targets implied by the parameters of civil service pension schemes are generally high, both relative to the lifetime earnings of workers - especially in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka - and compared with target replacement rates in OECD countries.

India introduced a defined contribution scheme in January 2004 for new entrants to the federal civil service. And Sri Lanka introduced a contributory defined benefit scheme in late 2003. Although the Indian and Sri Lankan schemes are both contributory, sharp differences in design will lead to markedly different outcomes. Four countries in the region have introduced mandatory retirement programs for private sector workers, though coverage remains minimal except in Sri Lanka.1 Nepal and Sri Lanka have defined contribution schemes, or provident funds. Pakistan established a defined benefit scheme.

There has been an "old pension scheme" for all government employees in India, under which monthly pensions were calculated on the basis of the employee's last salary level before retirement, does not apply to government employees who joined service after 2004 (Croissant, et al., 2014). India and Sri Lanka have allowed large firms offering their employees similar plans to be exempt from the national plan, and in Nepal firms can contribute to the national plan or set up a similar program if managed by an authorized financial entity. The national schemes are centrally administered, including their fund

management. Centralized mandatory pension schemes for private sector workers in South Asia have traditionally offered poor service to members. Record keeping is greatly deficient, and compliance by employers apparently low.

Current patterns suggest that only around 1 in 10 of South Asia's half a billion workers will enter old age with a pension related to preretirement earnings. Pension schemes in South Asia cover small shares of the population, concentrated in the formal sector. Pressure to expand coverage of pension schemes is already being felt. But the region lacks robust platforms of pension arrangements that would allow coverage to be extended to other groups of workers with the ability to save toward their old age. At present, the escalating cost of pensions for civil servants is becoming a growing concern in many South Asian countries as it crowds out higher-priority spending aimed at accelerating growth and poverty reduction.

Public pension systems have been strained by a combination of adverse demographics, insufficient returns and generous benefits, with funds ultimately proving inadequate to liabilities. The government‟s shift to a defined contribution plan in 2004 may thus have achieved sustainability, but the system as a whole is by no means capable of contributing to poverty prevention or equity. India‟s formal pension system only covers around 11% of the workforce, with this primarily being government employees or workers in firms with more than 20 employees. The latter are insured under a defined contribution scheme (Employees‟ Provident Fund Organization, EPFO), and receive pensions of sufficient value to lead a decent life. Firms not covered by EPFO may run their own fund. The government‟s National Social Assistance Program, which came into effect on August 15, 1995, includes among its various elements the National Old Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS). The NOAPS covers old persons who are considered destitute, and the disbursement is through the Gram Panchayats. While widely seen as the most successful of the government pension schemes for the poor elderly, with particular impact on women and those belonging to underdeveloped rural areas, the amount of the pension is abysmally low at INR 450.

The New Pension Scheme (NPS) for government employees which became effective from January 1, 2004, is based on a defined-contribution system, moving away from the defined benefit system of the old scheme. The new scheme has allowed the government to shed pension liabilities, and is instead dependent on investment and market calculations. In the absence of a social security system, the shift from a guaranteed benefit is largely seen as increasing old age insecurities.

A National Pension Scheme was launched by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) in May 2009, applying to all citizens irrespective of their employment status. Under this program, money invested in the pension fund during working life can later be claimed partly as a lump sum and partly as an annual pension. The government has also allowed foreign insurance companies and pension funds to collaborate with Indian companies. Investment in pension funds invariably involves huge sums if a reasonable return after retirement is to be expected. India has a variety of pension programs, with government-run schemes for government employees encouraging investment in pension funds. Social assistance is available for the needy elderly above 65 years who do not have any regular means of subsistence under a fund administered by the center and the states (Croissant, et al., 2014).

Social Exclusion

Social exclusion as a terminology and a notion was used for the first time in 1974 in a report submitted by Rene Lenoir, a Secretary in the Chirac Government, France. The backdrop was the debates on new forms of European poverty in the wake of the crisis of the welfare state. There had been a conceptual shift in the 1980s from the concept of income poverty towards the concept of social exclusion (Haan, 2011).

> *An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society, (b) he or she cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society, and (c) he or she would like to so participate, but is prevented from doing so by factors beyond his or her control (Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud, 1999, p. 229)*

The European Union designated 2010 as the year to combat poverty and social exclusion[145].

With its origin in France but travelling across Britain and US, the concept of social exclusion acquired multiple meanings in the OECD context. Social exclusion was seen later as encompassing the new forms of disadvantages that arose during the economic and political crises of the 1980s as well. There had been at least three broad historically influenced meanings of social exclusion. In a 'solidarity paradigm', dominant in France, exclusion is viewed as the rupture of a social bond between the individual and society, with the poor, unemployed and ethnic minorities defined as outsiders, while national solidarity implies political right and duties.

On the theory of social exclusion[146], two scholars are prominent: A B Atkinson and Arjan de Haan, in addition to writes-up of Amartya Sen and Andre Beiteille. While most international organizations define the poverty line in an absolute way as the level of income necessary for people to buy the goods necessary to their survival, there are others who prefer defining the poverty line in relative terms as some proportion of the mean or the median income in the country under analysis (see, for instance, Atkisnon, 1998 and Ravallion, 1992). Physical poverty is about mere survival, which is the capacity to buy food and all the goods necessary for the fulfilment of basic physical needs. Relative poverty or social deprivation is about not being like others. While not being under-nourished, the fact

[145] A 'specialisation paradigm', dominant in the US, and contested in the UK, is informed by individual liberalism, its emphasis on the contractual exchange of rights and obligations, and the assumption that individuals can move across boundaries of social differentiation and economic divisions of labour. Following this, exclusion reflects discrimination, the drawing of group distinctions that denies individuals full access to or participation in exchange or interaction. A 'monopoly paradigm' (influential also in Britain and continental European countries) views the social order as coercive, imposed through hierarchical power relations, with exclusion and inequality defined as a consequence of the formation of group monopolies (Haan, 2011).\

[146] Social exclusion is a process of excluding individuals or groups from social, economic and cultural networks. It is in some way a denial to resources associated with full citizenship. Social exclusion is also a process leading to a state of functioning deprivations; it is a state of impossibility to achieve some relevant functionings by individuals only by virtue of belonging to a specific group. The Lisbon Summit required that social exclusion be reduced through improvement in social cohesion and inclusion. There is multi-dimensional measure of social exclusion. There are two approaches to social exclusion: axiomatic approach that grapples with the problem of measuring the degree of exclusion and the empirical approach that is concerned with the empirical analysis of the existence of social exclusion.

that one cannot afford to wearing a linen shirt and thus being not able to participate in social events shows relative poverty - a 'linen shirt' argument (Sen, 1983).

Arjan de Haan (2011) has elaborated the origin, growth and present status of the notion and concept of social exclusion in the world and in south Asia. The concept started to make its first forays into international development discourse during the early 1990s, when the concept was promoted by a research project at the International Institute of Labour Studies (1994). This was originally an input for the World Summit for Social Development, and revolved around the production of country-level case-studies of social exclusion[147]**.** Social exclusion did not appear in debates in the US, but the UK development community soon came to pay closer attention to the notion of social exclusion and the social exclusion language thus entered in the UK development discourse in the late 1990s.

In 1992 the British Economic and Social Science Research Council (ESRC) commissioned a review research on poverty and social exclusion, and it emerged as an ESRC 'thematic priority' in 1995, with the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion established at the London School of Economics. The debate became dominated by the New Labour Government's initiative to establish an inter-departmental Social Exclusion Unit in late 1997. Within DFID, social exclusion became a major part of the language in South Asia, particularly in India and Nepal where it heavily influenced the production of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, but not in Bangladesh.

> *The cross-country empirical analysis linking growth with reforms was far from conclusive …… Income inequalities have widened, which induced further*

[147] In this sense, poverty arises any time an individual cannot afford doing, or 'functioning' in the words of Sen as 'most' people do in the society he/she is living in. In particular, relative poverty is often found to be related to or synonymous of 'inequality' and therefore of no primary relevance for 'actual', that is 'absolute' poverty issues and policy. Social poverty or relative deprivation thus describes a social phenomenon which may be considered as very close to the more modern concept of 'social exclusion'. In the literature on social exclusion, people are not excluded because they cannot do today what other people usually do. They are excluded because there is no way they will ever be above the corresponding relative income poverty line no matter how much work or efforts they put into it. This will generally be because they inherited an unfavorable combination of skills. In some cases, this will be because they belong to some specific social group defined by race or ethnic origin that is discriminated against. The initial distribution of wealth is creating permanent poverty and social exclusion. If social poverty and therefore 'social exclusion' is found to be excessive, then redistribution policies, or possibly growth-cum-redistribution policies are called for.

> *rethinking on policy within the World Bank. The more recent World Development Report (WDR) 2006 (World Bank 2005) captured the outcome of this rethinking …… WDR 2006, for the first time, took on board the growing concern among both analysts and civil society that while poverty in many DCs may have declined, income inequalities and social disparities were widening. WDR 2006 was indeed premised on the assumption that equity matters for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons …… The recommendation in WDR 2006 seeking to enhance the property rights of the poor are hardly a point of departure from those articulated in WDR 2000-01 or WDR 2004 titled Making Service Work for Poor People (World Bank 2003) …… The discourse on poverty had over the last 15 years moved beyond the conventional approach to reducing income poverty (Sobhan, 2010, pp. 13-18).*

A 'concept', in this case, is seen as a representation of societal phenomena that has emerged from social science observation, and in turn structures subsequent observations, measurement, selection of cases, and – possibly – new theory and policy. Concepts travel through policy circles as much as they do through social science communities, but of course with very different and sometimes unexpected paths, particularly as these communities are global, with characterised by very different political and ideological histories. In the way policy-makers commission research, the emphasis tends to be on theories that emerge from research, with rather less reflection on the way concepts and theories structure the research; this is a gap that needs to be bridged.

The concept of social exclusion has significant analytical strengths on its own, particularly in terms of bringing a richer tradition of social science theorising to bear than is often the case in development studies; its future influence however looks set to be further limited by the recent policy shift away from social issues to growth and productivity. The language of social exclusion, then, has helped to capture and highlight deprivation, primarily those linked to group-based disadvantages and discrimination (in South Asia and Latin America). It has not found to be useful within contexts of 'mass deprivation'.

> *Is it then the case …… that the take up of the concept of social exclusion signals a positive epistemological shift from the focus on poverty reduction that characterise neo-liberal approaches to development? The answer has to be 'yes' to the extent that the concept of social exclusion implies a focus on the causes of poverty and inequality as well as outcomes and encourages the exploration of macro-micro linkages. However, in practice, application of the social exclusion perspective in the context of development co-operation has largely given rise to a reformist rather than a transformationalist policy agenda. This is not least*

> *because social inclusion is offered as an alternative to social exclusion. The question remains - inclusion in what, on whose terms and in whose interests? (Beal, 2002, p. 50).*

Nevile (2007) argues that that Sen's framework – distinguishing constitutive and instrumental relevance, and active and passive exclusion – does help to analyze complex factors underlying chronic poverty. However, as I hope this paper will make clear, Sen's assessment of the concept under-estimates the extent to which his notions of capability remain embedded in a liberal-individualistic paradigm.

Social exclusion encompasses more than just poverty, although poverty is frequently an inevitable characteristic of most of the socially excluded. The excluded are often deprived of the chance to legally redress violations of their rights and denial of opportunities to them because they cannot afford the costs or they are prevented from doing so by the more powerful perpetrators of these injustices, who can often bend the rules and laws in their own favor.

There are two significant facets of exclusion: social and economic. Economic aspects of exclusion may take the form of a lack of access to land and other physical assets, credit, skills, and labor markets, resulting in the economic impoverishment of those who are excluded and frequently condemning them to undernourishment, ill health, poor housing or homelessness, and unsanitary living conditions. Social aspects of exclusion may involve discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity (including belonging to scheduled tribes and castes, particularly in India), social group (specifically, people in "lowly" occupations—as perceived by elite groups—such as street cleaners), mental and physical disabilities, and age. This discrimination effectively reduces the opportunities of the socially excluded to lift themselves from impoverishment.

Social exclusion may be deliberately imposed by a government or by a powerful social group on other communities or groups. Social exclusion also occurs through ongoing social processes in the absence of any deliberate attempt on the part of the government or any group of powerful people to exclude people, partially because there may not be any deliberate public or private interventions to reverse social exclusion of this nature. The two

types of social exclusion have respectively been designated by Amartya Sen as *active* and *passive* social exclusion.

Outside but linked to the donor community, the advocacy groups in India pragmatically picked up the notion of social exclusion, particularly to refer to caste exploitation but also extended to deprivation of scheduled tribes (*Adivasis*) (Thorat, 2007). In the literature on caste discrimination in particular, the language of exclusion was found to be a convenient tool, including with respect to emphasizing labour market discrimination (again, with a strong leaning towards an instrumental argument for addressing exclusion). Civil society organizations in India now frequently refer to caste discrimination and 'analogous forms of' social exclusion. These shifts were influenced in part by the fact that Amartya Sen commented favourably on the use of the concept, as well as the emergence of the inclusive growth language in the coalition government under Dr Manmohan Singh that came into power in 2004.

8.4. Epilogue: Agrarian Social Justice

Agrarian justice is intricately linked with the idea and political agenda of social justice in south Asia. The productive capacity of farmers and labourers is crucially determined by the provision of social protections, security, insurance and inclusion in general. Agrarian economic justice focused at enhancing the productive capacity of farmers and labourers is to be complemented with the social protection floor for the masses in general. The Helsinki Global Social Policy Forum in December 2013 defined social policies[148] as comprising of proactive and remedial actions that promote social equality and

[148] Comparative welfare state research has been largely based on using typologies to summarize commonalities and differences across few cases - relying on macro-typologies of institutional configurations. Most famously Gøsta Esping-Andersen's "Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" (1990), a typology that was based on a comparative historical analysis of social policy development in countries, led to a research industry on the merits of fitting real welfare states across Europe and beyond into the three or more ideal-type categories. A "regime" approach has been adopted to conceptualize distinct typologies in which to classify empirical similarities and differences. Comparative institutional analysis commonly employs typologies to map institutional variations. Comparative institutional analyses on welfare states go beyond the classification of particular institutions; more ambitiously, they aim to capture cross-national variations in "regimes".

inclusion, decent work, and socio-economic security, full participation and empowerment, as well as equal social rights for all population groups. It agreed with the core principle of the Social Protection Floor Initiative suggested by the ILO and WHO that had brought together national governments, civil society partners and international organizations such as the ILO, WHO, UNICEF, UN, UNFPA, UNDP, FAO, the World Bank in a forward looking collaborative strategy to build a recovery for all. Global social policy refers to global goals and institutional arrangements for nations to exercise socially oriented policies. The GSP Forum agreed that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are still unfinished business.

Nowhere as in South Asia has that the social protection floor is much needed in view of natural and man-made hazards, disasters and vulnerabilities that populace in general been facing since long. The SPF Initiative involves, at the minimum, the guaranteeing of access to essential health care and to basic income security over the life cycle which together secures the effective access to essential goods and services defined as necessary at the national level. It declared that goal of post-2015 development Agenda should be the "social sustainability" that involves four concepts of security, empowerment, inclusion and cohesion. The Forum has accepted the seven types of fundamental qualitative changes and transitions that are occurring in the world: demographic, climate change, fragile states, and technological, economic, social and epidemiological ones (Wiman, 2013). Alas! The International Labour Organization (ILO)[149] also finds that almost eighty percent of world

---

These typologies are either ideal-type constructs based on analytical concepts or are real-type categorizations that summarize cross-national variation of a selected group of countries. The threefold typology has been criticized for not paying attention to finer differences and by not taking into account the Southern European, Eastern European and Asian peculiarities of welfare state development. Typologies can be used then as membership set relations not unlike the conceptualization of a comparison of ideal-type and real-type observations as advocated by Max Weber (Ebbinghaus, 2012).

[149] The 1929 Financial Crash led to the Roosevelt's New Deal in which social forms of social protection were used as a powerful tool to raise the living standards of people and domestic demand in the national economies of many countries. In the year of global recession of 2009-2010, three significant international publications were out on the theme of social protection: "The Social Protection Floor Initiative" of the ILO and WHO (Geneva) in 2009, "Child-Sensitive Social Protection" of the UNICEF (New York) in 2009, and "Investing in People: Social Protection for All" of the Asian Development Bank (Manila) in 2010. All those were preparations for

population is without social protection. Wherever the social protection programmes are there, these are under-budgeted, with inadequate financial and human resources, and receive erratic yearly funds and fail to achieve the intended objectives.

A space for a multiplicity of voices and a system of public discourse is also the need of the hour in the South Asia. Education has ever been seen to be necessary to make demands on the governments for health care, social security and other entitlements (UNDP-HDR, 2013, pp. 1-14). In the south, there has been a deepening of the role of the states, a dedication to improving human development and an openness to trade and innovation. Brazil, India and China are projected to be producing a large percentage of global output by 2050 (UNDP-HDR, 2013). In short, crucial has been the governance deficits and failures throughout South Asia. The current global food-fuel and financial crisis of 2009 gives opportunity to revisit the rationale of social protection policy and its effective governance through public-private participation mode.

Agrarian social justice is not only a matter of policy formulation, design and financial expenditures devoted to it. What has always mattered is the effective governance of the policies and programmes[150]. A number of research findings have concluded that the delivery mechanisms has been inefficient and marred with rent-seeking activities and corruption of the implementing bureaucracy[151]. The delivery of a vital service by the

---

mainstreaming the social protection as significant constituent of the post-2015 development agenda of the United Nations.

[150] In south Asia, the civil society is still somewhat shallow, despite the multitude of associations of people. Noneconomic interest groups, depending on their specific area of expertise, have been known to provide reasonable input into government policy, backed by technical expertise and knowledge of long-term implications. The tragedy has been the important fact that only a small share of Indian citizens (less than 15%) is part of any association. Moreover, many of these are associated with political parties or individual politicians, are religious or caste communities, or simply depend on foreign donations.

[151] To quote in detail:

> *Apart from poor governance and corruption, some of the perennial impediments to investment in South Asia are poor technical infrastructure, power shortage, and lack of modernization of land and sea ports …… The Westminster system is the basis of governments in all South Asian states. However, with the exception of India, the region has struggled with democratization …….. The disequilibrium caused in South Asian societies by unequal delivery of public services*

government called the social defence of citizens is a casualty in south Asia. The largest country, India, is not an exception. The Center for Science and Environment (CSE) is one such organization that offers input based on rigorous research, and it has worked positively with the government on issues of biodiversity, climate change, and equitable development. According to ths tudy of the Centre, there is little evidence to suggest that citizens are well informed of government policies.

The State of the Nation Survey 2011, conducted by Lokniti (a program of the Center for the Study of Developing Society) suggests a relatively high level of awareness among citizens on key issues. It does not, however, indicate that a large proportion of citizens are aware of actual government policies. The National Election Survey (NES) 2009, covering the general elections which brought the UPA II government into power, suggests a substantial level of voter awareness of the flagship UPA program targeting the "common man" (aam aadmi). The Economic and Political Weekly special issue of September 26, 2009, which wrote about the NES survey, noted that more people had heard of at least three of the aam aadmi program – the NREGS, the farm loan waiver and the midday meal program – than is usually the case with government plans. However, citizens are able to judge overall governance quality (or the lack of it) in individual states and at the national level, as nonperforming governments are frequently voted out of office (Croissant, et al., 2014, p.140).

---

has led the formation of a number of ethno-regional movements in the region. The discrimination, sometimes a result of resource constraints and sometimes due to pork-barrel politics, has contributed to the political exploitation of regional ethnic or religious divisions by extremist groups. The failure of political institutions and governance structures, including political parties, parliaments, judiciaries and law enforcement bodies, has hindered social unity and political stability. The region's political institutions need to address parochialism and deep-rooted social injustices …… Due to a vicious combination of overpopulation, abject poverty, disproportionate depletion of resources and poor governance, South Asian countries lag behind other developing countries in terms of devising mechanisms for sustainable development. South Asian countries rely heavily on biomass sources of fuel-wood, crop residues and animal waste to meet their energy needs …… Security analysts believe that unless properly integrated with poverty alleviation and human development programmes, a large number of environmental refugees could join militant groups in the developing and underdeveloped regions of South Asia in the future (Jabed, 2012, pp. 736-44).

The social audit of the MNREGA conducted from 2008 – to 2009 onward by the Centre for Equity Studies, the National Institute of Rural Development and the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, among other organizations, has identified and brought to the notice of the government irregularities in the implementation of the program, and suggested measures for their correction. The right to food bill similarly drew responses (in January 2011) from civil society groups, which asked that the bill be amended to focus on reducing hunger and poverty, and to give a role to the Panchayati Raj institutions in achieving the bill‟s ends. The power of noneconomic interest associations to make reasonable policy proposals is compromised not by their (enormous) number, but by their varying strength and independence.

Table – 8.11

Nature of Governance as Practiced in South Asia

Region	Historical Paths	Contemporary Trends	Future Challenges
South Asia	Break Away With Colonialism	Widening of Scope, Allowing Other Actors to Join the Process of Governance	Establishing Rule of Law
	More Government and Less Governance, i.e., Overextended and Over-Centralized State	New Public Management Inspired Reforms Allowing Civil Society And Private Sector Engagement	Fostering Citizen's Trust in Public and Political Institutions
	Experience With Military and Authoritarian Leadership	Globalization and the Primacy of Economic Growth	Reinventing Government And Bureaucracy as Neutral, Goal- and Performance-Oriented Institutions
	Strong Bureaucracy Based On Strong Hierarchy	Policy Transfer From International Organizations in Setting The Policy Agenda For Reforms	Political and Managerial Accountability and Transparency of Actions
	Regulated Economy	Paternalism In Politics, Leading To Patron-Clientelistic Policy Making	Making Institutions Perform and Deliver

Source: Based on Cheung (2007, 2011) and produced in Jamil, et al., 2013, p. 344

In matter of governance of the agrarian justice and universal social policy, it is required to learn lessons from the past records in south Asia – the historical paths as well as the contemporary trends (refer to table – 8.11 and table – 8.12). In south Asia, the polities have gone through turbulent transformations in the recent past. It is characterized by intra-state, intra-region and regional conflicts, political instability, economic turmoil and nuclear proliferation.

Table – 8.12

Nature of Governance as Practiced in South Asia

Region	Contemporary Trends	Future Challenges
South Asia	Alliances Among Political Parties in Dividing Nations, with the Consequence of Infighting amongst Various Groups	Governance in Terms of Equity And Citizenship Rights, And Providing Human Safety And Security
		Solving Wicked Problems (Reducing Corruption, Access To Health and Education, Making Megacities More Liveable, and Addressing Environmental Hazards)

Source: Based on Cheung (2007, 2011) and produced in Jamil, et al., 2013, p. 344

A mosaic of weak and outdated polities does at present stretch over an extremely fragile socio-economic base in the region. Frequent conflicts and violence including guerrilla warfare, cross-border terrorism, communal riots and ant-government demonstrations are quite common here. Politically, south Asia is a self-defined region under the SAARC (a weak and divided regional association). South Asia is a region that harbours perennially rivalrous governments with varied prospects for stability[152]. Globalisation has further deepened the crisis and failures in recent years.

[152] Although the penchant is becoming less fashionable, arguing about how to fit the realities of rural India into Marx's Asiatic Mode of Production and way marking India's precise degree of advancement on the road to capitalism have long constituted elephantine components of the country's academic enterprise. For rural economists, a key conundrum is the extent to which South Asian farmers are rational, that is, the extent to which they react to the price and profit signals of the market. Befuddled Indian farmers are incapable of acting “scientifically”. In the past, Max Weber was highly pessimistic about South Asia's potential for the pursuit of economic advantage. That

Table – 8.13

Magnitude and Value of Governance Indicators
In South Asia, 2006 (Percentile Ranks)

Perception Based Indicators/ Countries	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption
1. India	58.2	22.2	54.0	48.3	57.1	52.9
2. Pakistan	12.5	4.8	34.1	38.5	24.3	18.0
3. Bangladesh	30.8	8.7	23.7	20.0	22.9	4.9
4. Nepal	13.0	1.9	19.0	28.8	29.0	25.2
5. Sri Lanka	36.1	8.2	42.2	50.2	54.3	36.1
6. Bhutan	22.6	95.2	65.9	47.3	68.1	80.6
7. Maldives	20.2	72.1	56.9	59.5	58.1	39.3
South Asia	--	--	--	--	--	--

Source: Kaufmann, et al., 2007, quoted in C Brassard, 2010, p. 73

More recently, it has been claimed that an arc of states considered "Critical" and "In Danger" of state failure - Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh— lie on India's land borders. A less-obvious cluster of most vulnerable states surrounds India. Although India itself is at low risk of state failure, a number of provincial Indian states in the Ganges plain — the so-called BIMARU states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh — share many features of state weakness. Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, major BIMARU states, appear to be clearly part of the northern sub-continental belt of weak governance. The Foreign Policy magazine has recently published a list of the failed states in 2010, based on the "Failed State Index 2010". Except for India and Maldives, all six states in south Asia was declared the failed states (including Afghanistan). No direct relationship to state failure was found for environmental factors, ethnic or religious

---

pessimism rested on twin hypotheses: first, the non-rational character of Hindu thought and its anti-materialist spirituality, and second, the "social expression" of the Hindu ethic, especially in the form of the caste hierarchy. Gunnar Myrdal undertook a mammoth survey of South Asia's development prospects in the three-volume Asian Drama (1968). Seeking to balance economic and social analysis, Myrdal found religion and social values to be obstructive of developmental gains. The Asian Drama has been pervaded by Ibsenesque gloom.

discrimination, price inflation, government debt, or military spending. Two distinct kinds of capacity affect a state's capacity to resist political crisis: the organizational *effectiveness* of that state and the *legitimacy* of its authority. The results of nearly 10 years of research were combined in 2005 by the Fund for Peace to produce their Failed States Index. Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have FSI scores over 91.

At a minimum, a failed state is one that can no longer defend its borders nor protect its citizens. The state failure is the risk of serious political instability, which can be identified in measurable characteristics of countries around the world from 1955 to 1998. Examples of state failures or internal political crisis are the revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides. The strongest influence on the risk of state failure was regime type. In addition, each of the following risk factors roughly *doubled* the odds of state failure: Low levels of material well-being, measured by infant mortality rates, Low trade openness, measured by imports plus exports as a percent of GDP, and the presence of major civil conflicts in two or more bordering states. No direct relationship to state failure was found for environmental factors, ethnic or religious discrimination, price inflation, government debt, or military spending. Two distinct kinds of capacity affect a state's capacity to resist political crisis: the organizational *effectiveness* of that state and the *legitimacy* of its authority. The results of nearly 10 years of research were combined in 2005 by the Fund for Peace to produce their Failed States Index. Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have FSI scores over 91 (refer to table – 8.14).

Table – 8.14

Failed State Scores and Rankings in South Asia: 2006

Country	FSI Score	Ranking
1. Pakistan	103.1	9
2. Bangladesh	96.3	19
3. Nepal	95.4	20
4. Sri Lanka	92.4	25
5. Bhutan	87.9	39
6. India	70.4	93

Source: http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php

In South Asia, the proximate causes appear more commonly in newspaper reports and in the warnings of concerned NGOs such as the International Crisis Group (ICG). The ICG's monthly "Crisis Watch" reports on such proximate causes of potential crisis including bomb attacks by Islamic militants in Bangladesh, the crisis triangle formed by the Monarch, the Maoists and electoral parties in Nepal or ongoing conflicts between tribal groups and the government in Pakistan's Balochistan (International Crisis Group, 2005). Perhaps the most forceful general argument for the primacy of society in generating state weakness is Joel Migdal's argument, made in *Strong Societies and Weak States,* those failures of governance in developing countries are primarily due to the ability of local, village-level elites to defeat the efforts of governments to extend their control down to the grass roots level (Migdal, 1988). Although Atul Kohli (1990) in his study of 'India's Growing Crisis of Governability' adopted a multicausal model which had much in common with that used by Zoya Hasan (1989), Kohli placed the primary emphasis in his work on the role of political institutions. The Rudolphs, writing just a few years earlier than Kohli, pointed to a similar cluster of causes for what they termed India's 'weak-strong state'. They intended that coinage to capture the paradox of a strong and capable developmental state which nevertheless faced 'highly mobilized albeit fragmented social forces that threaten governability, political stability and national purpose' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, p. 6). They pointed to a mixture of social and political causes, including the deinstitutionalisation and personalisation promoted by Indira Gandhi, growing political mobilisation by formerly depressed social groups, unofficial caste wars in the countryside and emerging religious fundamentalism (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987, pp. 6-7).

The future challenges (refer to table – 8.11 and table – 8.12) are not only to institute an effective and realistic agrarian social justice and universal social policy but also to establish the rule of law, fostering citizen's trust in public and political institutions, political and managerial accountability and transparency of actions, making institutions perform and deliver and governance in terms of equity and citizenship rights, and providing human safety and security.

The Part – III is an exercise in presentation of an alternative policy proposal for societies and economies of South Asia. It is concerned with prescribing an alternative agrarian justice and social policy framework. In matter of methodology, there is a switch over to policy framework. This part of the thesis comprise of a single chapter - 9.

The chapter is divided into three sections.

In the first section, a conceptual framework of the method of designing an alternative format of agrarian justice and social policy governance is set. It is argued that the policy of relative feasible equalization of surplus-producing capacity is a necessary condition for ensuring inclusive social policy of good governance in south Asia, and therefore, it must be the core of moral public and private principles of human action.

It is in the second section that a precise account of the prescriptive model proposed is presented. An alternative public agenda of agrarian justice is described. Policy goals and strategies are dealt with. The features of the the strategy of relative equalization of the surplus (material-productive) regenerating capacity at a threshold level among all production units in the countryside is put forth.

The third section at the end of this chapter outlines the common path towards attainment of justice and reduction injustices as the core moral principles of good governance of an inclusive social policy of a welfare state. This section is concerned with prescription regarding effective governance of policy.

In the moral-theoretic framework of the doctrine of South Asian agrarianism that prescribes a hybrid morality of goal-right system of human preferences and actions, explains an action through the objects-given and values-sensitive theoretical as well as practical reasons of partly akratic, partly rational human agency and justifies a hybrid private-public participative framework of actions motivated by meaningful and expressive rationality, it is a matter of practical significance that agrarian (distributive) (transitional) justice continues to be pursued as the political agenda of the present and the future. Such an agenda that prescribes the path of the future prospect of material existence of populace ought to be centered at achieving the outcomes of minimization of injustices and promotion of transitional (rather than anything 'ideal', 'perfect' or 'maximal') distributive justice, with respect to the allocation and distribution of human capacity to produce a surplus in particular and human capability in general as the most valued concrete thing, among the countryside populace of South Asia.

To fructify the political agenda of agrarian justice through equalization of human (productive) (surplus) capacity, a befitting policy design for countries of South Asia is required for the present and the future. The social and economic policy strategy ought to be towards guaranteeing a floor–level of capability and material (minimally at least the food) surplus productive capacity for all active human agents in the countryside. As part of operational strategy, the gap in the private capacity is to be closed, the range of differences in capacities is to be reduced, the level of floor with regard to capacity is to be lifted above benchmark and the level of ceiling of surplus-producing capacity of individual and household is to be stretched to its maximum through continuous public policy action.

In addition to the objective of agrarian justice through a policy of lifting-up and equalizing the surplus producing capacity across all producers, the strategies of composite policies ought also to be in the direction of continuation of the structures of provision of social protection and security against multiple facets of vulnerabilities and hazards afflicting the children, women, elderly and the marginalized section of rural society[153]**.** The agrarian

[153] Political economy, political philosophy, ethics as well as political science have all traditionally dealt with a specific section of society comprised of the able-bodied sane and reasoning adult male, and such a preoccupation originated in the enlightenment project and its spirit of freeing the individual as autonomous entity. Since the so-called spontaneous order of market and autonomous

justice policy framework does therefore require supplementary efforts of governments in south Asia towards a proactive, inclusive and comprehensive (universal coverage) social policy in future.

The alternative composite policy prescription of agrarian justice and social protection together ought also to be concerned with the practical question: 'how ought a government in south Asia to act to achieve the concrete observable outcome of impartiality in treatment of individual human agency, fairness in the procedures of public action, equality in the distribution and redistribution of human capacity to produce a surplus in the countryside?' A normative appraisal of 'how government does what it does or what it does not' is more crucial than the positive evaluation of the nature of the state and the size and scope of government. The governments ought to bring agrarian justice and social welfare in transparent manner through a system of accountability with orchestration of effective powers of the government agencies in south Asia.

9.1. Policy Prescription Methodology

Policy prescription is the third pillar of the composite and hybrid methodology that has been adopted in the present thesis. A public policy of agrarian justice is a sort of action by a government. A public policy is a goal-oriented purposeful action that is taken by a government to deal with societal problems. Parliamentary rules of order are examples of policy. It is promulgated through official written documents[154]. In the framework of the public policy, an analytical statement is one that concerns the functional relationships while

---

organisation of society have not addressed the disabilities, vulnerabilities, hazards and the lotteries of the brute luck that have ever affected the adult women, the elderly and the children, such a concern for these sections of human society ought also to be accounted in any genuine comprehensive policy framework of justice in the countryside.

[154] A policy is a statement of a principle to guide decisions and a protocol to achieve outcomes with regard to something. It is a statement of intents, procedures and actions to be steered by a governance body. It is a plan and a course of action intended to influence and determine decision, action and other matters. It merely guides an action towards a goal and towards an outcome. A policy does not compel anyone and prohibit anything. It is mostly expedient, prudent and advantageous.

an empirical statement is another that takes account of the quantitative significance of the relationships (G Stigler, 1958, p. 366); both are integral parts of a public policy statement.

A public policy of major types generally falls into four categories: distributive policy, redistributive policy, regulatory policy, and constituent policy. The alternative public policy model that is proposed in the present work is a distributive and redistributive one, and it is based on a variant of the basic income hypothesis and the redistribution of basic income as equal-lot public expenditures. It is a model of the distribution function of the public finance of the government that is concerned with the distribution of tax burden and expenditure benefits among citizens in a country. In South Asia, the administrative structure to carry out the taxation and expenditure functions of the government are already intact and a structure of sound public finance arrangement of tax-expenditure policy are already at work in all south Asian countries.

In our work, an alternative public policy of agrarian distributive justice through a programme of redistribution of individual and household capacity to reproduce economic surplus on the farm is the one proposed for governments in the region. This is all for the able-bodied adult productive male individuals on the farms in the countryside. Agrarian justice policy and a comprehensive social policy (for children, women, elderly and otherwise-able) feed each other and are complementary to each other. It is to be addressed through a composite and integrated public policy paradigm.

A policy has a purpose statement, applicability and scope statement, and responsibility statement. The objective of our alternative proposal of policy framework is to attain an imperfect transitional justice in South Asian countries. Agrarian (imperfect, transitional) egalitarian distributive justice policy requires working in tandem with complementary proactive universal social policy. A public policy of distribution and redistribution creates institutions of the just structure of the society that private plans and action of citizens can frustrate if a correspondence between private rationality and public rationality does not exist.

Agrarian injustices are to be demoted and minimized by public action through impacting the situations of fair and impartial individual behavior and private choices. The alternative policy prescription harps on the argument that the public goal is to be obtained through public efforts at improving the basis of institutional structure of society[155]**.** While self-interested maximization by private individual persons continues in the markets, the egalitarian redistributive policy of the state is required to be implemented[156]**.**

In the agenda of agrarian justice, the public redistributive policy is the second-best option because of the existence moral deficits caused by the *akrasia* (weakness of the will), psychic *akinesia* and *athymormia* individual persons in the civil society. It is only second-best option that a government[157], which is otherwise a state delegated seat of monopoly of coercion, takes up the public responsibility towards agrarian distributive justice, devises social redistribution public policy and initiate executive, legislative and judicial actions to minimize the instances of injustices in an action[158].

---

[155] Justice and injustice are not simply matters of individual behavioral psychology but also matters of social psychology and sociology of institutions of a human settlement in the economy. Injustices are not simply outcomes of immoral and dysfunctional behavior of individuals in an interactive setting but also a result of systematic structural factors of institutional setting of society. Where the outcome of agrarian justice, fairness and equity is not attainable through an appropriate behavioral psychology of individuals, the social psychology and structures of institutions of society ought to be moulded through the government policy and action.

[156] Public policy and private intentions must be in correspondence to each other for just outcomes to obtain. A laissez-faire economy and society does not require the state and government to intervene to promote any 'good' (or demote any 'bad') and protect any 'right' (or discourage any 'wrong'). Without a state to regulate and a government to direct through intervention, the agency of autonomous human individual persons are presumed to be the moral agency as well who exhibit impartial and fair motives and other-regarding behaviours that in turn results in fairness in procedures and equality as an automatic outcome. It is only in case of failures and deficits in private individual morality that the public (governmental) rationality and morality is required.

[157] The libertarian emphasis on voluntary agreement among willing people seems to be an abstraction from concrete history of antiquity. A government is often necessary but a government is to be watched and censured at times. Its legitimate authority needs to be denied at times.

[158] When do governments merit our allegiance, and when should they be denied it? This is an enduring political dilemma. To quote an observation:

> *When do governments merit our allegiance, and when should they be denied it? …… there must be limits to any government's legitimate authority …… Who is to judge, and by what criteria, whether the laws and actions of states that claim our allegiance measure up? …… Utilitarians answer our question with a variant of the claim that the legitimacy of governments is tied to their willingness and capacity to maximize happiness*

In the alternative policy model, the factors that can make the change of status quo are identified. These inputs are the shock variables or policy variable about which the decisions are required to be taken. The criterion variable measures the performance of the policy. The result of the policy implementation is called the "outcome" variable. Our policy statement comprise of three core constituents: policy statement agenda of agrarian justice and social protection, public financial allocation agenda and policy governance statement agenda of agrarian justice.

Arrow Diagram – 9.1

Public Agenda and Policy


Public Agenda
Policy Statement Agenda of Agrarian Justice and Social Protection
Public Financial Allocation Agenda
Policy Governance Statement Agenda of Agrarian Justice and Social Protection

Policy making is not a one-shot activity. A public policy of agrarian justice for future is required to be framed, executed and monitored by a government, and the policy design ought to be therefore broken into at least four stages:

1. formulation involving the process of setting the priorities among the social outcomes and designing the essential elements of policy statement in terms of objectives, strategy, targets, tools, personnel and finance;

……. For social contract theorists, the state's legitimacy is rooted in the idea of agreement ……. Democrats holds that governments are legitimate when those who are affected by decisions play an appropriate role in making them and when there are meaningful opportunities to oppose the government of the day, replacing it with an alternative ……. The democratic tradition offers better resources than the going alternatives for ensuring that political claims and counter-claims are tested for their veracity in the public arena, and for protecting those individual rights that best embody the aspiration of human freedom (Shapiro, 2004, pp. 1-6).

2. approval requiring the process of securing agreement and consensus within the legislature, legislature-executive niche and the public at large;

3. implementation as the set of interrelated actions taken by the public bureaucracy and its agents at various levels of administrative structure to put the design of policy statement into practice; and

4. monitoring and oversight geared to the appraisal, assessment and evaluation of outcomes and holding the public officials accountable for the outcomes of agrarian justice at the grass-root level of households in the countryside.

The various stages of implementation, monitoring, oversight and assessment do require a practice of good governance. Presenting an outline of instruments of effective governance is part of the method of prescription.

Arrow Diagram – 9.2

Stages of Policy Framework



In a public policy statement, there are components that are both concrete and non-concrete. With regard to the non-concrete components of policy, these are principally comprised of the "inaction" and "unintended consequences" of public actions. It is difficult to project in advance such unintended consequences and the level of inaction of bureaucracy. There are impacts of the lobbying, pressure groups and consultants on the policy making. There are influences of pragmatics and contingencies in the drafting of the policy. It is difficult to predict. Since policy processes are inherently political in nature of participation, and these are always based on contestable evidences and are strongly interrelated with agents and networks of communities, advocacy groups and expert groups, the habits and traditions of the political institutions of parliament, the civil services and judiciary are major influence.

9.2. Alternative Policy Model

In policy modelling[159], the policy problem is defined as a gap between the current status and the desired status of the state of affairs in the world. In the present context of our work, our policy problem is the gap between the current status of asymmetries and injustices and the desired status of agrarian justice and social protection in effective governance setting in the countryside of south Asia. In economics, the proxy measure for human capacity to labour and produce is approached through the notion and estimation of human 'productivity', i.e., the contribution of human labour actor to value-addition in the process of production.

Agrarian justice through equalization of surplus producing capacity would require subsidising the actor-producers with lower productivity and taxing the actor-producers of higher productivity. Guaranteeing the liberal principle of process-freedom for individual human beings in the countryside, the policy problem of closing the gap would require taxing a fraction of rent[160] of human capacity (or 'productivity') of all working citizens in the South Asian countryside.

Agrarian justice involves collection of a fraction of rental value of human capacity of rural actors and redistribution in equal lot amongst all[161]. Taxing a part of the income that is

---

[159] A model is by definition a mental construct that simplifies the real and actual world, a good policy model represent the real and actual world by capturing its salient features and essential information. It is mostly parsimonious – simple, tractable, precise and simple enough representation.

[160] A textbook definition of a rent is "the portion of earnings in excess of the minimum amount needed to attract a worker to accept a particular job or a firm to enter a particular industry" (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 269). More precisely, a person gets a rent if he or she earns an income higher than the minimum that person would have accepted, the minimum being usually defined as the income in his or her next-best opportunity. The economists' notion of the "minimum amount of reward" necessary to attract inputs which go into the production of a good or service is usually based on looking at what the providers could have earned in their next best alternative.

[161] In our project, the "burden of injustice" is one of the moral "bads" to be demoted and minimized. The egalitarian distribution of surplus producing capacity of individuals and households in the countryside is the criterion of assessment, appraisal and evaluation of action. Under the framework of social rules of regulation inspired by the spirit of egalitarianism, there are at least three rules of

earned as reward to productive contribution (or productivity), that is curtailing the rent-right[162] to productive capacity of individuals enjoying the process-freedom under the operation of liberal principle is a normative demand of agrarian justice. While such a strategy ensures the restoration of the classical liberal process freedom, it is also geared towards bringing equality among the peasantry.

> *A practical policy, notably a distributive policy, is a set of four elements: a tool, which is a function of a base through a rule, for implementing some objective. The tool can, in particular, consist of transfers of incomes, or goods or services taken or handed out. The best tool, base, and rule are in principle determined by, the objective, given the possibilities as concerns practicalities, information, and social and political life ……. the four elements of the policy conflate in "direct" policies, such as transfers to alleviate poverty, provide a basic income, or diminish some income inequality (Kolm, 2005, p. 227).*

There are empirical evidences to the effect of testing as to whether John Rawls' view of justice or Jack Harsanyi's view of justice or some other views are held by the people. Individuals were asked in many countries to rank the preferred principle. In a comprehensive survey across countries conducted by Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer (1992), it was found that 'basic need' fulfilment principle of justice was highly favoured one empirically. In the survey, four questions that related with four principles of justice were asked: maximizing the floor income, maximizing the average income, maximizing the average with a floor constraint, and maximizing the average with a

---

allotment of provisioning of the goods to individual agency: random arbitrary rule, equity rule, and equality rule. The framework of random arbitrary principle requires the maintenance of the status quo of equal birth with "blind lottery of luck' ruling the roost. Under equity rule, the reward to individuals is in proportion to the contribution made or the merit possessed by the individuals or households or groups - desert principle. A rule of equality however prescribes equal lot division of the goods amongst all.

[162] While a human capacity resembles with a set of human functioning - doings and beings, it is also a set of characteristics of the person that has the nature of an 'asset'. A capacity as an asset is held under a right to ownership. An ownership right confers four types of rights: destruction, use, benefit and rent. The right to destroy is the right to dismember, alienate and destroy; the use-right is the right to use without destroying it; the benefit-right is the right to receive the benefits from the use; and, the rent right is the right to the value of the availability of the services of the asset or capacity.

The ownership right in an asset is held under two statuses - bare ownership and full ownership. Full self-ownership is a conflation of all four types of rights, that is, the self-destruction, self-use, self-benefit and self-rent rights. Self-created improvements in capacity are part of the human capacity, and the classical process-freedom implies self-ownership in such self-created improvements in capacity.

range constraint. It was designed before experiments to set up some conditions of impartiality so that an assessment could be made as to the choice of principles by the participants and stability of their choices over time. Unanimous agreement was reached on a single principle in all cases in which the experiments were run properly. Around 78 percent of people chose the floor constraint principle, 12 percent chose to maximize the average income (Harsanyi's stand), and 9 percent chose the range constraint principle and only 1 percent chose the Difference principle (Rawls choice).

The floor constraint principle provides a safety net for all people – some basic level of income that is enough to meet the basic needs (refer to Gillian Brock, 2005). Such a public policy strategy would however face one significant constraint. In south Asia, correct declaration of the income of individuals and households are mostly suspect and a majority of people have mixed incomes, and therefore, it is needed to develop a sound system of identification of income bracket class of citizens for the success of this model.

Table – 9.1

Particulars of Alternative Policy Framework

Particulars	Our Focus
The Project	Agrarian Justice!
The Paradigm	Goal-Rights System
Philosophical Perspective	Synthesis of Rights-securing Deontology and Goods-promoting Consequentialism
Which rights?	The Rights to equality and fairness
Which goods?	The Goods of surplus-producing capacity
Axiotima	The Capacity to produce and reproduce economic surplus
Objective	Agrarian Distributive Justice through egalitarian distribution of capability and capacity to produce and reproduce economic surplus
Strategy	Agrarian Injustice Reduction (AIR) through lifting the Capacity to produce and reproduce economic surplus up to a benchmark/floor level
Coverage	Prioritarianism towards the worst-off, to be followed by Universalism in distribution amongst all

Our alternative policy prescription for the future existence of rural populace of South Asia consists of the proposition that journey towards agrarian justice ought to be attempted through the public policy strategies of lifting-up the surplus producing capacity of the rural

producers at the bottom and equalizing this benchmark capacity across all producers in the countryside. To realize the objectives of agrarian distributive transitional social justice, there is requirement of a clear statement of the operational strategies. The public policy strategy ought to be confined to public financial administration of tax and expenditures on the creation of capacity to produce a surplus in the ethos of guarantees of social protection, security and insurance of agency. The link between theoretical framework and practical policy design is presented in table – 9.2 and table – 9.2.

We subscribe and adopt a model of redistribution that has been illustrated by Serge-Christophe Kolm (2005) in his voluminous book entitled *Macrojustice: The Political Economy of Fairness.* In this policy model based on respecting the classical liberal principle of respecting the process-freedom and liberty of individual human agency and actor, this is a proposal of redistributing the average equalization labour income under the aegis of the welfare state to achieve the macro-justice.

Principal assertions of the model are: there are rights of individuals to ownership. A self-right to self-ownership leads to natural allocation of eudemonistic capacity – the consumptive capacity of human beings. The eudemonistic capacity does not come under allocation and distribution by public authority because it does not seem justified to tax the propensity to happiness or high mood, nor a priori, to subsidize – or compensate for – intrinsic sadness, gloom, and discontent. The issues for individualistic justice are the existence of deep un-happiness and in-satisfaction and of misery which are certainly prime concern for evaluating society. People who are miserable because they are deeply depressed should certainly receive a particular aid, but this is an issue in micro-justice.

With regard to the productive capacity, the classical liberalism championing the idea and facts of social freedom is interesting since the liberal social freedom the classical basic rights, rationality, impartiality and information. There is a requirement of combining the conception of justice of Aristotle and Plato with prescription of social freedom championed by classical liberalism. The process liberalism manifested in classical basic rights is based on democratic constitution, and the process-freedom theory of free exchange and property. The social freedom of classical liberalism is to be considered under two forms of the

classical basic rights – process freedom and democratic constitution together with consensus and unanimity. The social freedom is absence of relation of force and harms among individuals - absence of domination. The social freedom however requires rationality of individual agency, impartiality in treatment and process of action, information available to all, and classical basic rights of individuals in the society.

The classical liberal conception of process freedom is composed of act-freedom and aim-freedom. The process-freedom is theorized in the theory of free exchange and property under the classical political economy and libertarian framework of ethics. The process freedom determines the allocation of use-rights and benefit-rights in capacities, but not that of the rent-rights. The self-ownership implies process-freedom since it implies freedom to use one's capacities and to benefit from the use. A partial self-ownership in right to productive capacity together with principles of process-freedom under liberalism leads ultimately to rights allocation of rents of productive capacity. The productive capacity provides output-income-consumption for a given labour and leisure to human labour. There is income value of productive capacity as well as a productivity aspect. The process-freedom is much in line with deciding by unanimous agreement among rational and informed individuals. The consensus and unanimity is either actual or notional or a mix of both on principle of equal labour income equalization.

Agrarian distributive transitional justice is a matter of correction of inequalities in human productive capacities through the Equal Labour Income Equalization (ELIE) (amounting to each individual yielding her "equalization income"- that is, actual individual wage rate multiplied by equalization labour duration (suppose two days per week) and receiving the "average equalization income" – that is, average wage rate multiplied by two days per week multiplied by population of individuals.

> *The ELIE structure turns out to be the application of Plato's and Aristotle's theory of justice to labour and individuals' productive capacities. This theory consists of the two following principles: each individual merits the product of her actions, and what is give to society should be equally shared. The first part implies that each individual is entitled to the "full product of her labour". The second, however, implies that the a priori advantage provided by the availability of the given productive capacities is equally shared ..... the general case will turn out to be the ELIE distribution, where the product of a notional "equalization labour" are equally shared – which amounts to*

> *given transfers from the more productive to the less productive individuals (Kolm, 2005, p. 18).*

It is to be practically realized through the distribution function of a public sector – an equal distribution of the sum of rents of society's productive capacities according to each according to the excess or deficiency of her productivity to average.

To illustrate the policy model in terms of mathematical notations, let us suppose that the production function of a national economy in south Asia is represented by:

pi.li = wi.li

where **'i'** refers to the individual under consideration, 'n' to the total number of adult, able-bodied individuals in the nation, **'li'** to the amount of actual labour by the individual (in terms of duration worked per week), **'pi'** to the productivity of the individual **i**, and **'wi'** to the actual daily wage rate in the market (it is equal to productivity of labour of the individual).

With such a production function, the earnings of the individual are equal to **wi.li**, and the equalization income (value of equalization labour) is equal to **k.wi,** where **'k'** refers to the equalisation labour or a fraction of the rent of productive capacity.

The average equalization income is then equal to **k.w^**, where **'w^'** refers to the average labour productivity or average wage rate in the market (it is equal to 1/n. ∑wi), **'l^'** to the highest amount of labour possible or maximum duration hat could have been worked by the individual, and **'mi'** to the amount of actual leisure enjoyed by the individual (in terms of duration of leisure per week), it is equal to **l^ - li,**

Under Equal Labour Income Equalization scheme, an individual yields k.wi (by way of tax payment) but receives **k.w^** (by way of receiving equal lot subsidy). The estimation of the net transfer is **ti**, which is equal to **k.w^** minus **k.wi** , that in turn, amounts to **k. (w^ - wi)**. The condition is that if ti › 0, it is a subsidy and if ti ‹ 0 , it is a tax. The post transfer balance, **vi** is equal to **wi** plus **ti** , which in turn is equal to **(1 – k) wi** plus **k.w^.**

The consequence of taxation and expenditure is as such that the post transfer disposable income, **yi** = wi.li + ti = wi.li + k.w^ - k.wi = wi.(li – k) +k. w^ = k.w^ + wi.(li. – k). The post transfer disposable income, **yi** and leisure value, **mi** = yi + mi = wi.li + ti +mi = wi.li + k.w^ - k.wi +l^ - li = k.w^ + wi.li- li + l^

This abstract mathematical notation based model can be illustrated with a concrete example of the following sort. In the redistribution scheme, suppose equalisation labour = 1/3 rd of standard working time (k-th fraction as common coefficient of proportionality) in the nation. The average monthly income is rupees 10500, which may be considered the per capita income in a country in south Asia. The average equalisation income is then equal to rupees 3500 ($1/3^{rd}$ of PCI). Post-redistribution, the position of the poor, unemployed and the rich are as follows:

Poor

Person X has monthly earnings = Rupees 6000
Equalisation income of person X = Rupees 2000
Disposable income of person X = monthly earnings plus average equalisation income minus equalisation income = 6000 + 3500 – 2000 = Rupees 7500 (subsidy case)

Unemployed

Person Y has monthly earnings = Rupees 0 (unemployed)
Average equalisation income = Rupees 3500
Disposable income of person Y = 0 +3500 - 0 = Rupees 3500

Rich

Person Z has monthly income = Rupees 15000
Equalisation income of person Z = Rupees 5000

Disposable income of person Z = 15000 + 3500 – 5000 = Rupees 13500 (tax case)

Diagram – 9.1

Indifference Curve: Labour and Leisure



To illustrate with the help of a diagram so as to provide a visual sketch of the model, for a poor individual for whom the transfer is a subsidy, PT is the budget line, and the individual is at point F choosing between leisure and income as two goods. LLa is the amount of actual labour used, ON is the amount of earnings enjoyed [Wi.(li)] and OLa is the leisure amount enjoyed. LLb is the fraction of labour treated as equalisation labour, k, that is transferred to the central public finance authority as fraction of rent of productive capacity of the individual.

For rich individual for whom the transfer is a tax, ST is the budget line, and the individual is at point G choosing between leisure and income as two goods. LLc is the amount of actual labour used, OQ is the amount of earnings enjoyed [Wj.(lj)] and OLc is the leisure amount enjoyed. LLb is the fraction of labor treated as equalisation labor, k, that is transferred to the central public finance authority as fraction of rent of productive capacity of the individual.

We need to remember that this policy model is helpful in reducing inequality but not eliminating it. In a transitional society with records of past injustices, this is preferable in comparison to any aspiration of attaining some sort of abstract and idealised notion of perfect and maximal equality and justice. All these transfers to ensure a basic minimum income so as to create a floor level human productive capacity however require a sound taxation and expenditure public administration in each country of south Asia.

Our complete model is but one that advocates the composite policies[163] for the future. Such a design requires a prescriptive policy framework of proactive, inclusive and universal agrarian justice and social public policy of government in a 'good governance' format in the south Asian countryside as well. In addition to innumerable private human actors, a community of enlightened government legislators and functionaries as moral actors are required in south Asia. Our prescriptions are based on assumption of crucial roles assigned to the respective national governments in the region in designing an agrarian redistributive justice policy format in the public-private participation framework of agrarian governance.

Governing agrarian justice and social policy, that is, steering the formulation and implementation of programmes and projects related with food, fuel, and employment in a way conducive to maintenance and growth of the institutional structure of the social sector of economy, and consequent enhancement of the social welfare of individuals, has become a difficult but challenging proposition for good enough governance in the wake of the recent severe crisis of food, fuel and finance in South Asia.

---

[163] The strategy of public policy on the distributive justice ought to ensure the restoration of the rights to pre-natal care and nutrition of mother and child, right to education, right to sanitation and health, right to food security, right to borrow initial stock from financial system, right to land and water, right to compulsory comprehensive insurance – all as a package on universal basis of coverage and delivery.

Table – 9.2

Further Particulars of Alternative Policy Framework

Particulars	Our Focus
Priority	Who is worth of a priority? The worst-off*
Who is worst off*?	The food deficit households/farms (or at best, the balanced food budget)
How to prioritise?	Maximin/Leximin, that is, prioritising the worst-off – the deficit households – and maximising their capacity to produce and reproduce economic (nutritional) surplus from the actual minimum to an ideal benchmark level
Tools	1. a minimandum - a benchmark or a threshold level of economic surplus, representing a threshold level of productive capacity 2. An equalisandum - relative equality among peasantry with respect to a threshold level of capacity to produce economic surplus 3. A distribuandum - the equal-lot distribution through a central pool of sum of a fraction of rent-value of the productive capacity collected from all
Outcome Goal	Promotion of fulfilling lives with satisfaction of material basic needs (resources and capacities) plus social protection and security for all without discrimination and exclusion
Interactive agency	Partly-rational and partly-akratic but reasonable private human agency and/or altruistic public actor (Government)!

In the alternative agrarian justice and social protection policy in effective governance format, there ought to be a provision that a part of the public expenditure is to be devoted to general maintenance of social protection floor for all (expenditures on schools, hospitals, employment-programmes, old-age insurance, pensions, children-centered programmes and mitigation of man-made and natural hazards and disasters)[164] and public investment in agricultural research and development, soil, water drainage and post-harvest technology and engineering on small farms in general . The public expenditure on technology and

[164] The International Labour Organization has framed a universal social policy of protection floor as a crucial post-2015 agenda, and its implementation requires that South Asian governments orchestrate an increase in the percentage of government revenue raised by subnational governments to 60 percent. Such an attempt will make it comparable with practices of China. The way ahead is to introduce either agricultural taxation or the goods and service tax or a major share of the revenues from mining and querying. The percentage of government expenditures by subnational governments must be reduced to 30 percent to make it comparable with the world average in view of the fact that south Asian countries are characterized by corrupt frittering away of crucial resources on the administrative expenditures of the provincial states or subnational governments. The transfer to subnational governmental units as a share of subnational revenues must be raised to 80 percent in the form of ministerial project grants that is tightly monitored.

engineering improvements on the small farms ought to be able to enhance the productive capacity of actor-producer in general but rather indirectly. Such public expenditures ought to be financed through a major share of the revenues earned by governments from mining and querying since all citizens of a nation has a rent-right over the natural resources in south Asia.

9.3. Governing the Composite Policies

In recent times, there have been explorations regarding the common elements among human development policy (agrarian justice through enhancing the human productive capacity being a subset of the human development in general), social sector policy (social justice through the delivery of basic services and social protection and insurance) and policy paradigm of good governance (private-public participation in producing outcomes in an accountable, responsible, transparent and legal manner). The concerns with human rights and freedom, voice of people and participation and service delivery and provisioning of food are common considerations with each policy. These are shared concepts among policy paradigms of good governance, social policy and human development. The future demands human private and public actions in the common territory to realise the commonness of objectives (refer to Venn diagram – 9.1).

The present thesis subscribes and advocates the policy and practices associated with the concept of "democratic governance" for human development as proposed by the United Nations Development Programme in its Human Development Report of the year 2002. It subscribes and prescribes in favour of the pro-poor governance which is a dimension and sub-set of democratic governance, and defines a poor in individual as one characterised by productive incapacity.

The democratic governance, of which there are multiple dimensions and facets[165], requires: respect for people's human rights and fundamental freedoms, voice of people in decisions

[165] Political governance is about managing the state and establishing a practice of accountability to the people. It also refers to a country's voice and accountability, political stability and government effectiveness. Administrative governance requires that the public administration system that is

that affect their lives, accountability of the decision-makers, governing of the social interactions with inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices, equality between men and women, freedom from discrimination, current policies reflecting the needs of future generations, people's needs and aspirations reflected in social and economic policies and eradication of poverty and expansion of choice of people reflected in social and economic policies of the government (UNDP, 2002 quoted in UNDP-OGC, 2009).

An effective governance of agrarian justice and social protection floor policy do require and would continue to require in future that material interests of the human agency in both private and public realm is aligned to the values guiding the policy that attempts at building institutions through incentives (comprehensive scheme of universal subsidies) and constraints (taxation of rental income). A detailed outline of stages involved with the policy process and the objectives and targets to be achieved with respect to actors, institutions and human values are presented in table – 9.3 as four continued tabulations. The contents of the table are self-explanatory.

---

proactive and outcome-focused and this system have the managerial capacity to transform the state into an entrepreneurial developmental state with a 'visible hands-on' approach. This new public management style should use market mechanisms, client orientation and performance management to increase institutional capacity and to unbundle monolithic organisations into corporatized, decentralised, citizen focused and responsible public entities. Economic governance requires diminution of patronage distribution, nepotism and corruption. Regulatory governance requires strengthening governance by establishing the rule of law, and ensuring equality, democracy, transparency and accountability.

Venn Diagram – 9.1

Shared Concepts among Good Governance,
Social Policy and Human Development



Table – 9.3

Policy Process and Governance

Stage of Policy Process	Component of Policy Process		
	Actors	Institutions	Values
Formulation	• Capacities and capabilities of the beneficiaries • Nature of involvement- direct or indirect • Ethos of freedom of Civil society engagement • Involvement of local association and the media • Participation of women, minorities, citizens and the representatives	• Provisions of power sharing arrangements - formal or informal • Sharing of values of equity and fairness – informal or formal institutions	• Prioritization of the rights, concerns and interests of the citizens by political parties • Gap between political ideologies of electoral arena and policy making arena • Relation between the public actors and private charity organization • Operation of principles of fairness reflected in written documents, unwritten practices, media and educational messages

Table – 9.3 (Continued)

Policy Process and Governance

Stage of Policy Process	Component of Policy Process		
	Actors	Institutions	Values
Approval	• Power of dissent voice and opposition • Legislative accountability • Fragmentation or unity of actors involved • Representation of the interests of large organized group/ selective interests group/ privileged group • Freedom of legislator from financing of lobbyists	• Mechanisms of empowerment of executives, legislators, political parties, civil society actor • Power to amend the budget allocation of the executives by legislators • Degree of incentives in the rules of budget amendment – constituency-specific or politically inspired spending	• Nature of representation – individual geographic unite or hereditary or appointed member • Difference in the ideology of actors – polarized or moderate • Consensus building attitudes – history or tradition

According to the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (2009), there are three significant dimensions in the framework for assessment of policy making process: the agent-actors (who have material and non-material interests regarding distribution of resources and group norms) and technical and non-technical capacities (technical skills, information, specialized resources and capacity to persuade, negotiate, pressurize and cooptation), the institutions (both written and legislated formal rules and oral, informal rules and practices) that are characterized by a set of incentives and constraints, and the values (conservative or liberal or radical) guiding the policy.

Table – 9.3 (Continued)

Policy Process and Governance

Stage of Policy Process	Component of Policy Process		
	Actors	Institutions	Values
Implementation	• Nature of participation of citizens – direct or indirect • Nature of involvement of the civil society organizations • Bottom-up or top-down implementation • Contracting process with the private sector actors	• Role of judiciary/ office of ombudsmen • Nature of implementation – centralized or decentralized • Nature of Reward or punishment to implementers • Relation between mandate of budget and spending • Mode of recruitment – merit/political appointment/ethnic affiliation	• Degree of toleration of delays or deviations by the media, public opinion or government officials • Human right approach or rights-duties relations approach in implementation

An effective and good governance of the composite policies of agrarian justice and social protection floor would require policy process across various stages involved and the requirements parameters and dimensions of agent-actors, institutions and values. This is furnished in a tabular format, which is self-explanatory (refer to table – 9.3). In the alternative composite policy framework as proposed in the present work, the agenda of agrarian justice and social protection policy would require all the five types of spaces for making policy: the bureaucratic space where the civil servants provide inputs to policy, the invited space where the stakeholders participates and the consultants advise, the political/electoral space where the policy-makers enter into the election with an agenda, the popular space through which protests and demonstrations by citizens put pressure on the governments, and the conceptual space where new ideas can be introduced into the debates and circulated through the media.

Table – 9.3 (Continued)

Policy Process and Governance

Stages of Policy Process	Component of Policy Process		
	Actors	Institutions	Values
Oversight	• Who monitors – government or stakeholders • Degree of reporting b the media • Accessibility to information regarding outcomes through the internet or other medias sources • Involvement on policy makers with time and will to oversee	• Transparency of lack of it • Formal and informal incentives for legislative oversight • Role of judiciary in punishing the violation of the law and controlling the corruption and buses of political power • Incentives and constraints of human rights watch groups and councils • Relation of accountability questioning between legislators and ministries	• Prevalence or absence of accountability, transparency and responsibility between citizens and policymakers • Primacy of efficiency in terms of value for money or justice in matter distributive impact • Evaluation in terms of reduction of discrimination and protection of economic and social rights or the absence of this approach thereof

Source: adapted from UNDP Oslo Governance Centre, 2009, pp. 22-4

Our research project is an attempt towards providing the conceptual space where the idea and political agenda of practical and feasible programme of human actions has been outlined for further reflections. The governance of such a policy would require actions through multiple spaces, however. It is expected that South Asian populace and governments would exploit all spaces in future in the service of demotion of injustices and furtherance of justice in the countryside.

Principal political and economic demand of agrarianism has been centered at some notion of agrarian justice for the dwellers in the countryside. In the literature, there have been Jaffersonian ideals of moral agrarianism as well. To go back to the thesis, the radical version of agrarianism was in the beginning associated with the meaning: 'land tenure and use', 'equal division of land', and also forced equalization of the ownership of cultivated land. In its moral version, agrarianism during the eighteenth century itself emerged to be a normative social goal to be reckoned with right. Moral agrarianism prescribed a way of acting as an indispensable part for a good life wherever there was want of labourers and surfeit of land. Thomas Jefferson, another champion of agrarianism after Thomas Paine in America, considered the passion for agriculture and ideology of pastoralism as a moral virtue. Such ideas of Thomas Jefferson were bracketed into some sort of 'moral agrarianism' (and not ethical agrarianism) – championing the ideals of the pastoral and non-capitalistic, not anti-capitalistic farms (Leo Marx, 2000, p.125). Jeffersonian agrarianism preached the self-sufficiency and autonomy of an agrarian lifestyle so as to devote time and energy for local political participation (Holowchak, 2010).

Refinement of the conception of agrarian justice has been attempted in subsequent developments in moral philosophy and ethics over the years and the contemporaneous writings in the field of applied social agricultural ethics has brought this agrarian ideal to the question of food and human capacity. Presently, the global agrarianism is preoccupied with the ethical issues related with the mismatch between food supplies and human nutritional needs, and it advocates the socio-economic strand of agricultural ethics in the deontological tradition of rights, duties and obligations to be established through the intervention of public welfare policy. Assurance of rights to human capacity, nutrition, health and hygiene requires proper legislations, institutional arrangement, and of course, public expenditure on provision of food security. The notion of equity/equality has been central to the conception of distributive justice, throughout.

Beginning with an attempt to trace the origin of the social movement of agrarianism in America and Europe and the conception of productive surplus in the classical political economy of France and Britain, the present work has attempted to bring to the centre the exploration of the possibility of conceptualising agrarian justice in terms of equalization of

human capacity to produce an economic surplus on the farms in the countryside. The human capacity to produce a surplus over and above the consumption requirements of the households is a vital productive capacity. To attain agrarian justice, the equalization of human capacity to produce an economic surplus on the farms in the countryside involves the sacrifice of a part of the rent-right of the self-ownership over human productive capacity by way of public taxation and receipt of equal-lot subsidy from the government, and the sacrifice of a part of the rent-right of the self-ownership over human productive capacity by way of public taxation by every individual does not violate the process-freedom eulogised by the philosophy and economics of liberalism and libertarianism.

In our thesis, we have proposed the taxation of a fraction of the rental value of human productive capacity, and expenditure as equal-lot redistribution from the central pool of revenues of the government. Agrarian distributive justice ought to be complemented with proactive universal social policy. A sizeable amount of revenues of the government, particularly from mining and querying, is to be devoted to public expenditures on maintenance of the social right to education, health, employment, insurance, assistance and maintenance of social solidarity, cohesiveness and peace as well. Moreover, a lot of attention to efficacy of delivery mechanisms, accountability, transparency, voice of people, rule of law and the working of effective government are required in matter of good governance of the agrarian justice agenda and inclusive social policy.

While we have argued in favour of the suitability of the public scheme of agrarian justice as equalization of productive surplus capacity through fiscal policy of taxation-expenditure and social policy of education, health, pension and insurance for all in the context of countries of south Asia, the circumstances of justice has been traced by bringing into focus the multiple empirically observed facets of social and economic asymmetries and injustices in south Asia. South Asian countries suffer from a high level of poverty, food insecurity, social exclusion, resource asymmetries, social insecurity and lack of social protection, cohesion and peace, in addition to income and asset inequality in the ethos of governance deficits and failures in delivering the social assistance and insurance. Such circumstances warrant an alternative agenda and policy of agrarian justice and social security in effective governance framework.

As our thesis is biased in favour of burdening the governments and public authorities with the responsibility to orchestrate in a public-private partnership framework the moral agrarian agenda of justice as an operational scheme of guaranteeing a floor-level productive human capacity for the worst-off and subsequent equalization of this human capacity amongst all, the thesis has argued to underline the fact of possibility of private moral deficits, and as such the requirement of filling up the deficits with public actions, preferably in public-private-partnership framework.

The questions of 'why a government do' and 'how ought a government do' have taken us to the whole theoretical and conceptual discourse of moral and political philosophy on private and public reasons, practical rationality, morality, action, action appraisal, axiotima and equalisandum in civil society. Surveying the literature of moral and political philosophy as well as mainstream economics, our work has argued in favour of analytical significance to accommodate a conception of hybrid and mixed morality – a morality of the goal-right system. A conception of hybrid morality is one that simultaneously creates an ought-abidance imperative for pursuit of the goods of something as well as seeking of the rights to something. This is required by the circumstances of justice in concrete societies of south Asia which are not fully democratic and liberal. Arguments have been built up to underline the practical significance of advocating the idea of promotion of the sense of imperfect transitional justice and minimization of concrete facets of agrarian injustices. Transitional justice is associated with attempts to remove material scarcity and human vulnerability, and such amelioration actions are given lexical priority over Rawlsian basic rights and liberty. The theories of less-than-perfect, less-than-ideal, less-than-absolute justice do not prescribe adherence to the standard two principles of Rawlsian justice. The notion of less-than-perfect, less-than-ideal, less-than-absolute justice requires first and foremost attempts at lifting-up the conditions of the 'worst-off representative person' through guarantee of subsistence rights and protection from the 'standard threats' of material scarcity and concrete vulnerability. Such a justice is possible and feasible through morally permissible, politically feasible and effective 'policies' and 'course of actions' in order to move from less-just to more-just conditions of life and institutions in a burdened society. Transitional (non-ideal) justice is considered almost befitting to

circumstances in which background institutions of society are either unjust or do not exist at all.

Surveying the standard conceptions of human action and reasons for action, we have argued in favour of foundational significance to model a conception of hybrid action with plural standards of normative appraisal of such mixed action framework. What is true in a concrete world of affairs is the hybrid action of human agency. In all human society, there is a public authority – a sort of government like organization which acts in public interest. In other words, individual human actions are never in a vacuum. Rather, these private individual actions are performed along with and side by side the public bureaucratic actions. Governance is an example par excellence of hybrid actions of private and public agencies together. There are possibilities of private action deficits and failures. Failures of the civil society of private actors in interaction and their vulnerabilities have led to the rationale of a welfare state. The government intervention in the economy through the power of legislation is needed when the private actor fail to discharge their duties and carry out business in less than honourable way. A hybrid action of private-public partnership framework that is motivated and justified by private and public reasons and rationality require an exercise in synthesizing the categories of person-related reasons of respect and value-centered reasons of concern about human happiness, pleasure, goodness and wellbeing. The hybrid theoretical-practical reasons that are simultaneously person-related as well as value-centered and conjoint instrumental end-oriented and principled act-oriented reasoning has a normative content. Theoretical and practical reasons are both required for a good doctrine. In a doctrine of hybrid actions explained, recommended and justified by hybrid reasons, it is needed to accommodate both theoretical as well as practical reasons and the plurality of value-centered reasons of concern as well as person-related reasons of respect.

In our chosen theoretical framework of the doctrine of agrarianism, we have argued in favour of heuristic significance to assume and explore the possibility of a blended conception of rationality of reflexive and reasonable human beings. While contesting paradigms have multiplied, the way out is that a human being who responds to reasons of thought and reasons of action is posited to be endowed with the traits but of comprehensive

meaningful rationality. In reality, what suits for heuristic assumption is a blended conception of human rationality which is one that unifies the postulate of instrumental (maximizing) rationality with those of procedural (bounded), expressive, creative, extended and meaningful rationality. A broad conception of individual rationality, which is essentially the object-given and value-directed ends-rationality of human beings, is a facilitator of the concern for equity and justice.

Such a compromise is warranted for the heuristic purpose to further assume the portrayal of a partly free-willed, partly- dependent, partly-rational and partly-akratic agency. Such a human agency is a persona of imperfect capacity and incapacity and stands in mid-way between perfect rational agency and imperfect akratic agency. A human primate rather evolves through successive stages into an Aristotelian and Kantian rational agent. A human being is in reality a mixture of free-willed person of capacity and dependent person of incapacity and a mixture of perfect rational agency and imperfect akratic agency. An imperfect and rather less-than-full-bloodied rational agency is a human primate who is on the path of crossing the initial stages of a stimulus-response agency, a planning and strategic agency, and a norm-governed agency, and who is still short of rational agency endowed with full capacity to make moral appraisal – a partly-independent, partly-incapacitated and partly-akratic agency. This hybrid conception of human being is realistic and relevant to the advocacy of transitional justice in a framework of hybrid morality. This is however not to undermine the dominance of alternative monist tradition in moral philosophy and political philosophy and economics.

It is in this conceptual and theoretical backdrop that we have proceeded to analyse the conception of the most valued thing in human life. Recent literature in political philosophy, economics and ethics has emphasized that the most valued goal of human life is simply to acquire the capability to function with an advantage in the society. Among things and properties of things that facilitate the human lives to go well, the most valued concrete thing ought to be the human productive capacity and capability. In the science of axiology, this valued thing is called the ‘axiotima’. It is the material-productive capacity of human agents rather than the command over and rights to the ownership and control over the material goods and services (including money, income and property), which are of ultimate

value to and which is the fundamental claim of the human actors in the society. The agrarian egalitarian distributive justice in the framework of hybrid moral goal-right system of action and appraisal of human actions ought to accommodate the rights to surplus producing capacity of individuals in the society.

In our alternative formulation of the hybrid morality of the good and the right, it is the capacity and capability to produce an economic surplus in a social and economic ethos of equality of opportunity that ought to be the Axiotima. Our focus in the present work is narrow and limited to the Axiotima and equalisandum of human surplus productive capacity in the countryside. In the dualism between man and material, it is the human capacity to produce a material livelihood and nutritional surplus in the countryside that is more meaningful than the material entity of a surplus itself.

A rational and moral human agency has a capacity for production of livelihood, and it is not merely a category for consideration in theoretical conception and reasoning about the good to be promoted but also a vital concrete capacity for real-life actions towards guaranteeing biological-nutritive-material survival as a matter of the right to be restored and maintained in the countryside. The agenda which outlines the future prospect of material existence of populace ought to be centered at achieving the outcomes of minimization of injustices and promotion of transitional (rather than anything 'ideal', 'perfect' or 'maximal') distributive justice with respect to the allocation and distribution of human capacity to produce a surplus in particular and human capability in general as the most valued concrete thing among the countryside populace of South Asia.

To fructify the political agenda of agrarian justice through equalization of human (productive) (surplus) capacity, a befitting policy design for countries of South Asia is required for the present and the future. We have subscribed to the model of Serge Christophe Kolm and UNRISD in matter of proposing the taxation-expenditure policy model. Our thesis has further argued that the alternative policy prescription of agrarian justice and social protection ought also to be concerned with the practical question: 'how ought a government in south Asia to act to achieve the concrete observable outcome of impartiality in treatment of individual human agency, fairness in the procedures of public

action, equality in the distribution and redistribution of human capacity to produce a surplus in the countryside?' A normative appraisal of 'how government does what it does or what it does not' is more crucial than the positive evaluation of the nature of the state and the size and scope of government. The governments ought to bring agrarian justice and social welfare in transparent manner through a system of accountability with effective powers of the government agencies in south Asia.

It is always difficult to wind up the thesis by proposing a thing which goes in the name of a 'conclusion'. It is not easy because there is always a temptation to revisit the foregoing thesis write-up. To revisit may become cumulative and repetitive, and it is therefore the conclusion in this last chapter in which we have summarized the narratives so far elaborated in the preceding nine chapters. Given the limited scope of the study to be completed within the limited stipulated time, the fact remains the same as expressed elsewhere.

> *Paul Valery says somewhere: A poem is never finished, it is abandoned in despair. The same can be said of some works of philosophy ……. I still have the same feeling: "if only I could rewrite it from the beginning ……."* (Searle, 2001, p. xi).

Abdullah, Mohammad (2005) (Ed.), "Statistical Bulletin of SAARC Agricultural Data", SAARC Agricultural Information Centre, Dhaka (Compilation: Saleemulla Sohoo and Md. Mizanur Rahman)

Adams, J. (1965), "Inequity in Social Exchange" in Berkowitz, L. (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol.2, Academic Press, New York

Adams, J. (1986), "Peasant Rationality: Individuals, Groups, Cultures", *World Development*, vol. 14, no. 2

Adams, John (2001), "Culture and Economic Development in South Asia", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 573

Adorno, T. W. and M. Horkheimer (1979), Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London

Ahmed, Raisuddin (2002), "Agricultural Market Reforms in South Asia" in Prema-chandra Athukorala (2002), The Economics of Development of South Asia, Vol. II, Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, UK

Al-adhami, Rheem (2012), "Inequalities and the Post-2015 Development Agenda", Research and Policy Brief - 15, United Nations Research Institute of Social Development, Geneva, October

Alam, Quamrul and Julian Teicher (2012), "The State of Governance in Bangladesh: The Capture of State Institutions", *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 35, no.4, December

Alberto Alesina, Guido Cozzi and Noemi Mantovan (2012), "The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution", *The Economic Journal*, vol. 122, December

Almond, B (1993), "Rights" in Peter Singer (1993), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers Limited, Cambridge

Amadae, SM (2004), "Review of "Rationality and Freedom" by Amartya Sen", *Economics and Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 2, October

Amariglio, Jack, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff (1991), "Division and Difference in the 'Discipline' of Economics", *Social Scientist*, vol. 19, nos. 3&4, March–April

Anscombe, Elisabeth (1981), "Modern Moral Philosophy" in The Collected Philosophical Works of G E M Anscombe, Vol. 3, Ethics, Religion and Politics Series, Blackwell, Oxford

Anscombe, Elizabeth (2000), Intention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (original publication: 1957, 1963)

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958), "Modern Moral Philosophy", *Philosophy*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Aristotle (1952), The Works of Aristotle (384-322 BC), Vol. 1 & 2, Britannica Press, Chicago (Trans: W D Ross)

Arjan de Haan (2011), "Social Exclusion and the Road Not Taken: An Insider Account of Conceptual Travel within Development Practice", Working Paper No. 218, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, UK Department for International Development (DFID), London

Arneson, Richard (1998), "Equality and Egalitarianism" in Ruth Chadwick (1998) (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, Vol. 2, Academic Press, San Diego, California

Arneson, Richard (1998), "What, if anything, Renders All Humans Morally Equal?" in Dale Jamieson (1999) (Ed.), Peter Singer and His Critics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2007), South Asia Economic Report: Social Sectors in Transition, Asian Development Bank, Philippines

Atkinson, A B (1975), The Economics of Inequality, Oxford University Press, London

Atkinson, A B (1995), Public Economics in Action: The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Atkinson, A B and E Bourguingnon (2000) (Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Elsevier, North Holland

Avila, A. Flavio and Evenson, R.E. (2004), TFP Calculations from FAO Production Data, Yale University (Mimeo.)

Bacon, Francis (1999), Selected Philosophical Works, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis

Baier, Kurt (1958), The Moral Point of View, Cornell University Press, Cornell in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Baier, Kurt (1978), "Moral Reasons", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 3

Baier, Kurt (1982), "The Conceptual Link between Morality and Rationality", *Nous*, vol. 16

Bajpai, Rochana (2010), "Rhetoric as Argument: Social Justice and Affirmative Action in India, 1990", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 44, no. 4

Bannock, G., R E Baxter and Ray Rees (1978), The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, Penguin Books, England

Barah, B C (2012), "Feeding India's Growing Billion: Inclusive Growth of Food Production Indispensable", *RIS Policy Brief No – 57*, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, New Delhi

Baran, Paul (1968), The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press, New York

Baran, Paul and Paul Sweezy (1966), Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press, New York

Bardhan, Pranab (2001), "Social Justice in the Global Economy", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 36, no. 5/6, February

Barro, R. and J. W. Lee (2001), "International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications", *Oxford Economic Papers*, vol. 53, no. 3

Barro, Robert J (1977), The Impact of Social Security on Private Savings, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC

Baumol, William J. (1986), Superfairness: Applications and Theory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, Cambridge

Baumrin, Bernard (1990), "Post Cosmopolitanism: Whose Justice? Which Rationality?", *Nous*, vol. 24, no. 5, December

Beall, J. (2002). 'Globalization and Social Exclusion in Cities: Framing the Debate with Lessons from Africa And Asia', *Environment and Urbanization*, vol. 14, no. 1

Becker, Gary S (1983), "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 98, August

Benn, S I and G F Gaus (1983) (Eds.), Public and Private in Social Life, Croom Helm, London

Benn, Stanley (1967) "Justice" in Edwards, Paul (1967) (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.4, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London

Benn, Stanley I (1988), A Theory of Freedom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Bental, Jim and Stuart Corbridge (1996), "Urban-Rural Relations, Demand Politics and the 'New Agrarianism' in the Northwest India: The Bhartiya Kisan Union", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 21, no. 1

Bentham, Jeremy (1789), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Hafner Press, London (Reprint: 1970 by Laurence J Lafleur)

Bernstein, Henry (2008), "Agrarian Questions from Transition to Globalization" in Bernstein, H. Akram Lodhi, H. and Kay, C. (2008) (Eds.), Peasants and Globalisation: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question, Routledge, London

Bertin, J (1983), Semiology of Graphics: Diagrams, Networks, Maps, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison

Bevir, M (2011), "Governance as Theory, Practice and Dilemma" in M Bevir (2011) (Ed), The Sage Handbook of Governance, Sage, London

Bhagwati, J and I Gambri (2005), "Political Will, Not Just Aid Can Lift Africa Out of Despair", Financial Times, Column 2, July 5

Bhaskar, R. (1991), Philosophy and the Ideas of Freedom, Blackwell, Oxford

Bhatia, Bela (2005), "Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, April 9

Birthal, P. S., P. K. Joshi, and Ashok Gulati (2005), "Vertical Coordination in High-value Commodities - Implications for Smallholders", MTID Discussion Paper 85, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC

Black, Duncan (1958), The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Blanshard, Brand (1962), Reason and Analysis, Open Court Publishing Company, London (Reprint: 2002)

Blaug, Mark (1980), The Methodology of Economics or How Economists Explain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Reprint: 1992)

Blitz, J (2005), "Brown Attacks Trade Policies of the Rich", *Financial Times*, Column 8, June 20

Boland, Lawrence (1982), The Foundations of Economics Method, Allen and Unwin, London

Bonnerjee, Aniruddha (2014), "Social Sector Spending in South Asia: A Mixed Bag", in Koehler, Gabriele and Deepti Chopra (2014) (Eds.), Development and Welfare Policy in South Asia, Routledge, Abingdon

Bonnerjee, Aniruddha and Gabriel Koehler (2011), "The Challenge of Food and Nutrition Insecurity and Policy Innovations from the South - Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty", Report of the XIth EADI/DSA Conference, London (Mimeo.)

Borras Jr., S. M. (2007), "Free Market, Export-led Development Strategy and its Impact on Rural Livelihood, Poverty and Inequality: the Philippine Experience seen from a Southeast Asian Perspective", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol.14, no.1

Borras, Saturnino M. Jr. (2009), "Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies: Changes, Continuities and Challenges - An Introduction", Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 36, no.1, January

Boulding, K. E. (1970), Economics as a Science, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd, New Delhi

Boulding, Kenneth E (1945), "The Concept of Economic Surplus", *American Economic Review*, vol. 35, no. 5, December

Bowen, Howard R (1943), "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 58, February

Brandt, R. B. (1979), A Theory of the Good and the Right, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Brandt, R. B. (1989), "Practical Rationality: A Response", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. L, no. 1, September

Brandt, R. B. (1992), Morality, Utilitarianism and Rights: A Critical Study of Richard B. Brandt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Bratman, Michael (1984), "Two Faces of Intention", *Philosophical Review*, vol. 93

Bratman, Michael (1987), Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Bratman, Michael (1999), Faces of Intention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Braybrooke, David (1987), Meeting Needs, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Brennan, Geoffrey and JM Buchanan (1985), "The Reason for Rules: Constitutional Political Economy" in Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt and Robert Tollison (2000) (Eds.), The Collected Works of James Buchannan, Vol. 10, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis

Brinkerhoff, Derick W and Arthur A. Goldsmith (2005), 'Institutional Dualism and International Development: A Revisionist Interpretation of Good Governance', *Administration and Society*, vol.37, no.2

Brock, Gillian (1998), Necessary Goods, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham

Brock, Gillian (2005), "Needs and Global Justice" in Reader, Soran (2005) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Need, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 57, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Brown, D. D. (1971), Agricultural Development in India's Districts, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Buchanan, James M (1968), The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand McNally, Chicago

Buchanan, JM and R D Congleton (1998), Politics by Principle Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Burchardt, T, J Le Grand and D Piachaud (1999), "Social Exclusion in Britain, 1991-1995", *Social Policy and Administration*, vol. 33, no. 3

Burke, Edmund (1982), A Vindication of Natural Society: A View of the Miseries and Evils Arising to Mankind , Liberty Fund, Indianapolis (*Introduction*: Frank N. Pagano)

Buttel, F H (2001), "Some Reflections on Late Twentieth Century Agrarian Political Economy", *Sociologia Ruralis*, vol. 41, no. 2

Caldwell, Bruce (1982), Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in Twentieth Century, Allen and Unwin, London

Caldwell, Bruce (1993) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Elgar Reference Collection, Aldershot, England

Carrasco, M. A. (2004), "Adam Smith's Reconstruction of Practical Reason", *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 58, no. 1, September

Carter, Ian (2011), "Respect and the Basis of Equality", *Ethics*, vol. 121, April

Chadwick, Ruth (1998) (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, vol. 4, Academic Press, San Diego, California

Chalam, K S (2003), "Politics, Power and Poverty in South Asia", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 38, no. 40, October 4

Cheung, A B I (2007), "The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Asia: Paradigms and Legacies, Paths and Diversities, *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administrating and Institutions,* vol. 18, no. 2

Cheung, A B I (2011), "NPM in Asian Countries" in T Christensen and P Laegried (2011) (Eds), The Ashgate Companion to New Public Management, Ashgate , Farnham

Coelli, Tim J. and Rao, D.S. Prasada (2003), "Total Factor Productivity Growth in Agriculture: A Malmquist Index Analysis of 93 Countries, 1980-2000", International Association of Agricultural Economics Conference in Durban, August (Mimeo.)

Cohen, Daniel and Toby Handfield (2010), "Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will", *Mind*, vol. 119, no. 476, October

Cohen, G A (1995), Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Cohen, G A (2008), Rescuing Justice and Equality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Collard, D. (1978), Altruism and Economy: A Study in Non-selfish Economies, Martin Robertson, Oxford

Commission on Global Governance (1995), Our Global Neighborhood, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Compagnon, Daniel (2010), "Global Governance and the South: Blind Spot or Terra Incognita?" in H. Overbeek, K. Dingwerth, P. Pattberg and D.Compagnon (2010), Forum: Global Governance - Decline or Maturation of an Academic Concept?", *International Studies Review*, vol. 12

Cooper, Neil (1966), "Two Concepts of Morality", *Philosophy*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Crisp, Roger (1999), "Review of "Ethics and Practical Reason" edited by Cullity,G. and B. Gaut (1997)", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 197, October

Croissant, Aurel, UK Singh and Joachim Betz (2014), "Need for Reform and Governance Capacities in Asia: Country Report India", Sustainable Governance Indicators Project of Deutschland und Asien, Bertelsmann Stiftung in Gütersloh, Germany

Cullity,G. and B. Gaut (1997), (Eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford

D Held (1991), "Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System", *Economy and Society*, vol. 20, no. 2

D'Costa, Bina (2011), "Bangladesh in 2010: Digital Makeover but Continued Human and Economic Insecurity", *Asia Survey*, vol. 51, no. 1

Daintith, John (1983) (Ed.), Dictionary of Economics, Gulab Vazirani for Arnold-Heineman, New Delhi

Darwall, Stephen (2006), "Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach" in David Copp (2006) (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Dasgupta S and I Roy (2011), Good Agricultural Governance - A Resource Guide Focused on Smallholder Crop Production, Food and Agricultural Organization, Bangkok

Davidson, Donald (1963), "Actions, Reasons and Causes", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 60

Davidson, Donald (1980), Essays on Action and Events, Oxford University Press, Oxford

De Angelis, Massimo (2005), "The Political Economy of Global Neoliberal Governance", *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, vol. 28, no. 3

De Senarclens, Pierre (1998), "Governance and the Crisis in the International Mechanisms of Regulation", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. L, no. 155, March

Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (1991), What is Philosophy?, Columbia University Press, New York

Demsetz, H (1969), "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint", *Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 12, no. 1

Desmarais, A A (2002), "The Via' Campesina: Consolidating an International Peasant and Farm Movement", *Journal of Peasant Study*, vol. 29, no. 2

Deutsch, Morton (1985), Distributive Justice, Vail-Ballou Press, New York

Dey, M.M. and R.E. Evenson, (1991), The Economic Impact of Rice Research in Bangladesh, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven (Mimeo)

Donnellan, K S (1967), "Reasons and Causes" in Edwards, Paul (1967) (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London

Dore, R.P. (1959), Land Reform in Japan, Oxford University Press, London

Dumont, Luis (1980), "Agriculture and the Birth of Classical Economics: The Docteur Quesnay", in Hobsbawm, E J, W Kula, A Mitra, K N Raj and Ignacy Sachs (1980), Peasants in History: Essays In Honour of Daniel Thorner, Oxford University Press, Calcutta

Durrenberger, E. P. (1984) (Ed.), Chayanov, Peasants and Economic Anthropology, Academic Press, New York

Dworkin, Ronald (2000), Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Dworkin, Ronald (1978), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Dymski, G A and J E Elliot (1989), "Capitalism and the Democratic Economy" in E F Paul, F D Miller, J Paul and J Ahrens (1989) (Eds.), Capitalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (2012), "Comparing Welfare State Regimes: Are Typologies an Ideal or Realistic Strategy?", Draft Paper Presented at European Social Policy Analysis Network, ESPA Conference, Edinburgh, UK, September 6-8

Edwards, Paul (1967) (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols.4, 7 & 8, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London

Ellis, Frank (1988), Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Debelopment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Elster, Jon (1983), Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Elster, Jon (1985), Making Sense of Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Elster, Jon and J E Roemer (1991), Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Epsing-Andersen, Gosta (1990), Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge

Evenson, R.E., C. Pray and M.W. Rosegrant (1999), "Agricultural Research and Productivity Growth in India", *Research Report No. 109*, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C.

Fair, Christine (2011), "Pakistan in 2010: Flooding, Governmental Inefficiency, and Continued Insurgency", *Asian Survey*, vol. 51, no. 1

Fan, S., P.B.R. Hazell, and S.Thorat (1999), "Linkages between Government Spending, Growth, and Poverty in Rural India", *Research Report No. 110*, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.

Farazmand, A (2004) (Ed), Sound Governance: Policies and Administrative Innovations, Praeger Publishers, Westport

Farmer, B H (2002), "The 'Green Revolution' in South Asian Rice Fields: Environment and Production" in Prema-chandra Athukorala (2002), The Economics of Development of South Asia, Vol. II, Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, UK

Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M Schmidt (1999), "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 114, no. 3

Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge and R. E. Just (2007), "Researchability of Modern Agricultural Input Markets and Growing Concentration", *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 89, no. 5

Filmer, D. and L. Pritchett (1999), "Educational Enrollment and Attainment in India: Household Wealth, Gender, Village, and State Effects", *Journal of Educational Planning and Administration*, vol. 13, no. 2

Fine, Ben (1994), "Towards a Political Economy of Food", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 1, no. 3

Fisher, Walter R. (1980), "Rationality and the Logic of Good Reasons", *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, vol. 13, no. 2, Spring

Foot, Philippa (1958), "Moral Arguments", *Mind*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Foot, Philippa (2002), Virtues and Vices, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Ford, A, J Hornsby, and F Stoutland (2011) (Eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Foucault, Michael (1982), Discipline and Punish, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth

Frankena, William (1958), "MacIntyre on Defining Morality", *Philosophy*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Frankena, William K. (1967), "The Concept of Morality", *Series in Philosophy no. 3*, University of Colorado Studies, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Frankfurt, Harry (1978), "The Problem of Action", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 15

Friedmann, Harriet (1980), "Household production and the National Economy: Concepts for the Analysis of Agrarian Formations", *Journal of Peasant Study*, vol. 7, no. 2

Frohlich, Norman and Joe Oppenheimer (1992), Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, University of California Press, California

Fukuyama, F (2013), "What Is Governance?", *Governance: An International Journal Of Policy, Administrating And Institutions*, vol… 26, no. 3, July

Fuller, L L (2011), "Burdened Societies and Transitional Justice", *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Published Online, 30 June

Galston, W A (1980), Justice and the Human Good, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago

Garver, Eugene (2005), "Reason, Practical and Theoretical" in the New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3424300663.html

Gauthier, D. P. (1967), "Morality and Advantage", *Philosophical Review*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Gauthier, David (1987), "Reason to be Moral?", *Synthese*, vol. 72, no. 1, July

George, Henry (1885), The Crime of Poverty, Opera House, Burlington, Iowa

Ghani, Ejaz, Lakshmi Iyer and Saurabh Mishra (2013), "Promoting Shared Prosperity in South Asia: Economic Premise", *Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network (PREM) Number 110*, World Bank, March

Ghosh, Jyati (2002), "Social Policy in Indian Development", *A Paper Prepared for UNRISD Project, UNRISD*, Geneva (mimeo.)

Godelier, Maurice (1986), The Mental and the Material: Thought, Economy and Society, Verso, England

Godwin, William (1946), Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, University of Toronto Press, Toronto

Goldstein, Judith and Robort Keohane (1993), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY

Goodin, R E (1993), "Utility and the Good" in Peter Singer (1993), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers Limited, Cambridge

Goodin, R E (1995), Utilitarianism as a Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Gough, Kathleen (1974), "Indian Peasant Uprisings", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 9, nos. 32, 33, 34 (Special Number)

Govan, T P (1964), "Agrarian and Agrarianism: A Study in the Use and Abuse of Words", *Journal of Southern History*, vol. 30, no. 1, February

Government of India (2002), "Report of the High Level Committee on Long-term Grain Policy", Department of Food and Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumers Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, New Delhi

Government of India (2006), "Economic Survey 2005-06", Economic Division, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi

Government of India (2006), "Reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices or Crops Sown during 2005-2006", DAC Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi

Government of India, (2001), "Agricultural Statistics at a Glance", DAC, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi

Government of India (2005), "Agricultural Statistics at a Glance", DAC, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi

Government of India (2006), "State-wise Value of Output from Agriculture, Central Statistical Organization", Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, New Delhi

Graham, Keith (2002), Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Grand, Julian Le (1997), "Knights, Knaves or Pawns? - Human Behavior and Social Policy", *Journal of Social Policy*, vol. 26, no. 2

Green, Philip (1985), "Equality since Rawls: Objective Philosophers, Subjective Citizens, and Rational Choice", *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 47, no.3, August

Gregnani, Piero (1987), "Surplus Approach to Value and Distribution" in John Eatwell, M Miligate and P Newman (1987) (Eds.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave, London

Grindle, M (2007), "Good Enough Governance Revisited", *Development Policy Review*, vol. 25, no. 5

Guba, E G and Y S Lincoln (1994), "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research" in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook Of Qualitative Research, Sage Publication, Thousand Oaks, CA

Haan, Arjan de (2010), Towards a New Poverty Agenda in Asia: Social Policies and Economic Transformation, Sage Publications, New Delhi

Hahn, F. H. (1973), "On the Notion of Economic Equilibrium in Economics: An Inaugural Lecture" in Bruce Caldwell (1993) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Elgar Reference Collection, Aldershot, England

Halevy, Elie (1972), The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, Faber and Faber, Bath, England

Hall, Peter A (1993), "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain", *Comparative Politics,* vol. 25, no. 3

Hamalainen, Nora (2009), "Is Moral Theory Harmful in Practice? – Relocating Anti-Theory in Contemporary Ethics", *Ethical Theory And Moral Practice*, vol. 12, no. 5, November

Hamlin, A. P. (1986), "Individual Rationality" in Bruce Caldwell (1993) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Elgar Reference Collection, Aldershot, England

Hamlin, A. P. (1986), Ethics, Economics and the State, St. Martin's Press, New York

Hangen, Susan (2011), "Nepal and Bhutan in 2010: At An Impasse", *Asian Survey*, vol. 51, no. 1

Haque, Shamsul (2003), "Reinventing Governance for Performance in South Asia: Impact on Citizenship Rights", *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol. 26, nos. 8 & 9

Hare, R M (1976), "Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H D Lewis (1976), Contemporary British Philosophy, Allen and Unwin, London

Hare, R M (1981), Moral Thinking, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Hargreaves Heap, Shaun, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sudgen, and Albert Weale (1992), The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide, Blackwell Publisher, Oxford

Harrod, R F (1936), Utilitarianism Revised , *Mind (New Series)*, vol.45

Harsanyi, J. C. (1982), "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior" in A Sen and B. Williams (1982) (Eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Harsanyi, J. C. (1986), "Advances in Understanding Rational Behaviour" in Jon Elster (1986) (Ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Hart, H L A (1979), "Between Utility and Rights", *Columbia Law Review*, vol. 79, no. 5

Hasan, Zoya (1989), 'Power and Mobilization: Patterns of Resilience and Change in Uttar Pradesh Politics' in Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (1989) (Eds.), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Delhi

Hausman, Daniel and Michael McPherson (1993), "Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 31

Haworth, Alan (1994), Anti-Libertarianism: Markets, Philosophy and Myth, Routledge, London and New York

Hayek, F A von (1973), "Nomos: The Law of Liberty" in FA von Hayek (1973), Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order, vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London; reproduced in Richard A Posner and Francesco Parisi (1997), Law and Economics: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations, Vol. I, An Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, London

Hayek, F A von (1993), "Social' or Distributive Justice" in Ayn Rand (1993), Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Hayek, F A von (2000), "Against 'Social Justice' in R C Solomon and M Murphy (2000), What Is Justice?, Oxford University Press , New York

Heady, E. O. (1952), Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource Use, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

Heap, S. H. (1989), Rationality in Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Heintz, James and Francie Lund (2012), "Welfare Regimes and Social Policy - A Review of the Role of Labour and Employment", *UNRISD Research Paper No. 2012-4*, UNRISD, Geneva

Heinze, Eric (2013), The Concept of Injustice, Routledge, Abingdon

Hicks, John (1956), Value and Capital: An Enquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford (Reprint: 1975)

Hicks, John (1973), "Recollections and Documents", *Economica*, vol. 40, no. 157

Hicks, John (1979), Causality in Economics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford

Hicks, John (1982), Money, Interest and Wages: Collected Essays on Economic Theory, Vol. 2, Blackwell, Oxford

Higgins, V and G Lawrence (2005) (Eds.), Agricultural Governance: Globalization and the New Politics of Regulation, Rutledge, London

Hindess, Barry (1987), Freedom, Equality and Market, Travistock, London

Hirst, Paul (2000), 'Democracy and Governance', in Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York

Hoekema, David (1986), Rights and Wrongs: Coercion, Punishment and the State, Selinsgrove Susquechanna University Press, London

Hohfeld, Wesley N (1917) (1974), Some Fundamental Legal Conception as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, London and New Haven (Edited: W W Cook)

Hollis, Martin (1984), "Comment I: In Defence of Two Demons" in Peter Wiles and Guy Routh (1984), Economics in Disarray, Basil Blackwell, New York

Holowchak, M A (2010), "Jefferson's Moral Agrarianism: Poetic Fiction Or Normative Vision?", *Agricultural Human Values*, vol.2 December (published Online)

Hornsby, Jennifer (1980), Action, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London

Hornsby, Jennifer (2004), "Agency and Actions" in H Steward and J Hyman (2004) (Eds.), Agency and Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hossain, Moazzem, Rajat Kathuria and Iyanatul Islam (2010), South Asian Economic Development, Second Edition, Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), , London and New York

Hume, D. (1777/1975), "An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" in Selby-Bigge, L. A. (ed.), Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Claredon Press, Oxford

Hume, David (1748), An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Printed for A Millar, London

Hunt, Alan (1996), "The Governance of Consumption: Sumptuary Laws and Shifting Forms of Regulation", *Economy and Society*, vol. 25, No. 3

Hutcheson, Francis (1726), An Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Liberty Fund Inc, US (Reprint: 2004)

Hutchison, T. W. (1981), The Politics and Philosophy of Economics: Marxians, Keynesians and Austrians, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Hutchison, T. W. (1984), "Our Methodological Crisis", in Peter Wiles and Guy Routh (1984), Economics in Disarray, Basil Blackwell, New York

Hutchison, T.W. (1977), Knowledge and Ignorance in Economics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Hyman, David N (2010), Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy, South – Western Cengag Learning, Mason, America

Hyman, john and Helen Steward (2004) (Eds.), Agency and Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

International Crisis Group (2005), "Crisis Watch No. 18", *18: International Crisis Group*), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/crisiswatch/cw_2005/cw18.pdf.

International Food Policy Research Institute (2005), "South Asia Agricultural and Rural Development: Sustainable Solutions for Ending Hunger and Poverty", Proceedings of Seminars, New Delhi: IFPRI, March

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2011), Social Protection Floor: For a Fair and Inclusive Globalization, *Report of the Advisory Group Chaired by Michelle Bachelet Convened by the ILO with the Collaboration of the WHO*, Geneva

Jabareen, Yosef (2009), "Building a Conceptual Framework: Philosophy, Definitions, and Procedure", *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, vol. 8, no. 4

Jabed, M J H (2012), "Essay: British Interests in A 'Regionalized 'M South Asia", *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, vol. 35, no. 3, September

Jack A. Goldstone, et al. (2000), "State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings", *Science Applications International Corporation*, McLean, VA, September 30

Jamil, I, S Akvik and T N Dhakal (2013), Understanding Governance in South Asia, Springer, New York

Jamil, Ishtiaq, S M Aminuzzaman and S T M Haque (2013), "Introduction: Governance in South, Southeast and East Asia", *Public Organization Review*, vol. 13

Jane Lewis (1999), "The Voluntary Sector in the Mixed Economy of Welfare" in David Gladstone, et al. (1999) (Eds.), Before Beveridge: Welfare before the Welfare State, Choice in Welfare No. 47, Civitas, London

Jasso, Guillermina (1978), "On the Justice of Earnings: A New Specification of the Justice Evaluation Function", *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 83

Jasso, Guillermina (1980), "A New Theory of Distributive Justice", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 45

Jasso, Guillermina (1983), "Fairness of Individual Rewards and Fairness of the Reward Distribution: Specifying the Inconsistency between the Micro and Macro Principles of Justice", *Social Psychology Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 3, September

Jasso, Guillermina (1999), "How Much Injustice is there in the World? Two New Justice Indexes", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 64, no.1, February

Jasso, Guillermina (2000), "Some of Robert K Merton's Contribution to Justice Theory", *Sociological Theory*, vol. 18, no. 2, July

Jasso, Guillermina (2007), "Theoretical Unification in Justice and Beyond", *IZA Discussion Paper No. 2641*, Institute for the Study of Labour, Bonn, Germany

Jay Wallace, R. (1999), "Three Conceptions of Rational Agency", *Ethical Theory and Moral* Practice (Kluwer Academic Press), vol. 2, no. 3, September

Jessop, B (1998), "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 155

Jodha, N S (1986), "Common Property Resources and Rural Poor", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 21, no. 27

Jon Elster (1986), "Introduction" in Jon Elster (1986) (Ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters (2000), Governance, Politics and the State, Palgrave Macmillan Press, London

Jordan, J (2001), "Hayekian Economic Infrastructure as a Foundation for Sustained Prosperity", *Contemporary Economic Policy*, vol. 19, no. 1

Joshi, P. K., A. Gulati, P. S. Birthal and L. Tewari (2004), "Agriculture Diversification in South Asia: Patterns, Determinants and Policy Implications", *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 12

Joshi, P. K., Ashok Gulati and Ralph Cummings Jr. (2005), Agricultural Diversification in South Asia: Beyond Food Security, Academic Foundation, New Delhi

Kabele, Jiri (2010), "The Agency/Structure Dilemma: A Coordination Solution", *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, vol. 40, no. 3

Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. Thaler (1986), "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market", *American Economic Review*, vol. 76

Kaldor, Nicholas (1958), "Review of 'The Political Economy of Growth", *American Economic Review*, vol. XLVIII, no. 1

Kamenka, E (1969), Marxism and Ethics, Macmillan , London

Kamm, F M (2011), "Sen on Justice and Rights: A Review Essay", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 1, Winter

Kant, Immanuel (1785) (1988), Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Prometheus Books, (Trans: T K Abbott)

Immanuel Kant (1998), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Translated: Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman)

Kaplan, Robert D. 1994. 'The Coming Anarchy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February

Kapur. Devesh and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2004), "Indian Higher Education Reform", CID working paper no.108, Harvard University quoted in Aurel Croissant, Ujjwal Kumar Singh and Joachim Betz (2014), Need for Reform and Governance Capacities in Asia: Country Report India, Sustainable Governance Indicators Project of Deutschland und Asien, Bertelsmann Stiftung in Gütersloh, Germany

Kaufmann, D and A Kraay (2002), "Growth without Governance", *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No – 2928*, New York

Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2007), "Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2006", *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4280*, Washington, July

Kennett, Jeanette (2001), Agency and Responsibility, Oxford University Press, Clarendon

Kerkvliet, Tria B. J. (2009), "Everyday Politics in Peasant Studies (and Ours)", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1

Keynes, John M (1931), Essays in Persuasion, MacMillan, London

Khan, Mushtaq Husain (2006), "Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward", G-24 Discussion Paper Series No.42, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva

Khan, Mushtaq Husain (2007), "Governance and Growth: A Preliminary Report", *Report Presented to the Department of International Development (DFID)*, London, UK (Mimeo.)

Khan, Mushtaq Husain (2009), 'Building Growth-Promoting Governance Capabilities', Background Paper for The Least Developed Countries Report 2009, UNCTAD, 2008–09, New York and Geneva

Kirchner, Beatriz Bossi de (1989), "On the Power of Practical Reason", *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 43, no. 1, September

Kirkpatrick, Graeme (1995), "Philosophical Foundations of Analytical Marxism" in T. Carver and P. Thomas (Eds.), Rational Choice Marxism, Macmillan, London

Koehler, Gabriele (2014a), "Is There an Asian Welfare State Model? – East and South Asian Trajectories and Approaches to the Welfare State", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Department for Asia and the Pacific, Berlin, Germany, March

Koehler, Gabriele (2014b), "New Social Policy Direction? Some Reflections on South Asia", UNRISD Workshop on New Directions in Social Policy, 7-9 April, Geneva

Koehler, Gabriele and Deepti Chopra (2014) (Eds.), Development and Welfare Policy in South Asia, Routledge, Abingdon

Koehler, Gabriele and Jennifer Keane (2006), Social Policy in South Asia: Towards Universal Coverage and Transformation for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, UNICEF, New York

Koehler, Gabriele, Marta Cali and Mariana Stirbu (2009), Social Protection in South Asia: A Review, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Regional Office For South Asia (Rosa), Kathmandu, Nepal

Kohler, Wolfgang (1927), The Mentality of Apes, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London

Kohli, Atul (1990), Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Kohli, Atul. 1990. Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Kolm, Serge-Christophe (2005), Macrojustice: The Political Economy of Fairness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Konow, James (2003), "Which is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. XLI, December

Koolman, J (2003), Governing as Governance, Sage Publications, London

Korsgaard, Christine (2009), Self-constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Kristeller, P. O. (1961), Renaissance Thought- the Classic, Scholastic and Humanistic Strains, Scholars Choice, New York (Reprint: 2015)

Kujur, Rajat (2008), "Naxal Movement in India: A Profile", IPCS Research Papers - 15, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, September

Kumar, P. and Mruthyunjaya (2002), "Long-term Changes in Food Basket in India", Paper Presented in the International Workshop on Agricultural Diversification and Vertical Integration in South Asia, FICCI-ICRISAT-IFPRI, New Delhi, 5-6 November (Mimeo.)

Kymlicka, Will (1990), Contemporary Political Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Kymlicka, Will (1993), "The Social Contract Tradition" in Peter Singer (1993) (Ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers Limited, Cambridge

Kymlicka, Will and W Norman (1994), "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Works on Citizenship Theory", *Ethics*, vol. 10, no. 1

Ladejinsky, Wolf (1964), "Agrarian Reform in Asia", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 3, April

Landell-Mills, P. and I Serageldin (1992), "Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991", World Bank, Washington DC

Langlois, Richard N (1986), Economics as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Lawrence, Geoffrey (1987), Capitalism and the Countryside: The Rural Crisis of Australia, Pluto Press, Sydney

Lemos, Ramon M (1986), Rights, Goods, and Democracy, University of Delaware Press, Newark

Leontief, Wassily (1966), Essays in Economics: Theories and Theorizing, Oxford University press, New York

Lerner, A. P. (1961), Everybody's Business, Michigan State University Press, USA

Levering, B (2002), "Concept Analysis as Empirical Method", *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, vol. 1, No. 1

Levy, D M and S J Peart (2004), "Sympathy and Approbation in Hume and Smith: A Solution to the Other Rational Species Problem", *Economics and Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 2, October

Lewis, Arthur (1972) "Reflection on Unlimited Labor" in L E di Marco (1972), (Ed), International Economics And Development – Essays in Honor of R Prebisch, New York

Lewis, Arthur (1979), "The Dual Economy Revisited', *Manchester School*, no. 3, September

Lieberman, Samuel (1980), "Rural Development and Fertility Transition in South Asia: The Case for a Broad-Based Strategy", *Social Research*, vol. 47, no. 2, summer

Lindberg, Staffan and S. T. Madsen (Forthcoming), "Farmers' Movements in South Asia: Contemporary Trends in a Historical Context", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, quoted in Gail Omvedt (2005), "Farmers' Movements and the Debate on Poverty and Economic Reforms in India", in Raka Ray and M. F. Katzenstein (2005) (Eds.), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham (USA)

Lindenberg, Seigwart (2005), "Social Rationality" in George Ritzer (2005) (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Social Theory, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London

Lindhal, Erik (1958), "Just Taxation: A Positive Solution" in A Musgrave and A T Peacock (1958) (Eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Cromwell-Collier, New York

Lippit, Victor D (1985), "The Concept of Surplus in Economic Development", *Review of Radical Political Economics*, vol. 17, no. 1&2

Lippit, Victor D (1996), "The Concept of Surplus in Economic Development", in Victor Lippit 91996), Radical Political Economy: Explorations in Alternative Economic Analysis, ME Sharpe, White Plains, New York

Lipton, Michael (1968), "The Theory of the Optimizing Peasant", *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3

Livingston, Paisley (1991), Literature and Rationality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Locke, John (1689), Two Treatises on Civil Government, George Routledge and Sons, New York (Reprint: 1884)

Louis, Prakash (2002), People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, Wordsmiths, New Delhi

Lowe, Jonathan (2005), "Needs, Facts, Goodness, and Truth", in Soran Reader (2005) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Need, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 57, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Ludden, David (2005), "Development Regimes in South Asia: History and the Governance Conundrum", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Special Article, September 10

Ludden, David (2012), "Empire Meets Globalization: Explaining Historical Patterns of Inequality in South Asia", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. XLVII, no. 30, July

Lukes, Steven (2010), "Review of 'There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science: In Defence of Peter Winch' by Phil Hutchison, Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock", *Contemporary Sociology*, vol. 39, no. 3, May

MacCallum, Gerald (1967), "Positive and Negative Freedom", *Philosophical Review*, vol.76, no. 3, July

MacIntyre, Alasdair (1957), "What Morality is not" in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

MacIntyre, Alasdaire (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana

MacIntyre, Alasdaire (1991), "Precis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. LI, no. 1, March

Maine, Sir Henry (1890), Ancient Law, Murray, London

Marshal, Alfred (1890), Principles of Economics, 8th Edition, Macmillan Limited, London

Marx, Karl and Frederich Engels (1970), German Ideology, International Publishers, New York

Marx, Leo (2000), Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, Oxford University Press, Cambridge

Mason, Andrew (2001), "Egalitarianism and the Leveling Down Objection", *Analysis*, vol. 61

Masters, R D (1991), "Naturalistic Approaches to the Concept of Justice", *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 34, no. 3

Maximoff, GP (1953) (Ed.), The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, Free Press, Glencoe

McKay, Andrew (2002), "Inequality Briefing: Defining and Measuring Inequality", *Briefing Paper No. 1*, Economists' Resource Centre for the Overseas Development Institute and University Of Nottingam, March (Mimeo.)

McMichael, Philip (2000), "The Power of Food", *Agriculture and Human Values*, vol. 17

Meek, Ronald (1962), The Economics of Physiocracy, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London

Mele, A R (1997) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford

MHDC 2002 (Khadija Haq) (2002), "Human Development in South Asia 2002: Agriculture and Rural Development", Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Oxford University Press, Karachi

Migdal, Joel (1994), 'The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination' in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (1994) (Eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Migdal, Joel S (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton University Press, Princeton

Milgrom, P and J Roberts (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice Hall, New Jersey

Mill, J. S. (1871), Utilitarianism, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, London

Mill, J. S. (1978), On Liberty, Hackett, Indianapolis (First Published: 1859)

Mill, J. S. (1987), "On the Connection between Justice and Utility" in Ryan, A. (Ed.), Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Miller, David (1976), Social Justice, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Miller, David (1989), Market, State and Community, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Miller, David (1999), Principles of Social Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Miller, P and N Rose (1990), "Governing Economic Life", *Economy and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1

Mises, Ludwig von (1978), Notes and Recollections, Libertarian Press, South Holland

Mises, Ludwig von (1998), Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama

Mkandawire, Thandika (2006), 'Transformative Social Policy: lessons from UNRISD Research", Research and Policy Brief -5, United Nations Research Institute of Social Development, Geneva, September

Mohammad Abdullah (2005) (Ed.), "Statistical Bulletin of SAARC Agricultural Data", SAARC Agricultural Information Centre, and Dhaka (Compilation: Saleemulla Sohoo and Md. Mizanur Rahman)

Moore, Andrew (1993), "The Utilitarian Ethics of R. B. Brandt", *Utilitas*, vol. 5, no. 2, November

Moore, Barrington Jr. (1978), Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, M E Sharpe, White Plains, New York

Moore, M (2000), "States, Social Policies and Globalization: Arguing on the Right Terrain?", *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin*, vol. 31, no. 4

Morison, Samuel Taylor (undated), "A Hayekian Theory of Social Justice", *NYU Journal of Law and Liberty*, vol. 1

Moss, Jeremy (2009), "Egalitarianism and the Value of Equality", Discussion Note, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, September

Mueller, Dennis (1984), "Further Reflections on the Invisible-Hand Theorem" in Peter Wiles and Guy Routh (1984), Economics in Disarray, Basil Blackwell, New York

Mueller, Dennis C (2003), Public Choice III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Murdoch, Jonathan (1994), "Some Comments on 'Nature' and 'Society' in the Political Economy of Food", *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 1, no. 3

Nagel, Thomas (1984), The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Nagel, Thomas (1991), Equality and Partiality, Oxford University Press, New York

Nakajima, C. (1986), Subjective Equilibrium Theory of the Farm Household, Elsevier, Amsterdam

Nanda, Ved P (2006), "The "Good Governance" Concept Revisited", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 603, no. 1, January

Narayanan, S. and Ashok Gulati (2002), "Globalisation and the Small Holders: A Review of Issues, Approaches, and Implications", MSSD Discussion Paper - 50, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC

Narveson, Jan (1998), "Egoism and Altruism" in Chadwick, Ruth (1998) (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, Vol. 2, Academic Press, San Diego, California

Nayar, B. R. (2009), The Myth of the Shrinking State: Globalization and the State in India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press

Neild, Robert (1984), "The Wider World and Economic Methodology: The Public Case for the Reconstruction of Economics" in Peter Wiles and Guy Routh (1984), Economics in Disarray, Basil Blackwell, New York

Nevile, A. (2007). 'Amartya K. Sen and Social Exclusion', *Development in Practice,* vol. 17, no. 2

NIRD (National Institute of Rural Development) (2000), India Rural Development Report, National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad

Niskanen, William A (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago

Noonan, Jeff (2003), "Collective Identity and Practical Reasoning", *Res Publica* (Kluwer Academic Press, Netherland), vol. 9

Norris, P (2012), Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare and Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books Inc, New York

Nozick, Robert (1993), The Nature of Rationality, Princeton University Press, Princeton

Nussbaum, Martha (1992), "Human Functioning and Social Justice", *Political Theory*, vol. 2

Nussbaum, Martha (2006), Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership, Oxford University Press, New Delhi

O'Neill, Martin (2008), "What Should Egalitarians Believe?", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 36, no. 2

Oates, Wallace E (1999), "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 37, no. 3, September

Oppenheimer, N (2005), "Aid Fatigue – Enough Handouts for Africa", International Herald Tribune, Column 3, July 12

Oritz, Isabel (2007), "Social Policy", UN-DESA National Development Strategies Policy Notes, UN-DESA, New York

Paarlberg, R. L. (2002), "Governance and Food Security in an Age of Globalization - Food, Agriculture, and Environment 2020 Vision", *Discussion Paper no.36*, Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute

Paine, Thomas (1797), The Agrarian Justice, W. Adlard and Company, Paris

Pareto, Vilfredo (1971), Manual of Political Economy, Augustus Kelley, New York (First Published: 1909)

Parfit, Derek (1978), "Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma" in Jon Elster (1986) (Ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Parfit, Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Parfit, Derek (2002), "Equality or Priority" in M Clayton and A Williams (2002) (Eds.), The Ideal of Equality, Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke

Parfit, Derek (2011), On What Matters, Vol. I, The Berkeley Tanner Lectures Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Parijs, Philippe von (1992), Arguing for Basic Income, Verso, New York

Patnaik, Prabhat (1997), "On the Concept of Efficiency", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 32, no. 43, October

Patnaik, Prabhat (1998), "Amartya Sen and the Theory of Public Action", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 33, no. 45, November

Patnaik, Utsa (2007), The Republic of Hunger and Other Essays, Three Essays Collective, Gurgaon

Pazner, E. A. and D. Schmeidler (1978), "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 92

Percy, Charles H (1992), "South Asia's Take-off", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71, no. 5, Winter

Peter Mayer (2006), "The South Asian Arc of Instability: In Search of Explanations", Paper presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, University of Wollongong, 26-29 June

Peter Mayer (2006), "The South Asian Arc of Instability: In Search of Explanations", *Paper Presented at the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia*, University of Wollongong, 26-29 June

Pettit, P (1993), "Consequentialism" in Peter Singer (1993), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell Publishers Limited, Cambridge

Pettit, Philip and Michael Smith (1993), "Practical Unreason", *Mind*, vol.102, no.405

Pigou, A. C. (1965), Essays in Applied Economics, Augustus M. Kelley Bookseller, New York

Pimple, Minar and Manpreet Sethi (2005), "Occupation of Land in India: Experiences and Challenges" in Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (2005) (Eds.), Reclaiming the Land – The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Zed Books, London and New York

Pinker, Robert (1971), Social Theory and Social Policy, Heinemann, London

Pinker, Robert (1979), The Idea of Welfare, Heinemann, London

Pinker, Robert (1986), "Social Welfare in Japan and Britain: A Comparative View", in E. Oyen (Ed.), Comparing Welfare States and Their Futures, Routledge, London

Pinker, Robert (2011), "Social Inequality, Poverty and Social Redistribution", *Journal of the National Centre for Social Research*, vol. 13, no. 136

Plato (1952), The Dialogues of Plato (428-348 BC), Britannica Press, Chicago (Trans: Benjamin Jowett)

Plato (1993), The Republic in Ryan, A. (Ed.), Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Pogge, Thomas (2002), " Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resource Dividend" in Thomas Pogge (2002), World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity Press, Cambridge

Polanyi, Karl (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Farrar and Rinehart, New York (Foreword: Robert M Maciver)

Polanyi, Karl (1957) (Ed), Trade and Markets in the Early Empires: Economics in History and Theory, The Free Press, New York

Portmore, D. W. (2011), "The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons", *Mind*, vol. 120, no. 177, January

Postow, B. C. (1989), "Criteria for Theories of Practical Rationality: Reflections on Brandt's Theory", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 1, no. 1, September

Prichard, H A (1945), "Acting, Willing, Desiring" in H A Prichard (1945) (Ed.), Moral Obligation, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Rai, Anil, S. D. Sharma, P. M. Sahoo and P. K. Malhotra (2008), "Development of Livelihood Index for Different Agro-Climatic Zones of India", *Agricultural Economics Research Review* , vol. 21, July-December

Rama, Martin, Tara Beteille, Yue Li, Pradeep K Mitra and John Lincoln Newman (2015), Addressing Inequality in South Asia: South Asia Development Matters, World Bank Group, IBRD, Washington DC

Rao, P. P., P. S. Birthal, P. K. Joshi and D. Kar (2004), "Agricultural Diversification towards High-Value Commodities and Role of Urbanisation in India", MTID Discussion Paper – 77, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC

Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London

Rawls, John (1985), "Justice as Fairness: Political, Not Metaphysical", *Philosophy and Public Action*, vol.14, no.3

Rawls, John (1989), "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy" in Samuel Freeman (1999) (Ed.), John Rawls: Collected Papers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England

Rawls, John (1993), Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York

Rawls, John (1999a), A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Rawls, John (1999b), Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Rejda, George E (2000), Social Insurance and Economic Security, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey

Rhodes, Roderick Arthur William (1997), Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity, and Accountability, Open University Press, Buckingham

Richter, Judith (2002), Codes in Context: TNC Regulation in an Era of Dialogues and Partnerships, The Corner House, Briefing 26

Risse, Mathias (2009), "Common Ownership of the Earth as a Non-Parochial Standpoint: A Contingent Derivation of Human Rights", *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 17

Ritzer, George (2005) (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London

Robinson, Joan (1962), Economic Philosophy, CA Watts & Co. Ltd., London

Roemer, J. E. (1996), Theories of Distributive Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Rose, N (1999), Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Rose, N and P Miller (1992), "Political Power Beyond the State: Problematic of Government", *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 42, no. 2

Rosenau, J N and E-O Czempiel (1992) (Eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Politics, Cambridge

Rosenberg, Alex (1995), "The Metaphysics of Microeconomics", *The Monist*, vol. 78, no. 3 in Uskali Maki (2001) (Ed.), The Economic World View, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Rosenblum, Nancy (1978), Bentham's Theory of the Modern State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Rosenzweig, M. R. and P. Schultz (1982), "Market Opportunities, Genetic Endowments, and Intra-Family Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India", *American Economic Review*, vol. 72, no. 4

Roth, Timothy P. (2002), The Ethics and the Economics of Minimalist Government, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK

Rudolph, L. I. and S. H. Rudolph (1987), In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, Chicago University Press, Chicago and Orient Longman, Bombay

Ryan, Ayn (1993) (Ed.), Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Samuelson, Paul (1954), "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 36, November

Sandel, M. (1982), Liberalism and Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Scanlon, T. J. (1995), "Comments on Roemer", *Boston Review*, April/May

Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1991), "The Quest for Optimality: A Positive Heuristic of Science?" in Bruce Caldwell (1993) (Ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Elgar Reference Collection, Aldershot, England

Schueler, G. F. (2003), Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Scott, J. T., R. Matland, P. Michelbach and B Bornstein (2001), "Just Deserts: An Experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms", *American Journal of Politics*, vol. 45, no. 4

Scruton, Roger (1994), Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey, Penguin Books, New York

Searle, J. R. (2001), Rationality in Action, MIT Press, Cambridge, London

Searle, John (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Seers, Dudley (1969), "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, vol. 11, no. 4, December

Sen, Amartya (1986), " Behaviour and the Concept of Preference" in Jon Elster (1986) (Ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Sen, A. K. (1987), Commodities and Capabilities, Oxford University Press, Delhi

Sen, A. K. (1992), "Rights and Agency", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol.11

Sen, A. K. (1992), Inequality Re-examined, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Sen, Abhijit and M.S. Bhatia, (2004), Cost of Cultivation and Farm Income, State of the Indian Farmer – A Millennium Study, Academic Foundation, New Delhi

Sen, Amartya (1973), On Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press, Delhi

Sen, Amartya (1999), Development as Freedom, Knopf, New York

Sen, Amartya (2000), "Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, and Scrutiny", Social Development Paper 1, Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, Manila

Sen, Amartya (2002), Rationality and Freedom, Oxford University Press, New Delhi

Sen, Amartya (2009), The Idea of Justice, Penguin Books, London

Sen, Amartya and Bernard Williams (1982) (Eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Shanin, Teodor (1971), "Peasantry: Delineation for a Sociological Concept and a Field of Study, *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12

Shanin, Teodor (1972), The Awkward Classes: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia 1910-1925, Oxford University Press, London

Shapiro, Ian (2004), The Moral Foundations of Politics, Aakar Books, New Delhi (First Published: 2003)

Sharma, Shailendra (2011), "India in 2010: Robust Economics amid Political Stasis", *Asian Survey*, vol. 51, no. 1

Sheng, Yap Kioe (undated), "What is Good Governance?", UN-Economic and Social Commission of Asia and Pacific, Bangkok

Shionoya, Yuichi (2005), Economy and Morality: The Philosophy of the Welfare State, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK

Sidgwick, Henry (1874), The Methods of Ethics, Macmillan and Company , London (Republished: Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge) (Reprint: 1981)

Simmons, A J (2010), "Ideal and Non-ideal theory", *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, vol. 38

Simon. HA (1982), Models of Bounded Rationality, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Singer, Peter (1985) (Ed.), In Defence of Animals, Basil Blackwell, London

Singh, Sukhpal (2007), "Agribusiness in South Asia: A Fact Sheet", Make Trade Fair Campaign Research Paper, New Concept Information Systems Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi

Smart, J J C and B Williams (1973), Utilitarianism for and against, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Smith, Adam (1976), "Moral Sentiments" in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Clarendon Press, Oxford (First published: 1759) (Edited: Raphael, D. D. and A. L. Macfie)

Smith, Adam (1976), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford (First published: 1776) (Edited: W B Todd, Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. 1)

Smith, Adam (1976), Theory of Moral Sentiments, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis (First published: 1759) (Edited by Raphael, D. D. and A. L. Macfie)

Smith, Michael (2003) "Rational Capacities, or How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion" in Stroud, Sarah and Christine Tappolet (2003) (Eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Sobhan, Rahman (2010), Challenging the Injustice of Poverty: Agendas for Inclusive Development in South Asia, Sage Publications, New Delhi

Sobhan, Rahman (2004), "Aid, Governance and Ownership", *South Asian Journal*, Issue - 4, 6 July

Solomon, R C and M Murphy (2000), What is Justice?, Oxford University Press, New York

Soltan, K E (1981), "Jasso on Distributive Justice", *American Sociological Review*, vol. 46, no. 3, June

Sraffa, Piero (1960), Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Stanfield, Ron (1973), The Economic Surplus and Neo-Marxism, Heath Books, Massachusetts, Lexington

Stanfield, Ron (1974), "A Revision of the Economic Surplus Concept", *Review of Radical Political Economics*, vol.6, no. 3

Staveren, Irene van (2001), The Values of Economics: An Aristotelian Perspective, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), London and New York

Sterba, J P (1999), Social Justice: Alternative Political Perspectives, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, Cal

Stevens, Jacob (2001), "G. A. Cohen's Revolution in Morals", *New Left Review*, vol.7, January

Stiglitz, Joseph (2001), An Agenda for the New Development Economics, UNRISD, Geneva, Switzerland

Stiglitz, Joseph (2012), The Price of Inequality, WW Norton and Company, United States

Stoker, G (1998), "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions", *International Social Science Journal*, vol. 50, no. 155

Strauss, A and J Corbin (1990), Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA

Strawson, P. F. (1961), "Social Morality and Individual Ideal", *Philosophy*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Stroud, Sarah and Christine Tappolet (2003) (Eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Summer, L W (1987), The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, New York

Taylor, C. C. W. (1965), "Critical Notice of R. M. Hare's Freedom and Reason", *Mind*, reprinted in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Taylor, Charles (1985), "The Concept of A Person", Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Thompson, Michael (2010), Life and Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Thomson, G (1987), Needs, Routledge, London

Thorat, S. (2007), 'Human Poverty and Socially Disadvantaged Groups In India', *Human Development Resource Centre Discussion Paper Series No – 18*, UNDP, New Delhi, India

Thorner, Daniel (1965), "A post-Marxian Theory of the Peasant Economy: The School of Chayanov", *Economic Weekly*, December 4

Thornton, M.T. (1982), "Aristotelian Practical Reason", *Mind* (New Series), vol. 91, no. 361, January

Tiebout, Charles (1956), "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 64, October

Tillich, P. (1957), The Protestant Era, Phoenix Books in Frankena, William K. (1967), "The Concept of Morality", Series in Philosophy no. 3, University of Colarado Studies, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Titmuss, Richard (1956), Essays on the Welfare State, Allen and Unwin, London

Titmuss, Richard (1970), The Gift Relationship, Allen and Unwin, London

Titmuss, Richard (1974), Social Policy, Allen and Unwin, London

Todd, L. S. (1999), "Review of John E. Roemer (1996)'s Theories of Distributive Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge", *Eastern Economic Journal*, Winter

Torisky Jr, Eugene V (1993), "Van Parijs, Rawls and Unconditional Basic Income", *Analysis*, vol. 53, no. 4, October

Toulmin, Stephen, Richard Reike and Allan Janik (1979), An Introduction to Reasoning, MacMillan Publishers, London

Turkewitz, Joel and Benjamin Powis (Undated), Procurement and Service Delivery: An Overview of Efforts to Improve Governance of Public Procurement at Local Levels in South Asia, World Bank Group, Washington DC

Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1986), "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice" in Jon Elster (1986) (Ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford

Tyler, Tom R (2005), "Procedural Justice" in Ritzer, George (2005) (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London

UNDP (1997), "Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document", United Nations Development Programme, New York [http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/)

UNDP (2003), Assessment of Micro-Macro Linkages in Poverty Alleviation: South Asia, UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, October

UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (2009), "Pro-Poor Governance and the Policy Process: A Framework", *OGC Framework Paper – 2*, Oslo Governance Centre, Norway, January

UNDP-HDR 2013 (Khalid Malik) (2013), "Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South – Human Progress in a Diverse World", United Nations Development Programme, New York

UN-RISD (2006), "Transformative Social Policy: Lessons from UNRISD Research", *Research and Policy Brief -5*, UNRISD, Geneva

Vallabh, V (2007), Institutional Alternatives and Governance of Agriculture, Academic Foundation, New Delhi

Vallentyne, Peter, Hillel Steiner and Michael Otsuka (2005), "Why Left Libertarianism is not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 2

Varian, H. A. (1974), "Equity, Envy and Efficiency", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 9

Velleman, David (1989), Practical Reflections, Princeton University Press, Princeton

Velleman, David (2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Vercelli, Alessandro (1991), Methodological Foundations of Macroeconomics: Keynes and Lucas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Veron, Jacques, Krystyna Horko, Rosemary Kneipp and Godfrey Rogers (2008), "The Demography of South Asia from the 1950s to the 2000s: A Summary of Changes and a Statistical Assessment", *Population (English Edition)*, vol. 63, no. 1, January-March

Vincent, Andrew (1998), "Marx and Ethics" in Ruth Chadwick (1998) (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, vol. 3, Academic Press, San Diego, California

Von Wright, G H (1963), Norm and Action, Rutledge, London

Waldron, Jeremy (1995), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Walinsky, L J (1977) (Ed.), Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business- Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, World Bank document, Oxford University Press, New York

Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Walras, Leon (1954), Elements of Pure Economics, Or the Theory of Social Wealth, Augustus Kelley, New York (Translated: W Jaffe)

Walsh, A J (1997), A Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Social Justice, The Responsive Community, Brookfield, Ashgate:

Warnock, G J (1967), "Reason" in Edwards, Paul (1967) (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.7, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London

Warriner, Doreen (1957), Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

Weaver, R M (1950), "Agrarianism in Exile", *The Sewanee Review*, vol. 58, no. 4, October-December

Weiner, Jarrod (2001), "Globalization and Disciplinary Neoliberal Governance", *Constellations*, Vol. 8, No.4, December

Weiss, Linda (2000), "Developmental States in Transition: Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, not Normalizing", *Pacific Review*, vol.13, no.1

Weiss, L (2003), States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Whiteley, C. H. (1959-60), "On Defining 'Moral' ", *Philosophy*, in Wallace, G. and A. D. M. Walker (1970), The Definition of Morality, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London

Wiggins, David (1998), "Claims of Needs" in David Wiggins (1998), Needs, Values, Truths, Clarendon Press, Oxford

Wilkins, B T (1997), "A Third Principle of Justice", *Journal of Ethics*, vol. 1, no. 4

Williams, Bernard (1962), "The Idea of Equality" in P Laslett and W G Runciman (1962) (Eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series II, Blackwell, Oxford

Williams, Bernard (1981), Moral Luck – Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Williams, Bernard (1985), Ethics and Limits of Philosophy, Fontana Paperbacks, London

Wilson, George (1989), The Intentionality of Human Action, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA

Wiman, Ronald (2013), "New Directions for Social Policy – Towards Socially Sustainable Development: Key Messages", Helsinki Global Social Policy Forum, Finland, December

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1995), A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the Rights of Women, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Edited: Sylvana Tomaselli)

Wolf, Clark (2005), "Theories of Justice: Human Needs" in Ruth Chadwick (1998) (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, vol. 4, Academic Press, San Diego, California

Wolf, Eric (1966), Peasants, Englewood Cliffs Inc., New York

Woods, M (2003), "Deconstructing Rural Protest: The Emergence of a New Social Movement", *Journal of Rural Studies*, vol. 19, no. 3

World Bank (1992), "Proceedings of the World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1991", World Bank, Washington DC

World Bank (2012), "More and Better Jobs in South Asia", International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, Dc

World Bank (2013), "World Development Indicators, 2013", International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington DC

World Bank (2014), "South Asia: SAR, Regional Analysis", Global Economic Prospects, World Bank, June

Yeats, N (2001), Globalization and Social Policy, Sage Publication, London